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Preface
This thesis is fundamentally about the cognitive processes involved in learning to 
become a designer.
To give this thesis context it is probably best to start is by explaining the title: Form 
Follows Feeling. The title did not occur to me until well after the first draft was 
completed. Up until then the title was: The acquisition of design expertise and the 
function of aesthesis in the design process. Admittedly, not a particularly catchy title.
The title is an obvious reference to Louis Sullivan’s famous, often misquoted, out 
of context and sometimes misattributed quote, “Whether it be the sweeping eagle 
in his flight, or the open apple blossom, the toiling work-horse, the blithe swan, the 
branching oak, the winding stream at its base, the drifting clouds, over all the coursing 
sun, form ever follows function, and this is the law.” (Sullivan, 1869, p. 408). The 
quote comes from an article written by Sullivan entitled “The tall building artistically 
considered." In this article Sullivan makes a passionate and eloquent plea for the 
legitimization of a new building type – the tall building – on its own terms. He argues 
against the use of the "classical column" as the true prototype, against “the beauty of 
prime numbers," against the "logical statement," against organic justification found in 
the "vegetable kingdom" (p. 406). Sullivan, referring to how in nature “the essence of 
things is taking shape in the matter of things,” makes his point again:
It is the pervading law of all things organic and inorganic, of all things physical 
and metaphysical, of all things human and all things superhuman, of all true 
manifestations of the head, of the heart, of the soul, that the life is recognizable in 
its expression, that form ever follows function. This is the law… And thus the design 
of the tall office building takes its place with all other architectural types made when 
architecture, as has happened once in many years, was a living art.” (p. 408) 
His was not an argument against decoration, as can easily be seen by looking at any of 
his buildings. Nor was he arguing for a from of technical rationalism, though he does 
argue for a kind of inevitability “if we follow our natural instincts without the thought of 
books, rules, precedents, or any educational impedimenta…” His argument, not unlike 
Kahn’s conversation with a brick (Kahn & Twombly, 2003), is founded on the belief 
that the truth of a thing is found by recognizing the essence of a thing, feeling into it, 
letting it be what it wants to be. 
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Unfortunately, Sullivan’s passionate plea to embrace a new building type “for the 
transaction of business,” and made possible by “the intervention and perfection 
of the high-speed elevator…, development of steel manufactures has shown the 
way to safe, rigid, economical constructions…, and so on, by action and reaction, 
interaction and inter-reaction” (p. 403), has been perverted as a justification for a 
kind of technical rationalism and functional determinism. Sullivan is not arguing for 
technical rationalism or functional determinism, but rather he is arguing for a kind of 
passionate essentialism.
The technical rationalism and functional determinism that the phrase form follows 
function has come to embody has been embraced by architecture design students1 
across the world as if it is a self-evident truth. This, along with the cult of the concept 
(where it is believed that all design solutions have their genesis in a concept) and the 
banishment of the concept of the aesthetic (dismissed due to a naive understanding 
of subjective relativism) has led to a kind of intellectual abstraction of the design 
process that no longer recognizes that the proper end of design is not a concept for 
or a representation of a possible building or built environment: The proper end of 
architecture design is a building, a built environment made of the stuff of the earth. 
Somehow architecture design has become a disembodied activity, not unlike Cartesian 
dualism, where the mind has an existence without the body, where the concept for a 
building is more important than the building itself. I suppose that if one accepts that 
one’s true existence as a person is as a disembodied mind, then it follows that the end 
of architecture design should be a disembodied idea/concept for a building. But if one 
does not accept mind/body dualism, but rather embraces an embodied view of human 
existence, where mind means nothing more than human cognition, and the body is 
understood as not only a way of interaction with the world, but as a way, perhaps the 
primary way of knowing the world, then architecture design is about making places for 
human dwelling that engages the body and takes into account fleshy, smelly, sensuous, 
romantic, tender, ingenious, vulnerable beings that humans are. Thus I argue, 
form follows feeling.
1 For the purpose of simplicity, I will refer to the “designer” as a person. This is not to suggest that I am talking 
about the Howard Roark (a character from [the nemesis of Peter Keating] Ayn Rand’s The Fountainhead, 1996) 
like individual who alone knows what is good and what is right. Rather I recognize that the designer often includes 
many people who actively participate in the design process throughout its many phases: from defining the problem, 
through the production/implementation of the solution. The designer can be understood to be an individual, a 
group or a series of individuals and groups. Dong (2009) discusses this issue in terms of agency, who is permitted 
to claim the role of designer. Acknowledging the role that the user plays in defining the problem, the need for large 
teams of designers when working on large-scale systems, and the expectations by which we identify who a designer 
is as opposed to who engages in “designerly actions,” he observes that the “boundary between being in/within the 
process of design and outside of what is considered designing is artificial” (pp. 5-7).
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My motivation for writing this thesis comes from and is grounded in 25 years of 
professional practice and making stuff; but perhaps more so from a genuine love of 
teaching and of my students. For the past 15 years I have been spending most of my 
time helping students learn to design at architecture schools in the USA, Hungary and 
China. It is surprising how similar the basic structure of the programs are, and the kinds 
of challenges that students have to face. In architecture schools there are several models 
of teaching design, including critic, coach, and instructor (Adams, R., 2016). Each has 
its strengths and weaknesses. I prefer the instructor model, as it emphasizes “showing 
how.” I work closely with students trying to understand what they are trying to do, 
showing them how to approach a design problem, suggesting multiple methodologies 
and strategies, and helping them to discover their own voice. Some things work, some 
things don’t. It often depends on the student, their learning preferences, group dynamics, 
skill sets, etc. I often find myself trying to put myself in their place, and try to recall what 
it was like when I was a student. And when I need a little humility I take out a project I did 
when I was their age. Sometimes I forget that I had to learn to design too.
Several years ago I began to notice a pattern in the design studio. There would be 
12 eager students in a second-year studio. As it was a selective school, the students 
tended to be of above average intelligence, highly motivated and hard working. They 
were enthusiastic and curious. All of the students were given exactly the same project, 
with clearly defined learning objectives, and plenty of personal attention. Even so, while 
most of the students seemed to understand the problem, actively engage in seminar-
type discussions on design theory and methodology, completed all the exercises, there 
were always three or four students whose work would stand out. They were not always 
the "smartest," or the hardest working students. But their work always seemed to have 
"that something extra" that a design instructor is always looking for. For years I just 
assumed, like many of my colleagues, that these students just had "natural talent," and 
it was my responsibility to identify it, nurture it and to draw it out. But then I wondered, 
what about the other students? How does one draw out what isn't there? Would they 
ever be able to produce work that also possessed that something special? 
Often I would encounter some of the same students a few years later in an upper level 
studio. By this time, they were familiar. I knew their work. But I noticed something very 
interesting; some of the work of students who seemed to possess natural talent in the 
second year no longer stood out; while some of the work of students who just didn't 
seem to get it in the second year now had that something special. As I reflected on this 
phenomenon over the years, I tried to make sense of it. 
The theory that students who are able to produce design solutions that had that “something 
 special” where just naturally talented was not satisfying. This explanation did not  
adequately explain those other students who seemed to develop a sense of design later on.  
TOC
 16	 Form	Follows	Feeling
Was it that their talent was laying dormant waiting to be drawn out as Socrates draws 
out knowledge from Meno's slave boy? (Plato, Meno, 1956).  Research on the topic of 
nature versus nature does not bear this theory out. I began to consider what if there 
is no real connection between a sense of design and talent? What if a sense of design 
is not a natural God-given gift that some have and some do not, but rather a learned 
ability, a kind of connoisseurship, that plays a critical function in the design process? 
What if talent had nothing to do with developing a sense of design?
As I explored this possibility, I learned that while certain psychological, physiological, 
and cognitive predispositions do offer an advantage, and while some students do 
benefit from a more privileged environment, none of these guarantee that one can 
or will achieve expert levels of performance. This observation resonated with my 
experience. Further, research in the area of the acquisition of expert performance 
showed that what determines if one will ever achieve a level of expert performance 
(in any discipline) is not natural talent, but years of deliberate practice that reshapes 
and reinforces cognitive and physical abilities required for that discipline (Ericcson, 
2016). It is an embodied feel for what to do – a complex, embodied, cognitive ability to 
assess a situation, identify a strategy and then implement it in an apparently effortless 
manner – that is essential to being an expert more so than propositional knowledge, 
technical rationality or so-called talent. 
What I have learned working with some extraordinary students over the world is 
that more than technical knowledge, problem-solving ability, representational skill, 
previous experience, hard work and motivation, what is necessary for a student to 
produce work that has that something special is a sense of design. And that a sense 
of design heavily depends on the ability to know feelingly (aesthesis) and identify 
the quality of a built environment (atmosphere). It is not functional analysis that 
determines good design or the inevitability of functional determinism. Neither is 
intended by Sullivan’s famous quote. Functional determinism is a fiction that promises 
if a design solution is true to the functional requirements of the design brief, then 
the design solution will be inevitably good and possess desirable aesthetic qualities. 
But there is no inevitability in design (Rittel, 1988). While form follows function and 
Mies van der Rohe’s less is more (another so-called self-evident truth of architecture 
education), taken in a historical context, provided a new way to think about design, 
that took into account the reality of post-war Europe, new materials and methods 
of construction; in contemporary design education these function as naïve slogans 
and empty epithets. In fact, there is no function that is necessarily associated with 
a particular form (Pye, 1978). Sure, one can conceive a form that is better suited to 
a particular task, but that relies on a very specific definition of a task and/or form. A 
certain kind of hammer while being well suited to driving a particular type of nail into a 
particular type of material, can also make a very effective weapon.
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Like many designers and design instructors who have gone before me, my problem has 
been that while I have learned much about how students learn and what is necessary 
to be a good designer, what I know is mostly in the form of tacit knowledge. That is, a 
kind of knowledge where I know more than I can say (Polanyi, 1975). This thesis is an 
attempt to correct this situation. To do this I have spent a good deal of the past six years 
in an effort to find a way to say what I know. 
The following is an attempt to understand what is involved in learning to design and 
to propose a theoretical framework that explains how design expertise is acquired 
and why a highly developed sense of design is necessary to acquire design expertise. 
It’s a multi-disciplinary work that looks at the topic from theoretical, philosophical, 
psychological, historical, evolutionary and cognitive science points of view. There 
is no doubt that some will take issue with how I describe design, what I claim is the 
proper end to design, how I define expertise, what I identify as normative performance 
expectations, my argument in favor of tacit knowledge and embodied cognition 
over technical rationality, whether one really can experience qualia in mental 
representations, the developmental model of the acquisition of expertise, my use of 
the word aesthesis, and the importance of aesthetic resonance in the design process. 
Even so, there are many valuable concepts and ideas presented here that are worth 
considering and that offer insight into how students learn to design. 
It is my hope that this work will prove to be useful to others who desire to and are 
committed to helping others learn to design; and for those who simply would like to 
read what they already know about being a designer but have yet to find the words.
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Samenvatting
1 Onderzoekvraag
Terwijl het voor het oplossen van een ontwerpprobleem een basale vereiste is rekening 
te houden met functionele en technische criteria, zowel als met een gevoel voor 
samenhang, is het vermogen een bedoelde esthetische ervaring op te roepen het 
kenmerk van ontwerpexpertise. Dit vermogen is wat bedoeld wordt met een gevoel voor 
ontwerpen. Expert-ontwerpers hebben een sterk ontwikkeld gevoel voor ontwerpen, 
dat in dit onderzoek “aesthesis” wordt genoemd. Reflectie op 25 jaar ontwerponderwijs 
in de Verenigde Staten, Hongarije en China heeft tot de observatie geleid dat de meeste 
succesvolle ontwerpstudenten, meer dan intellectuele vaardigheid, de vaardigheid om 
te tekenen en maquettes te maken of een sterke motivatie, allen leken te beschikken 
over wat een intuïtief gevoel voor wat een goed ontwerp is genoemd kan worden. 
Het is niet dat zij al weten hoe te ontwerpen, of dat ze van nature ontwerpers zijn, 
maar zij hebben een meer ontwikkeld gevoel voor aesthesis. Dit onderzoek hanteert 
een multidisciplinaire benadering om een theoretisch raamwerk te ontwikkelen dat 
beschrijft wat het inhoudt om ontwerpexpertise te verwerven, wat de rol is van 
aesthesis in het ontwerpproces, en om te bepalen of wat een intuïtief gevoel voor 
ontwerpen lijkt te zijn een natuurlijk talent is of een verworven vaardigheid. 
2 Onderzoekmethode
De methodologie van onderzoek omvat: (1.) kritische reflectie op 25 jaar 
ontwerponderwijs, ontwerppraktijk en bouwen; (2.) testen van de inzichten die uit deze 
reflectie voortkomen aan relevant onderzoek en theorie, inclusief ontwerponderzoek, 
psychologie, filosofie, cognitiewetenschap en evolutionaire biologie; en (3.) 
discussie met collega’s. 
3 Resultaten
Het onderzoek startte met onderwerpen uit de ontwerpmethodologie, wat vragen 
opriep gerelateerd aan de cognitieve psychologie, in het bijzonder probleem-
oplossingstheorieën. Diepgaande studie van het onderzoek naar belichaamde cognitie 
resulteerde in argumenten tegen de ontkoppeling van lichaam en geest, en een 
herintroductie van het lichaam als een essentieel onderdeel van de menselijke cognitie. 
TOC
 20	 Form	Follows	Feeling
Dit heeft geleid tot nader onderzoek naar aanverwante onderwerpen als: voor-
verbale kennis, de cognitieve architectuur van het brein, de mechanismen van gevoel 
en waarneming, beperkingen in en typen van het vermogen tot herinnering en de 
verwerkingscapaciteit van het brein, en in het bijzonder de werking van emoties/
gevoelens in kennisverwerving, die tezamen inzicht bieden in hoe ontwerpen werkt als 
cognitief proces. 
4 Conclusie
Het onderzoek laat zien dat ervaren ontwerpers in plaats van te vertrouwen op 
technisch rationele kennis alleen, vertrouwen op een sterk ontwikkelde impliciete 
belichaamde kennis om tot beslissingen en oordelen te komen. Hierdoor weten ze 
meer dan wat ze kunnen uitdrukken. Dit is het kenmerk van experts op vele gebieden. 
Het komt echter niet voort uit een natuurlijk talent, maar uit een ontwikkelingsproces 
dat jaren van bewuste oefening vergt. Dit is noodzakelijk voor het herstructureren van 
het brein en het trainen van het lichaam op een manier die uitzonderlijk functioneren 
mogelijk maakt. Voor expert ontwerpers vormt aesthesis een soort meta-vuistregel 
waarmee complexe problemen schijnbaar moeiteloos opgelost kunnen worden. 
Aesthesis is een vermogen dat iedereen heeft, maar dat expert ontwerpers ver 
hebben ontwikkeld. Dit maakt het mogelijke gebouwen en de bebouwde omgeving te 
produceren die de beoogde kwaliteit van esthetische ervaring bij de gebruiker oproepen 
(een gevoel voor ontwerpen). Het is een cognitieve vaardigheid die het zowel mogelijk 
maakt het ontwerpprobleem te (her-)structureren en de oplossing te evalueren; en 
het is tevens een vaardigheid om zich met zijn gevoel in te leven in de ontwerp-wereld, 
op zoek naar esthetische resonantie die anticipeert op de kwaliteit van de omgeving 
die de gebruiker waarschijnlijk zal ervaren. Deze vaardigheid is cruciaal voor het 
verwerven van ontwerpexpertise.
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Summary
1 Research Question
While the consideration of functional and technical criteria, as well as a sense of coherence 
are basic requirements for solving a design problem; it is the ability to induce an intended 
quality of aesthetic experience that is the hallmark of design expertise. Expert designers 
possess a highly developed sense of design, or what in this research is called aesthesis. 
Reflection on 25 years teaching design in the USA, Hungary, and China led to the 
observation that most successful design students, more than intellectual ability, drawing, 
model making or drive, all seemed to possess what may be called an intuitive sense 
of good design. It is not that they already know how to design, or that they are natural 
designers, it is that they have a more developed sense aesthesis. This research takes a 
multi-disciplinary approach to build a theory that describes what is involved in acquiring 
design expertise,identifies how aesthesis functions in the design process, and determines if 
what appears to be an intuitive sense of design is just natural talent or an acquired ability.
2 Research Methods
The methodology used for this research includes: (1.) Critical reflection on 25 years of 
teaching, design practice, and making; (2.) Testing insights gained from this reflection 
against related research and theoretical work, publications, including design research, 
psychology, philosophy, cognitive sciences and evolutionary biology; (3.) Discussion 
with colleagues. (4.) (4.) Externalizing results of research. 
3 Results
The research started with topics related to design methodology, which led to questions 
related to cognitive psychology, especially theories of problem-solving. An in-depth 
review of research in embodied cognition challenged the disembodied concept of the 
mind and related presuppositions, and reintroduced the body as an essential aspect 
of human cognition. This lead to related topics including: pre-noetic (pre-verbal) 
knowledge, the cognitive architecture of the brain, sense mechanisms and perception, 
limitations and types of memory as well as the processing capacity of the brain, and 
especially how emotions/feelings function in human cognition, offering insight into 
how designing functions as a cognitive process. 
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4 Conclusion
The research provides evidence that more than technical rationality, expert designers 
rely heavily on a highly developed embodied way of knowing (tacit knowledge) 
througout the design process that allows them to know more than they can say. Indeed, 
this is the hallmark of expert performers in many fields. However, this ability is not to 
be understood as natural talent, but as a result of an intense developmental process 
that includes years of deliberate practice necessary to restructure the brain and adapt 
the body in a manner that facilitates exceptional performance. For expert designers it is 
aesthesis (a kind of body knowledge), functioning as a meta-heuristic, that allows them 
to solve a complex problem situation in a manner that appears effortless. Aesthesis 
is an ability that everyone possesses, but that expert designers have highly developed 
and adapted to allow them to produce buildings and built environments that induce 
an intended quality of aesthetic experience in the user. It is a cognitive ability that 
functions to both (re)structure the design problem and evaluate the solution; and 
allows the designer to inhabit the design world feelingly while seeking aesthetic 
resonance that anticipates the quality of atmosphere another is likely to experience. 
This ability is critical to the acquisition of design expertise.
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1 Talent is way over-rated
2 Experts normally do not make good teachers
3 Design is a kind of making: an action that results in an artifact” [for human use], not 
planning or problem-solving. 
4 The primary manner in which we know the world is through our bodies, not our minds
5 Without a direct experience of the properties and characteristics of materials, one can 
never truly master architecture design. 
6 While human behavior not predictable, it is however consistent.
7 The hallmark of a true craftsman is not to be found in his hands, but rather in his ability 
to feel the grain, density, and irregularities of a piece of wood through the edge of the 
blade of the plane in his hands.
8 While beauty may be in the eye of the beholder, it all depends on how one defines 
the beholder. 
9 The current world-wide trend to require a PhD to teach (design) at the university level is 
having a deleterious effect on design education. 
10 There is only so much bad design that people can handle, at some point they simply 
stop seeing the world they live in. 
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1 Introduction2
A critical, but rarely discussed ability necessary for design expertise, that functions within 
the design process as both a means of assessment and a desire to be satisfied is a kind 
of body knowledge called aesthesis. Aesthesis is used here in the Greek sense (αἴσθησις) 
that Perez-Gomez (2016) describes, “referring not only to visual perception but to 
apprehension by all the senses, enabling an understanding through non representative 
concepts of that which is perceived by embodied consciousness” (p. 17).
Design expertise involves more than technical rationality, problem-solving, technical 
competency, and the ability to produce a coherent solution often associated with the 
dictum– form follows function. While these components of design are necessary, they 
are not sufficient. From the theory of tacit knowledge and embodied cognition, I will 
argue that the desire for and the seeking of aesthetic quality (and aesthetic experience 
itself), rather than being simply one of many design criteria, operates as an overarching 
unifying function that provides focus and motivation throughout the design process. 
One might call this kind of knowledge a sense of design. As the human body is 
the primary means for knowing the world, the ability to determine and assess the 
experiential quality of the design solution (aesthesis) is essential for design expertise. 
More than functional efficiency, technical feasibility and a sense of coherence, the 
ability to induce an intended aesthetic experience (create an atmosphere) determines 
the quality of a design solution. Thus the title of this work: Form Follows Feeling. What 
this means and how it functions in the design process are central to this thesis.
To describe what designers do and what is involved in learning to be a designer, 
I have framed the problem as: the acquisition of design expertise and the function 
of aesthesis in the design process. 
2 English language is burdened with not having an inclusive pronoun. Traditionally “he” was, for better and 
for worse, considered to be inclusive. Contemporary sensibilities and the desire to be inclusive in academic 
language has left us with the unfortunate problem of choosing a pronoun. S/he, Her/his, is awkward. They, and 
one, are equally awkward. Recently, the recognition of the fluidity of gender identity has made this question of 
the inclusive pronoun even more complicated. In light of this, I will fall back on the traditional standard of using 
he, though I am quite aware that soon almost half of students studying architecture design in the USA will be 
women (See NAAB 2016 Annual Report, sec. 03 “Overall Enrollment in accredited programs.”). My apologies to 
anyone who may be offended by this choice.
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§  1.1 Some	Clarifications
The sub-title of the thesis contains some terms that need clarification. Acquisition 
of design expertise: This research is not about how to teach design,3 but rather how 
design expertise is acquired (learned). Menon asks Socrates (Plato, Meno, 1956), “Can 
you tell me, Socrates—can ‘virtue’ be ‘taught’? Or if not, does it come by practice? Or 
does it come neither by practice nor by teaching, but do people get it by nature, or in 
some other way?” (p. 28). Replace the word “virtue” with “design,” and “taught” with 
“learned,” and the question posed to Socrates by Menon encapsulates the question I 
am asking. “Tell me, can design be learned? Or if not, does it come by practice? Or does 
it neither come by practice nor by learning, but do people get it by nature or in some 
other way?” Design (knowledge), like virtue (in the Aristotelian sense), is not acquired 
in the same explicit way as propositional knowledge. Its acquisition is more implicit, 
learned by doing, hard to define, tacit.
The function of aesthesis in the design process: This research is not about aesthetics 
per se, but rather about the function of aesthesis – hedonic body knowledge – in 
the design process. This research does not attempt to define what good design is, 
or propose a normative standard for evaluating a design in the sense of criticism. 
This research proposes a theoretical basis for understanding how design expertise is 
acquired.4 It is founded upon extensive research literature, and critical reflection on 
25 years of architecture professional practice and teaching architectural design at the 
university level. To adequately describe my observations and defend my thesis, the 
research takes a multidisciplinary approach to the problem, including: design theory 
and methodology; philosophy, psychology and cognitive science;5 and the relatively 
new fields of expert performance theory, and neuroaesthetics.
3 Though it is my intent that this research will provide new insights that will influence how design is taught.
4 The insight that a deeper understanding how design expertise is acquired would benefit the teaching of design 
is not new. Cross (1990) suggests that “it is through understanding the nature of design ability that we can 
begin to construct an understanding of the intrinsic values of design education.” This research however is not 
specifically intended to form the basis for a new theory or critique of design education. Rather it is asking how 
design expertise is acquired and what role does aesthetic judgment play in the design process. 
5 Gardner (1985) describes cognitive science as a (then) emerging interdisciplinary study of mind and intelligence 
that includes philosophy and psychology as well as neuroscience, artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, 
and evolutionary biology.
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Designing occurs in various disciplines, such as architecture, interior design, urban 
design, landscape design, product/industrial design, engineering and others. This 
research recognizes that while certain theories, principles, methodologies and 
methods are relevant across disciplines, design expertise, as it is practiced, tends to be 
domain specific (situated). The focus of this research is on the domain of architecture 
design, where (normally) a building/built environment is the expected outcome. The 
presupposition is that the proper (normative) end (purpose) of architectural design is a 
buildable building/built environment that provides a coherent solution for the design 
problem and evokes intended aesthetic qualities. It is understood that this is not the 
only end of architectural design (architects do much more than design buildings), but it 
is the working definition for this research.
Other terms that are central to this thesis include: Tacit	knowledge	(Ryle, 1949), 
knowing more than you are able to say. Boundedness (Simon, 1972), the 
acknowledgment of the limits of cognitive capacity that influence how we think and 
structure problems. Extension (Clark), the way things and external mechanisms are 
recruited to increase the cognitive capacity; for example sketching. Einfühlung and 
mirror-neurons, (Wölfflin, 1884; Rizzolatti, 2004) the cognitive mechanisms that 
allow us to feel into a thing, as well as feel the feelings someone else is likely feeling. 
Inhabiting the problem space feelingly (Polanyi, 1974), how experts are able to know 
how to instantaneously respond to complex situations. Aesthesis (Perez-Gomez), 
the mechanism that is critical in assessing the aesthetic experience (quality) of an 
atmosphere. Representations (Newell), how pre-noetic cognitive data is structured 
in the mind to facilitate comprehension. Functional representation (Habraken, 
1985), the proximate end (product) of designing that results in a building/built 
environment. Exaptation(Gould, 1982), how attributes that were acquired through 
evolutionary processes for one purpose adapt to become useful for something else as 
the environment changes. Pre-structuring (Hillier, 1972), the presuppositions and 
biases one brings to the problem situation which help to both define the problem space 
and frame the problem. Appreciative system (Schön, 1985), the values, norms, beliefs 
and preferences that facilitate decision-making and judgments. Deliberate practice 
(Ericsson, 2008), what is necessary for a person to effectively adapt his cognitive 
capacity and body that allows him to perform at an exceptional level. These concepts, 
as well as others included in the text, led to proposing the concept of aesthetic 
resonance, an emotional state experienced by the designer where he assesses the 
congruence between the intended quality of aesthetic experience and the quality of 
aesthetic experience as he inhabits the design world feelingly.
TOC
 28	 Form	Follows	Feeling
§  1.2 Methodology
The methodology used for this research includes: (1.) Critical reflection on 25 years of 
teaching, design practice, and making; (2.) Testing insights gained from this reflection 
against related research and theoretical work, publications, including design research, 
psychology, philosophy, cognitive sciences and evolutionary biology; (3.) Discussion 
with colleagues. (4.) Externalizing results of research
As will be discussed below, knowing how to do something (tacit knowledge) is 
different than knowing what (propositional knowledge). Tacit knowledge is described 
as knowing more than you can say (Polanyi, 1974). Its a kind of implicit knowing. 
The challenge in this research was to engage in critical reflection on my experience 
teaching design to try to make explicit what I have come to know without conscious 
deliberation (van Dooren, K. et al., 2013). While I know much about how students 
learn to design, and about how to design, as a result of years of deliberate practice 
supported by theory and research, and while I can substantiate my claim to success 
as a teacher of design and as a professional designer (see attached CV), I have not 
systematically documented the insights and knowledge I've acquired in a manner that 
could be considered quantitative research. Rather, the (tacit) knowledge that I have 
gained from teaching design functions as a way to structure and enter into the problem 
space feelingly (Polanyi, 1974), to frame the questions and how to know which paths 
of evidence to follow. It is a dialectical approach where I test what I know from doing 
against the evidence that I encountered in the research. The dialectic gave direction 
to the research. Sometimes the research confirmed what I suspected, sometimes the 
research provided new categories, vocabulary and concepts to better express what 
I know, and sometimes the research forced me to rethink how I thought about my 
experience. My research methodology follows that recommend by Schön (1991) in 
the tradition of Dewey (1938/2015), which proposes building theory on experience 
through reflective practice. This approach is sometimes referred to as a designerly way 
of knowing (Cross, 2001). 
As the nature of the topic is inter-disciplinary, so is the research, as is the thesis. 
In discussion with colleagues knowledgeable in the field, and through publication 
(Curry, T., 2014; 2014a) I identified key issues I wanted to explore. To test my 
assumptions against empirical research, I started by (re-)reading Broadbent (1973), 
Bloomer & Moore (1977), Jones (1992), Weber (1995), Rowe (1987), Alexander 
(1964), Cuff (1992). Then I discovered Schön (1991), Cross (2011), Dorst and Lawson 
(2009), Margolin and Buchannan (1995), McCormick (2004). These led to Simon 
(1996), Popper (1996), Rittel (1988; Protzen & Harris, 2010), Polanyi (1974), Ryle 
(1949), Goldschmidt (2003), Arnheim (2009), Csikszentmihalyi (1996), Finke et al. 
(1992), Akin (1986) and Brawne (2003).
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 As I began to focus I found Lakoff & Johnson (1999), Mallgrave (2011; 2013), Thagard 
(2002), Ramachandran (2011), Damasio (1994), Chatterjee (2014), Ericsson (2016) 
and Gänshirt (2007), and others, as well as much cross-referencing, many leads and 
dead ends. It became clear that the only way to see the whole picture was to look at it 
across disciplines, including: design theory, philosophy, psychology and a good deal of 
cognitive science. This research uncovered a world I had suspected existed, but that I 
knew little of. The research confirmed some of my beliefs, forced me to rethink others, 
and led to still entirely new ways of thinking. After diagramming and examining the 
relationships between knowledge from experience, discussion with colleagues and 
review of relevant research, confirmed observations and new ways of thinking about 
the topic, the final methodology was to externalize what I knew as a linear narrative 
that makes sense. Externalizing mental representations is always useful, it not only 
exposes the holes in thinking that the mind is happy to pretend do not exist, it provides 
feedback, and forces one to be as clear and precise as possible, lest one’s intended 
meaning is lost. In many ways it is not unlike designing a building.
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§  1.3 Claims
This thesis makes five claims. (1.) Designing is an acquired skill that (though tacit 
in nature) can be described (not defined) by well-established models of expert 
performance. (2.) Architecture design is fundamentally about making buildings/
built environments for human use and habitation, which are (primarily) experienced 
through our body’s sense systems, not (only) as abstract ideas (concepts), but rather as 
tactile, actual, built objects. (3.) A successful design is not only a coherent solution (one 
that “makes sense”) that solves clearly defined (functional, technical, environmental, 
economic) criteria and constraints (that is problem-solving), but also one that induces 
intended aesthetic experience (a hedonic quality/body knowledge) in the user. (4.) 
Along with the seeking of coherence, an evolving knowledge of (feel for) the quality 
of the intended aesthetic experience plays a critical, overarching, motivational role 
throughout the design process; a kind of seeking. (5.) The ability to assess/anticipate 
the quality of the intended aesthetic experience (aesthesis) of a design proposal 
(anticipating the experience it will induce after it is built) within the design process 
(aesthetic resonance), with a reasonable level of reliability (a kind of emotional 
intelligence), is essential for the acquisition of design expertise.
§  1.4 Argument 
In making these claims I argue for the importance of understanding the developmental 
process that students of architecture design typically move through from beginner to the 
acquisition of design expertise; the need to challenge Cartesian dualism that promotes 
abstract formalism to the exclusion (or devaluation) of body experience; the importance 
of embodied cognition (body knowing) in designing; a need to rethink how we normally 
think about aesthetics (as quality of experience rather than the quality of an object), 
based on principles of empirical aesthetics; and the importance of emotion (feeling) as a 
motivational factor in the design process. These claims and supporting concepts may be 
met with objections by others, such as: whether my definition of designing is accurate; 
whether buildings are or should be considered the proper end to architectural design; 
whether (gifted) students do just have what it takes to be designers (talent/innate ability) 
and some do not; whether the design process is definable, or observable; whether the 
primary standards for assessing a design solution should be rational, programmatic, 
functional; whether aesthetic judgment is fundamentally/ultimately little more than 
subjective opinion; whether it is actually possible to learn to be an expert designer.
TOC
 31 Introduction
The following provides a theoretical framework (argument) that both supports my 
claims and answers the objections. I have divided it into ten chapters. There is a good 
deal of overlap and perhaps some repetition of ideas between the chapters. This is the 
result of translating a way of thinking about this topic that is multidimensional, to a 
two-dimensional narrative. For the sake of a coherent narrative, I have made ample use 
of footnotes and citations. These both provide support for the argument and provide 
the reader with references should he want to pursue an idea in more depth.
Chapter 2 locates this research in the domain of architecture design as an occupation 
that possesses well-defined performance expectations. After reviewing how others 
have described design, I propose a description of design that will function as a basis for 
the following chapters. Chapter 3 provides a brief overview of the history and objectives 
of design research as a discipline, especially the early attempts at scientising design. 
This leads to an in-depth review of some theories of problem solving, tacit knowledge 
and embodied cognition. A main emphasis of this chapter is to (re-) establish the 
importance of the body in cognition. Arguments are presented from philosophy, 
evolutionary biology and cognitive science. Many of the ideas contained in this 
overview have shaped and continue to influence how we talk about designing. It is the 
foundation for what follows. Chapter 4 looks at the ways designing can be described 
as a process, and the influence the concepts of heuristics and systems theory have 
had on the development of design methodologies. This chapter identifies the three 
meta-components of designing: the problem, the solution and the problem-framing/
solution-seeking process that is at the core of designing.  An important point in this 
chapter is that designing is not a process. Process is a cognitive approximation used to 
describe designing. Designing is a cognitive ability.
Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 8, focus on the three meta-components of the design process. 
Chapter 5 looks at the problem in terms of who defines the problem, the structure of 
the problem and the problematic nature of design problems. Chapter 6 looks at the 
solution, who defines the solution, the function of representations, and what is meant 
by the four normative performance expectations related to design practice that are 
established by the profession. These expectations are of two types: demonstrable and 
experiential. The demonstrable expectations are satisfying functional criteria and 
constraints and technical competency. The experiential expectations induce a sense 
of coherence and an intended quality of aesthetic experience. The remainder of the 
chapter is spent on describing these with an in-depth discussion on the importance of 
a sense of coherence and its evolutionary roots in human cognition.
TOC
 32	 Form	Follows	Feeling
Chapter 7 explains the meaning and function of aesthesis in the design process, 
and the historical development of how we understand and experience the aesthetic. 
Aesthetic is described as a kind of hedonic (body) experience that is induced, that 
involves sensations, emotions and meaning. And an argument from evolutionary 
biology and cognitive science is given for inter-subjectivity. Chapter 8 gets into the 
heart of what designers do. The chapter describes several ways of thinking about 
design methodology, presents some representative examples, and finally provides a 
synthesis that frames a way of describing design that takes into account the function of 
aesthetic judgment.
With the above establishing what is involved in designing, the following two chapters 
look at how design expertise is acquired. Chapter 9 is about expertise. It starts with 
the question, who can be a designer? The question is explored in terms of personality, 
character traits, and aptitude. The research suggests that there are very few indicators 
that suggest that one person over the other is more likely to be successful at design, 
except for general intelligence, problem-solving ability, personal drive, and access to 
resources. However, one aptitude does stand out: visio-spatial thinking and problem 
solving ability. There is no mention of natural talent. The chapter ends with a theory 
of technical ability and a developmental model that describes the stages involved in 
acquiring expertise.
Chapter 10, after an overview of the argument up until now, introduces the concept 
of aesthetic resonance. Aesthetic resonance describes how aesthesis functions in the 
design process, as both a means for assessing internal/external representations, and 
by pre-structuring the design problem through determining a quality of atmosphere 
the designer wants to induce in the user. The expression used to describe how 
aesthesis works in the design process is inhabiting the design world feelingly. It is this 
ability that allows the designer to anticipate how the building/built environment will 
be experienced by the end user. It is this highly-developed ability to enter feelingly into 
the design world that is critical to acquiring design expertise.
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§  1.5 Structure of the argument
The proper end of architecture is buildings or built environments for human use 
 Built environments are made of materials b Humans experience the world through 
their bodies b The quality of an architectural solution is determined by both 
demonstrable and experiential criteria b Demonstrable criteria have to do with 
functional and technical requirements b Experiential requirements have to do with 
the sense of coherence and experience of aesthetic qualities of a design solution 
b  These are considered to be performance expectations of (architecture) design 
practice b The ability to design buildings that exceed the performance expectations 
of practice requires design expertise b Design expertise is acquired over time with 
years of deliberate practice b Fundamental to design expertise – in addition to being 
able to design a building that solves for the demonstrable criteria – is the ability 
to make buildings that induce an intended hedonic (aesthetic) experience b The 
ability to assess the quality of an aesthetic experience is called aesthesis b Aesthetic 
experience is dependent on having a (human) body b Humans have the psychological/
physiological ability to anticipate how another will experience a situation (empathy) b 
To achieve (induce) an intended quality of aesthetic experience requires refining the 
ability to (accurately) anticipate how another is likely to experience the building/built 
environment b Aesthetic resonance is the ability to inhabit a design world “feelingly” 
and to anticipate how another is likely to experience the design solution when it is 
built b Aesthetic resonance is a fundamental ability necessary for the acquisition of 
(architectural) design expertise.
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2 What is designing?
A designer makes things. 
(Schön, 1991, p. 78)
Like a design problem, writing about designing requires setting a problem space b 
framing the problem b finding a way to communicate the ideas in an effective manner. 
Like a building design this research is inter-dependent and multi-dimensional. 
Conceptually, it is more multi-dimensional rather than two. But, as a means of 
transferring information, language typically relies on narrative and a narrative is 
basically linear, that is two-dimensional. I need to start somewhere. So, I am starting 
with setting the broad boundaries of the problem space. 
This chapter locates design expertise in the context of an established profession 
or occupation: architectural design practice. As a presupposition it is a given that 
the proper end of architectural designing is the production of buildings/built 
environments. While it is true that professional architectural design practice involves 
more than the designing of buildings and built spaces, including alternative forms 
of practice, designing is the focus of this research. The presupposition is that the 
act of designing results in objects (artifacts) and it is by the quality of these objects 
that a designer’s ability (expertise) is judged. There are reasons for starting with this 
presupposition that will become clear below. 
It will be argued that while the proximate end of architectural the design process is the 
making of representations – drawings, physical and digital models, documents, etc. 
– whose purpose is to facilitate the making of buildings, the proper end (telos) of the 
architecture design process is the production of buildings.6 
6 Though I feel in debt to Prof. Rittel for all I have learned about design from his writing, in these ways I hazard 
to respectfully disagree with him. (1.) Rittel (1968) declares design is “an activity, aiming at the production of 
a plan.” As pointed out above and as will be discussed in detail later, the proper end to architectural design as 
an activity is a building. It is not a plan. When the end of architectural design is thought to be a plan, it results 
in several unintended consequences. These will be discussed below. (2.) He (1988) argues that “Since design 
is intentional, purposeful, goal-seeking, it decisively relies on reasoning” (p. 2). I will argue below, that to the 
contrary, designing – as a tacit way of knowing and as a function of embodied cognition – decisively relies on 
feelings (body knowledge) or aesthesis. (3.) Rittel (1988), who was a philosopher and planner, also argues that 
“Design terminates with a commitment to a plan which is meant to be carried out” (p. 1). Here again Rittel 
seems to miss the point. Designers make things. I will explain what I mean by this below. 
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Designing, as an action, in this thesis is understood to be teleological. That is, 
designing as an action is not seen as a good (value) in itself. The value of designing as 
an action is to be found in the quality of the proper end of the action; where activities 
and all proximate ends contained within the action are directed toward achieving its 
end. As the quote from Schön above says, “a designer makes things.”
With these boundaries established, I will explore what might be meant by designing 
as an activity7 and the goals of design research. I will not try to define designing, rather 
I will offer a working description. The purpose of this first chapter is to establish the 
context, to define the problem space and frame the problem.
§  2.1 The Designer’s Context
This research is not about designing in its most basic sense, as in “everyone can 
design.” 8 Or as Cross calls it “run-of-the-mill designing" (1990, p. 129), or “lower 
level design ability” (2007, p. 38). 9 This research is about design expertise – designing 
practiced as a recognized occupation (profession) in a manner that (significantly) 
exceeds (normative) performance expectations established by a profession (domain).10 
7 As this research is not about providing a prescriptive definition of or methodology for how to design, but rather 
to understand how design expertise is acquired, I am intentionally not going to provide a definition of design. I 
am however going to describe what I mean by design.
8 “All men are designers. All that we do, almost all the time, is design, for design is basic to all human activity. The 
planning and patterning of any act toward a desired, foreseeable end constitutes the design process… Design is 
composing an epic poem, executing a mural, painting a masterpiece, writing a concerto. But design is also cleaning and 
reorganizing a desktop drawer, pulling an impacted tooth, baking an apple pie, choosing sides for a back-lot baseball 
game, and educating a child… Design is the conscious effort to impose meaningful order” (Papanek, 1984, p.3).
9 “Although professional designers might naturally be expected to have highly developed design abilities, it is also 
clear that non-designers also possess at least some aspects, or lower levels of design ability. Everyone makes 
decisions about arrangements and combinations of clothes, furniture, et However, in other societies, especially 
non-industrial one’s, there is often no clear distinction between professional and amateur design abilities – the 
role of the professional designer might not exist” (Cross, 2007 p. 38).
10 Winch (2010) explains that expertise as it is related to practical activity “involves mastery of an occupation, 
profession or activity” (p. 1). Expertise is a level or quality of performance that is evaluated against an accepted 
norm. Performance expectations are established by and/or accepted by the occupation. It is not possible to talk 
about expertise without referring to a field within which it takes place. To put this important point into context 
Winch refers to MacIntyre’s influential book, After Virtue (2007) where “practice” is described as a recurrent 
social activity characterized by four key features: 
 
>>>
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As noted above, this research is not about professional designers in general, but 
designing as it is practiced (situated) within the specific discipline (domain) of 
architecture.  As such, it is the performance expectations as found/established within 
the domain of architectural design (as a recognized practice) that will define the 
problem space for this research. 
As an occupation (or profession) architectural design serves both personal and social 
goods, and possesses expectations11 that are well-established by historical tradition, 
professional associations and society in general.12 It is not understood as simply a 
skill, ability or a “way of knowing” that is practiced in isolation. In this way, design 
expertise is understood to possess characteristics in common with other types of 
expert performance. “Architectural design,” understood as an occupation or profession, 
does not exist in isolation. In many ways architectural design as an occupation is a 
social construct.13
>>> 1.  It has goals or telos (internal/intrinsic goods), criteria for the achievements of which constitute the  of 
excellence available in that practice. The activities involved in achieving and the fulfillment of the criteria of 
excellence are both seen as intrinsic goods.
 2.  It is historically constituted and involves taking into account of a developing tradition or activity aimed at 
attaining intrinsic goods.
 3.  A practitioner understands the significance of his life and worthiness in relation to the practices in which he 
is located
 4.  In addition to internal goods a practice also possesses external goods that have extrinsic value, i.e.: the 
ability to make money. (p. 11)
11 The terms norms and performance expectations  as described by Winch(footnote 12) are used in this research 
not in the sense of rules, but rather as reasonable expectations or basic criteria. In this case performance 
expectations refer to, in general terms, the reasonable expectations has for the work a particular practice. Or the 
criteria one can use which describes the scope of service one might normally expect from an occupation.
12 In the report, Building Community: A future for architecture education and practice Boyer writes, “Membership 
in any profession, whether law, medicine, teaching, journalism, accounting, or architecture, entails not only 
the mastery of a body of knowledge and skills but at its best the honoring of a social contract to advance basic 
human values… In the case of architecture, the larger purposes relate not only to building competently and 
fulfilling the wishes of the clients, but to helping to foster, through design, more wholesome neighborhoods, 
safer streets, more productive work places, a cleaner environment, and more cohesive communities” (Boyer & 
Mitgang, 1996 p. 31).
13 “Social constructs or social constructions define meanings, notions, or connotations that are assigned to objects 
and events in the environment and to people’s notions of their relationships to and interactions with these 
objects. In the domain of social constructionist thought, a social construct is an idea or notion that appears to 
be natural and obvious to people who accept it but may or may not represent reality, so it remains largely an 
invention or artifice of a given society” (Ozor, 2008).
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Expertise implies above average performance as measured against an accepted 
norm. This means that there must be normative (implied or explicit) performance 
expectations against which performance is measured.14 Like it or not, a designer’s 
performance, insofar as he is deemed to be performing at an expert level, is so only 
insofar as his performance is evaluated against normative performance expectations 
that are established by historical tradition, professional associations and the society 
(culture) in general. Expertise is a relative term. 
Without reference to such expectations (of practice) it is impossible to discuss levels 
of expertise or expert performance. The difficulty in this case is explicitly stating, 
establishing and/or codifying said performance expectations for architecture 
design. While there have been numerous attempts to do this over the centuries, 
through treatises, codes of professional practice promoted by professional societies, 
regulations and licensing by government authorities, the primary way by which a 
practitioner learns the professional expectations of practice is by participating in and 
becoming part of the professional culture.15 These expectations are more implicit 
than explicit in practice, descriptive than prescriptive, acquired more by being 
incorporated into the culture of the practice than by imposition from outside.16  
14 Csikszentmihalyi (1996, p. 27) in identifying not what creativity is, but where it is to be found identifies three 
criteria, “…the idea must be couched in terms that are understandable to others, it must past muster with 
experts in the field, and finally it must be included in the cultural domain to which it belongs.” Further, he 
writes, “A person cannot be creative in a domain to which he or she is not exposed. No matter how enormous 
mathematical gifts a child may have, he or she will not be able to contribute to mathematics without learning its 
rules.” Csikszentmihaly’s point is that a truly “creative” (as opposed to “novel”) act, idea or way of thinking can 
only legitimately be considered as such within a particular domain, recognized by its gate-keepers, and be the 
work of an individual or group of individuals working within the domain. This is not to say that it is not possible 
for an individual working outside the domain to stumble upon a genuinely creative, culture changing idea, that 
either is or is not accepted or rejected as such by the field (gate-keepers). It is only to say that this is not the 
norm and should be seen as the standard. See also Gardner (1993).
15 These are so numerous that it would be impossible to provide a comprehensive list of references here. A 
Google search of “architecture standards of professional practice” resulted in over 84,000,000 results in 0.37 
seconds. Some examples of what I am referring to would be from Vitruvius, On Architecture, Books 1-10 (1998); 
(Vitruvius, 1998); Palladio, Four Books of Architecture (1997); Semper, The Four Elements of Architecture 
(1989); to UIA International Standards of Professional Practice (2014), AIA Handbook of Professional Practice 
(2014); the UK Architects Registration Board’s Architects Code: Standards of Professional Practice (2009); RIBA 
Code of Practice for Chartered Practices (2005); Royal Institute of Dutch Architect’s, The Architecture Profession 
in the Netherlands (2006).
16 In this way the profession is seen as the gate-keeper. The American Institute of Architects revised and enacted the 
Standards of Professional Practice, at the 86th Convention held in Boston. The following quote makes the point: 
“There is one aspect of our responsibility that no one else can discharge for us. Where we as individuals live and 
practice our profession. The profession and all architects are judged by us. No program of national publicity or public 
relations will avail if in our own community we fail to do a good job. Here is a responsibility we cannot shirk. Upon us 
personally and individually rests the yoke of the discipline of our profession” (Cummings, 1955).
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In much of the world this involves the rite of passage associated with most 
professions: completing an accredited professional degree program, a professional 
internship, qualifying and passing a licensing/registration exam, and years 
of practice. Specifying what these expectations are and providing an in-depth 
description of how these expectations are assimilated is beyond the scope of 
this research. The point here is simply that expertise in architecture design as a 
profession	or	occupation	is	defined	by	performance	expectations that, though not 
static, exist in a social/historical/cultural context. And anyone who professes to be 
a designer as a professional architect practices within this context.
Having located design expertise in the context of an occupation or practice, where an 
established occupation (legitimately) imposes performance expectations of practice, 
we can now get on to describing what is meant by (the practice of) designing.
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§  2.2 Describing Designing 
Describing design, as an activity, can be an elusive task. Over the years there have 
been numerous attempts.17 Each description takes a particular point of view that 
emphasizes some aspect, function, purpose, or personal opinion about what 
designing might be.18 None are completely adequate or exhaustive. This being the 
case, I have decided that I am not even going to attempt to “define” designing.
Rather I propose, as a working description, that architectural design is a kind of 
solution-driven problem-solving process that results in the making of a functional 
representation for a building/built environment that solves for design criteria and 
constraints 	within	an	acceptable	range,	that	is	technically	competent,	coherent,	
and induces intended aesthetic qualities. The meaning and the implications of this 
description will unfold in the following chapters.
Four components of designing are identified in this description that function as 
performance expectations.19 These components are of two types: demonstrable 
and experiential. The demonstrable components describe the quantitative, 
measurable (perhaps objective) aspects of the design solution. The experiential 
components describe the qualitative (perhaps subjective) aspects of the design 
solution. Most design/problem-solving theories  (implicitly) suggest three 
performance standards: (1.) A successful design solution should satisfy design 
criteria and constraints within an acceptable range, (2.) be technically feasible 
(possible to build), (3.) and possess some level of coherence (makes sense).
17 Buchanan writes, “No single definition of design, or branches of professional practice such as industrial or 
graphic design, adequately covers the diversity of ideas and methods gathered together under the label” 
(1995, p.3). In describing the pluralism of definitions, diverse ideas, meanings and claims about design in 
the design literature Buchanan and Margolin (1995, p. xiii) write: “Young designers are rightfully confused 
about the pluralism of competing ideas, and they struggle to form their own concepts and find a place in the 
design professions… At its best … debate about the meaning and definition of design has gradually broadened 
the subject matter under discussion, revealing new aspects of products and suggesting alternative paths for 
exploration, practice and reflection.”
18 Some of these will be reviewed below.
19 These will be discussed in detail below. Though I rearranged them, these four performance expectations are 
derived from Vitruvius (1998), Book I. c. III, 2: “Now these should be so carried out that account is taken of 
strength [firmitatis], utility [utilitatis], grace [venustatis]. Account will be taken of strength when the foundations 
are carried down to solid ground, and when from each material there is a choice of supplies without parsimony; 
of utility, when the sites are arranged without mistake and impediment to their use, and a fit and convenient 
disposition for the aspect of each kind; of grace, when the appearance of the work shall be pleasing and elegant, 
and the scale of the constituent parts is justly calculated for symmetry.” Criteria and constraints refers to 
utilitatis; technical competency refers to firmitatis; and coherence and aesthetic quality refers to venustatis. 
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 Most do not (even implicitly) identify inducing intended aesthetic quality as a 
separate component.20 This may have to do with the desire within design research 
to be inclusive of those design disciplines for which a design solution is not 
necessarily an artifact – thus making it difficult to talk about aesthetic qualities 
as an independent component of designing. More likely, I will argue, is the desire, 
promoted by the Modernists (still prevalent within the schools and the profession) 
and argued for by the design methods movement, that designing can be, even 
ought to be, scientised. 
20 There is a presupposition, attributed to modernism, that if a design solution optimizes functional/technical 
requirements, and is governed by reason and  “mathematical calculation”, the solution will (implicitly) possess 
meaning and/or aesthetic qualities. From this point of view there is no need to be explicitly concerned with 
determining intended aesthetic experience, as long as the design is rationally defensible. This concept, usually 
misquoted and wrongly  attributed to Sullivan’s (1896) famous aphorism “form ever follows function” (Leslie, 
2010; Mumford, 1989), which is often mis-attributed  to Le Corbusier (Rawsthorn, 2009) who promoted a kind 
of machine aesthetic (See Banham, 1980, p. 188 quoting van Doesburg,  “The new possibilities of the machine 
have created an aesthetic expressive of our time, that I once called the ‘machine aesthetic’.”) famously described 
in by his “five points” (Corbusier, 1926/1970).  In Towards a New Architecture Le Corbusier (1923/1986) writes 
“the Engineer’s Aesthetic and Architecture are two things that march together and follow one from the other: 
the one being now at its full height, the other in an unhappy state of retrogression” (p. 17). He goes further 
to insist that the architect should follow the engineer who “inspired by the law of Economy and governed by 
mathematical calculation” achieves harmony (p. 102). And that by doing so, “The Architect, by his arrangement 
of forms, realizes an order which is a pure creation of his spirit; by forms and shapes he affects our senses to an 
acute degree and provokes plastic emotions; by relationships which he creates he wakes profound echoes in us, 
he gives us the measure of an order which we feel to be in accordance with that of our world, he determines the 
various movements of our heart and of our understanding; it is then that we experience the sense of beauty” (p. 
20). Perez-Gomez (1992) writes, “Many years have passed since architects began their search for a universal 
theory grounded in absolute rational certainty. Gottfried Semper, for one, drawing on some of the insights 
first expressed by Durand, postulated functionalism as a fundamental premise of architectural intentionality. 
Semper clearly attempted to make the process of design analogous to the resolution of an algebraic equation. 
The 'variables' represented the manifold of reality that architecture had to take into account; the solution was 
simply a 'function' of these variables. This reductionist strategy has since become the fundamental framework 
of architecture theory and practice, whether one examines the forms of structural determinism or more subtle 
attempts to utilize psychological, sociological, or even aesthetic variables. More recently, various sophisticated 
methodologies and even computers have been applied to design, always failing, however, to come to terms 
with the essential question of meaning in architecture” (p. 469). For Perez-Gomez, meaning is analogous to 
what I mean by aesthetic quality, it is the ability of architecture, as to evoke a particular kind of experience that 
imbues architecture with meaning. Johnson, (2015) describing human beings as “complex, bodily and social 
animals… [whose locus of all] experience, meaning, thought, valuing, communicating, and action is a series of 
ongoing organism-environment interactions,” argues that the “meaning” of “any object or event arises in the 
processes of organism-environment interaction that mutually define ourselves and our world. The meaning of 
any object, person or event is what it affords us or points to by way of some experience we might have – either 
past or present, or future possible experience” (p. 27). Meaning in this sense has to do with the significance of 
our (embodied) interaction with the world (simulation semantics) as opposed to abstract inference (conceptual 
semantics). Meaningful interaction with the world relies on the “affordances” that “arise from the ways my 
body-mind can engage that object or event” (p. 28). See Gibson (1986).  In this way, the experience of the world 
has aesthetic meaning, or as Dewey writes, meaning “that presents itself directly as possessions of objects 
which are experienced… the meaning is as inherent in immediate experience as is that of a flower garden” 
(1994, p. 41). Maier & Fadel (2009) write “in the context of engineering design, we define an affordance as a 
relationship between two subsystems in which a potential behavior can occur that would not be possible with 
either subsystem in isolation” (p. 226).
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I will argue, however, that for an architectural design solution to exhibit expert qualities 
it must satisfy four performance expectations:
1 Solve for (functional) design criteria/constraints21
2 Be technically competent (possible to implement with available technology and materials)
3 Appear to be coherent (make sense to the user)
4 Induce (intended) quality of aesthetic experience
Further, I will argue that, in architectural design, these four performance expectations 
function together in a manner that is interdependent and incommensurable. To do so 
an expert designer must possess multiple cognitive abilities, skills and competencies 
to produce design solutions that satisfy (all) these performance expectations.  How this 
is achieved, how the various performance expectations function in the design process, 
and how the ability to satisfy them is learned/acquired is the question of this research.
§  2.3 Designing as an Object of Study
The purpose of researching design/design behavior/design cognition is to gain a 
deeper understanding of what happens when designers design, to identify/codify 
methodologies and methods that can inform how designing is taught, with the goal 
of improving the effectiveness and efficiency of the design process and to increase the 
likelihood of producing better quality design solutions. 
Cross (2007) writes that knowledge about designing comes from three sources: 
(1.) People, (2.) Processes, and (3.) Products.22
21 This component of design is most like problem-solving. It refers to the functionalism postulated by Semper 
(Perez-Gomez, 1998).
22 While I prefer Cross’ morphology, there are other ways to think about it. For example, Rittel writes that design 
research (science of design) has three tasks: (1.) To further develop theories of and to learn more about the 
reasoning of designers; (2.) To pursue empirical inquiries about how “plans” come about; (3.) To discover new 
tools to support designers in their work. (Rittel, 1987, p. 9) 
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1 People: designing is a distinctively human activity, there is no evidence that other 
animals display such behavior,23 and (so far) machines cannot do it either.24 
As such design research studies designing as a kind of human behavior. This includes 
examining the nature of designing ability, performance expectations of practice, as well 
as understanding how people learn to design.
2 Processes: designing is an observable behavior that follows predictable patterns or 
processes, making use of similar tactics and strategies (methodology/methods) that aid 
the designer in discovering a solution. Much of this research involves careful observation 
of designers at work in a controlled environment (design/talk aloud protocol).25 Critical 
reflection on these observations gives insight into how designers actually work, which 
tools and methods facilitate the process, when various strategies are applied.
3 Products: these are the embodiment of the design solution. Their shapes, forms, 
materials, textures, functions, applications, references and precedents all embody 
design attributes. How a product evolves over multiple generations, how new products 
emerge, and what forms a designer can imagine often depends on the nature of the 
problem, the needs of the user, the available fabrication and production technologies. 
The study of the end product provides a wealth of information that can be used to gain 
deeper insight into designing.
23 This not completely true, there is some evidence that animals do engage in deliberate problem solving activities 
including evaluating aesthetic quality. See Ramachandran (2011); Damasio (1994); de Waal (2016) and Dong 
(2015). A famous example is that of the bower birds from Australia and New Guinea who build elaborately 
decorated nests with arrangements of flowers, berries, stones, and even bits of plastic in deliberate patterns. 
Such is the intention of these arrangements that should the bower bird return to his nest and find even one 
stone out of place, he will immediately return it to its proper place. (Ramachandran, 2011, p. 194-195) 
24 Dreyfus (1992), discussing the limitations of “good old-fashioned AI,” argues that due to the disembodied 
nature of computers, they are (and will always be) incapable of solving certain types of problems (a kind of 
bounded rationality of computers), architectural design being one of them. As a fundamental characteristic of 
architectural design is the quality of the aesthetic experience, and both the ability to assess and experience that 
quality relies on embodied cognition (having a human body), and as computers do not have human bodies (and 
most likely never will), it is impossible for computers to generate, evaluate and assess the quality of the aesthetic 
experience of the design solution. This does not however mean that computers are useless in the design 
process. See Schön (1992) for a discussion on the role of computers in the design process.
25 Think aloud protocol analysis emerged as a method of research in the area of problem solving in the 1920’s. 
Both the general availability of tape recorders in the late 40’s and video in the 70’s aided in increasing the 
accuracy and verifiability of note-taking and observations. Two landmark studies were by de Groot (1965) on 
playing chess, and by Newel and Simon (1972) on problem solving. “In essence, protocol analysis relies on the 
verbal accounts given by subjects of their own cognitive activities” (Cross et al. 1996) as well as documenting 
sketches and similar externalizations related to the thought process. Cross et al. (1996), Zeisel (2006), and 
Goldschmidt (2014) recognize the limitations inherent in asking someone to describe their thinking process 
while actively working (think aloud protocols) but, even so, the empirical data gained from these protocols has 
led to significant insights, and in fact is the most common data collection method used in design research. 
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Based on these three sources of design knowledge, Cross (2007) proposes a taxonomy 
of the field of design research that includes:
 – Design epistemology – study of designerly ways of knowing (cognition)
 – Design praxiology – study of the practices and processes of design (methodology)
 – Design phenomenology – study of the form and configuration of artifacts (criticism)26
In addition to the three sources mentioned above, there is an additional source of 
study related to designing and designer’s behavior, and that is Artificial Intelligence 
(AI), design automation, and  computer generated design. Research related to 
problem-solving, systems and cybernetics, the mechanization of the problem-solving 
process and AI (cognitive science), has influenced design research as a discipline 
from the beginning (See Polya,1945; Popper, 1959; Churchman, 1968; Simon, 1996; 
Rittel, 1984; Schön, 1992). While research into design automation has led to many 
important insights into designing, designer’s behavior, and design mechanization, 
(see  Cross, 1977; Gun, 1982; Coyne et al. 1990; Mitchell, 1990; Ward and Smith, 
1992; Tzonis & White, 1994; Davis, 2015; Gero & Maher, 2016), my interest in this 
research is only insofar as it provides insight into how humans design and how design 
expertise is acquired by people (students). Computer aided design is considered 
here as one of multiple design tools (technologies) that facilitate the work of 
the (human) designer.27 
26 While I am considering aspects of all three: design epistemology (acquisition of design expertise), design 
praxiology (methodology) and design phenomenology (the special characteristics of architectural design as a 
particular domain of design research, and the function of aesthesis in the design process), my emphasis is on 
design epistemology and design praxiology. 
27 Schön (1992, p. 131) discusses computer aided design in terms of the “purpose of the exercise.” Schön 
lists four possible purposes:  (1.) To achieve a design output, given some input, as well as, or better than, 
designers ordinarily do it, but without particular reference to the ways in which the do it; this is the Turing 
test, more or less, and it will be called functional equivalence. (2.) To reproduce how people actually go about 
designing; this will be called phenomenological equivalence (3.) To assist designers in their designing (4.) To 
provide an environment for research aimed at understanding how designers design. It is the latter which I am 
most interested in.
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§  2.4 Designing in the Most Basic Sense
In the most basic/simplistic sense, designing as an activity (not necessarily design 
expertise) can be understood as a fundamental (human) activity in which all people 
engage that leads to “making things to serve a useful goal” (Dorst, 2015, p. vii).28 
Terzidis, (2007) in an article about the etymology of design writes:
[D]esign is a conceptual activity involving formulating an idea intended to be expressed 
in a visible form or carried into action. Design is about conceptualization, imagination, 
and interpretation. Design is a vague, ambiguous, and indefinite process of genesis, 
emergence, or formation of something to be executed, but whose starting point, origin, or 
process often are uncertain. Design provides the spark of an idea and the formation of a 
mental image. It is about the primordial stage of capturing, conceiving, and outlining the 
main features of a plan and, as such, it always precedes the planning stage. (p. 69)29 
The verb “design”
is derived from the prefix de and the Latin verb signare, which means to mark, mark 
out, or sign. The prefix de is used not in the derogatory sense of opposition or reversal, 
but in the constructive sense of derivation, deduction, or inference. In that context, 
the word ‘design’ is about the derivation of something that suggests the presence or 
existence of a fact, condition, or quality. (p. 69)
28 “Everyone can – and does – design. We all design when we plan for something new to happen, whether that 
might be a new version of a recipe, a new arrangement of the living room furniture, or a new layout of a personal 
web page. The evidence from different cultures around the world, and from design created by children as well as 
adults, suggests that everyone is capable of designing… it is a key part of what makes us human” (Cross, 2011).
29 Design is not the same as planning.
TOC
 46	 Form	Follows	Feeling
The word design in Greek
 is σχε′διo (pronounced schedio), which is derived from the root σχεδο′ν (pronounced 
sche- don), which means ‘nearly, almost, about, or approximately.’ Thus, from its Greek 
definition, design is about incompleteness, indefiniteness, or imperfection, yet it also 
is about likelihood, expectation, or anticipation. In its largest sense, design signifies 
not only the vague, intangible, or ambiguous, but also the strive to capture the elusive. 
(Terzidis, 2007, p. 69) 
During the Renaissance, Walker (2009) writes, disegno “described the inventive, 
conceptualizing phase which generally preceded the making of paintings, sculptures 
and so forth” (p. 42). It wasn’t until the industrial revolution of the 18thcentury that 
the modern notion of (professional) designers, as such, began to emerge as “the 
full-time activity undertaken by trained specialists employed or commissioned 
by manufactures” who were not normally involved in the production of the things 
they designed (p. 43).30
The Merriam-Webster Learner’s Dictionary31 definition of design is: “de·sign verb \di-ˈzīn\: 
to plan and make decisions about (something that is being built or created): to create 
the plans, drawings, etc., that show how (something) will be made.” In this definition 
designing is understood as an action, a verb, it is not the end product.32 Further, designing 
is understood as a creative goal-oriented, teleological activity. An activity that involves 
planning and making decisions about something that will be made, built or created; where 
the perfection of the action is determined by its proper end. 
The word design can also be used as a noun (as in, “What do you think of my design?”), 
and as an adjective (as in, “design research”). Both of these forms are derivatives of 
the verb form. When used as a noun design can refer to the design concept, or the idea 
that generated the product, thus making a distinction between the object at hand 
and the design. 
30 Though the evolution of the architect as a design professional removed from actual building (from craftsman, 
to master builder, to professional) evolved over centuries, it follows a similar pattern. See Kostof (1977); Cuff 
(1992) “Metamorphosis of Architecture,” and http://www.designingbuildings.co.uk/wiki/The_architectural_
profession for an excellent historical summary of the evolution of the architect as a professional in England.
31 http://www.learnersdictionary.com/definition/design (January 24, 2017)
32 Properly speaking, one does not design for the sake of designing.
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Design as a noun can also refer to the proper end or product of the design activity (qua 
verb) as an artifact called ‘a design’ (qua noun) – which is not the thing itself but, as 
Habraken (1985) calls it, an a functional approximation of a thing to be made. 
Schön (1988, p. 182) writes, “design is understood as a kind of making: an action that 
results in an artifact” [for human use]. This is the basic understanding of designing that 
informs this research.
§  2.5 The Proper End of Designing
The type of something/artifact that is intended to be made greatly influences how one 
goes about designing (tacit knowledge) and determines the scope of knowledge necessary 
(declarative knowledge) in order to design it. While there are broad general principles, 
methodologies and methods that can be applied to all design disciplines (graphic 
design, industrial design, architectural design, engineering design, etc.) each discipline 
(domain) specializes in designing different types of artifacts, that require different areas 
of specialized knowledge, competencies and skills.33 The specialized knowledge necessary 
to design a website is not the same as that which is necessary to design a toaster; is not 
the same as that which is necessary to design a building; is not the same knowledge 
necessary to design a sewer system. The criteria for and the way one experiences 
or uses a website, a toaster, a building and a sewer system are not the same either. 
33 That there are principles, methodologies and characteristics of design thinking/problem solving that are cross-
disciplinary is well established. See Jones (1992) Cross (2007), Lawson (2005), Schön (1991), Lawson and 
Dorst (2009), Buchanan & Margolin (1995). However, due to the significant variation between the (content 
and expected outcomes of) different domains of design, there is also value in discussing design as it is situated 
in a particular domain. This research will use many of the concepts and theories from design research that are 
considered cross-disciplinary, and then look more closely at them as they can be applied to architectural design 
in particular. The emphasis on design as a cross-disciplinary activity was, and to some extent continues to be, 
preferred within the design research community. However, as this research is not about design in general, but 
rather design expertise within the domain of architecture, I am emphasizing the situatedness of design as a kind 
of expertise. Gero and Kannengieser (2008) write, "Situatedness is a paradigm that provides a framework for 
understanding how a designer’s interactions affect both what is designed and the designer’s experience (Gero 
1999), drawing on models of situated cognition (Dewey, 1896; Bartlett, 1932; Clancey, 1997; Ziemke, 1999). 
It can account for the central role of Schön’s reflection-in-action and related phenomena reported in empirical 
studies of designers (Suwa et al., 1999). Gero and Kannengiesser (2004) have modeled situated designing 
as the recursive interaction between three different worlds: the external world, the interpreted world and the 
expected world" (p. 3).
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Designing,	by	its	very	nature,	tends	to	be	situated	in	a	particular	domain.34 One doesn’t 
normally ask an engineer to do graphic design, just as one usually does not ask an 
architect to design a tea kettle – though I suppose you could.35
In the Nicomachean Ethics (2004), Chapter 1, book 1, Aristotle argues that every action 
has an end that is proper to it (a telos).
Every art and every inquiry, and similarly every action and pursuit, is thought to aim at 
some good; and for this reason the good has rightly been declared to be that at which 
all things aim. But a certain difference is found among ends; some are activities, others 
are products apart from the activities that produce them. Where there are ends apart 
from the actions, it is the nature of the products to be better than the activities. Now, 
as there are many actions, arts, and sciences, their ends also are many; the end of 
the medical art is health, that of shipbuilding a vessel, that of strategy victory, that of 
economics wealth. (p. 3)
Designing as a goal oriented (teleological) activity has a goal (telos) that is proper 
to it: the thing to be made/the artifact. As such architectural design also has a telos 
(just as making ships is to ship-building) that is proper to it: the making of buildings.36 
34 There is a general assumption that problem solving/design skills are transferable across disciplines. The 
research, following McCormick (1997), does not accept this. Decades of research have found that problem-
solving skill is highly dependent on considerable domain specific knowledge. See Glaser (1984). Both problem-
solving and design (as a kind of problem solving) cannot be reduced (or generalized) to cross-disciplinary 
procedural heuristics, processes or pure algorithms. 
35 Lawson quotes the noted product designer Richard Seymour who observed “Although some architecture and 
some product designs look very close it is really the extreme end of the bow of the architecture tree rubbing up 
against a leaf at the extremity of the product design tree. We tend to think that they are very similar, but they are 
not. Fundamentally their roots are completely different” (1994).
36 While this observation may seem self-evident, it is a surprisingly contentious point. In an informal survey I 
asked 12 colleagues and grad students at Tsinghua University what they thought the proper end of architectural 
design was: a concept (idea behind the design or generative idea), a set of plans (model and diagrams), a 
building (the actual built building), or quality of space (created by the building). Six answered concept, two a set 
of plans, one answered building, two answered quality of space, and one answered concept and quality of space.
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This is not to say that the practice or occupation of architectural design may not 
have other benefits and produce other ends,37 but these benefits and other ends are 
subordinate to the proper end of the action – in the Aristotelian sense. 
The quality of the action is determined by the quality of the end that results from 
the action. This quality is determined by domain specific, normative38 performance 
expectations. Just as the excellent ship-builder is said to be so because he builds 
excellent ships, so it is that the level of expertise of the architectural designer is 
determined by the quality of the (built) buildings/built environments that he designs. 
The proper end of architectural design is buildings/built environments.39
§  2.6 Proximate End of Designing
However, while buildings may be the proper end (telos) to architectural design, 
buildings are not the proximate end. Designers (normatively) do not “make” 
buildings per se. What they do is make functional approximations for the purpose of 
building buildings (Schön, 1988; Habraken, 1985). Its been many centuries since 
architectural designers were known as “master-builders,” or were directly involved 
with the actual construction/making of buildings.40 From the outside, many people 
believe what architectural designers make are drawings, models and renderings. 
37 See Cuff (1992) for a general overview of architecture practice
38 Normative is this sense is a generally accepted standard or expectation for performance as commonly used in 
the study of Ethics. It is not meant to be evaluative. It simply refers to a what one usually means by or reasonably 
expects when describing a particular behavior or practice.
39 Dewey (1938/1987) writes, “Why put it down in black and white that painting cannot exist without color, 
music without sound, architecture without stone and wood, statuary without marble and bronze, literature 
without words, dancing without the living body?”  Explaining that “in every experience, there is the pervading 
underlying qualitative whole that corresponds and manifests the whole organism of activities which constitute 
the mysterious human frame (p. 204)
40 Though there is a growing interest in design/build where the architect is both designer and builder, it is not 
considered normative. In fact, it was not that long ago that it was considered unprofessional if not unethical by 
the AIA for architects to be both architect and builder on the same project. 
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The confusion comes not from the fact that architects do make drawings, and drawings 
are/can be approximations, but with what the nature and the (intended) function 
(purpose) of the drawings (or approximations) are.41 
In the most fundamental sense an approximation can be understood, without reference 
to physiology or “hardware,” as “the way patterns within [a system] mirror, or fail to 
mirror the patterns without that they represent” (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958, p. 51). 
In this way,42 design activity can be understood as being comprised of two (inter-related) 
meta activities: that of ideation (conceiving of the thing to be produced) – what 
is normally referred to as the “design process,” and that of devising a means for 
externalizing43 the idea in a manner that sufficiently communicates the design 
intention so that it can be produced (usually by others), resulting in an artifact 
(building) that actualizes the design intent (within an acceptable range). The 
intended purpose of the (proximate) product of designing is to provide a means of 
communicating (transferring) the information necessary to actualize the design intent. 
41 It is also of interest how the designer “encodes” his internal representation (design idea that is not, in a 
cognitive sense, visual, spatial, haptic or auditory) in order to translate the idea into an external representation 
(verbal description, drawing, model, CAD, etc.) that can be perceived and understood by another. (See Newell et. 
al., 1958, p. 54 ff.) This problem is further complicated, if one is of the belief that the proper end to architectural 
design is not a building but spatial experience. Gibson (1986), Bloomer and Moore (1977), Weber (1995), 
Zumthor (2006) and others, observe that spatial experience involves not just single senses (such as smell, 
touch, taste, sight, hearing) but rather by sense systems, which are informed by past experience (memory), and 
perceived meaning (cognition). How does one accurately encode such intention in a manner that can be reliably 
communicated to the builder? Does one make a note: “Room to be light and airy”? And just to make this ever so 
slightly more complicated, Newell et al. propose the concept of the “mind’s eye,” or the “mind’s ear,” asserting 
that “an internal representation is visual if it is capable of serving as an input to the same information processes 
as those that operate on the internal representations of immediate visual sensory experiences” (p. 55). Their 
point is that while in fact the mind does not “see”, people do experience the phenomenon of “seeing”, (without 
the use of their eyes) which from an operational point of view is sufficient. Pallasmaa makes a similar point in 
his Eyes of the Skin (2005).  The significance of this phenomenon, which is related to the experience of empathy 
and described by mirror-neurons for design expertise will be discussed below.
42 In terms of producing the end-product of design. Within the design process drawing/externalizations serve 
many purposes.
43 The topic of externalizing design ideas is closely related to the question of the role of drawing in the design 
process. While this is a closely related and fascinating topic, I will not deal with it in detail here. Goldschmidt 
(2003) and Arnheim (1993) frame the issue well. In the studio, I make a useful distinction for my students. 
Designers make five different types of drawings: diagrams (used for understanding/exploring relationships), 
sketches (used for exploring formal/spatial ideas), technical drawings (used for testing and refining ideas as 
well as communicating detailed information about building assemblies), and finally illustrations (intended to 
simulate the visual appearance of spatial experience of the finished thing). The cognitive function of drawing 
is two-fold: the physical act of drawing and seeing provides feedback to the designer allowing him/her to see if 
what he is thinking about is what he intends; and as a means of extending the short-term working memory of 
the human mind, allowing the designer to extend the mind’s capacity to deal with highly complex problems.
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To do so the designer makes a functional approximation or representation (which 
may include drawings, models, CAD, prototypes, written documentation, etc.) that 
is intended to communicate to another how to make the intended thing. For the 
designer, this representation is instrumental or functional: it is not the end-in-itself. 
Let me explain…
A representation or image of a thing is not the thing itself, it is an approximation.  
Larkin and Simon (1987) write, “Two representations are computationally equivalent 
if they are informationally equivalent and, in addition, any inference that can be drawn 
easily and quickly from the information given explicitly in the one can also be drawn 
easily and quickly in the other, and vice versa” (p. 67). But it is impractical for architects 
to produce computationally equivalent representations of things as complex (and big) 
as buildings. Instead what architects do is make representations, whose purpose it is 
to approximate	the	information	necessary	to	actualize	the	making	of	a	building	with	
the intended characteristics. It does not matter what form the representation takes: 
drawings, diagrams, models (physical or computer generated), BIM, specification 
manuals, conversation or scratches on a rock. The point is to transfer the information – 
through whatever means – that effectively facilitates the communication of an accurate 
representation of the “design” to another who will make the building as per the design 
approximation.
There are many types of representations (sometimes called externalizations) involved in 
designing. These serve different functions in the design process.44  Schön (1988) writes, 
“Sketches, diagrams, drawings and models function as virtual worlds, representations 
of the real world of building on a site, within which architects can experiment at 
relatively low risk and cost” (p. 182). However, finally, the design needs to externalize 
and reliably transfer the elements of the “virtual world” as a representation so that 
someone can make it in “the real-world of building on a site.”
Polanyi (1974) makes a helpful distinction when he discusses two kinds of meaning that 
a thing (whole) may possess: existential and representative (or denotative). He writes, 
“anything that functions effectively within an accredited context has a meaning in that 
context and… any such context will itself be appreciated as meaningful” (p. 58). Within 
such a context (as design), a thing (the outcome of the design process, i.e.: the functional 
representation embodied as a set of drawings or model, specifications, BIM, etc.) may 
have either existential or representative meaning. In the existential sense, a thing has 
meaning in itself, for example, pure math or “the meaning of music is mainly existential.” 
44 The topic of representations as they function in the design process will be taken up later.
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In the representative sense, a thing means, or points to (as a symbol might), or describes 
(denotative) another thing. The thing, in this sense has no meaning in and of itself, its 
meaning comes from that toward which it is pointing or that which it is describing – it 
is instrumental. The proximate product of designing (the functional representation of 
the proposed object) is therefore understood not in the existential sense (the drawings 
or models as products in themselves), but rather in the sense that they (the drawings 
or models, etc.) point to something else: the intended building/built environment. The 
functional representation of the object only has meaning insofar as it means “not the 
building, but at one remove, sets of instructions for building” (Hillier, et al., 1972). The 
proximate product of designing is better understood as a “data set” or set of instructions, 
in whatever form, whose primary function is to communicate the information necessary to 
make (build) the building as intended by the designer(s).
However it is possible for a thing to possess both primary meaning and subsidiary 
meaning(s), even at the same time. For example, it is possible that technical drawings, 
though made for the purpose of providing technical information for the purpose of 
building, can be (at the same time) understood or appreciated as expertly crafted 
artifacts in themselves.45 But it must be understood, that in this case, the artifacts 
(technical drawings) are no longer valued (though they still retain it) for their intended 
purpose as a functional approximation of the thing to be built. Their value in this case is 
as objects that were intended for another use. 
The	proximate	end	of	architectural	designing,	then,	is	the	making	of	a	functional	
approximation for the purpose of building (making). While the proper end is the 
building (object) that meets certain demonstrable criteria and constraints and possess 
certain experiential qualities.  Insofar as the actual building that results from the 
interpretation and implementation of the functional approximation produced by the 
designer satisfies the minimum standard expectations of professional practice it is 
considered minimally competent. And to the extent that the functional representation 
produced by the designer significantly exceeds the minimum expectations the work is 
considered to be that of an expert. So, then what is meant by designing? What is it that 
designers do?
45 Consider the sketches by Gehry, Johnson, Calatrava etc. or the beautifully inked technical drawings displayed in 
offices and museums. These have become objects in themselves, appreciated for the skill and meaning and/
or emotion that they convey, or simply as historical artifacts. But, as objects in themselves they are no longer 
valued as functional representations. It is not unlike the tourist who, fascinated with the traditional dress of an 
ancient culture, takes it home, mounts it in a frame, and proudly displays the artifact over his sofa. The artifact 
is still a piece of clothing, but its value is no longer as a piece of clothing, but rather as a souvenir. One further 
example is personal. Before my grandfather died he asked me if I wanted anything. I asked if I could have his 
hammer. The hammer brought me back to childhood days working by his side. The hammer, though designed 
and intended as a tool for pounding in nails, is not valuable to me as a tool (though it is perfectly useful), but 
rather as a relic that induces a state of anamnesis. 
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§  2.7 Some	Attempts	as	Defining	Designing
The way designing is defined by a dictionary and historians, and the way that designing 
is understood by designers and design theorists is not necessarily the same. Some 
attempts at defining design by some noted design theorists include:
 – A purposeful activity directed toward the goal of fulfilling human need. 
(Asimow, 1962, p. 150)
 – The process of inventing physical things which display new physical order, organization, 
form, in response to function. (Alexander, 1964,  p. 1)
 – The performing of a very complicated act of faith. (Jones, 1966, p. 3)
 – Design as we know it can be seen as the socially differentiated transformation of 
the reflexive cognition of the maker in terms of the latent possibilities of his tools, 
materials and object types. Its object is not the building, but at one remove, sets of 
instructions for building. (Hillier, Musgrove, & O’Sullivan, 1972, p. 6 )
 – The area of human experience, skill and understanding that reflects man’s concern 
with the appreciation and adaptation in his surroundings in light of his material and 
spiritual needs. (Archer, 1979, p. 17)
 – Designing is not a profession but an attitude… [design should] be transformed from 
the notion of a specialist function into a generally valid attitude of resourcefulness and 
inventiveness. (Moholy-Nagy, 1947, p.42) 
 – [Design is] an activity, aiming at the production of a plan, which when implemented, 
yields the desired results, but no undesired and unforeseen side- and aftereffects. 
(Rittel, 1968, as cited in Protzen and Harris, 2010, p. 14) 
 – The conscious and intuitive effort to impose meaningful order…  both the underlying 
matrix of order and the tools that creates it. (Papanek, 1984, p. 4)
 – Courses of action aimed at changing existing situations into preferred ones. (Simon H. 
A., 1988, p. 111)
 – Design is a form of problem solving where individual decisions are made toward the 
fulfillment of objectives. (Akin, 1986, p. 20)
 – Design is a complex game in which exploration of formal possibilities in some world 
and critical inference from some knowledge base proceed in parallel and eventually 
reach a reconciliation. (Mitchell, 1990, p. 81)
 – To design is to plan for the making of something new. (Goldschmidt G. , 1991, p. 125)
 – Design is the human power of conceiving, planning, and making products that serve 
human beings in the accomplishment of their individual and collective purposes. 
(Buchanan, 2001, p. 9)
 – The most essential thing that any designer does is to provide, for those who will make 
the artifact, a description of what the artifact should be like. (Cross, 1990, p. 128)
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 – We shall describe architectural designing as a kind of experimentation that consists 
in reflective ‘conversation’ with the materials of a design situation...  an interaction of 
making and seeing, doing and discovering. (Schön & Wiggins , 1992, p. 135)
 – Design is an enactment of a set of operating principles wherein the actors emphasize 
different aspects of these principles. (Dong, 2009, p. 9)
 
The above quotes offer a glimpse into the plurality of ways designers and theorists 
think about designing in general. Dorst, (2015), building on advances made in design 
studies over the past 50-60 years proposes five statements that challenge some 
common misconceptions about designing: 
 – Designing is not just about creating beauty 
 – Designing not all about ideas
 – Designing is not irrational
 – Designing is not mysterious 
 – Not all designing is good
A common misconception is that designers are only concerned with designing 
beautiful objects and/or that they are willing to sacrifice function for aesthetics. 
Dorst points to the 18th century industrial revolution that first mass-produced “over 
decorated monstrosities,” as the historical root of this perception from the perspective 
of his discipline (industrial design).46 The result of this “flood of curls and patterns 
on every available surface” was a wake-up call “for the need for a new aesthetic for 
industrial products.” Dorst is not saying that beauty doesn’t matter, but that a sense 
of refined taste was lost in the transition from hand-crafted objects where “ornaments 
were expensive, and thus were a status symbol owned by very few,” to mass-production 
and manufacturing that “suddenly made ornamentation very cheap” and less refined.47
46 A similar situation arose in the area of architectural design during the period that lead up to Modernism. Loos et al.
47 Dorst’s point is not that a well-designed object should not have refined aesthetic qualities, rather, he is 
critiquing the simplistic additive technique of “beautification,” where objects are “overly decorated,” not refined. 
Dorst references his own discipline where “designers are torn between the requirement to create a product that 
is technically viable and ergonomically sound and the need to make it visually attractive.” His point is that there 
is a balance between technical viability, ergonomics and aesthetics within his design discipline. Later on, I will 
make a similar argument from the discipline of architecture.
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When Dorst states that designing is not all about ideas, he is critiquing the popular 
notion amongst novice designers (and non-professionals), “who haven’t yet 
developed the skill and amassed the experience to work in a much more deliberate 
way,” (and unfortunately taught in design schools), that the key to a successful 
design solution is (principally) the generative idea or concept: once you have a 
“concept” everything else magically falls into place.48 Dorst explains that professional 
designers do not rely exclusively on the generation of “the idea,” rather “they 
approach problems in a very strategic, deliberate, and thoughtful way” (p. 43). This is 
what is meant by design methodology – how one approaches the design problem in a 
systematic, strategic, deliberate and thoughtful way.
There is an impression (by non-designers) that because designing is a “creative,” 
activity and perhaps because it involves drawing (rather word processing or spread 
sheets), that it is somehow not serious work, that designing is fun, 49 that it does not 
require disciplined reasoning. When Dorst writes that designing is not irrational, he 
not saying that designing is rational, but that designing is not completely objectifiable, 
that is “design is inherently open-ended” (p. 43). Designing requires exercising 
judgment based on clear analysis to develop viable “solutions that can be judged 
on a sliding scale of better or worse relative to the needs of stakeholders” (p. 43). In 
designing there is no single right answer, that can be justified in a strict “rational” or 
“scientific” manner.50
48 The term/concept of the generative idea is attributed to Jane Darke (1979). The generative idea works within 
the “generator – conjecture – analysis” model of design, where the generative idea is understood to be “a broad 
initial objective or small set of objectives, self-imposed by the [designer]” (Darke, 1979)., p. 40
49 Rittel writes: “The act of designing could be fun: what would be a more rewarding pastime than to think up some 
future and to speculate how to bring it about? However, what is troublesome is the recognition that the plan may 
actually be carried out. If so, the designer faces two possible kinds of failure. A type-1 failure has occurred if the plan 
does not accomplish what was intended. A type-2 failure has occurred when the execution of the plan causes side 
and after effects that were unforeseen and unintended, and prove to be undesirable. Normally, mainly the fear of the 
latter type of failure spoils the fun of design: Have I forgotten something essential? Designers worry” (1987, p. 2).
50 This aspect of design can be particularly frustrating for beginner designers (novices) who are determined to 
produce and believe that there is a “best” or an optimal solution. The open-ended characteristic of design is very 
frustrating for them. This is also related to why design cognition is said to be primarily abductive (rather than 
deductive or inductive).
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Designers like to talk about what they do in mysterious ways, they like to suggest that 
what they do cannot be explained, or relies on some special knowledge. 51 This is related 
to the tacit nature of designing. Dorst argues that in fact designing is not really all that 
mysterious. Over the past 50 years a great deal has been learned about designing, 
design cognition, designers and the things that they design. By now, Dorst claims, there 
is a “core body of knowledge that is largely beyond contention.” His point is that while 
there is still much to be learned, and there is still much room for innovation, there 
is a body of research and knowledge that has been amassed that forms a generally 
accepted foundation for design theory.
Finally, Dorst writes that not all designing is good designing. There is an opinion 
amongst some that if a design is based on reliable research and sound thinking and 
done by a professional, that the design must then be good. This is simply not true. Not 
all designers are equally skilled, and as in any profession, “there is also superficiality 
and mediocrity in designing – and many designs that make up our human-made world 
are hard to defend, even inexcusably awful” (p. 44). Implied in this observation is the 
acknowledgment that there are established performance expectations of practice 
against which the work of a designer is judged and the developmental aspect of design 
expertise: there is a difference between the competency of a novice and an expert 
designer. These in turn beg the question of connoisseurship (which will be discussed in 
detail later).  How does one know bad design from good design, and a good design from 
an exceptional design?
51 Coyne and Adrian (1991) propose that the mysteriousness associated with design has its roots in the “dual 
knowledge thesis,” which is related to Cartesian dualism and the mind/body problem. They describe the dual 
knowledge thesis as positing that there are two ways of thinking: logical, analytical, and rational (science is 
associated with this kind of thinking); and subjective, idiosyncratic and irrational (design is said to fall into the 
latter). Coyne and Adrian argue that “the dual knowledge thesis is untenable and unnecessary.” Theirs is an 
argument to return to “the way things appear.” Founded on the hermeneutics of Gadamer and the pragmatism 
of Dewey, the authors argue that the idea that design is mysterious is pervasive because, generally speaking, 
there is a belief that “there is a kind of thinking that is logical, analytical and rational,” and that any kind of 
thinking “that is not explicable in these terms” is deemed mysterious. Their thesis argues that “understanding 
is acquired” when expectations are brought to bear on a situation. As expectations are brought to bear “that are 
derived from our effective historical consciousness” they are constantly renewed as we respond to new situations. 
As expectations are brought to bear on a situation are renewed, knowledge (understanding) is “accomplished 
through interpretation” of the situation in light of expectations. By offering this hermeneutic understanding of 
knowledge they argue that “when mystery is removed then effective dialogue, and hence learning, can ensue.” 
While this explanation is intriguing and insightful (and points to a significant problem in how we understand 
what knowing is), it seems to me that the argument from two different types of knowing, knowing that and 
knowing how, where knowing that is associated with declarative/conceptual knowledge that is easily transferable, 
and knowing how is understood as procedural/heuristic knowledge that is tacit, offers a clearer explanation for 
why design knowledge/ability (like other kinds of expertise) is often described as “mysterious.”
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§  2.8 Summary
This chapter places architectural design in the context of an occupation. As an activity 
within an occupation, it is understood that designing is evaluated by normative 
(explicit and/or implicit) performance expectations of that occupation. Based on 
my working definition of designing, I have proposed four normative performance 
expectations. These include producing a solution that: (1.) Solves for the criteria 
and constraints of the design; (2.) That is technically possible; (3.) Coherent; (4.)  
And induces intended qualities of aesthetic experience. These components are of 
two types: demonstrable and experiential. The demonstrable components describe 
the quantitative, measurable (perhaps objective) aspects of the design solution. 
The experiential components describe the qualitative (perhaps subjective) aspects 
of the design solution. By placing designing within a profession with performance 
expectations I also establish the possibility of discussing design expertise: a designer 
(recognized by the profession) who consistently produces design solutions that 
significantly exceed the performance expectations of the practice. While it is true that 
said expectations, especially the experiential expectations, are difficult to codify, and 
are in flux, there is an ability amongst practitioners to recognize work that exceeds the 
normative standard. This ability is related to connoisseurship. Architectural design has 
both a proper and a proximate end. The proper end of designing is a building (object). 
The proximate end of designing is a functional approximation for building (making). 
The degree of expertise possessed by the designer is determine by the degree to which 
the building exceeds both the demonstrable and experiential components of the 
performance expectations.
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3  Design Cognition
The natural sciences are concerned with how things are. Design on the other hand is concerned 
with how things ought to be, with devising artifacts to attain its goals. We might question 
whether the forms of reasoning that are appropriate to natural science are suitable for design. 
One might well suppose that the introduction of the verb ‘should’ may require additional 
rules of inference, or modification of the rules already embedded in declarative logic. 
Simon H. , 1996, pp. 58-59
The above quote raises the question of cognition – “the activities of thinking, 
understanding, learning, and remembering,”52  More specifically it raises the question 
of design cognition. It suggests that designers may think differently than scientists. 
It is a question of the mind. 53 While Simon, who coined the term sciences of the 
artificial and is also credited with first considering designing as a way of thinking 
(1996), others such as Rowe (1987) with his design thinking, Lawson (2005) 
with what designers know, Dorst (2015) with his frames of mind, Jones (1992) 
with his systematic approaches, and Cross (2011) with his designerly ways of knowing, 
have continued to develop the idea of designing as a way of thinking. 
52 “Cognition.” Merriam-Webster.com. Merriam-Webster, n.d. Web. 14 Jan. 2017.
53 “Mind” is a problematic term. The mind is not understood as a physical thing as it is a word used to identify the 
function of human cognition and self-awareness. This is how “mind” is used in this research. In ancient and 
medieval philosophy mind was used to identify the “essential” qualities of a person not unlike the “soul.” It had an 
eternal existence. Its what was left when you died. Mind and brain are not interchangeable. See Damasio (1994), 
Searle (1994), Lakoff & Johnson (1999). To explain this the analogy of the mind as the software and the brain as 
the hardware is often suggested. (McCarthy, 1966, p.65) While the analogy does offer a useful distinction (similar 
to form and matter), it confuses the issue by locating all cognitive functions in the brain. Human cognition is not 
limited to the brain, but includes the entire body as well as external resources by means of extension, for example 
tools, or Ryles’ blind man’s cane. (Dreyfus, 1992) Philosophers and scientists have attempted to locate where the 
mind/soul resides. Most famous is Descartes who locates it in the pineal gland. In 1907, Duncan MacDougall 
performed some experiments to identify the weight of the soul the moment that it left the body upon death. He 
found the soul in six patients to weigh between 0.5 to 1.5 ounces . See Pandya (2011) Clark (2001) describes the 
mind as a “meat machine.” His is both a “rejection of the idea of mind as immaterial spirit-stuff and an affirmation 
that the mind is best studied as a kind of engineering perspective that reveals the nature of the machine that all 
that wet, white, gray, and sticky stuff happens to build” (p. 7). Pinker, referencing the computational thinking 
model (CTM), he presents in his book How the Mind Works, (2009, pp. 22-27) writes that the “mental life consists 
of information- processing or computation. Beliefs are a kind of information, thinking a kind of computation, and 
emotions, motives, and desires are a kind of feedback mechanism in which an agent senses the difference between 
a current state and goal state and executes operations designed to reduce the difference” (Pinker, 2005). He 
describes the “mental life” as consisting of: beliefs, thinking, and emotions. 
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Others, with a decidedly more cognitive approach include: Gero (2016), 
Sussman & Hollander (2015), Brawne (2003), Eberhard (2007), Mallgrave (2011), 
Eastman, Newstettel, and McCracken (2001), Mitchell (1990), Akin (1986), and 
to name a few. Dong et al. (2015) consider designing  from the point of view of 
evolutionary biology, looking to the thinking of animals for the building blocks 
of design thinking.  
The question of the nature of design cognition is not so much whether there is 
a physiological difference in the neural structure specific to the scientist’s or the 
designer’s brain that makes one more suited to one domain over the other – though 
there is some evidence that this may be true (Mallgrave, 2011) – it has more to do 
with how scientists and designers think about and go about solving problems within 
their domains. The question needs to be considered in light of the nagging belief 
that scientific thinking, with its inductive reason and logic, is objectively superior to 
the way designers think, with their reliance on inspiration, intuition, and feelings. 
Design researchers believed (or at least they wanted to believe) that by reframing 
what designers do, using more terminology from cognitive science – and by perhaps 
changing the way that designers work and doing away with inspiration, intuition, 
and feelings – that designing, designers, and design solutions may achieve the same 
credibility as science, scientists, and scientific solutions. 
The other question that the above quote poses is related to the word “should.” 
Should implies that while there is a way to see things as they are and understand 
them as such, there is also an alternative to the way to see things, perhaps a better way, 
and that this alternative way ought to be implemented. It is the difference between 
making the claim that the pencil is yellow and the pencil should be yellow. The first is a 
verifiable observation of what is or what seems to be. The second is a proposition of 
what should or ought be (for some perhaps some unknown or yet-to-be known reason). 
This	distinction	between	observing	what	is	and	proposing	what	could/should	be	
encapsulates	the	epistemological	difference	between	(scientific)	problem-solving	
and	designing	–	it	asks	how	do	designers,	as	opposed	to	scientists,	know	what	could/
should	be,	on	what	basis	do	they	know	it,	and	why	should	we	listen	to	them. 54
54 A “way of knowing” is a kind of intelligence. Though the terms are often used interchangeably, there is a 
distinction between information, knowledge and intelligence. MacFarlane (2013) describes information 
as a “meaningful, shared pattern” (¶ 3).  Information is encoded and transferred by language. Information 
understood as data is transferred and measured in bits, chunks and bytes and possesses no semantic value. 
(However, some do claim certain kinds of information can also be found in the semantic, meaning-related 
aspects of language.) Knowledge is “a store of information [data] proven useful for a capacity to act” (¶ 6).
 >>> 
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The question possesses epistemological, ontological and phenomenological 
dimensions. Answering it requires an examination of how designers know what they 
know, what designing is as a behavior, and how one experiences it as an activity. For 
example, when designing is understood as primarily (abstract) thinking, designers 
rely heavily on analysis, narrative, conceptual ideation to produce a design solution.55 
The product (expected outcome) of such an approach to designing is understood to 
be an idea – a concept – the Platonic form that gives shape to matter, the Aristotelian 
substance that gives meaning to accidence, the essence that enables existence. 56
 It is a disembodied (abstract) concept for a building that is only embodied (given 
shape) should it finally be built.57 The design solution does not rely on being built to 
exist, even before it is built, the design already exists in the realm of possibility.
>>> Though some knowledge is innate, “most is gained by interaction with the world” (¶ 6). There are multiple 
means for gaining information. Intelligence unlike belief and knowledge is a process, or “an innate capacity 
to use information to respond to ever-changing requirements… to acquire, adapt, modify, extend and use 
information in order to solve problems” (¶ 10). There can be some confusion when talking about knowing 
versus knowledge. Just as there are different kinds of knowledge, such as explicit or implicit, practical or 
propositional, conceptual and procedural, there are also different kinds of knowing. Way of knowing is akin 
to intelligence. Though intelligence has often been considered to be of one type, whose quotient is famously 
measured by psychologist William Stern with his IQ test. Research, such as that by Howard Gardner (1983), 
proposes that there are more likely multiple intelligences. Garner proposes eight intelligences but acknowledges 
that there may be more. Nigel Cross (1982) suggested that there may be a “three cultures view” of human 
knowledge: sciences, humanities and design. Cross calls these “ways of knowing.” D’Souza, (2007) building on 
Gardner’s theory of multiple intelligences, considers design as an additional (perhaps ninth) kind of intelligence.
55 “Mitrovic (2009) explains that even to this day, “the view, widespread among theorists in the late 20th century, 
that the only properties of an architectural work that matter (or even that might exist) are those which can be 
described in words. Everything else, it was assumed, was superficial and unworthy of consideration” (p. 31).
56 These also include philosophical understandings of design, not in terms of the object or in terms of the action, 
but in terms of how the action of designing transforms or imbues meaning on the object irrespective of its 
physical form or material properties. Folkman (2013) writes: “A design process may take its point of departure 
in an idea, that is, before the object, while it is the cultural context after the object that ultimately determines 
the meaning of the design object. However, it is the object that gives the idea its tangible expression… In the 
phase of becoming, that is, in the design process, design converts and transforms the possible into forms and 
appearances. Accordingly, as final objects, some aspects of the possible remain as a structure of meaning 
afforded by the objects” (p. 3). This ability or phenomenon where design imbues meaning on an object is related 
to the quality of the aesthetic experience afforded by the object. Folkman describes this ability of design to 
imbue meaning on an object as the function of the aesthetic in design. I, however, will discuss the function of 
aesthesis as a motivational factor in the design process. 
57 In this line, Aristotle writes in the Metaphysics, book 3,”And this itself is also one of the things that must be discussed-
whether sensible substances alone should be said to exist or others also besides them, and whether these others are of 
one kind or there are several classes of substances, as is supposed by those who believe both in Forms and in mathematical 
objects intermediate between these and sensible things” (2014, ¶ 2). What constitutes existence of a thing?
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When designing is primarily understood as a kind of making, designers rely on emotions, 
sense perception, experience in space, materiality, technical ability, buildability.58 These 
designers also make use of generative ideas or concepts (Darke, 1979), but more so as 
a method, or a vehicle for generating a form or for identifying a way to think about the 
problem. It is understood that in the end the concept doesn’t really matter, in the end 
it is only the actual building/built environment that matters. The product of such an 
approach to designing is not the concept or the idea, but the means to make a building, 
that explain what the artifact is made of and how to make it. The design is not the form  
that gives shape to matter, but more an instruction communicated to a builder that is only 
actualized (finds its true existence) when it is built. It is only then that one can assess the 
quality of the design. Before it is built, the design exists in an ontological limbo.
While the above example may only describe the extremes, it illustrates that what	the	
designer considers to be the proper end of architectural design – the concept (idea) or 
the	building	(object)	–	impacts	how	the	designer	expects	his	design	will	be	experienced	
by others as an intellectual or a haptic experience.59 It suggests that the design is the 
“meaning” of, rather than the experience of the object (Folkman, 2013); where it is the 
design that transforms the essential being of the materials in a more basic sense by 
bestowing them with (new) meaning.60  
Does such a (ontological) transformation, effect the (phenomenological) experience 
of the object? Or could it be that the product of designing is (just) the artifact, an 
intentional assemblage of objects that results in the building/built environment; where 
the only meaning comes from the intended quality of the architectural experience or 
the meaning imposed on it (perceived) by the user?
58 A representative example of this approach can be found in Zumthor’s, Thinking Architecture (2006). He writes, 
“Architecture is always faced with the challenge of developing a whole out of innumerable details, out of various 
functions and forms, materials and dimensions. The architect must look for rational constructions and forms for 
edges and joints. These formal details determine the sensitive transitions within the larger proportions of the 
building. The details establish the formal rhythm, the building’s finely fractionated scale” (p. 15).
59 Heschong’s little book, Thermal Delight (1989) is a wonderful exposition on how “the thermal function of a 
building could be used as an effective element of design. Thermal qualities – warm, cool, humid, airy, radiant, 
cozy – are an important part of our experience of a space; they not only influence what we choose to do there but 
also how we feel about the space” (p. vii).
60 For example, I, as a designer, stumble across an oak log in the woods. After I stand up and brush the leaves off my 
cloths I notice the shape and the texture and the color of the log. I think, “this log will make a great stool.” I take it 
home, I clean it, I adjust its shape so that it doesn’t wobble in the floor and it’s a little more comfortable to sit on. 
I put a finish coat on it and polish it. I might even put little floor protector feet on it. Now, have I transformed this 
log into a stool. Has my “designing” a stool from a log changed its being, its meaning? Is it still a log? 
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Whether the proper end of designing, is thought of as an idea or an object, or as an 
action, as primarily thinking or making, in all cases designing is a kind of problem-
solving, albeit with the “devising of artifacts” as its goal. 
How then do we understand the cognitive functions of design as a kind of problem-
solving? Is it a primarily a deductive, inductive or abductive process? 61 Is it an explicit, 
rational, scientific process or a more implicit, tacit, experiential way of knowing? 
To solve a design problem, is it necessary to exhaust every possibility and combination of 
possibilities, eliminating each option until the most optimum solution is had? Or does design 
as problem-solving involve short cuts that eliminate all but the most likely optimal solutions 
from the start? And if it does include such short cuts, how does a problem-solver know 
which short cut to use when. And how does a designer as problem-solver know when he has 
found the most optimum solution possible? Does the most optimal solution even exist? 
The answers to these questions will provide the conceptual foundation for what follows.
This chapter will present concepts from cognitive science62 that have been influential 
on design research in general and on designing in particular. Influential thinkers 
include, Popper, Newell, Simon, Ryle, Polanyi, and Rittel, Dreyfus, Damasio, and 
Lakoff and Johnson. Their work provides a theoretical basis, supported by legitimate 
authority and research to claim: 
61 When discussing problem-solving and human cognition three types of thinking or inference are generally 
referred to: deduction, induction and abduction. In short, “Deduction proves that something must be; induction 
shows that something actually is operative; abduction merely suggests that something may be” (Pierce, 1931).
 
 Deductive reasoning can be equated with the rules of logic or logical inference. Deduction results in new facts. 
Starting with a verifiable premise and using the rules of logic, deductive reasoning almost guarantees a true 
statement. Deductive reasoning however is non-amplitative, it doesn’t add to human knowledge because the 
conclusions are contained within the premise (tautological). Deductive conclusions are not predictive.
 Inductive reasoning starts with specific observation that form the basis, in light of the evidence, of a likely, but 
not certain generalized conclusion. Induction leads to the conclusion that the theory in question is likely true. 
Inductive assertions are fundamental to scientific inquiry.
 Abductive reasoning (a term coined by C. P. Peirce) is projective and generally suggests some kind of action or 
procedure. Pierce defines abduction as “the process of forming an explanatory hypothesis. It is the only logical 
operation which introduces any new idea” (Douven, 2016). Abduction leads to a new concept or theory that 
explains observable facts. Abductive thinking is behind many contemporary theories of design thinking, such as 
Dorst’s  Frame Innovation: Creative New Thinking by Design,(2015).
62 See Gardner’s The Mind’s New Science, (1985) for a history of the emergence of cognitive science as a new 
discipline. Gardner defines cognitive science as an inter-disciplinary, “contemporary, empirically based effort to 
answer long-standing epistemological questions – particularly those concerned with the nature of knowledge, 
its components, its sources, its development, and its deployment” (p. 6). The cognitive sciences include: 
philosophy, psychology, artificial intelligence, linguistics, anthropology, and neuroscience.
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(1.) Our popular understanding of scientific method is flawed, (2.) There are different 
ways of knowing, (3.) Problem-solving follows a consistent pattern and is sequential, 
(4.) Due to the limits of human processing ability and memory capacity, short cuts 
(heuristics) and/or means for extending these resources (paper and pencil) are 
necessary, (5.) Even with unlimited (brute) processing power, memory capacity and 
time, an optimal solution may not be possible for certain complex problems, (6.) We 
can know more than we can say. (7.) Our bodies play a significant role in thinking, (8.) 
There is no such thing as the “innocent eye,” all human problem-solving is influenced 
(due to our bodies, memories, intellectual ability, experience, language, etc.) by 
presuppositions, preferences, and biases, and this is a good thing, (9.) The human 
“mind” is always seeking coherence (Gestalten), (10.) Feelings play an important role 
as a verification system in the problem-solving process. 
§  3.1 A Short History
The history of Design Research as a discipline has been well documented. 63 (See Langrish, 
2016; Goldschmidt, 2014; Margolin, 2010; Bayazit, 2004; Archer, 1999; Cross, 1993; 
Broadbent, 1973/1984). Over the past 50-60 plus years multiple theories and research 
methodologies have evolved that have led to important insights into what designing 
is, its practice and products. The evolution of the discipline can be described as taking 
place over three over-lapping phases.64 In the early years the primary aims of design 
research were to scientise/systematize designing and propose prescriptive methods65 
63 It is generally accepted that, though efforts have been documented as far back as the 1920’s, the (Design 
Methods) movement began with the 1962 (London) Conference on Systematic and Intuitive Methods in 
Engineering, Industrial Design, Architecture and Communications, Imperial College, September 1962. (Jones & 
Thornley, 1963)
64 See Cross (Science and Design Methodology: A Review, 1993, p. 63-64) for a description of this important period of 
evolution from rejection of the movement by the founders to the emergence of the “second generation.”
65 Dixon (1987) identified three models (taxonomy) of (engineering) design theory. These include: prescriptions, 
descriptive cognitive theories, and computational theories. Prescriptive “advocate how design should be done in 
particular circumstances” (p. 151). Descriptive cognitive theories, require “relating the meaningful operationally 
defined variables from each of the following: the person or persons; the problem; the organizational environment; 
the design environment; the design environments including (for example) computer tools, analytical and drafting 
tools, information resources, etc. and; time” (p. 152). Computational theories: A complete design system for a 
computational theory requires relating the meaningful operationally defined variables from each of the following: 
the problem; the knowledge; the control (i.e. communication and decision making); and time. (p. 153)
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that would produce reliably superior results. In the first phase the discipline was 
referred to as Design Methods. This phase is said to have ended when two of its 
founding members (Alexander, 1971; Jones, 1977) famously and publicly rejected the 
movement. 66 The second phase, referred to as Design Theory and Methodology, began 
with a new understanding of the relationship between the design problem and the 
design solution. 67 
During this phase the emphasis was/is on the use of protocol analysis and cognitive 
science that suggests descriptive models based on how designers really work.68 
In the present phase, referred to as Design Research,69 the discipline is applying 
new discoveries in cognitive science and artificial intelligence, proposing new ways 
of approaching design problems, refining earlier theories and discovering ways 
that give insight into how designers think that can be applied to other disciplines. 
The popularization of the term design thinking, has grown out of this phase 
of the research.70 
66 Alexander, when asked in an interview, “In what areas should future work center in design methodology?” He 
answers, “I would say forget it, forget the whole thing. Period.” This is an oft quoted sentence, but its not the 
end of his answer. He continues, “Until those people who talk about design methods are actually engaged in the 
problem of creating buildings and actually trying to create buildings, I wouldn’t give a penny for their efforts,” 
One presumes that he is talking about Simon, Rittel and Broadbent, none of whom are architects.
67 In response to the crisis that the design methods movement met when some of the early founders publicly 
disassociated themselves from it, Rittel (1984) suggested that rather than abandon the entire movement, to 
consider the beginnings of the movement as a first phase of an evolving discipline. He went on to suggest an 
agenda for the second phase, which was largely ignored. 
68 Zeisel writes that research describing what happens when designers think is necessarily “indirect and 
inferential or introspective.” Such evidence includes personal experience, participant observation, stream-of-
consciousness reports, and analysis of successive design drawings. Some theorists look to other disciplines such 
as linguistics, artificial intelligence, evolutionary biology and neurosciences to provide illuminating analogies 
and insight into designers’ mental processes. (2006, p.21)
69 To avoid confusion, I will refer to the discipline throughout using the designation currently in use: Design 
Research (DR). This designation is the most inclusive.
70 See Brown’s “Design Thinking” (2008) Brown defines design thinking “a discipline that uses the designer’s 
sensibility and methods to match people’s needs with what is technologically feasible and what a viable 
business strategy can convert into customer value and market opportunity” (p. 86). See also Razzouk and Shute 
(2012) for an overview of the development and the ideas related to design thinking.
TOC
 66	 Form	Follows	Feeling
§  3.2 The Desire to Scientise (Rationalize) Designing
The desire to scientise71 designing was the driving force behind the first generation of 
design research (Cross, 2001). And as such (wittingly or unwittingly) set the agenda 
(framed the problem) for future research.72 As early as the 1920’s there was a rising 
suspicion and distrust of the idea of design expertise as special knowledge (Banham, 
1980) and the function of aesthetics in designing (Downton, 2003). As quoted by 
Cross (1993, p. 66) this mistrust of that which was not “scientific” is captured by the 
writings of Theo van Doesburg, who wrote:
Our era is inimical to all subjective speculation in art, science, technology, and so on. 
The new spirit which already governs almost all modern life, is opposed to animal 
spontaneity (lyricism), to the dominion of nature, to complicated hair-styles and 
elaborate cooking. In order to construct a new object we need a method, that is to say, 
an objective system. (Van Doesburg & Van Esteren, 1924/1994)
And Le Corbusier who wrote about a house as an objectively designed 
“machine for living” in:
The use of the house consists of a regular sequence of definite function. The regular 
sequence of these functions is a traffic phenomenon. To render that traffic exact, 
economical and rapid is the key effort of modern architectural science. (CIAM 2nd 
Congress, 1929)
71 See Schön (2009) for a good overview of how the technical rationality, by the second half of the twentieth 
century, in American universities, had become “embedded not only in men’s minds, but in the institutions 
themselves, [as the] dominant view of professional …” (p. 30-37)
72 Broadbent (1973) writes that the reasons “for approaching design in new ways… are determined by shifts in 
philosophical attitudes which are not exclusive to architecture, but pervade the whole of our culture and, most 
specifically, its science and technology” (p. 56).
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These comments epitomize a way of thinking about designing that wants to be 
objective and methodological – rational. There is a distrust of intuition and inspiration 
and personal expression, preferring a kind of so called objective rationality, devaluing 
the importance of aesthetic experience as well as the function of aesthesis in the 
design process. The true design solution was thought to lie in the application of the 
“scientific method” to designing.73 The belief emerged that if designers could clearly 
state the problem, follow a prescriptive procedure, anticipate (all of) the intended and 
unintended outcomes, then they could arrive at better (optimal) design solutions more 
efficiently without depending on “special knowledge.”74 Or if designers just collected 
enough data, organized it in a special way, devised a method for optimizing the 
desired outcome of a complex system, with measurable outcomes, designing could be 
systematized (and mechanized/computerized). The belief was (and for some continues 
to be) that the design process must be able to be codified and mechanized.
This desire was tied to the positivism of the early 20th century within the scientific 
community that called for a “unity of science.”75  That is, that all (respectable) sciences, 
both human and natural, must use the same methodology. The design professions 
wanted to be included as one of the sciences, believing that by doing so designing 
would be legitimized, taken more seriously. To do so designers could only lay claim to 
truth or certainty if they made use of the (verifiable) methods of the natural sciences. 
Much work was done based on these premises to rethink designing in these terms. 
Simon’s (1996) The Sciences of the Artificial, and the early work of Christopher 
Alexander (1964) in Notes on the Synthesis of Form exemplify this effort.76 
73 By scientific method was meant rational empiricism based on logical deduction and inductive inference.
74 It may turn out that it is exactly this so-called “special knowledge” that designers tried to rid themselves of that 
holds the key to understanding how designers think. Later I will propose that was meant by special knowledge 
may be nothing more than what is meant by tacit knowledge coupled with insights from embodied cognition. 
The problem, I will argue is not with how designers think, but rather that the implicit nature of tacit knowledge 
makes it difficult to describe how they think using scientific vocabulary.
75 “Positivism claimed that ‘the laws and concepts of the special sciences must belong to one single system… 
They must constitute a unified science with one conceptual system (a language common to all the 
sciences) containing the conceptual systems of the individual sciences as members and their languages as 
sublanguages’” (Kraft, V, 1953, as quoted by Snodgrass & Coyne, 1997, pp. 71-72)
76 Gabriella Goldschmidt (2014) offers a good summary of Alexander’s efforts. (pp. 15-18)
TOC
 68	 Form	Follows	Feeling
Much was learned by these efforts, but there were several problems (and continue to 
be) with this scientised approach to designing and design research regarding both 
what designers do and how they do it.77 First, as observed by Simon (1996, p. xii), 
designers do not do the same thing as scientists. Designers propose a world that does 
not yet exist, while scientists propose theories based on the known world. Scientists 
are concerned with the necessary while designers are concerned with how things might 
or ought to be. Second, as design research is about understanding how designers 
design and designing as a human behavior, methods that are successful for producing 
new knowledge in the natural sciences, where the subject of study is inanimate with 
predictable properties, are not as effective when applied to human behavior. “The 
criteria of objectivity demanded by the natural sciences are self-negating when applied 
to the study of human behavior” (Snodgrass & Coyne, 1997, p. 9). Third, the emphasis 
on problem-solving and the use of verifiable methods of the natural sciences had so 
devalued the experiential/aesthetic nature of design[ing] as to “rob it of its soul,” 
destroying “the frame of mind the designer needs to be in if he is to design good 
architecture” (Alexander, 1984, p. 310) 
Still a more fundamental problem with this approach comes from the presuppositions 
of the scientific method itself. Positivistic/rational theories of scientific knowledge 
insist that truly scientific knowledge is gained primarily through verifiable observation 
and inductive conjecture. That is, as Popper (2002) summarized: “the inference 
of universal laws from particular observed instances as a method by which we 
are guided to the point whence we can intuit or perceive the essence of the true 
nature of a thing” (p. 16). Popper, critiquing this definition, argues that this is 
not what Socrates meant when describing the process of induction in the Meno. 
Rather, what Socrates meant by induction, as understood within his epistemology, 
is anamnesis. For Socrates, all knowledge (truth) is pre-existent, derived from 
eternal universal laws. Learning and inquiry is a kind of remembering (re-cognition 
of pre-existent truths observed in nature), not discovery. The truth already exists. 
77 Whether design should be considered as a science or could ever be considered a science was contested within 
the Design Methods movement from the beginning: “The question of whether design can or will ever be 
‘scientised’ is a point of disagreement in the field of design methods. Rittel makes a powerful argument that it 
can never be a scientific activity, based on the observation that science attempts to be “value-free” in the sense 
of not allowing values or prejudices to distort the observations from nature, while design in fact attempts to 
implement the very values and images of what ought to be that science attempts to keep out of its procedures. 
In this view design can be studied scientifically, but it is a fundamentally different activity in itself than the 
activity of science” (Grant, 1972). The science of design is what is meant by design research.
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Popper argues that this misunderstanding of the meaning of inductive reasoning 
(scientific knowledge), that universal truths can be revealed from verifiable observation, 
is a fundamental flaw that is central to many noted thinkers, including Bacon, Hume 
and Descartes.78  For Popper, due to the  inherent limits of observation and human 
cognitive capacity, knowledge gained by induction is at best an educated guess that has 
the appearance of truth. 
Bruce Archer (1999), summarizing Popper’s critique of scientific method argues that 
we should therefore "reject the old [Baconian] principle that the true scientist should 
arrive at a scientific theory through inductive reasoning” (p. 567). He argued that we 
must accept, instead, that induction, is fundamentally flawed as a method of scientific 
inquiry. That in fact most, if not all, scientific discovery is actually an informed guess 
based on verifiable observation, and then tested, perhaps, using a method that is 
something like inductive reasoning with the claims to universal truth, but with the 
understanding “that most, if not all, scientific discovery is based on the positing of an 
insightful tentative explanation about the meaning of the evidence" (p. 567). 
You do not, said Popper, have to prove whence these conceptions came. What you do 
have to do, is apply every test you can think of to discover any flaws in, or limitations to 
your proposition. (p. 567)
78 Popper (2002) goes on further to say that what Aristotle (and Bacon) meant by induction is “not so much 
the inferring of universal laws from particular observed instances as a method by which we are guided to the 
point whence we can intuit or perceive the essence or the true nature of a thing” (p. 16). Rather, he calls it an 
“optimistic” epistemological “method of systematic doubt” that like Descartes’ method is intended as a way of 
“destroying all false prejudices of the mind, in order to arrive at the unshakable basis of self-evident truth” (p. 
19). Self-evident truth is essentially a religious doctrine that is based in divine authority. The knowledge that 
is arrived at by induction then, is more properly understood as “the natural or the pure state of man, the state 
of the innocent eye which can see the truth, while ignorance has its source the injury suffered by the innocent 
eye in man’s fall from grace; an injury that can be partially healed by a course of purification” (p. 20). See also 
The Logic of Scientific Discovery (1959), for Popper’s argument with Hume. In Popper’s final analysis he argues, 
“My solution of the logical problem of induction was that we may have preferences for certain of the competing 
conjectures; that is, for those which are highly informative and which so far have stood up to eliminative 
criticism. These preferred conjectures are the result of selection, of the struggle for survival of the hypotheses 
under the strain of criticism, which is artificially intensified selection pressure” (Quoted in, Schilpp, 1974, p. 
1024). Induction does not result in empirical truth, but rather preferred conjecture.
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The challenge then, is to determine where this “insightful tentative explanation” 
comes from that initiates the inquiry, and on what basis can it be verified. If the insight 
induced from careful examination of verifiable observations does not necessarily 
possess the qualities of a universal truth, from where then does it get its claim 
to legitimacy?
Archer was determined to reconcile the apparent conflict between science and 
designing, especially regarding the suspicion with which scientists regard “design 
knowledge.” Building on this critical insight offered by Popper, Archer proposes 
that if real science “proceeds by the postulating of informed conjectures, followed 
by systematic attempts at the refutation of these conjectures” designing must be 
a “science” because that “is exactly what designers do!” Thus, Archer observes, in 
the end, if what Popper says is true then, “Design activity was [already] scientifically 
respectable” (p. 567). Problem solved. But not really. 
§  3.3 Problem solving: Information-Processing Theory
 All problem-solving starts off with the realization that “it could be otherwise.” 79 This 
insight applies to the most mundane situations such as realizing that I am hungry, 
hunger is unpleasant, if I eat something I can alleviate this unpleasant feeling; To the 
realization that the unrestrained use of fossil fuels is causing significant damage to the 
environment, and considering the possibility that there may be alternative means to 
generate energy that are less destructive to the environment while still having access to 
enough energy so that we can continue to use the technologies we currently enjoy.;To 
starting a revolution. This phenomenon can be described as five states of being (based 
on Prochaska & Velicer, 1997): 
79 For Sartre the knowledge that it could be otherwise is fundamental to human freedom and agency. 
(Sartre, 1946)
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(1.) A normative state where things are more or less acceptable; (2.) A feeling of 
discomfort that causes one to assess the current state; (3.) The awareness that it could 
be otherwise/the discomfort experienced by the realization that the current state is not 
necessary; (4.) Exploration of possible alternative states; (5.) A change in the current 
state that achieves (within an acceptable range) the desired outcome (goal state). 
How one decides what action to take, within a range of possible actions to achieve the 
desired state is the problem of problem solving.80
Simon (1996) writes “Human problem solving, from the most blundering to the most 
insightful, involves nothing more than varying mixtures of trial and error and selectivity” 
(p. 195).81 Selectivity arises with the emergence of “rules of thumb” (heuristics) that 
suggest how to approach a (kind of/type of) problem or offers short-cuts through familiar 
territory. The effective application of these rule-of-thumb comes from experience when 
using them in a particular situation tested against a trusted verification system. If it leads 
toward a promising solution or “solution path,” then it’s useful. If it doesn’t, then it’s not. 
This process is usually learned through experience (situated learning). One recognizes a 
familiar situation, remembers what worked, and tries it again.
Possible solutions are judged within a range of acceptability based on (implicit or 
explicit) criteria and constraints. The attempt to maximize the expected value of the 
utility function (demonstrable) of the solution is called optimization (Simon, 1988).82 
80 The classic problem-solving process proposed by Polya in How to Solve It (1945) is: understand the problem 
b devise a plan b carry it out b review/extend. Here I am describing a situation in which a person recognizes a 
need, desire or possibility for change which precedes problem solving. Polya’s process is a meta-heuristic for 
how to solve a problem. His process will be described in detail below
81 The work of Simon, Newell, Shaw and Chase has been very influential in the area of problem solving (cognitive) 
theory. There are other theories of problem solving. However, as the purpose of presenting these theories is 
to form a basis for understanding the underlying concepts that support DR, I have decided to focus on their 
work. These are the most often quoted/referred to by Cross, Lawson, Dorst, Schön, Alexander, Cross, Hillier, etc. 
(Roozenburg & Dorst, 1999).
82 Optimization describes the desired goal state of the problem solver. It is the process by which an optimal 
solution is sought. This involves establishing a large search area within which all possible solution paths are 
exhausted from which the best possible solution is determined. In problem solving theory there is only one 
optimal solution. Optimization requires some means of producing a (objectively) measurable outcome. You may 
notice that optimization is described in terms of “utility factor” not in terms of experience. As the problem-
solver as information processing system model is intended as a general theory equally applicable to humans and 
machines, and machines do not have bodies, and you need a body to experience feelings, and the quality of the 
experience is determined by feelings, it is impossible for the problem-solver as information processing system 
model to assess the quality of an experience.
 
 Search domain defines the boundaries of the search. 
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The optimal solution (from a functional point of view) is not always the most 
desirable (satisfactory) solution. Sometimes a solution may be chosen that is simply 
good enough (sufficient). When a solution is considered to be both satisfactory and 
sufficient, it is considered to be satisficing. 
Much of the early research in problem solving came from chess playing, especially from 
studies by de Groot. (1978)  With more than 200 years of study and experimentation, 
chess is a favorite because it is sufficiently complex, there is a set of rules (operations) 
that must be mastered, it requires strategy, and there is a definable goal (objective) 
that signals the end of the game (Simon & Chase, 1972).83 
Research about chess, in terms of problem solving, involves both (1.) understanding 
how expert chess players make decisions/solve problems/think (Simon H. , 1977), and 
(2.) how to design a machine (computer program) that can “do mechanically what man 
can do naturally” (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958, p. 320). This early research focused 
on extracting the processes, procedures, sequences and methods that humans use 
when attempting to solve complex problems and translating them into a computer 
program to test their theory in order to both mechanize and demystify problem solving. 
Testing a problem solving theory by mechanizing it or by writing a computer program 
was considered the way to verify and validate the theory.
De Groot’s study, Thought and Choice in Chess (1978), provides an analysis of the way 
people with different degrees of expertise (in chess) approach the same problem. One 
of his studies involved showing images of chess boards (with the pieces prearranged in 
mid-play), and asking 5 grand masters and 5 candidate masters (both playing at expert 
level) to think aloud as they tried to find the best next move. Surprisingly, he found that 
there were no significant differences (statistically) between the grand masters’ and the 
candidates’ thought processes (heuristics, depth of search, etc.). However, he did find 
that the grand masters were better at finding “the ‘right’ moves for further consideration, 
whereas weaker players spent considerable time analyzing the consequences of bad 
moves” (Chase & Simon, 1973, p. 396). He also found that the grand masters were 
better able to recall the location of pieces when they were not arranged randomly. The 
candidate masters, lacking the extensive experience (situated knowledge) possessed 
by the grand masters were less able to recall the proper location of the pieces. 
83 Interestingly enough, it is exactly these characteristics of chess that makes it poorly suited for understanding 
design. But, I don’t want to get ahead of myself.
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Chase and Simon suggest that this has to do with “immediate perceptual processing” 
which allows the master to see “structure” or patterns84 rather than individual 
pieces or chunks of information.85 So while statistically speaking there appeared 
to be no difference in performance between the grand master and the candidate, 
there was a difference in how the grand master perceived, evaluated and processed 
the situation. Thus it was surmised that “thinking depends on acquiring the ability 
to recognize relationships, patterns and complete situation” (Lawson B. , 2005, p. 
133).  These experiments led to insights into how problem-solving systems work, in 
terms of identifying a problem, memory, defining a search area, recognizing patterns, 
identifying/prioritizing criteria for evaluation/selection of the next move, anticipating 
the consequences, making choices, evaluating the effectiveness of the solution, and 
projecting a possible future. As well as the understanding that expert problem-solvers 
when faced with a new problem tend to try to make sense of a situation first (solution 
driven), while novices tend to try analyze the problem (research driven). 86
With a growing base of research describing how experts solve problems, Newell, et 
al.(1958) sought to propose their own theory for how human problem-solving works. 
They identified four criteria for such a theory. It should: (1.) Predict the performance 
of a problem-solver by explaining what processes are used and what mechanisms 
perform these processes; (2.) Predict incidental phenomena; (3.) Show how attendant 
conditions alter problem-solving behavior; (4.) Explain how problem-solving skills are 
learned (acquired). 
84 Later on this ability to recognize (non-random) patters or perceive order will be discussed in terms of the natural 
tendency of humans to seek/impose order, perceive a Gestalt, experience a sense of coherence.
85 Chunking is a cognitive strategy that allows short term memory to increase the amount of information it can 
store. Short term memory is said to be limited to approximately seven bits (units) of information. Chunking 
information into bits allows one to exceed the constraints imposed by this physiological limitation. One can 
further extend the limits of short term memory by arranging the chunks in to schemata. (Miller, 1956)
86 This has become a generally accepted principle in design theory, See McCormick (1997), Lawson & Dorst 
(2009); Beilock (2010), Cross (2011), Ericsson (2016). Lawson (2005) writes: “The scientists adopted a 
technique of trying out a series of designs which used as many different blocks and combinations of blocks as 
possible as quickly as possible. Thus they tried to maximize the information available to them about the allowed 
combinations. If they could discover the rule governing which combinations of blocks were allowed they could 
then search for an arrangement which would optimize the required colour around the layout [problem-focused]. 
By contrast, the architects selected their blocks in order to achieve the appropriately coloured perimeter. If this 
proved not to be an acceptable combination, then the next most favourably coloured block combination would 
be substituted and so on until an acceptable solution was discovered [solution-focused]” (p. 31).
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An organism’s problem-solving behavior is described as an information processing 
system.87 This system consists of control systems, effectors, and receptors. A control system 
consists of a number of memories containing ordered symbolized information, where 
primitive information processes operate on the information stored in these memories 
based on a “definite set of rules” that are combined into processing programs. The program 
processes include: searching, generating and evaluating.88 To arrive at problem solutions 
in a similar manner as humans, programs cannot rely solely on “brute processing power,”89 
but rather must make use of heuristic processes (a kind of cognitive shortcut).90 
To test their theory they developed a program, Logic Theorist (that later developed 
into General Problem Solver [GPS] which provided the foundations for AI), that they 
claimed could “solve problems in a manner closely resembling that exhibited by 
humans” (p. 162). To prove that their program did in fact solve problems in a manner 
closely resembling that of humans (it could pass the Turing Test)91 they identified six 
criteria that they considered (based on psychological research) fundamental to human 
problem solving and that their program satisfied: 
87 The use of the term “problem-solving behavior” implies a kind of purposefulness (intention) that seems odd 
to assign to machines. This notion of machines as purposeful or goal oriented has its roots in cybernetics, 
especially how an organism (system) maintains homeostasis. Norbert Wiener wrote: “The central nervous 
system no longer appears as a self-contained organ, receiving inputs from senses and discharging into muscles. 
On the contrary, some of its most characteristic activities are explicable only as circular processes, emerging 
from the nervous system into the muscles, and re-entering the nervous system through the sense organs, 
whether they be proprioceptors or organs of the special senses. This seemed to us to mark a new step in the 
study of that part of neurophysiology which concerns not solely the elementary processes of nerves and synapses 
but the performance of the nervous system and an integrated whole” (As quoted by Gardner, 1985, p.20).
88 One begins to see how this relates to design as problem-solving behavior: problem b [searching/generating/
evaluating] b solution
89 Memory and processing power at some point all reach their limits in terms of capacity and speed. Simon 
refers to this reality “bounded rationality” (1972). Bounded rationality refers to the limits of human cognition. 
Human cognitive systems involve several components: sense/perception systems, thinking ability (processing), 
memory, skill (the where with all to implement the solution). Each of which has special competencies, capacities 
and limitations. Human cognition is limited within these bounds. When the resources necessary to solve a 
problem exceed the competency, capacity and limitations of human cognition, humans can extend or enhance 
these by training and/or making use of tools and machines, such as: paper and pencil, reference books, 
conversations, calculators (both primitive and advanced), computer simulations, models, etc. Recognizing 
the limits of human cognitive systems is essential for understanding how human problem-solving and design 
works.
90 These ideas have since provided the principles for the “symbolic information processing” approach to problem-
solving, or the rational problem-solving, traditional, or computational view (Visser, 2010).
91 Turing (1990) devised a test to assess the intelligence of a machine where if the machine could produce a 
result that was indistinguishable for what one would expect from a human, then the machine was considered 
intelligent (at least in that instance). The Turing Test is a standard measure for (artificial) intelligence.
TOC
 75  Design Cognition
(1.) It incorporated a system of processes that could in fact solve complex problems; 
(2.) Its problem-solving ability depended on the sequence in which problems were 
presented; (3.) The program “behavior” exhibited both preparatory and directional 
set; (4.) It exhibited insight; (5.) It employed simple concepts; And (6.) it made use of 
a complex organized hierarchy of problems and sub-problems. This was considered 
quite a success. They wrote that such an information processing system should not 
be understood as merely a metaphor, but as “a precise symbolic model on the basis of 
which pertinent specific aspects of man’s problem-solving behavior can be calculated” 
(1972, p. 5).
 Newell et al. were careful, to separate problem solving processes from “neurological or 
pseudo-psychological terms.” Problem-solving at the level of information processing, 
they wrote, “has nothing specifically ‘neural’ about it, but can be performed by a wide 
class of mechanisms, including both human brains and digital computers” (1958, p. 
153). As far as they were concerned, problem-solving is problem-solving is problem-
solving, be it done by a human or a machine. 
With this understanding of human cognition as an information-processing system, 
Newell and Simon,92 describe the system as consisting of four components: memory, 
processors, effectors, and receptors. Memory is made up of symbols and tokens that 
stand for or represent objects, concepts and their relations. Processors are symbol 
manipulators that encode information gathered by receptors in a manner that is 
consistent with the symbols structures (architecture) of the system; transforms system 
codes and relations; and transforms system codes so that they can be communicated 
to the effectors. Effectors manipulate and receptors gather information from the 
internal and external environment. Taken together this theory of human cognition 
as an information processing system and its four components provided a new way to 
understand human problem-solving, artificial intelligence and consequently design. 
However, this system was only able to deal with well-defined problems where the 
parameters were clearly defined, and the outcome was predictable, thus verifiable. This 
system was incapable of producing novel, innovative or creative results. Nor was it able 
to consider any alternative solution that included variables outside the data-set. These 
limitations posed a new problem. Could their system be adapted to tolerate ambiguity, 
unpredictability and novelty within an open framework and thus allow for creativity?
92 As summarized by Akin (1986 p. 12)
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For Newell et al. (1958) creative thinking is assumed to be “simply a special kind of 
problem-solving behavior” (p. 5) 93 Creative problem solving is characterized by novelty, 
unconventionality, high motivation and persistence, and/or by a problem that is ill-
defined, that is, a problem for which there is no right or inevitable solution. (1958, p. 
4) The process includes (1.) identifying a suitable problem situation and criteria for 
evaluation, (2.) identifying a strategy for solving the problem, (3.) defining the search 
field, (4.) producing and testing multiple test paths (creating a maze), (5.) identifying 
the optimal path, and (6.) producing an acceptable solution. For a problem-solver to 
generate a creative solution, the problem-solver needs to be able to (1.) [re]assess the 
problem situation, 94 (2.) introduce random variables, (3.) frame and reframe based 
on alternative desired outcomes, and (4.) discover multiple (feasible) solution paths95 
that can lead to unexpected results, and an unanticipated goal state that exceeds 
expectations established by the problem criteria 
Problem-solving systems make use of two processes: a solution-generating process 
and a verifying process. Solution generators function similar to a “trial-and-error” 
search. “Associated with a problem is a space of possible solutions” (Newell, Shaw, 
& Simon, 1958, p. 63). As the problem-solver operates in a sequential manner, it is 
necessary to not only identify possible strategies, but to determine in which order to 
execute them to arrive a viable solution path. The order in which processes are executed 
matters. How the problem-solver does this is by resorting to a “solution generator” that 
provides a means for evaluating possible solution paths and reduce the search time.
93 Creativity in design is a big topic, and is beyond the scope of this project. However, it cannot be ignored. 
When referring to creativity in this study, I do not mean simply novelty or innovation. I prefer how Gardner, 
Csikszentmihalyi and Gero use the term. In Creating Minds, Gardner (1993) discusses creativity in terms of 
“big C” and “small c” creativity. For Gardner a person who is big C creative is “a person who regularly solves 
problems, fashions products, or defines new questions in a domain in a way that is initially considered novel but 
that ultimately becomes accepted practice in a particular cultural setting” (p. 35). Like Csikszentmihalyi (1996), 
Gardner identifies a big C creative work as possessing several characteristics. Creativity in design is also explored 
by Gero, where he identifies four kinds of design (which in his language can be understood as problem solving): 
routine design, non-routine design, innovative design, and creative design. He notes, similar to the above, “for a 
design to be evaluated as creative the criterion of novelty is insufficient, utility and value are also required.” For 
Gero (2016), value is the distinguishing criterion, because value is related to transformation and concentration. 
That is, the “power to transform the constraints of reality” and that “they have an intensity and an intensity and 
concentration of meaning requiring continued contemplation” (p. 3). 
94 The “problem situation” includes the multiple variables, criteria and constraints, seen and unseen, anticipated 
and unanticipated that make up the environment in which the problem needs to be solved. 
95 The “solution path” is the series of decisions made within the problem space (maze) that leads to an acceptable 
solution. The problem maze is a matrix of choices and alternatives that is generated by how the problem space is 
framed. Archer (1963) describes designing in terms of a decision-making map.
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A solution generator determines how the problem-solver will think about the problem. 
Newell et al.(1958) write “There is likely to be a positive correlation between creativity 
and the use of trial-and-error generators” (p. 14). The likelihood of producing a 
creative solution is determined by the way that the solution generator is defined by the 
problem-solver.96
Verifying processes evaluate the problem states, determining the direction the 
problem-solver takes on the solution path. The verifying process provides feedback, 
based on the criteria set by the problem-solver, for the solution generator to inform it 
if it is heading in the right direction, toward generating the desired solution.
Problems requiring creative solutions quickly grow in complexity due to several factors. 
Complex problems pose two problems for problem-solvers: the size of the search space 
(maze) of possible solutions; and determining how to identify creative solutions that 
are likely to satisfy the problem. Possible searches can be increased exponentially by 
including additional (random) variables, easily exceeding the processing and memory 
capacity of the information processing system. The possibility of randomly considering 
additional variables only exacerbates the situation, quickly overwhelming the system. To 
avoid overwhelming the system it is helpful reduce the search space (maze) the problem-
solver makes use of. The problem then is how to choose which variables to eliminate 
without engaging in an exhaustive trial and error routine? The answer is to make a 
“best guess,” perhaps based on past experience, statistical analysis, predetermined 
preferences, etc. These “best guess” routines are called heuristics.97 One such heuristic 
might be to search the problem maze for the simplest possible solution path first. 
96 This problem of creativity is also explained in terms of the opportunistic nature of design. Referring to Cross 
(1999) writes, “all the relevant information cannot be predicted and established in advance of the design 
activity. The directions that are taken during the exploration of the design territory are influenced by what 
is learned along the way, and by the partial glimpses of what might lie ahead. In other words, design is 
opportunistic, and so the path of exploration cannot be predicted in advance. (p. 29) Cross (2004) describes 
opportunism in design as “deviations from a structured plan or methodical process into the ‘opportunistic’ 
pursuit of issues or partial solutions that catch the designer’s attention.” He further makes reference to Guindon 
(1990), Visser (1990), Akin and Lin's (1995) concepts of “novel design decisions” to explain what is meant by 
the opportunistic aspects of design from different design disciplines.
97 Newell et al. define a heuristic as “any principle or device that contributes to the reduction in the average 
search to solution” (1958, p. 22). Heuristics are kinds of “maxims” or as Polanyi calls them “rules of art.” The 
use of heuristics in problem solving is characteristic of experts. “A major function of heuristics is to reduce 
the size of the problem space so that it can be searched in a reasonable time” (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958, 
p.61). However, the problem with heuristics or maxims or rules of art is that they “cannot be understood, still 
less applied by anyone not already possessing a good practical knowledge of the art” (Polanyi, 1974, p. 31). 
Heuristics are reasoning strategies that “do not guarantee the best solution, but often lead to potential solutions 
by providing a simple cognitive ‘short-cut.’” (Yilmaz, Seifert, & Gonzalez, 2010)
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The solution-generator functions to optimize the solution path in a manner that 
maximizes the likelihood of arriving at an acceptable (creative) solution while reducing 
the demands it makes on available resources (time, processing power, memory). 
Each time the solution-generator applies processes to a state, it results in a new state 
that is acted upon by verifying processes and acted upon again, etc. This sequence of 
states constitutes the solution path. When a problem-solver assesses the problem 
situation and determines a (best) way for traversing the solution maze, perhaps by 
breaking a complex problem into subtasks, he is applying a heuristic of planning. 
By this definition, design methodologies are considered planning heuristics or 
meta-heuristics.
As the problem-solver traverses the solution maze, a significant about of data is 
collected that when seen together produces “patterns of elementary symbols” or 
a “state description.”98 This pattern of elementary symbols or state description is 
what is meant by a representation.99 The representation is evaluated insofar as the 
patterns within the representation “mirror or fail to mirror the patterns without 
that they represent” (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958, p. 51). That is, that there is a 
correspondence between the internal and external representation (based on a set of 
predetermined expectations for what constitutes a successful solution). Evaluating 
this correspondence provides feedback on two levels: it allows the problem-solver 
to determine if the solution path he has chosen is leading to an acceptable solution 
(feedback), and to evaluate the quality of the execution of the final solution (the 
artifact) against his internal representation (correspondence).100
98 Bartlett (1958) refers to these patterns of elementary symbols or internalized mental images as “schema."
99 A representation is not necessarily visual. It is considered to be visual “if it is capable of serving as an input to the 
same information processes as those that operate on the internal representations of immediate visual sensory 
experience… produce the phenomena of visual imagination” (Newell, Shaw, & Simon, 1958, p. 55). This way 
of understanding a representation as a visualization of a data set (imagination), can also be understood in the 
reverse as an internalization of the data set. That is, when we think (observe) about something external, we 
construct an internal visual representation based on the data gathered by the senses and cognitive processes 
(p. 58). Recent research in the area of neuro-psychology has provided evidence that internal visualizations of 
internal data (imagination) and those generated by external data  stimulate the same parts of the brain (visual 
cortex) and effect the same pleasure centers. See Searle (2015), Ramachandran (2011), Damasio (1994). This 
evidence is critical for substantiating the concept of aesthetic resonance presented in the final chapter.
100 This process of evaluating an internal image against an external representation is called externalization. It is 
a primary method designers use to gain feedback during the design (problem-solving) process. Methods for 
externalization included sketching, model-making, conversation, etc. Criteria for assessing the quality of the 
externalization include both  the demonstrable and experiential characteristics.
TOC
 79  Design Cognition
This understanding of human problem-solving behavior as information processing (by 
demystifying it and mechanizing it), in part accounts for the reframing of designing 
as primarily problem-solving behavior, where designing involves little more than 
finding a satisficing solution for a clearly stated design problem. Or as Akin writes, 
“Design is a form of problem-solving where individual decisions are made toward the 
fulfillment of objectives.” 
But this theory raises other issues that are not satisfactorily addressed: (1.) What 
motivates the system to make “decisions” to solve a problem, (2.) on what basis 
does the system define the problem situation, frame the problem, consider random 
variables to discover a creative solution, and (3.) how the system understands 
“fulfillment” and “objectives.” When we consider the designer as a human problem-
solver we can ask the same questions: (1.) What motivates a designer to solve the 
problem, and (2.) on what basis does a designer define the problem situation, frame 
and reframe the problem, consider random variables to discover a creative solution? 
(3.) How does the designer know what to do? (4.) How does a designer know (and on 
what basis) when the objectives are fulfilled (solution is had). 
Rittel (1987) proposes that this happens via a process that he calls epistemic reasoning. 
He writes, the nature of the designer’s reasoning is argumentative,
the process appears as one of the formation of judgment, alternating with the search 
for ideas. The understanding of the design situation changes with the alternatives seen 
in pursuit of the plan. Different facts and different ought-to-be questions come up 
depending on the means to accomplish these ends. (p. 5) 
The process (deliberations) is terminated with a judgment (good enough) “which 
may be based on the deliberations, but are not [necessarily] derived from them.” 
Rittel concludes: “How this happens is beyond reasoning… There are no ‘algorithms’ 
to guide the process. It is left up to the designer’s judgment how to proceed. There is 
no – logical or other –  necessity to want to do something particular in response to an 
issue. Nothing has to be or to remain as it is or as it appears to be; there are no limits 
to the conceivable. There is a lack of ‘sufficient reason’ which would dictate to take a 
particular course of action and no other” (p. 5).
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§  3.4 Tacit	Knowledge
As opposed to Plato who writes “that which we know, we must surely be able to tell” 
(Laches, 2015), Polanyi (2009) poses an alternative explanation for how we know what 
we know, called tacit knowledge: a kind of knowledge that starts with “the fact that we 
know more than we can tell” (p. 4).101 Polanyi (1972) holds that human knowledge is 
of two kinds: “What is usually described as knowledge, as set out in written words or 
maps, or mathematical formulae, is only one kind of knowledge; while unformulated 
knowledge, such as we have of something we are in the act of doing, is another form 
of knowledge” (pp. 12-13). The first kind of knowledge is called explicit knowledge, 
(articulate knowledge), was described above. The second is called tacit knowledge, 
(inarticulate knowledge). Tacit knowledge is a kind of inferential, embodied knowledge 
that seeks coherence, and mostly operates below the radar of consciousness. It is 
a kind of knowing with characteristics similar to what Badke-Schaub (2014) calls 
intuition: “[It] is related to unconscious and subconscious processes; it associates to 
the totality of the situation” (p. 356); it is accompanied by affects, feelings, emotions; 
it is fast; it uses multi-sensorial stimuli; it develops with experience; it can simulate 
creative solutions.102 For Polanyi, tacit knowledge is fundamental to scientific discovery 
and artistic genius.
From an Aristotelian point of view103 design knowledge is considered “practical/technical” 
knowledge, because the proper end of design knowledge is the ability to make something. 
101 Though the concept of tacit knowledge was present in Wittgenstein (1958) with his concept of “seeing-as”, it is 
normally attributed to Polanyi. Seeing-as was explained by using the duck-rabbit drawing borrowed from Jastrow 
(Jastro, 1901). The point being that depending on certain factors related to one's perceptual predisposition, the 
drawing can (legitimately) be seen as either a duck or a rabbit. This phenomenon poses a serious challenge to 
the possibility of “verifiable observation” essential to inductive rationality.
102 Simon has a similar theory of intuition. See Frantz (2003).
103 In Book 6 of the Nicomachean Ethics, Aristotle classifies all knowledge as being of two types: theoretical/
propositional knowledge (episteme) which aims at contemplation; and practical knowledge which includes 
phronesis (knowledge which aims at action production) and techné (which aims at creation). Architectural 
design ability, for Aristotle, is a kind of technical knowledge.
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Ryle (1949) described propositional/theoretical knowledge104 and practical/procedural 
knowledge105  as “knowing that” and “knowing how” respectively.106 These ways 
of knowing can be described as both explicit and implicit.  Explicit knowledge is 
theoretical/declarative or conceptual knowing, sometimes described as intellectual, 
rational or logical ways of knowing that.  It is (relatively) easily transferred (encoded/
decoded) via language from one subject to another (taught/learned).107 The ease by 
which knowledge is transferred (regardless of the mode of transfer) determines the 
level of implicitness or explicitness. Language, as a mode of transfer is well suited 
(though not perfect, as data is occasionally lost) for transferring explicit information. 
Classroom, textbook, lecture, on-line distance methods of learning are good examples 
of this mode of transfer. Most areas (domains) of expert knowledge/ability involve a 
great deal of explicit (propositional/declarative) knowledge. Designing is no exception. 
Consider the cross-section of declarative/propositional knowledge with which 
architects are expected to be familiar: history, materials and methods of construction, 
structures, ergonomics, human environment systems, codes and zoning, economics, 
management, etc. Explicit means of acquiring this kind of information is very effective 
and easily measured. However, not all ways of knowing (thinking) or acquiring 
information are of this kind. Knowing what is involved in the domain of architectural 
design is not the same as knowing how or being able to design.108
104 Historical precedents, theories, technical knowledge about structures, systems, materials and methods of 
construction, and environmental sustainability, professional practice, finance, zoning and building codes, 
ergonomics, sociology, environmental psychology, etc. are kinds of declarative/conceptual knowledge.  
105 Design methods, methodology and procedure are kinds of procedural/heuristic knowledge 
106 This distinction between ways (modes) of knowing can be traced back to Confucius in the East who wrote: “I hear 
and I forget; I see and I remember; I do and I understand.” 
107 Collins (2010) describes the transfer of knowledge (information/data) in terms of “strings.”  That is, “bits of 
stuff inscribed with patterns” that facilitate the transfer of information between two entities. (p. 9) While strings 
are the “means by which languages are shared,” strings are not the language. Language is not the only means 
for	transferring	knowledge	between	humans. Collins’ point is that in order for the transmission of knowledge 
between humans (entities) to take place something with “a relatively fixed meaning that carries a degree of 
technical empowerment has to be transferred” (p. 10).
108 This question of knowing what and knowing how as different ways of knowing was no by any means settled by 
Polanyi and Ryles. For a more recent discussion of knowing how and how see Noe (2005). Where he agues that 
Stanley & Williamson (2001), who argue that all know how is a species of propositional knowledge, does not 
offer a sufficient reason to reject Ryle’s distinction.
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Knowing how is a kind of implicit knowledge that includes procedural/heuristic 
knowing, strategic knowing, and connoisseurship.109 Knowing how (skill/being 
able to do/make something), involves a kind of data set (domain specific situated 
information/knowledge) that is difficult to encode and transfer from one entity to the 
other via explicit means, i.e. language.110 As such, this kind of knowledge is most often 
acquired through practice (being shown how) and involves knowing/recognizing the 
difference (connoisseurship) between something well-done and something done poorly 
or just average. 111  Schön calls this situated knowing, that is “knowing-in-action.” It 
is associated with the acquisition of abilities and complex skills. Apprenticeship or 
learning by doing,112 deliberate instruction (coaching) and mentorship are effective 
means for transferring this kind of knowledge, as these allow the learner to observe an 
expert while attempting to learn not only what the master does, but why he does it.113  
109 Connoisseurship (a kind of knowing), like skill, is learned through the example of another, “it can be communicated 
only by example, not by precept. To become an expert wine-taster, to acquire a knowledge of innumerable different 
blends of tea or to be trained as a medical diagnostician, you must go through a long course of experience under the 
guidance of a master. Unless a doctor can recognize certain symptoms, e.g., the accentuation of the second sound of 
the pulmonary artery, there is no use in his reading a description of syndromes of which this symptom forms a part. 
He must personally know that symptom and can learn this only by repeatedly being given cases for auscultation in 
which the symptom is authoritatively known to be present, side by side with other cases in which it is authoritatively 
known to be absent, until he has fully realized the difference between them and can demonstrate his knowledge 
practically to the satisfaction of an expert” (Polanyi, 1974, p. 55). See also Polanyi, Personal Knowledge, 1974, p. 
54. Analogously, until a design student has experienced different types of enclosure, appreciates the dynamics 
and limitations of structural systems, possesses a first hand feeling for materials and their properties and their 
characteristics, can demonstrate knowledge of them, appreciates them, and understands how these work together 
to form a building (see for example Pallasmaa (2005) and Zumthor (2006) for how this works in architecture) it is 
unlikely that he will be able to perform at an expert level as an architect.
110 It’s the difference between explaining how to do something to someone or reading about how to do something, 
versus being able to actually do it. Knowing how/being able to actually do something (be it riding a bike, playing 
the violin, making furniture, or designing a building) is a different kind of knowledge than know what to do.
111 “The mechanism for transition of tacit knowledge is not telling and understanding, but rather performance and 
imitation” (Winch, 2010).
112 Schön’s work was heavily influenced by John Dewey’s pragmatism and his educational theory that emphasized 
learning by doing (Schön, 1992). See Dewey’s Experience and Education (1938/2015).
113 The passing on of skills is best done through apprenticeship. “An art which cannot be specified in detail cannot be 
transmitted by prescription, since no prescription for it exists, It can only be passed on by example from master to 
apprentice… To learn by example is to submit to authority. You follow your master because you trust his manner 
of doing things even when you cannot analyze and account in detail for its effectiveness, By watching the master 
and emulating his efforts in the presence of his example, the apprentice unconsciously picks up the rules of the art, 
including those which are not explicitly known to the master himself” (Polanyi, 1974, p. 53). See also Gieser (2008) 
for a phenomenological approach to apprenticeship learning. Gieser describes how learning through apprenticeship 
works by introducing the concept of empathy to show how the imitation of movements along with their intentions, 
and especially their emotions, leads to the perception of merging between two beings and thus to the ‘discovery’ of 
cultural knowledge” (p. 301). Gieser calls the process by which this occurs enskilment.
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It is similar to the Japanese apprentice who is said to be “stealing the master’s secrets,” 
where the master expects them to be stolen by the apprentice (Singleton, 1998, p. 26). 
Collins, (2010, pp. 85-86) as a critique of Polanyi, proposes that there are three types 
(levels) of tacit knowledge: strong, medium and weak, “referring to the degree of 
resistance of the tacit knowledge to being made explicit.”114 Strong (resistance) tacit 
knowledge is what he calls collective (CTK), medium (resistance) is called somatic 
(STK), and weak (resistance) is called relational (RTK). Collective has to do with the 
nature of the social (society/culture in general), “knowledge that the individual can 
acquire only by being embedded in society;” somatic has to do with the nature of the 
body, “knowledge that is inscribed in the material of the body and brain;” relational is 
a matter of how particular people relate to each other, having to do “with the relations 
between people that arise out of the nature of social life.” 
For Collins, the question is not whether or not tacit knowledge can be transferred, but 
the degree to which it can and the nature of the intermediary necessary to facilitate 
transference. He explains, “certain potentially explicable forms of tacit knowledge are 
so complex that the only practical way to transfer them from human to human is by 
close personal contact that allows for guiding, showing, imitating, and so forth as a 
short cut to explaining” (Collins, 2010, p. 87). Other considerations include whether 
(tacit) knowledge is difficult to transfer because it is concealed (as in trade secrets)115, 
or because its ostensive, that is, the best way to explain something is to point to 
something else (as in “just watch how I do it.”) Other (contingent) reasons why tacit 
knowledge might be considered difficult to make explicit/transfer is because it is 
simply too complicated (logistically), or not worth the effort (as in its easier to ask the 
librarian than memorizing where everything is and go looking for the book yourself); 
the learner lacks the previous (salient) knowledge necessary to understand  
114 All knowledge (both tacit and explicit) is passed on (transferred) through intermediaries, or strings. Intermediaries 
do not possess knowledge per se, rather they are vehicles for the passing on of information. For example, a French 
cookbook does not possess knowledge or the ability to cook French food. The cookbook is an intermediary. It is a 
vehicle for the transfer composed of bits of data in the form of a collection of papers bond together with recognizable 
ink stained patterns (letters), that when properly transferred and interpreted (received by optic nerves and 
deciphered/read) facilitate the transfer of information (communicate meaning) about French cooking. This may 
seem obtuse, but it is an important insight for understanding the nature of tacit knowledge. In this way architecture 
drawings, models and written specification are understood as intermediaries.
115 This problem of “concealed” knowledge involves both deliberately hiding or keeping secret special knowledge, and 
only passing it on to the select few; as well as knowledge that is not deliberately withheld due to a lack of awareness 
by the expert about why what he does actually works. In this case the learner is expected to “figure it out” on his own, 
while the expert acts as an evaluator of the performance not as teacher or coach. See “Chapter One: The Curse of the 
Expert” (Beilock, 2010) for an in-depth discussion on why experts often make poor teachers. Beilock writes: “As we 
get better and better at performing skills such as operating a cell phone or riding a bike, our conscious memory for 
how we do it gets worse and worse. As we become more expert and our procedural memory grows, but we may not 
be able to communicate our understanding or help others learn that skill" (p. 16).
TOC
 84	 Form	Follows	Feeling
(as in “oh I thought you knew how to read a ruler); the person passing on the knowledge 
does not know how to, is unaware, (unrecognized) or is unable to explain what he does 
(as in “I don’t know, I just do it and it usually works”).116 Polanyi (1969) writes “While 
tacit knowledge can be possessed by itself, explicit knowledge must rely on being tacitly 
understood and applied. Hence, Polanyi claims, all knowledge is either tacit or rooted in 
tacit knowledge. A wholly explicit knowledge in unthinkable” (p. 144).
Polanyi is interested, not only in how knowledge is transferred, but also in describing 
how tacit knowledge describes how scientific discovery (really) occurs (new knowledge 
is acquired). He describes tacit knowledge as a kind of knowing that is made up of a 
range of conceptual and sensory information, images and ideas that can be brought 
to bear (made use of) when making an attempt to make sense of  (understand, frame, 
find order) or perform some task that is typically associated with expert (design) 
performance (1974).  Contrary to commonly held rationalist belief that scientific 
discovery is (normally) had by an inductive process based on observable evidence, 
Polanyi (1966) claims that “scientific discovery cannot be achieved by explicit 
inference.”117 Rather, he claims, scientific discovery “must be arrived at by the tacit 
powers of the mind” (p. 138). To explain his position he turns to Gestalt theory of 
perception. (See Wagemans et al., 2012; Wong, 2010; Weber, 1995.)
Polanyi’s basic assumption is that the ability that scientists possess to perceive/recognize 
patterns, systems, and relationships in nature differs from “ordinary perception” 
only in that scientists have a more refined ability118 to discover patterns, systems and 
relationships that ordinary perception cannot. They are experts. Polanyi writes, “Scientific 
knowing consists in discerning Gestalten that indicate true coherence in nature.”119 
116 Unrecognized knowledge is the type of tacit knowledge most often associated with expert performance and 
typical of designers who prefer the “black box” theory of design. 
117 This will be an recurring theme
118 Related to connoisseurship.
119 In describing Gestalt Psychology, Broadbent describes Kohler’s observation that “whenever a form displays 
insufficient unity it will be transformed, by laws intrinsic to the brain itself, into a satisfactory… ‘good’ form, 
simple, well-balanced and symmetrical which, because of this organization, will stand out from its surroundings 
and will be perceived as a ‘figure’ against ‘ground.” This became the basis of the concept of gestalten, the 
(subconscious) tendency for the human mind to seek out order. Broadbent (1973) writes that, this observation 
was misinterpreted (especially by the Bauhaus) to mean that the brain prefers simple forms. That rather than 
interpreting the observation as a preference for simple forms, it is equally reasonable to argue that the “brain 
‘enjoys’ the task of simplifying complex forms and is liable to get bored if the challenge is removed” (p. 66). This 
is how Polanyi uses it.
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It is a kind of knowing that seeks out/discovers coherence. He describes the effortless 
ability to perceive coherence as being demonstrated by how one can perceive a series 
of rapidly changing clues “some in the field of vision, some in my eye muscles, some 
deeper in my body, as in the labyrinth of the inner ear” and somehow integrate all these 
various stimuli into one coherent perception of a particular phenomenon. The only real 
difference between this effortless/ordinary experience of integration (coherence) and 
scientific discovery is a matter of range and degree, coupled with “sustained effort”120 
and “guided by exceptional gifts.”121
This ability to integrate disparate clues into a cohesive perception, or the basic 
structure (functional relationship) of tacit knowledge, is facilitated by two kinds of 
awareness: subsidiary (attending from) and focal (attending to). Polanyi (2009) writes, 
“in an act of tacit knowing we attend from something for attending to something else” 
(p. 10). These are fundamental to the “tacit apprehension of coherence.” Subsidiary 
is an awareness of the parts. Focal is awareness of the whole. When one apprehends 
coherence, one’s awareness shifts from the subsidiary clues (parts) to a focus on the 
whole. The parts, which are elements in themselves, once perceived as part of a whole 
acquire a functional appearance: they cease being perceived as elements in themselves 
to being perceived as (subsidiary) parts of a whole (Gestalten). 
Scientific discovery involves a kind of “reverse engineering” of this experience. What 
scientists do is discover the whole (distal term of tacit knowing) and seek to define it in 
terms of its constituent parts (proximal term of tacit knowing). Polanyi calls this act of 
integration (functional relationship) “tacit knowing.” What designers do is the opposite. 
Designers take disparate (constituent) parts and “discover”122 a whole (coherent unity).123 
120 “Sustained effort” has to do with motivation, which is a topic that I will discuss later in regard to the role seeking 
an intended quality of aesthetic experience plays in the design process.
121 This issue of “exceptional gifts” will be discussed later as it relates to the concept of talent and the physical/
intellectual/psychological attributes and predispositions necessary to acquire the ability to design at 
the expert level.
122 Of course designers do not “discover a whole.” That would imply that there was a (pre-existent) whole to be 
discovered, which is absurd seeing as a designer is making something that never existed before. Rather, the 
designer manipulates the disparate constituent parts, making use of various methods and techniques, in a 
manner that results in a relationship of spaces/form and assembly of parts that is perceived as a whole and that 
satisfies (demonstrable and experiential) expectations. The perception of “wholeness” resides in the perceiver 
(which includes the designer).
123 One might also say “impose” coherence via some kind of organizing mechanism (proportion, composition, 
spatial relationship, etc.) upon the disparate parts.
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The ability to switch between proximal term (seeing things in isolation) and distal term 
(seeing things as a coherent unity) is an important quality of tacit knowing: “This is 
the phenomenal accompaniment of tacit knowing; which tells us that we have a real 
coherent entity before us” (p. 2). Tacit knowing is a claim that there is a reality that has 
not yet been perceived. It is based on an indeterminate range of anticipations, which is 
based on actual knowledge that cannot be explicitly stated. 
The classic example given by Polanyi, to describe the nature of tacit knowledge by 
analogy is the ability to ride a bike or being able to swim (Polanyi, 1966). 
If I know how to ride a bicycle or how to swim, this does not mean that I can tell how 
I manage to keep my balance on a bicycle, or keep afloat when swimming. I may not 
have the slightest idea of how I do this, or even an entirely wrong or grossly imperfect 
idea of it, and yet go on cycling or swimming merrily. Nor can it be said that I know 
how to bicycle or swim and yet do not know how to coordinate the complex pattern 
of muscular acts by which I do my cycling or swimming. I both know how to carry out 
these performances as a whole and also know how to carry them out as elementary 
acts which constitute them, though I cannot tell what these acts are. This is due to the 
fact that I am only subsidiarily aware of these things and our subsidiary awareness of a 
thing may not suffice to make it identifiable. (p. 4)
The analogy suggests two distinctions. First, just because you know how to ride a 
bike does not mean that you can (explicitly) tell someone else how. For example, you 
manage to keep your balance. You do it. But you may not have any idea how it happens. 
Most likely you cannot explain how to coordinate the complex patterns of muscle acts 
necessary to ride a bike, but still you ride “merrily” along. 
Second, even without explicit knowledge (or awareness) of the “elementary acts” 
(subsidiary) necessary to perform the whole it is still possible to do it. The disparate 
elementary acts somehow function, without explicit awareness, together as a coherent 
whole and allow you to ride from here to there. Polanyi writes that this is because 
subsidiarity awareness of disparate parts does not suffice to complete the action. For 
example, a human face is made up of subsidiary parts: overall shape, hair, nose, mouth, 
ears, chin, etc. The distinctive combination of these parts makes up the human face. 
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Polanyi's point is that though we may not be (explicitly) aware of the distinctive 
characteristics of the subsidiary parts (precisely state it) we can recognize a person’s 
face though we may not be aware of how.124 That one can acquire a complex skill, yet 
not be able to explain how or even be aware of how it happens (in terms of the  all the 
specific subsidiary acts) exemplifies how/that tacit knowledge is “discovered:” learning 
without awareness. As in learning to ride a bike, “we are relying on our awareness of 
a combination of muscular acts for attending to the performance of a skill. We are 
attending from these elementary movements to the achievement of their joint purpose, 
and hence we are usually unable to specify these elementary acts. We may call this the 
functional structure of tacit knowing” (Polanyi, 2009, p. 10). Polanyi (1966) posits 
if there can be learning without awareness, then there must be also discovery without 
awareness. Discovery comes in stages, and at the beginning the scientist has but a 
vague and subtle intimation of its prospects. Yet these anticipations, which alert his 
solitary mind, are precious gifts of his originality. They contain a deepened sense of the 
nature of things and an awareness of the facts that might serve as clues to a suspected 
coherence in nature. Such expectations are decisive for the inquiry, yet their content is 
elusive and the process by which they are reached cannot be specified. It is a typical feat 
of discovery without awareness. (p. 6)
Polanyi’s point is that there is a capability of the mind to recognize (discover) patterns, 
order, relationships that is not immediately obvious and that we cannot specify 
(articulate), but which can be learned.125 These discoveries occur not by explicit inference 
– indeed these discoveries may be inhibited by explicit inference – but rather by tacit 
knowledge.  The human mind is a coherence craving, pattern seeking, order making, 
relationship-loving, fleshy, machine. “It is a work-a-day skill for scientific guessing with a 
chance of guessing right.” A heuristic. Humans seek order naturally if we allow ourselves 
(Beitman, 2009). But, the ability to go beyond what is possible by simply “allowing 
ourselves,” to exceed the ability possessed by most people, requires practice. 
124 For example, before I went to China a photo of a group of Chinese students was just that. But after seven years 
teaching in China that same photo is no longer a “group of Chinese students” but I can recognize each individual 
(and probably describe his projects) 
125 See Beitman (2009), who addresses the following concepts: (1.) The brain seeks patterns; (2.) The brain is 
predisposed to use coincidences to create or discover patterns; (3.) The philosophical basis for interpreting 
coincidences is provided by fundamental association cortex schemata; (4.) Personally relevant coincidence 
interpretation is influenced by a person’s biases; (5.) Hemispheric lateralization influences coincidence 
detection and interpretation — the right brain associates while the left brain inhibits; and (6.) Coincidences 
suggest the possibility that we can look where we cannot see (pp. 256-263).
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In reinserting the body into thinking Polanyi defines tacit knowing as a kind of 
embodied or extended knowing. Not unlike the way the blind man uses his cane, 
feeling his way through the world. He loses the feeling of holding a stick in his hand, 
the stick disappears, and becomes an extension of his hand.126 Or the craftsman using 
a plane, who for all practical purposes may as well be feeling the wood with his hand 
as he varies the pressure and adjusts for the peculiarities of the wood.127 It is the 
difference between looking at something and attending from it at something else. It 
is a phenomenon described by Merleau-Ponty (1962) who describes the difference 
between dwelling in our body, and experiencing the world as such (without awareness 
of it), and dwelling from outside our body and experiencing it as an object. This has to 
do with how our body participates in the act of perception/knowing (which is a direct 
assault on Cartesian dualism).128 Polanyi writes:
When we attend from a set of particulars to the whole which they form, we establish 
a logical relation between the particulars and the whole, similar to that which exists 
between our body and the things outside it. In view of this, we may be prepared to 
consider the act of comprehending a whole as an interiorisation of its parts, which 
makes us dwell in the parts. …in the same sense as we live in the tools and probes 
which we use and in the culture in which we are brought up. Such indwelling is not 
merely formal; it	causes	us	to	participate	feelingly	in	that	which	we	understand. 
[Emphasis is mine.] Certain things can puzzle us; a situation may intrigue us—and 
when our understanding removes out perplexity, we feel relieved. (p. 11)129
126 This phenomenon is called “extended cognition.” See Clark & Chalmers (1998).
127 See Wilson (1998) and Sennet (2009) for a detailed discussion on the relationship between the hand and tools 
and the concept of extension
128 Ryle (1949/2000), seeing tacit knowing as a matter of philosophy of mind with roots in the mind/body problem 
(or Cartesian dualism), sought to once and for all. In simple terms mind/body dualism (with its ancient roots 
in early Greek philosophy) proposes that there are two types of knowing that are possible: that of the mind, 
which is reliable; and that of the body, which can deceive. The mind is where the real self exists. While the body, 
imprisoned as it is by the laws of physics, has a subservient (secondary) role. The mind is transcendent. The 
body is corporal. These two have separate existences. A such, the question becomes, how do they communicate. 
The body is the vehicle through which the mind inhabits the earth, and is dependent on the body for sense 
perception and data collection. A person can only perceive/communicate what is known through the body. So 
the mind (self) becomes a prisoner in the body. Descartes proposes then that the only way that a person can 
know he exists is that he thinks that he exists. Ryle finds this mind/body dualism unacceptable. He refers to the 
theory as “the ghost in the machine.” His point being that mind/body dualism is untenable. And argues that a 
person knows he exists through his body, and that this is real knowledge (pp. 11-24).
129 Participating in something “feelingly” begins to suggest the important role of the body in the (design) thinking/
decision-making/discovery process. It suggests what Schön calls inhabiting the problem space. It is the 
application of the sense to the situation, and paying attention to the quality of the experience to gain insight or 
perhaps inform the choice of which step to take along the problem-solving path.
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§  3.5 Embodied Cognition
This idea posed by Polanyi, that the problem-solver130 comprehends the problem by 
indwelling, or participating feelingly in the problem situation, reintroduces the human 
body into the problem-solving (thinking) process. It suggests that we do use our bodies 
to enter into the problem space, to inhabit it, to experience it, to apply our senses, as 
a way to both understand the problem and as a means of assessment to know what to 
do. This idea that cognitive functions are not exclusively the realm of abstract reason 
(and located exclusively in the brain qua mind), that they are dependent upon the 
physical (beyond-the-brain) body of an agent for cognitive processing is the central 
idea behind embodied cognition. (See Searle, 2015; Mallgrave, 2013/2011; Shapiro, 
2011; Johnson, 2007; Thagard, 2005; Clark, 2001; Lakoff & Johnson, 1999; Varela, 
Thompson & Rosch, 1991).131
Embodied cognition challenges the popular belief, philosophically and psychologically, 
that there is a necessary separation between a (disembodied) mind that reasons and a 
(sentient), non-rational body, by recalling our (human) evolutionary lineage, as evolved 
creatures who have inherited our cognitive abilities in a large part for the purpose 
of coping with our environment (Brooks, 1991). Lakoff and Johnson (1999) put it 
succinctly, coming at the question as philosophers informed by cognitive science:  
130 The work of Newell and Simon became the basis for what has become the study of artificial intelligence 
(AI). Great advances have been made in making machines that appeared to “think” like humans, (pass the 
Turing test) based on the belief that cognition can be accounted for in terms of “the manipulation of abstract 
representations by explicit formal rules” In the early 90’s this theory of cognition came under attack, especially 
by Brooks who argued that this approach could not “account for large aspects of what goes into intelligence” 
(Brooks, 1991, p. 1). Anderson (2003) explains that the most significant problem with cognitivism has to do 
with its dependence on representations that stand for a particular state that are composed of symbols (tokens) 
that have no necessary connection with the state of affairs at hand. And the reliance on “explicitly specifiable 
rules of thought.” Simply put, “having disconnected the form of a symbol from its meaning, cognitivism rules 
out the possibility of content sensitive processing, and so requires rules to govern the transformation from 
one cognitive state to another” (pp. 93-94). This kind of cognitivism, with its Cartesian roots forms the basis 
for what has come to be known as good old fashion artificial intelligence (GOFAI). The resultant disembodied 
theory of cognition is the basis of Dreyfus’ critique of GOFAI in his book What Computers Still Can’t Do (1992). 
This inability to perform “context sensitive processing” comes from Dreyfus’ understanding that the two most 
basic forms of human intelligence, learning and skillful action, are dependent on a human body to form a “tight 
connection between the agent and the world” (2002). 
131 As a topic of cognitive science, this question of embodiment is looked at from psychological (i.e.: Gestalt, 
in terms of perception; Gibson, in terms of affordance), philosophical (i.e.: Heidegger, in terms of being-in-
the-world; Merleau-Ponty, in terms of perception and representation occurring in the context of) and neuro- 
and computer science points-of-view. It is also considered from several other points-of-view: physiology, 
evolutionary history, practical activity and socio-cultural situatedness. It is a broad and developing area of 
research. This section will only introduce general concepts.
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“The mind is inherently embodied. Thought is mostly unconscious. Abstract concepts 
are largely metaphorical” (p. 3). They argue that reason (cognition), contrary to 
Cartesian dualism, and the Kantian radically autonomous person, who is absolutely 
free, whose reason transcends the mortal confines of the body, is not disembodied. 
Rather, “reason arises from the nature of our brains, bodies, and bodily experience… 
the very structure of reason itself comes from the details of our embodiment” (p. 
4). Reason is not that which allows us to transcend our animal nature or necessarily 
unique to humans, but rather a consequence of evolution.132 Reason is not 
transcendent, as in a universal principle, but it is a capacity, to varying degrees, that 
is shared by all human beings and (to a lesser degree) animals. Most of what we 
call reason occurs beneath cognitive awareness. It is not “purely literal, but largely 
metaphorical and imaginative. Reason is not dispassionate, but emotionally charged” 
(p. 4). Cognition evolved as a means to allow the body to inhabit the earth. Not the 
other way around. There is no human reason without a human body. Reason is shaped 
by the body (physiologically), especially by the sensorimotor system.133 Lakoff and 
Johnson (1999) claim that the western philosophical tradition (starting with Plato) 
has so misunderstood human cognition, as to “drastically distort our understanding 
of what human beings are” (p. 21). The presupposition of embodied cognition theory 
is: People	are	sentient,	thinking,	feeling	beings,	whose	bodies	have	evolved	with	the	
cognitive capacity to prosper on the earth. 
132 Wilson (2008) considers evolutionary factors contributing to the development of human cognition “from 
situation-bound to a more flexible, abstract, and general purpose form of cognition.”(p. 376) In doing so she 
considers “a cluster of possibly linked capacities that may have driven human embodied cognition, including the 
ability to exert flexible voluntary control over particular effectors, the ability to see analogies, and the ability to 
imitate.”
133 An example how cognition is inherently embodied, not just because it is made of flesh and depends on bodily 
systems for survival, but also due to the way our perceptual and motor systems play a basic role in the definition 
of concepts and rational inference, is the experience of color. Mallgrave (2011) explains Land’s discovery of 
the area V4 in the visual cortex that lead to a precise description of why we actually perceive color, contrary to 
the popular explanation that we see color due to the variations in light waves reflected off a surface. “[Land] 
demonstrated that in focusing on an object we assess the wavelength of light in a particular patch of the 
visual field (V4) with respect to its surroundings, not only for one, but for all the different wave lengths in the 
surrounding field. Therefore [making] color, far from being something out there in the world (photons have no 
color), [but] rather a creation of our biological or neurological apparatus” (2011, p.145). There are less technical 
examples as well, such as, well, we have eyes which facilitate visual perception in a particular manner. Not like a 
camera. But in thousands of little snippets that enter through the lens that hit the retina upside down. They then 
pass through nerve cells distributed across the retina made up of about 100 million rods and five million cones, 
that transmit information, through the optic nerve to opposite sides of the visual cortex where the information 
is processed in both hemispheres of the brain that segregate details of object recognition into lines, shapes, 
color and motion. Other bits of information is sorted and sent out to other areas of the brain (i.e. occipital lobe) 
where functions such as facial recognition take place. Further information is sent to the temporal lobes for form 
recognition, and still other functional processing which trigger memories and emotions. This system does not 
only allow us to see, but determines what we can see, what expect we can see, and how we see.
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 Embodiment theory argues that the mind is not just something that resides in the 
body, rather the very properties of concepts are created as a result of the way the brain 
and body are structured and the way they function in intra/interpersonal relations 
and in the physical world” (Lakoff & Johnson, 1999, p. 37). The basis for these claims 
comes from advances in neuroscience.134  Building on Lakoff’s previous work Metaphors 
We Live By (2003), Lakoff and Johnson observe that spatial relationship concepts 
evolved from the human body’s relationship to its environment.135 Spatial relationship 
terms such as in, on, over, through, under; concepts of body movement, like grasp, pull, 
lift, tap, punch; as well as concepts pointing to the structure of action or events like, 
starting, stopping, resuming, continuing, finishing, describe what the body does, and as 
such can be understood to be shaped by the body. The point being: “The visual systems 
of our brains are used in characterizing spatial-relations concepts. Our actual motor 
schemata and motor synergies are involved in what verbs of motor movement mean. 
And the general form of motor control gives general form to all our actions and the 
events that we perceive” (p. 39). There is a strong, inescapable relationship between 
the development of basic concepts and how the body interacts with its environment. 
Even a concept as fundamental (to design such) as Gibson’s (1986) affordance, relies 
on a human body in order to know how to interact with a given situation.136  
134 Lakoff & Johnson (1999) refer to their appendix, and research by Regier (1995), Bailey (1997), and Narayanan 
(1997) to substantiate this claim. See also Mallgrave (2011) and Damasio (1994) for similar research.
135 I first encountered this idea in Bloomer & Moore,’s Body, Memory, and Architecture (1977). In the first paragraph 
of the first chapter they write, “At the very beginning of our individual lives we measure and order the world out 
from our own bodies: the world opens up in front of us and closes behind. Front thus becomes quite different 
from back, and we give attention to our fronts, as we face the world, which is quite different from the care we 
give to our backs and what lies behind us. We struggle, as soon as we are able, to stand upright, with our heads 
atop our spines, in a way different from any other creatures in the world, and up derives a set of connotations 
(including moral ones) opposite from down. In our minds left and right soon become distinguished from each 
other in quality as well as in direction, as words like ‘sinister’ and ‘dexterous’ record” (p. 1).
136 Affordances, a term “made-up” by Gibson (1986), are those elements and situations in an environment that 
offer, provide, or furnish, for good or ill, value or meaning to an agent. For example a flat surface of suitable 
strength and area may afford support for a human being. The term flat, extended, rigid, horizontal, are 
properties of a surface that are measured relative to the agent. The concept proposes that a physical thing as 
experienced or perceived by a physical agent offers opportunities relative to the physical body (form, shape, 
attributes, properties) of the agent. For example a rock in the forest may afford a cozy shelter for a worm, and 
also afford a convenient place to sit and take a rest for a hiker. (And these can take place simultaneously.) Much 
of our environment acquires meaning in terms of the value the constituent elements afford us. This includes the 
physical elements in our immediate environment (a horizontal surface 900mm above the ground, supported 
by four elements that keep the surface stable affords a work surface suitable to stand at. But rather than 
going through the trouble of identifying the many affordances that give this assembly of elements meaning or 
usefulness, we simply call it a table), as well as “substances that afford ingestion” (seem to be good to put in 
one’s mouth). Some of these substances afford poisoning and others afford nutrients.  
 
>>>
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As such Gallagher (2005) poses the question, “To what extent, and in what ways are 
consciousness and cognitive (noetic or mental) processes, which include experiences 
related to perception, memory, imagination, belief, judgment, and so forth, shaped or 
structured prenoetically by the fact that they are embodied?” (p. 2).
The above question goes right to the dilemma posed by the rational processor system 
approach to problem-solving described by Newell et al. There is a likelihood that, 
while Newell et al. arrived at significant insights into problem-solving by attempting 
to abstract the process from human experience, codifying it and mechanizing it, the 
system they propose does not really describe how human problem-solvers function. 
Humans do not seem to function the same as (dis-embodied) information processing 
systems. (Though we do make use of them). 
Simon’s concept of bounded rationality does not only apply to limits of memory 
and the cognitive capacity of the brain, but also applies to, due to the shape and 
characteristics of our bodies, the limits of both how we experience and perceive the 
world. Humans are limited by space and time. Humans have limited hearing and visual 
ranges. The sense of smell, touch and the range of temperature humans can experience 
are all determined by the human body. In addition to this, the human mind possesses a 
particular type of structure that determines what we can experience and how we make 
sense of what we do experience in a situation. The human mind is limited by the means 
of encoding and transferring information that are available, especially by language. 
These limitation are not deficiencies, rather these are simply the bounds within which 
human cognition takes place. 
In the cognitive model, a human problem-solver (agent) possesses a body schema 
and body image137 that inhabit a world. Body schema refer to how a person 
perceives his body via a mental model, that includes his perceived shape, size, 
location of limbs, and orientation in space. Straus (1970), identifies the body 
schema as a “cortical representation, a neurophysiological map of body parts 
located in the somatosensory cortex, operating below the level of self-referential 
intentionality: close to automatic performances” (Gallagher, 2005, p. 21). 
>>> This applies to animate objects as well. For example the child affords the family dog a playful interaction. The 
dog brings the ball to the child and waits for the child to throw it. For Gibson, the concept of affordances is a 
lens through which to see the world. He distinguishes affordances from values, in this way tries to avoid the 
objections of the philosophers in terms of meaning and being, and the psychologists who are concerned with 
perception, physicality or phenomenal experience. The concept of affordances affords a way to experience 
elements and situations in an environment prenoetically.
137 There is some difference of opinion in the literature about the meaning of these terms. See Gallagher (2005, p. 21)
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The body schema is able to extend its identification beyond personal corporal limits 
to include, say a hammer. While the body image “consists of a system of perception, 
attitudes and beliefs pertaining to one’s body… that involves a form of reflexive or 
self-referential intentionality… and normally represents the body as my own body” (p. 
25). The body image influences posture and location in space. 
How does the agent know how to interact with the world in the problem-solver 
as information processor system?138 Newell et al. (1958) write, “To think about 
something, that something must have an internal representation of some 
kind, and the thinking organism must have some processes that are capable of 
manipulating the representation” (p. 58). Similar to what was discussed earlier, 
Newell and Simon proposed that the agent constructs representations, which 
are generated from data (proposition-like mental entities) not only of itself 
(body schema and body image), but also of its (given) physical environment 
(situation).139 Insofar as this environment is stable and predictable, the 
system can build a two or three -dimensional representation (model) that is 
sufficiently complex, within which it can function and generate a plan of action.140 
138 Perez-Gomez, referring to the work of Eva Thomson (2007) describes embodied dynamicism as the concept in 
cognitive science that “called into question the conception of cognition as disembodied and abstract mental 
representation. The mind and the world are simply not separate and independent of each other; the mind is an 
embodied dynamic system in the world” (p. 223).
139 Peirce (1873), in addition to coining the term abduction, is also closely connected with semiotics. It is in this 
context that he explores the question of representations. Peirce defines a representation as “an object which 
stands for another so that an experience of the former affords us a knowledge of the latter.” A representation, 
for Pierce, has three essential conditions to which it must conform: It must have qualities independent of its 
meaning; it must have real causal connection with its object; it must address itself to a mind. Ideas, in the 
strictest sense, are all representations. “A representation not only has material qualities but also imputes 
certain qualities to its object.” It is the function of representations not only to communicate abstract ideas, 
but also to communicate concrete and experiential qualities of the idea/concept. According to Bundgaard and 
Stjernfelt (2010), Peirce, by including iconic signs, logic and perception as the basic semiotic phenomena of 
representations, he “avoids the pitfalls of linguistic imperialism and the ensuing ideas of being trapped in ‘the 
prison house of language’” (p. 69).
140 The cognitive function of representations and even the existence of mental representations is a contentious 
issue in cognitive science. The less extreme theories settle in on a happy medium, which allows for a kind of 
mental representation that has an inter-dependent and dialogical relationship with the environment. An 
example of such a theory is the Representational Theory of the Mind proposed by Fodor (1980, 1985).
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This would have to be a world that accounts for gravity and temperature change,141 
where windows suddenly open, where other agents unexpectedly cross your path. 
Systems that function like this are called a sense-model-plan-act framework 
(SMPA).142 The problem with this framework, according to Brooks, is that it is 
“insufficiently dynamic.” For an agent to survive in an environment like this the system 
must constantly build and re-build an internal representation of the environment, 
locate itself in the environment and build and re-build an internal representation/
image of itself, as well as be able to function in an almost infinite number of possible 
situations. Brooks observes that this “SMPA is by its nature too expensive (in terms of 
cognitive resources), and therefore biologically implausible” (Anderson, 2003, p. 97). 
Though it may be possible to solve the technical challenges, its not likely that this is an 
accurate model of human cognition. 
Human cognition evolved over millions of years from the primordial soup to an 
intelligent agent. The problem with the agent as information processor is that it is 
not "physically grounded in animal systems… These [animal] groundings provide the 
constraints on symbols necessary for them to be truly useful” (Brooks, 1991). The 
rules of abstract thinking need to be “grounded” not so much in logic and rational 
inductive reasoning but in “the more evolutionary primitive mechanisms which 
control perception and action” (Anderson, 2003, p. 100). Dreyfus writes, “Adherents 
of the psychological and epistemological assumptions that human behavior must be 
formalizable in terms of heuristic programs for a digital computer are forced to develop 
a theory of intelligent behavior which makes no appeal to the fact that man has a body, 
since at this stage at least the computer clearly doesn’t have one” (1992. p.235). That 
is, “the structure of our conceptual schema – is primarily determined by practical 
criteria, rather than abstract or logical ones” (Anderson, 2003, p. 104).
141 Blickhard (2009) argues that while several aspects of biology (mental and normative processes) have been 
embraced by cognitive science, the thermodynamics of living systems has not. Framing cognition as an 
information processing system (plus the cultural predisposition to Cartesian dualism) raised the possibility 
that the mind could be modeled relatively independently from the brain. As cognitive science has evolved 
this concept of a disembodied mind has been continually challenged. One particular challenge was that of 
interactivism. The theory emerged from discussions related to the relevance (necessity) of representations to 
cognitive activity and how these representations correspond to the situation they are intended to represent. 
From this discussion grew the question of how representational models emerge (and re-emerge adjusted) that 
more accurately correspond to the target situation. This dialogue lead to a dynamic systems approach (feedback 
seeking homeostasis) interactive model based on biological foundations.
142 These systems have shown great promise in the area of robotics. See Brooks (1991).
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The theory of embodiment has many critics.143 Probably the most significant of which 
is the claim that “no complex, intelligent creature can actually get by entirely without 
representations” (Anderson, 2003, p. 115). This appears to me to be a legitimate 
criticism.144 It seems reasonable that complex data sets would be organized and 
experienced as internal (mental) representations, that can be externalized either to 
test for congruence or to transfer (communicate) with another. It does seem to be 
true that a certain aspect of “problem solving routines involve intensive cooperation 
between computations and internal representations on the one side, and repeated 
environmental interactions on the other” (Anderson M. L., 2003, p. 108). Be that as 
it may, embodied cognition does provide a way of answering some of the questions 
posed by Polanyi, especially those concerning (1.) agency, (2.) situatedness, (3.) tacit 
knowing, and (4.) the role of the body as an assessing mechanism. 
1 Agency (processing system): The understanding of the agent as a person with cognitive 
capacities shaped by a particular body dwelling in the world as it is, is itself a useful 
meta-heuristic which says: when faced with a problem, approach it as a person with 
cognitive capacities shaped by a particular body dwelling in the world, rather than as a 
disembodied information processor. 
2 Situatedness: With this meta-heuristic in hand, it gives the agent permission to 
engage the situatedness of the problem, making use of knowledge accumulated over a 
lifetime145 as well as that bestowed on us by our evolutionary inheritance. 
3 Tacit	Knowing:	Given that human ways of knowing are not limited to those acquired 
as a disembodied information processing system, but rather, and perhaps more 
importantly, exist primarily as means for interacting with world, we have the advantage 
of thinking about the problem making use of all the cognitive resources of our entire 
body, including sense systems and emotions. Without having to make excuses or 
apologize for it.146
143 See Bickard (2008) for a comprehensive review. 
144 See for example Takano and Okubo’s (2006) study on metal rotation: the cognitive ability to create mental 
representations of a rotated object and its transformations. See also Shepard (1971).
145 Which includes cultural knowledge understood as “accumulated collective knowledge.” (Conversation with 
Henco Bekkering 2017, 01, 29.)
146 Mitrovic, in his provocative book Visuality for Architects (2013) observes, “The expectation that one must 
justify architectural design by referring to something outside architecture, that formal and visual qualities 
are of secondary importance in architecture, has not just accidentally happened to dominate thinking about 
architecture. It has its own history and originates in a number of philosophical and psychological positions 
that became influential in the 1960’s. While these positions have in the meantime ceased to be credible in 
philosophy and psychology, they have remained enshrined as dogmas in the writings of architects, architectural 
theorists, and historians” (p. xiii).
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4 Assessing mechanism: And finally, the theory of embodied cognition demands that one 
engage the problem in a feelingly way.147 That one gives into one's natural tendency to 
restructure the situation in a search for coherence (gestalt). That one applies his senses 
to feel the situation. That one engage multiple systems, including haptic, somatic, 
hedonic, that are available to him, considering options and alternative way of framing 
and reframing the problem outside the (black) box.
§  3.6 Summary
This chapter explained that while inductive/deductive reasoning is often referred 
to as the foundation of the scientific method, Popper, Rittel, Ryles and Polanyi offer 
convincing arguments that show that its not that simple. I have emphasized three 
aspects of their arguments: (1.) That while one can arrive at astute observations, 
recognize patterns and suggest or make an educated guess as to why phenomena 
occur in a manner that is verifiable, claiming that such an observation, is a universal 
truth, useful as it might be, is more wishful thinking than fact. (2.) The presupposition 
that the scientist approaches the problem with an “innocent eye,” without bias, 
and open to any possible result, while perhaps a great ideal way of approaching a 
problem that is worthwhile, it does not reflect the reality of the situation. All data 
processing systems have limitations (are bounded). Scientists, problem-solvers, and 
designers bring on their experiences, memories, feelings, expectations, expertise, 
as well as presuppositions to every situation. They rely on these for insight and 
motivation. (3.) In contradiction to popular concepts of knowledge, it is possible to 
know more than you can say. A good deal of knowledge is per-linguistic. Its embodied 
knowledge that allows one to know how. This knowledge is acquired not by explicit 
means, such as reading a book, but rather by being shown how, and by doing. 
This kind of knowledge is difficult to transfer (encode) in explicit terms. But it is real. 
147 The role of emotions in problem-solving has become a topic of interest in the cognitive sciences as well as in 
decision-making theory. Lerner et al. (2015) provide research that supports emotions as being “powerful, 
pervasive, and predictable drivers of decision making” (p. 799). Thagard & Schröder (2014) explain this 
function of emotions as a way of explaining cognitive phenomena “from low-level perceptual abilities all the 
way up to high-level reasoning” (p. 1). defining this function as semantic pointers. The concept of semantic 
pointers is defined by Blouw, et al. (2015) as “symbol-like representations that result from the compression 
and recursive binding of perceptual, lexical, and motor representations, effectively integrating traditional 
connectionist and symbolic approaches” (p. 1). 
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(4.) All problem-solving and scientific inquiry rely on solution-generators and 
verification systems. These work in tandem. Solution generators scan the problem 
space looking for solution opportunities, while verification systems assess the value of 
these opportunities. Verification systems are not limited to logical rational assessment, 
but include seeking coherence as well as inhabiting the problem situation feelingly as a 
way to know.
This section shows that while human problem-solving is highly dependent on reason 
and logic, problem solving involves more than reason and logic, it also involves 
the body, feelings and experiential knowledge. Human cognition is fundamentally 
embodied. Humans do make use inductive reasoning for scientific discovery. However, 
claims to universal truth may be over-stated. The Cartesian mind (disembodied reason) 
does not adequately describe how humans know, Polanyi’s account of tacit knowledge 
(embodied reason), coupled with the theory of embodied cognition, seems to be a 
more viable approach to problem-solving and design cognition.
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4 The Design Process
Thinking goes on in trains of ideas, but the ideas form a train only because they are 
much more than what an analytic psychology calls ideas. They are phases, emotionally 
and practically distinguished, of a developing underlying quality; they are its moving 
variations, not separate and independent like Locke’s and Hume’s so-called ideas and 
impressions, but are subtle shadings of a pervading and developing hue…
(Dewey, 1934/2005, p.39)
Returning to the working definition proposed in Chapter One,148 and allowing that this 
may be a reasonable description of architectural design, how then does this “solution-
driven problem-solving process” that results in a building/built environment that 
solves for certain criteria and qualities, and is intended for human use work? How then, 
in light of the cognitive theory presented in Chapter Two, does a designer get from 
the problem state to the solution state. Are there identifiable functions, phases and 
components? How does the expert designer come-up with a solution? How does the 
designer know which of the many possible solution paths is the right one to take? And 
how does the designer know when a solution is had?
§  4.1 Designing as Process
As discussed above, problem-solving for real-world problems, where there is an 
expectation for a novel solution and an artifact intended for human use, is not 
adequately described by theories of inductive reasoning (traditional definitions 
of the “scientific method), technical rationality, or general problem theory. This 
is better achieved by what Clark (1997, p. 135) calls situateduated reasoning – 
reasoning by embodied beings acting in a real physical environment. 
148 Design is “a kind of solution-driven problem-solving process that results in the making of a functional 
representation for a building/built environment that solves for design criteria and constraints, is technically 
competent, coherent, and possesses intended aesthetic qualities for human use.” See Chapter Two. 
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Due	to	the	embodied	nature	of	the	human	problem-solver,	not	only	are	problem-
solving processes dependent on/bounded by the neurocognitive architecture of the 
human	body	(including	the	brain),	but	they	are	also	dependent	on	the	human	body-
environment	relationship	as	a	primary	means	of	assessing	the	effectiveness,	quality	
and feasibility of a design solution. 149 The theories of tacit knowledge and embodied 
cognition described above offer a more probable description of how designer/problem-
solvers think, that works with open-ended problems, allows for novelty and establishes 
expectations for the qualitative assessment of a solution (building/built environment) 
intended for human use. With these theories of human cognition in hand, the next 
problem is to describe how designers apply their cognitive abilities to a problem 
situation to produce a solution. 
Dewey (1934/2005), as quoted above, writes about cognitive processes (thinking) 
as occurring in “phases, emotionally and practically distinguished, of a developing 
underlying quality… [with] subtle shadings of a pervading and developing hue” (p. 
39).  Newell and Simon’s description of cognitive processes is far more mechanical, no 
emotions, no underlying quality, or "pervading and developing hue." But both Dewey 
and Newell and Simon, consider human cognition as a process: a series of actions or 
steps taken to achieve a particular end (English Oxford Living Dictionary, 2017).150 
To describe designing as a cognitive process it is first necessary to identify the series 
of actions or steps taken to achieve a particular end that constitutes what it means 
to design. One method of doing this is the application of functional analysis.151 
149 A study by Alexiou et al. (2009) on the neurological basis of design cognition suggest that not only are 
problem-solving and design different, but that “design and problem-solving involve distinct cognitive functions 
associated with distinct brain networks” (p. 642). The role of the body in assessing the quality of the design 
solution will be discussed below.
150 Maier, et al. (2012) describe a process in the cybernetic sense as a “particular situation as it happened to 
unfold” (p. 234). They describe five types of process models that provide insight into and support design 
problem-solving. These include the prescriptive (how it should be done) and descriptive (how it is actually 
done) types which have already been discussed above. The other types include, predictive (how it will be done), 
contingent (how it could be done), and historical (how it was done).
151 Cummins (1983) provides a psychological explanation of how functional analysis works in three-stages: (1.) 
function is defined; (2.) it is organized into a set of simpler functions; (3.) the rules for how the functions interact 
with each other is described. Functional analysis is the analysis of a capacity in terms of the functional properties 
of a system and their organization, that is “…the attempt to explain the properties of complex systems—
especially their characteristic effects—by the analysis of a systemic property into organized interaction among 
other simpler systemic properties or properties of component subsystems” (Roth & Cummins, 2017, p. 11). The 
functional analysis of design results in a process where design is (1.) understood as a complex system, that is 
(2.)  broken into its constituent functions, and (3.) how these functions inter-relate are described. 
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Once the functional properties of a system, their organization and inter-relationships 
are understood, the system can then be described in terms of a series of (cognitive) 
actions, states or phases of discernable transitional components.  For example, a 
typical five-phase description of the design process that one might use to describe 
the design process to a novice might be: a problem situation is presented b [define 
the problem space b frame the problem (discover a way to think about the problem) 
b seek a solution for both demonstrable criteria and experiential qualities] b arrive 
at a solution. 152 Each phase represents a different state along the problem-framing/
solution-seeking path. The series of actions, transitional components, and inter-
relationships are then, typically, represented as a linear diagram.153 However, it should 
be understood that while describing designing as a process and producing diagrams 
to represent them is useful and can be helpful for understanding cognitive capacities 
involved in designing, diagrams, like the processes they represent are  artificial 
approximations. Diagrams by nature lack in detail. That is what makes them useful. 
They are intended to provide a conceptual approximation (visual representation) of 
how the design process may happen. They are often missing (implicit and explicit) 
functions, such as feedback loops, motivations, search and decision-making criteria 
depending on the grain (level of detail) of the representation. How actions and steps 
are identified and categorized may also differ, from one diagram to another, depending 
on one’s perspective, domain of practice, experience and level of expertise. 
152 Broadbent points out that even at the first Conference on Design Methods (1962) where J. K. Page pointed 
out “the fallacy of believing that a design process consists of a single, simple sequence ‘straight through from 
analysis to synthesis to evaluation’ because, as he said, ‘in the majority of practical design situations, by the 
time you have produced this and found out that and made a synthesis, you realize that you have forgotten to 
analyze something else here, and you have to go round the cycle and produce a modified synthesis, and so on. In 
practice you go round several times” (1973, p.256). A few pages later he refers to a report produced in 1966 by 
the Tavistok Institute of Human Relations, which points out that “no design process can be completely linear. It 
must incorporate feed-back loops of some kind so that new information which is thrown up at any stage may be 
included in the further recycling of one of the decision sequences” (1973, p.269). 
153 Gedenryd (1988) is highly critical of design methodology in general and especially the tendency to represent it 
in linear diagrams, which he sees as being based on rationality, abstraction, and rigorous principles. Referring to 
Alexander (1964), Asimow (1962), Jones (1970), and Simon (1996), he writes “It portrays, or rather prescribes, 
design as an orderly, stringent procedure which systematically collects information, establishes objectives, and 
computes the design solution, following principles of logical deduction and mathematical optimization techniques.” 
He even goes further, writing, “Having said this much about design methods, there is but one thing to add: They 
don’t work, and they don’t work at all” (p. 59). It is important to note that Gedenryd died (November, 2002) soon 
after the publication of this book. So while his opinion about design methodology is representative of the time he 
was writing, it would be interesting to read what he thinks about how the discipline has evolved over the past 25 
years. I have no expectation that using any particular design methodology will result in a superior design solution. 
My understanding and application of design methodology is as a description of how design in general and how some 
individual designers work, or think they work. Insofar as these methodologies offer an insight into the acquisition of 
design expertise, I find them very useful. Still, his critique is well thought out and worth considering. See also Coyne 
et al. (1990, pp. 94-123) for a discussion on issues related to representing design.
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However, diagramming the process (as perceived by the designer, or observed by the 
researchers), does provide a way to describe designing as an evolutionary process, perhaps 
as a “journey”, that approximates the sequence, means, methods and procedures the 
designer uses to identify a design problem all the way through proposing a solution.154
Even though the term process may suggest otherwise, designing is not a simple step-
by-step procedure. Designing is a kind of thinking, that involves underlying cognitive 
mechanisms (Gabora, 2002). It is a complex cognitive process that is directed, open-
ended, self-correcting, seeks novelty (creative), and results in an artifact for human 
use. In this way designing is better described as a system: a self-correcting, recursive 
process aimed at a specific end. 
The application of system theory, such as Churchman’s Systems Approach (1968), as a 
means for understanding design, lead to the development of design methodologies,155 
that is, a system of methods156 used in a particular domain or type of problem aimed at 
a specific end. 
154 Journey, as a metaphor, is used widely in various contexts including research and project-based studies, such as 
“innovation journey” (Van de Ven, 2017). Richard MacCormack, a British architect, uses the journey metaphor 
to illustrate his design process: “The design process is a journey, an episodic journey towards a destination 
which you don’t know about, which is what life is and what writing and all arts like; a journey (As quoted by 
Lawson, 1994, p. 62). Cross (2011) also uses this metaphor to describe the design process. He treats the design 
brief as the starting point and a known part of the journey. Cross cites Rowe (1998), “stand back and adopt a 
fresh point of departure” (cited in Cross, 2011, p. 36). Similarly, Jones (1992) likens a designer to an explorer 
looking for a hidden treasure, and sees design methods as navigational tools and maps. To him, a new problem 
is like an unknown land, of unknown extent, in which the explorer searches by making a network of journeys. 
Design methods assist in plotting the course of the journey and maintaining some control over where design 
goes. On the other hand, Lawson and Dorst (2009) use the journey metaphor to describe the overall process 
of developing expertise: “we see the creation of design expertise as a journey” (p. 21). For them, acquiring 
expertise is a long journey that commences with graduation.” 
155 Though related and often used interchangeably, methodology and method are not the same. Methodology is 
defined as: A system of methods used in a particular area of study or activity. (English Oxford Living Dictionaries, 
2017) Bochenski (1965) describes methodology as “the theory of the application of the laws of logic to various 
fields” (See de Vries 1997). Method is defined as: “a particular procedure for accomplishing or approaching 
something, especially a systematic or established one” (English Oxford Living Dictionaries, 2017). A method 
is a way of doing something, or achieving an incremental goal. A method might be a rule-of-thumb, a simple 
procedure, or useful trick that solves a problem. A method can also be understood as a heuristic. Newell (1980) 
identifies a method as possessing four characteristics: (1.) It is a specific way to proceed; (2.) It is a rational way 
to proceed; (3.) It involves sub-goals and sub-plans; (4.) Its occurrence is observable. 
156 Throughout the design process, designers make use of multiple methods (heuristics) and strategies that facilitate 
the overall design process. Methods include diagramming, mapping, brain-storming, sketching, drawing, modeling, 
critique, testing, etc. Methods can be used to help define the problem, facilitate the process, evaluate the solution. 
One of the earliest collections of methods is Universal Traveler: A Soft Systems Guide to Creativity, Problem-solving and 
the Process of Reaching Goals (Koberg & Bagnall, 2003). Christian Gänshirt (2007) calls these methods “design tools.” 
 
>>>
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Design methodologies describe (and sometimes prescribe) what expert designers do, 
and help to understand how design expertise is acquired. Alexander (1984) writes, 
that the intent of describing design methodologies is “to try and create well-defined 
procedures which will enable people to design better buildings” (pp. 3-7). Cross (1984) 
describes the purpose of studying design methodology as a way to understand “how 
designers work and think; [by] the establishment of appropriate structures for the 
design process; the development and application of new design methods, techniques, 
and procedures; and reflection on the nature and extent of design knowledge and its 
application to design problems” (p. vii). 
Historically, attempts at systematizing designing have not been well received by 
practitioners, who resist even the suggestion of a systematic approach to designing 
for fear of prescriptive, formulaic or cook-book methodologies.157 The fear was well 
deserved. During the “design methods” phase of design research, it was accepted that 
proposing a (scientific) design methodology implied that there must be a way to codify 
what designers do, analyze it, apply new tools offered by systems theory and cognitive 
science, and propose a more efficient/effective, if not the optimal, way of applying 
cognitive ability to a design problem that guaranteed (or at least made it more likely), if 
applied properly, would result in a superior design solution. Broadbent (1973) quotes 
architect Eric Lyons as saying. “Design methods, ah yes. That’s where they do all those 
charts and diagrams instead of designing buildings” (p. 282). Like Newell and Simon 
seeking to codify the problem-solving process, multiple attempts were made by design 
theorists to verify these findings by mechanizing (computerizing) the design process. 
These involved applying the language of inductive reasoning (scientific rationalism) 
and systems theory to describe how designers think by proposing prescriptive methods, 
that could produce predictable, reproducible results. It was successful to a degree, but 
not to the extent that a design machine could pass the Turing Test.
>>> Design tools can be organized into 12 categories: gesture; sketch; language; design drawing; model, projective 
view; photograph; film video; calculation; computer, program, simulation; criticism; theory. Curedale has 
assembled an impressive collection of methods in three volumes: Design Thinking Process & Methods 
(Curedale, 2016);  Design Methods 1 & 2 (Curedale, Design Methods 1, 2012). An excellent synthesis between 
methodology and methods can also be found in Delft Design Guide (van Boeijen, Daalhuizen, Zijlstra, & 
van der Schoor, 2013).
157 Gerkan (1998) writes that “the assertion that design could be explicitly effected in terms of methodology is 
charlatanism” (p. 39).  Kucker, as quoted by Gänshirt (2007), criticizes the “so-called scientific approach to 
design:” saying that cutting the dimensions of design down to something comprehensible on the basis of 
rational planning process is bound to fail, as designing is an artistic act (p. 29).
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The mainstream of design researchers abandoned this prescriptive approach. Because, 
while prescribed methods followed a clear logic, that resulted in logically coherent, 
elegant, rational processes, they were often based on personal reflection and how 
design researchers thought that designers should design, rather than how they actually 
designed (Broadbent, 1973). This approach to theorizing designing was an example 
where theory preceded practice (Schön, 1991). In reassessing the situation, especially 
in light of the work of Simon (1996), Broadbent (1973), Rittel (Protzen & Harris, 
2010) and Churchman (1968), it was recognized that due to the different nature of 
design problems, the expectation for novel results, and difficulty in providing accurate 
means for assessing experiential factors, general problem-solving theory (GPS) was 
not adequate for accurately describing design problem-solving. This acknowledgment 
in many ways breathed new life into the Design Methods movement, leading to what 
came to be known as Design Theory and Methodology period of design research. 
Design Theory and Methodology researchers, rather than starting with 
prescriptive methods of problem-solving derived from cognitive science, 
turned to the social sciences, making use of design protocols that emphasized 
observing designers (novice, professional and expert) actually designing. These 
protocols were then codified, diagrammed and mapped, analyzed, and tested 
using various (verifiable) means and methods (in an effort) to identify patterns 
of behavior and thinking processes that describe how designers “really” design.158 
158 One of the on-going challenges with protocol analysis is the lack of a consistent method of documenting the 
results. Goldschmidt (2014) offers a (mapping) model that tracks the design process using a notation method 
that documents design moves she calls linkography. The premise underlying the linkography theory is that 
“the quality and the creativity of a design process depend on the designer’s ability to synthesize a solution 
that exhibits good fit among all its components”(p. 73). Rather than looking at design phases, or “sweeping 
comprehensive models,” linkography documents how designers design making use of a linkograph to identify 
incremental critical moves that make up the design process. A linkograph is similar to a decision-making map. A 
move, is understood as “a step in the [design] process that changes the situation”(p. 42). The linkograph evolved 
from years of research based on protocol analysis and a recognition of the inadequacy of the tools available to 
document the activity of the designers. Its intended as a way to standardize design protocol notation.
 According to this theory the early part of the design process can be seen as a synthesis of a “series of cycles of 
divergent and convergent thinking… in which ideation and evaluation follow each other in frequent proximity, 
pertaining to embodiment and rationale”(p. 47). These cycles are documented by identifying and sequentially 
numbering moves and connecting them via backlinks and forelinks. There are four types of moves: orphan 
moves, unidirectional moves, bidirectional moves, and critical moves. Moves that propose are forward looking, 
resulting in forelinks. Moves that are evaluative are backward looking, resulting in backlinks. The diagrams 
that result from the moves (nodes) and the links (lines), result in a web-like graphic. Linkography is concerned 
with the links between moves, as such “it is believed that this is the best way to capture the essence of design 
cognition and behavior” (p. 52).
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The patterns and processes (heuristics and methods) observed by design researchers, 
after taking into account the distinctive attributes of the design process, often did 
follow the meta-structure of GPS phases, but with different functions.159 
The thing to keep in mind, is that designing	is	not	a	process,	per	se. Designing is 
fundamentally a human cognitive ability. A process is an artificial construct used to 
describe or approximate directed behavior. Structuring certain human behaviors as 
processes is a product of the architecture (structure) of human cognition.160 Design 
processes and the methodologies are approximations used to describe/understand 
what	designers	do.161
§  4.2 Design as Black Box
A system is a big black box. 
Of which we can’t unlock the locks, 
And all we can find out about 
Is what goes in and what comes out. 
Perceiving input-output pairs, 
Related by parameters, 
Permits us, sometimes to relate 
An input, output and a state. 
If this relation’s good and stable 
Then to predict we may be able, 
But if this fails us – heaven forbid! 
We’ll be compelled to force the lid!
(Boulding, 1964) 
159 One of the most influential protocols was the Delft Protocol (Cross, Christiaans, & Dorst, Analyzing Design 
Activity, 1996). Many of the researchers who were involved in this foundational study, such as Cross, Dorst, 
Eastman, went on to become leaders in the field. 
160 Sweller (2008) defines human cognitive architecture as, “the manner in which structures and functions required 
for human cognitive processes are organized” (p. 370).
161 Insofar as design can be described a processes and/or methodology, whether they are aware of it or not, 
explicitly or implicitly, all designers can be said to make use of a design methodology, or multiple methodologies 
depending on the situation. Be it a methodology of their own making, borrowed from someone else, yet to be 
described, or read about in a book. 
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Since just prior to WWII, when design research and systems theory were coming into 
their own as individual disciplines it has become more-or-less common (though there 
are still some who resist the concept), to think of design in terms of process. 
In its most basic (meta) form, designing can be described as a kind of problem solving-
heuristic that involves three phases or states: the problem phase b [the problem 
framing/solution-seeking phase] b the solution phase. If we can accept that what 
a designer does can be described as a process, and we can accept that a process is 
made up of multiple phases, and that these phases function in a manner that is inter-
dependent and directed toward a particular kind of problem-solving situation; and if we 
can accept that the designing/problem-solving process is initiated by the problem state 
and is terminated by the solution state, then what we are interested in is the problem 
framing/solution seeking phase. This is the question for this chapter; to describe what 
happens between the brackets described in the three-phase heuristic above.
Expert designers, when asked how they arrive at a design solution, resisting getting 
into too much detail or hesitant to give away trade secrets, seeming to prefer what is 
called the “black box” theory of designing: define the problem (input) b [something 
magical happens (designing)] b solution (output).162 Of course this black box theory 
of design/problem-solving is not adequate if one wants to understand how designing 
really happens (how the designer as transformative agent arrives at a solution),163 or 
if someone wants to learn how to design. However, the black box theory does provide 
a simple three-phase model: input, process, output. The assumption is that the black 
box receives the input, say the project brief; and the output is a design solution. 
162 Jones (1992) introduces the black box model of design with a “picture” of the brain as “a semi-autonomous 
device that is capable of resolving incompatibilities between inputs (i.e. solving problems) by assuming a 
pattern that is compatible not only with current inputs but also with many previous inputs of which the memory 
is composed” (p. 47). He then offers three alternative ways of thinking about this basic design model as: 
intuitive (black box thinking), rational (glass box thinking), and procedural (thoughts about thoughts/brain 
as self-organizing system). These three ways should be not thought of as exclusive of each other, but rather as 
describing three aspects of the same action (p. 46-570).
163 Having abandoned Newell and Simon’s definition of the problem-solving agent as a thinking process for 
reasons given above, the transformative agent in this research is understood to be a human designer. There 
have and continue to be efforts to remove the human designer from the design process by codifying what the 
designer (as transformative agent) does and programming a computer to design. While this idea is intriguing, 
it is not the subject of this research. I am specifically interested in how people learn to design. For a description 
of how the computer may participate in the design process see Schön (1992, p. 131), where he proposes four 
possibilities: "(1.) To achieve a design output, given some input, as well as or better than designers ordinarily 
do it, but without particular reference to the ways in which they do it. This is the Turing test, more or less, and 
I shall call it "functional equivalence." (2.) To reproduce how we actually go about designing; this I shall call 
"phenomenological equivalence." (3.) To assist designers in their designing. (4.) To provide an environment for 
research aimed at understanding how designers design" (p. 131).
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But that is not enough. We need to know what is meant by the input phase, the process 
phase, and the output phase; where the input is understood to be the problem, the 
output is understood to be the solution, and the process is understood to be what 
happens in-between. We need to "force the lid."
The black box, as described by Ashby (1956) is posed as way to introduce the concept 
of a system.164 The idea is that an “engineer is given a sealed box that has terminals for 
input, to which he may bring any voltages, shocks, or other disturbances he pleases, 
and terminals for output, from which he may observe what he can. He is to deduce 
what he can of its contents” (pp. 86-117). All the engineer knows is that certain inputs 
consistently produce certain results. He does not know how or why. His job is to figure 
out what happens in the box, by observing what kind of output is produced when he 
applies this or that input. 
Its not that different from the experience of the novice watching the master. On 
Monday the master starts with a pile of wood, (input) and by some mysterious process 
of cutting, planing, chiseling and carving (black box), by Friday the pile of wood is 
transformed into a beautifully crafted refined cabinet (output). The novice can see the 
actions but can only guess why the maker did this or that, and if this or that is how the 
master produced such a beautiful result. The novice wonders, "Is it simply a matter of 
refined technical skill, a proper sequence of procedures, years of experience, special 
secret knowledge?" It all seems so mysterious. The novice wonders, “Will the master 
tell me, or do I have to figure it out myself?” Unfortunately for the novice, there is a 
likelihood, due to the tacit nature of expert performance, that the master does not 
know how he does it either.165
The black box theory can also describe how some understand starting a car’s engine: insert 
the key into the ignition switch, turn it and (mysteriously) the engine starts, and we can 
drive merrily away. Of course it is not really all that mysterious. The system (mechanism) 
that is initiated by turning the key is easily explained. But for many, simply knowing if 
one turns the key the engine will start is sufficient. Further knowledge is not necessary. 
164 Meadows (2008) writes, “A system is an interconnected set of elements that is coherently organized in a way 
that achieves something” (p. 11). A system consists of three components: elements, interconnections, and a 
function or a purpose. (p. 11)
165 Recall that the mastering of a skill, how to do something, involves tacit knowledge, and that the distinctive 
characteristic of tacit knowledge is the ability to know more than you can say.
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However, should a curious child be interested, she could open the hood (bonnet) 
of the car, peek in; and by following the wires, locate the battery and the starter and 
discover that the ignition switch completes the circuit between the battery and the 
starter motor, which turns the engine and initiates ignition. And should the child be 
even more curious, she might stumble upon a carburetor (if it’s a really old car), or a 
circuit board and sensors, and figure out that this is how the car self-regulates and 
adjusts to various conditions, and informs the driver when the car needs to be serviced. 
Unfortunately, understanding how designers work, is not as simple as lifting up the 
hood and peeking in. 
However, expert designers, it seems, would prefer if you just minded your own business 
and left the hood closed, thank you very much.166 There are four reasons I will offer to 
explain this preference: (1.) It is a deliberate attempt to mystify technical knowledge 
as a means of protecting trade secrets;167 (2.) There is a belief that design expertise is a 
special, “God-given” talent, which the designer was blessed to receive;168 (3.) There is 
no one way that can describe how designers work;169 (4.) Experts have so internalized 
(embodied) design knowledge that is becomes tacit, and in fact they really do not know 
(are not explicitly aware) why they do what they do. This fourth reason is most related 
to this research.
166  Regarding this preference for the mysteriousness of the black box, Gulari (2015) writes, “Cross argues that 
mystification of design can be a deliberate act. Some designers find mystery rather pleasant. For example, 
Lawson notes that MacCormac 'seems to be fascinated by the mystery of where design ideas originate.' 
Designers sometimes use magic in a positive sense and associate it with creativity. For instance: “I am a graphic 
designer who loves creativity and magic, and my aim in life is to share these with you. I believe that we find 
our truest vision and purpose in the magical world of creativity” (p. 8). Another graphic designer, Garry Emery 
(2014), writes, “What matters is the outcome. Ideally the outcome will solve all the functional criteria, be 
beyond the rational and be imbued with a certain ‘magic’” (Designboom, 2014, ¶ 6). MacCormac described 
his practice as “having a repertoire of tricks” to exemplify to his original and surprising ideas (Lawson, 1994, p. 
66). Lawson (2004) likens designing to the activity of a gambit, a chess player who needs to create a new and 
unexpected move in a chess game in order to win. Kolko (2011) also suggests that clients may desire magic 
because "a satisfying magic show means the money being well spent on the magician” (as quoted by Gulari 
2015, p. 8 of 16). 
167 Not unlike secret knowledge passed on by master to apprentice in craft guilds.
168 The question of “talent” will be discussed below.
169 This seems to be true. Bahrami & Dagli (1993) offer an exhaustive description of multiple models.
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§  4.3 Systems Theory
The most fundamental challenge to conventional ideas on design... has been the 
growing advocacy of systematic methods of problem solving, borrowed from computer 
techniques and management theory, for the assessment of design problems and the 
development of design solutions. 
(Archer, 1965, p. 58)
Attempts to describe what designers do by thinking of designing as a process, has 
its roots in systems theory which includes General Systems Theory and cybernetics. 
Systems theory looks at the behavior of organized, adaptive, complex systems170 in 
terms of process, self-regulating mechanisms and homeostasis, and analyzes their 
adaptability in terms of the theory of selective information (Simon H. , 1962). Design 
Research, General Systems Theory (Bertalanffy, 1968) and Cybernetics (Ashby, 1956) 
all emerged as disciplines in the period just after WWII. General Systems Theory is 
concerned with understanding open and closed, complex, dynamic systems acting 
as regulatory devices in science. Cybernetics looks at self-correcting, regulatory 
mechanisms in complex dynamic systems, such as feedback loops and control systems 
(Broadbent, 1973, p. 368). 
Bertalanffy (1968) recognized that just as a living organism, as an entity, involves 
multiple inter-dependent systems and sub-systems which can be identified as 
distinct parts, there is also “an interrelationship [that] exists between all elements 
and constituents of society” (p. 4), just as there are multiple systems of microscopic 
(atoms) and large (cars) of individual elements, mechanical and biological, in the world 
that interact as a symbiotic system. He observes that there are structural similarities in 
the way all systems organize themselves and function. Bertalanffy writes that,
there exists models, principles, and laws that apply to generalized systems or their 
subclasses, irrespective of their particular kind, the nature of their component 
elements, and the relations or “forces” between them. It seems legitimate to ask for a 
theory, not of systems of a more or less special kind, but of universal principles applying 
to systems in general. (p. 32)
170 Simon (1962) defines complex systems as “made up of a large number of parts that interact in a 
non-simple way” (p. 468).
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Bertalanffy describes general systems theory as a theory of “wholeness,” one which 
is “purely formal but applicable to the various empirical sciences” (p. 37). From 
a general systems approach, all systems consist of input, output, throughput or 
process, feedback, control or cybernation, environment, goal, as well as a tendency 
toward entropy, that develop order and energy over time. 171  These components can 
also be found in most design methodologies. Within this framework, Bertalanffy 
identifies two kinds of systems: closed systems and open systems (pp. 39-41). Closed 
systems are self-contained and isolated from their environment, such as the study 
of thermodynamics where the system is always seeking a state of equilibrium. Open 
systems are those which are in a constant state of metabolism, always emerging and 
evolving. The theory includes control mechanisms or cybernation, the activities and 
processes used by the system to evaluate input, throughput and output to regulate 
the system, or homeostatic mechanisms, such as feedback loops (p. 43). Homeostatic 
mechanisms,172 as derived from biology, are the means by which “body temperature 
stays constant, and other built-in devices by which the body senses changes in the 
external environment and adjusts itself accordingly. Homeostatic mechanisms are 
the “dynamic (self-correcting) processes by which an organism or device maintains 
a state of equilibrium” (Broadbent, 1973, p. 369).  The mechanical example of a 
homeostatic mechanism is a thermostat which regulates the temperature of a room 
based on a predetermined range of comfort. When the temperature of a room exceeds 
the range of comfort, the thermostat signals the furnace to send more heat; when it 
reaches or exceeds the desired temperature is sends a signal to stop. The system is 
made up of the furnace, the distribution system (pipes), the heater (radiator), and the 
control (thermostat). In this way a system is understood as any organized, interacting, 
self-regulating and interdependent assemblage of parts or body of knowledge working 
together as an organized whole, which is more than the simple summation of the parts. 
171 See Cook (1980) for a simple diagram
172 Alexander (1964) makes reference to homeostatic self-organizing cognitive systems when explaining the 
“nature of the form-making process”, that is design. He writes, “To understand the form-making process, it is 
not enough to give a quick one-word account of unselfconscious form-making: adaptation… Roughly speaking, 
I shall argue that the unconscious process has a structure that makes it homeostatic (self-organizing), and that 
it therefore consistently produces well-fitting forms.” His argument is that while this is how design takes place 
in traditional cultures, where design knowledge is mostly implicit (tacit) in nature, attempts in contemporary 
culture to make it explicit (self-conscious) have broken down the homeostatic structure of the design process, 
“so that the production of forms which fail to fit their contexts is not only possible, but likely” (p. 38).
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Systems are hierarchical, they serve a purpose, and they take place in time (systems are 
not static).173 The general schema of a system environment includes: input b [system] 
b output. The “system box” represents a transformation agent that “functions to 
translate or process a stated set of inputs into a defined set of outputs” (Cook, 1980, p. 
15).  Systems do not exist independently; they normally exist as subsystems of a larger 
or smaller system (environment/universe). The system box is the basis for what Ashby 
(1956) described as the black box. 
General Systems Theory challenged two assumptions that had been accepted as 
givens of the “scientific method” 174 since Descartes:175  (1.) A system could be broken 
down into its individual components and be studied as independent entities. (2.) 
Individual components of a system should be added linearly when describing a whole 
system. While these assumptions work well for simple (closed) systems, they do not 
when considering complex (open) systems. General Systems Theory holds, rather, 
that (1.) a (complex) system is better understood by the relations and hierarchy of 
interactions between its components and subsystems; and (2.) That the interactions 
between individual components in a (complex) system do not (necessarily) behave in a 
linear fashion.
173 Cook (1980) describes a system as having four characteristics: a set or assemblage of parts of entities; inter-
related and independent yet identifiable that; that operate or interact or in relationship to accomplish a stated 
function or objective.
174 There is no one, single, definitive “scientific method” or “model of scientific inquiry.” Scientific method is a term 
for the (rational) rules/techniques used for scientific reasoning and investigation. It normally refers to a logical, 
inductive/deductive, empirical/measurable methodology for gaining knowledge and testing hypotheses and 
predicting behaviors related to physical/natural world. A generally accepted test for the validity of a scientific 
method is its repeatability. Technical rationality is sometimes used the same a scientific method. See Schön 
(2009, p. 31).
175 Descartes’ four precepts (heuristics), found in the Discourse on Method (1637/1999), when using the scientific 
(analytic) method are: (1.) Doubt everything: “The first of these was to accept nothing as true which I did not 
clearly recognize to be so: that is to say, carefully to avoid haste and prejudice in judgments, and to accept in 
them nothing more than what was presented to my mind so clearly and distinctly that I could have no occasion 
to doubt it. (2.) Break every problem into smaller parts: “The second was to divide	up	each	of	the	difficulties 
which I examined into as many parts as possible, and as seemed requisite in order that it might be resolved in 
the best manner possible. (3.) Solve the simplest problem first: “The third was to carry on my reflections in due 
order, commencing	with	objects	that	were	the	most	simple and easy to understand, in order to rise little by little, 
or by degrees, to knowledge of the most complex, assuming an order, even if a fictitious one, among those which 
do not follow a natural sequence relatively to one another. (4.) Be thorough: “The last was in all cases to make 
enumerations	so	complete	and	reviews	so	general	that I should be certain of having omitted nothing.”
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In explaining how complex systems evolve Simon (1962) offers the following “parable:”
There were once two watch makers, named Hora and Tempus, who manufactured very 
fine watches. Both of them were highly regarded, and the phones in their workshops 
rang frequently – new customers were constantly calling them. However, Hora 
prospered, while Tempus became poorer and poorer and finally lost his shop. What was 
the reason? (p. 470)
Simon explains that both men made watches consisting of 1,000 parts each. Tempus 
had designed his so that if he had one partially assembled and had to put it down 
to, say, answer the phone, it would fall to pieces. Hora, however, designed his watch 
so that he could assemble it in sub-assemblies which fit together in to larger sub-
assemblies, etc. So when the phone rang, he could put down what he was working 
on, and not lose everything. The issue here is not the quality of the end product, 
or the individual’s craftsmanship, or even the need for customers. The issue is the 
system of assembly that did not allow for interruptions (by a telephone call). The 
connection between this parable and building construction is easily made, but there 
is a connection between this parable and the design process that can be made as 
well. The design process, rather than being thought of as a sequence of individual and 
incremental steps, is rather thought of in terms of phases, states, functions, feed-back 
loops, and heuristics.
Systems theory can be used to understand three aspects of design practice: (1.)the 
design problem, and (2.) the problem of designing. Systems theory can be applied to 
the design problem, (3.) as a way to understand buildings, not as simple entities, but 
as complex systems, composed of interdependent components, involving multiple 
regulation mechanisms with the goal of providing an environment for human 
habitation.176 Systems theory can be applied to the problem of designing, as a means 
for understanding designing as a complex system of cognitive processes, that includes 
multiple feedback loops, that when applied to a design problem can result in a solution 
(functional approximation) that solves for demonstrable criteria and experiential 
qualities in a manner that exceeds performance expectations.
176 Pye (1978), regarding the design of things and their functions, writes “It is fruitless to consider the action of a 
thing without considering the system of which it is a component” (p. 17). 
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The ability to reflect on how something is being done, requires being able to consider 
the behavior or task in terms of a system of procedures; to break it down into its 
components and be aware of the desired outcome; then to assess if the component 
actions and procedures are executed in the proper sequence that maximizes the 
desired outcome. However, this is only useful if one has properly identified the 
component actions and procedures. And/or should it turns out that the system model 
is not useful to be able to consider alternative actions and procedures that have a 
greater likelihood to achieve the desired outcome. The	problem	with	system	models	
occurs	when	the	system	becomes	the	ends	in	itself	rather	a	means	to	facilitate	the	
effective	production	of	the	desired	outcome.	
Schön, (1991) writing about professional education, and management develops his 
theory of the reflective practice. Reflective practice is when one is not only aware of 
the methods and strategies that are used in order to solve a problem, but when one is 
also constantly taking note of what facilitates the effective production of the desired 
outcome and what does not, and adjusts the system (methodology) accordingly. For 
Schön the reflective practitioner is one who recognizes patterns of what works and 
doesn’t work, and adjusts his strategy to adapt to novel situations. The reflective 
practitioner takes a systems approach to designing, assessing and reassessing the 
sequence of phases, feedback loops, methods, strategies and situations. 
When someone reflects-in-action, he becomes a researcher in the practice of content. 
He is not dependent on the categories of established theory and technique, but 
constructs a new theory on the unique case. His inquiry is not limited to a deliberation 
about means which depends on prior agreement about ends. He does not keep means 
and ends separate, but defines them interactively as he frames a problematic situation. 
He does not separate thinking from doing, ratiocinating [sic.] his way to a decision 
which he must later convert to action. Because his experimenting is a kind of action, 
implementation is built into his inquiry. Thus reflection-in-action can proceed, even in 
situations of uncertainty or uniqueness, because it is not bound by the dichotomies of 
Technical Rationality. (1991, pp. 68-69)
However, expert designers do not normally experience designing as a process, or 
sequence of differentiated phases, or a step-by-step process. They experiences 
designing as a fluid, tacit, intuitive ability to produce solutions that exceed 
performance expectations and resists explanation. Expert designers experience 
designing more as a Gestalt, a unified way of thinking, rather than the sum of its parts. 
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In addition, designers,	when	actively	engaging	(inhabiting)	the	problem	space,	are	
tacitly	(without	explicit	knowledge)	seeking	a	Gestalt,	a	unified	way	of	thinking	about	
the	problem	as	a	whole177.  
 By understanding/analyzing (1.) how complex systems evolve, (2.) how components 
and subsystems interact, and (3.) how systems self-correct within a system (feedback 
loops), one can assess their effectiveness and look for ways to maximize (optimize) 
their function. Influenced by the advances being made in manufacturing, business 
management, and organizational development, the pioneers in design methods 
research sought to apply this new paradigm to understand, evaluate and propose new 
ways of approaching and thinking about designing and the role of the designer.
§  4.4 Designer as Transformative Agent
All designers intend to intervene into the expected course of events 
by premeditated action. 
(Rittel H. , 1988, p. 1)
Dong (2009), in the chapter “Rethinking the Designer,” asks, when a designer 
gives an account of who is the ‘I/we” who is doing the designing, identifies 
several models of the designer as – designer as information processor; designer 
as person who receives inputs from the user and produces outputs; designer as 
conceiver where the user is the receiver; designer as community activist who 
facilitates the design process; designer as collaborator.178 His point is that there 
is something in a name. The model of designer as that one uses reveals what 
one “expect[s] to observe in the designer, which alternatively questions the 
autonomy of the designer detached from ontological expectations of designing… 
177 Recall Polanyi (2009) and his references to Gestalt psychology above.
178 Dong’s (2009) account of the different models of designing is in the context of a critique of design where “a 
designer is only a designer to the extent that the person ‘realizes’ the legitimate act of design,” (p. 4) Dong’s 
point is that the expectations that have traditionally “legitimatized” the designer qua designer have changed. 
He writes that “the boundary between being in/within the process of design and outside of what is considered 
designing is artificial,” (p. 7)
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The rationale, intent, influences, and ideas provided in a designer’s account of 
designing should be seen as linguistically enacting the designed work, not just 
describing it” (pp. 9-10).  The way one understands designer as also influences how 
one understands the normative expectations for performance.
In this account of design expertise, I am proposing designer as transformative 
agent. But, unlike Dong, who is reframing the identity of the designer from a multi-
disciplinary (even anti-disciplinary) perspective, I am specifically focusing on designing 
within the domain of architecture, where the designer, as architect, as licensed 
professional, has fiduciary and civic responsibility, and is bound to a professional code 
of conduct that (minimally) presumes technical competency. The model of designer 
as transformative agent that is being developed here understands the designer (as 
individual,	group,	collaborative	effort)	to	be	the	one	who	identifies	a	situation	that	
could	be	otherwise,	engages	in	problem-framing/solution-seeking	activity,	and	
produces a solution for human use that meets or exceeds both demonstrable criteria 
and experiential qualities. In this way the design process is the opposite of the process 
of evolution, in that the designer does not adapt (primarily) to the conditions that 
nature presents,179 but rather adapts (transforms) nature for a human purpose. The 
designer is an agent of change. The designer’s method for changing is described by the 
design process. The designer (not the design process) is the transformative agent.
§  4.5 Designing as Heuristic
Designing, understood as a kind of problem-solving process, follows a similar pattern 
as George Polya's familiar problem-solving methodology outlined in his classic book 
How to Solve It (1945). The meta-structure of his methodology (meta-heuristic) is 
structured in four phases: understand the problem b devise a plan b carry it out b 
review/extend, along with recommended heuristics (methods) appropriate for each 
phase. In Polya’s model, the problem is a given, and the optimal solution is the product 
of the problem-solving process. His model was intended as a learning tool to help 
students, and as an aid to help teachers to be better able to teach problem-solving. 
179 Though one would hope that he takes the conditions nature presents us with into account in a way that is 
respectful and conscientious.
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His is a how to method that formulates a series of phases in the form of brief questions  
or heuristics. His methodology (purpose-driven system of methods) is one way to 
describe what happens between the brackets in the black box theory: Problem b 
[Polya’s problem-solving methodology] b Solution.
Newell (1980) assesses the advantages and disadvantages Polya’s problem-solving 
methodology offers in terms of human intelligence vs. artificial intelligence (AI). In 
Polya’s methodology, as in Newell’s GPS, the problem-solver is the transformative 
agent who functions as an information processing system. The transformative agent, 
as problem-solver, whether she/he/it is a human, computer, animal, or some yet to 
be discovered being, acquires a problem from a task environment by “encoding it in 
an internal data structure [cognitive architecture180] and which solves the problem by 
processing these structures by (a sequence of) internally available methods, making 
use of 'bodies of encoded knowledge'" (p. 6). The transformative agent functions within 
the black box, insofar as the black box is understood as the information processing 
system. The information processing system is composed of three components: (1.) 
Basic processing system architecture	(methodology),	which	structures	(the	problem	
space	of)	the	overall	process;	(2.)	The	methods,	which	provide	specific	strategic	
heuristics	for	solving	various	problem	situations;	and	(3.)	Knowledge	which	provides	
the (domain) information and concepts necessary to solve the particular type of 
problem. 181  The same methods and knowledge can be used within different basic 
processing systems depending on the problem situation and type. 
Newell (1980) notes that while Polya’s heuristic can be applied to any problem solver, 
it is better suited to problem-solving situations where the transformative agent 
is human. For Newell, the strength of Polya is that, like the theories of embodied 
cognition presented above, his heuristic takes into account physiological, cognitive 
and psychological (bounded) aspects of human cognition. Newell identifies three 
factors that make Polya’s heuristic better suited for a human problem-solver: Attention	
needs to be focused: Attention in humans does not occur automatically. Our sense 
systems are constantly seeking new information and competing for the attention of our 
consciousness.182 Attention in this sense acts as a cognitive filter which allows one to 
focus (attend to) on the problem at hand and make sense of the situation. 
180 In AI the basic processing system (methodology) is called the architecture.
181 These three components are analogous to: strategic knowledge (basic processing system); declarative/
conceptual knowledge); procedural/heuristic knowledge (methods).
182 This concept of “attending to” in order to “make sense of” a situation is supported by research from cognitive 
science. See Passingham (2016), Ramachandran (2011), Damasio (1994).
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It is the ability to attend to one thing while to “blocking out” another that is what allows 
us decipher what a friend is trying to say in a crowded room. Human memory needs 
to be “tickled”: Human memory is not always directly accessible. Memory is generally 
understood as short-term working memory and long-term memory. Short-term 
memory is immediately available, but the mind has limited working memory capacity; 
while the capacity for long-term memory seems to be limitless, it is often difficult to 
access (Miller, 1956). Heuristics are necessary to facilitate access to information stored 
in long-term memory (memory loci), such as mnemonic devices. Problem solvers 
need to be motivated: Motivation involves stimulating a “desire to earnestly obtain a 
solution,” the “will” to do it, and a social context that supports the effort.183 
What is notable in this critique is that not all systems are well-suited to all problem-
solvers. Problem-solvers possess characteristics, or “bounded-ness.” An effective problem 
solving methodology takes into account the characteristics, strengths and limitations 
(physical, psychological, cognitive) of the problem-solver. Problem-solving systems that 
work well for computers are necessarily not well-suited for humans, and visa-versa.184
As Polya was primarily a mathematician his methodology is best suited for solving 
problems where the problem can be clearly defined and there is an optimal solution, or 
a closed system. His is a methodology that a designer might use when facing technical 
issues, where there are demonstrable criteria, for instance determining efficient space 
relationships or maximizing floor area usage. This methodology does not work well with 
wicked or open-ended problems, which are a defining characteristic of design problems. 
The usefulness of a methodology tends to be domain and situation specific. A methodology 
(with its associated epistemology)185 does not only describe how to complete a task but 
it also explains how the methodology facilities achieving the goals and objectives of the 
particular task. These goals and objectives of a problem situation can be stated as criteria, 
constraints, and qualities. However, it should be noted that while design methodologies 
are by nature teleological (goal oriented), using this or that methodology itself does not 
necessarily guarantee an optimal solution, or even the most efficient means of arriving at a 
minimally acceptable solution even though it may have been effective in the past. 
183 This question of motivation will come up again as it is central to my thesis.
184 This is also applicable to degrees of expertise. Methods that are well suited to the abilities and experience of 
experts, are not necessarily helpful or appropriate for novices. This topic will be taken up in more detail in the 
following chapter.
185 The function of the epistemological aspects of this or that methodology will be discussed in the section below on 
the “design problem”
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A methodology describes the procedures a problem-solver might use, or has used, to 
solve a similar problem. It is a framework or a tool. But a methodology does not solve 
the problem. Nor does it (nor is it able to) make judgments regarding the quality of 
human experience and perception.186 This is the responsibility/work of the designer as 
human transformative agent. Cross, (2011) when making this point, refers to Simon’s 
"ant" and Jones’s "explorer" (p. 124). 
Simon (1996) describes the opportunistic behaviors of an ant returning to its nest, 
encountering all kinds of challenges along the way, and “designing” a way to meet 
them.187 However, if one where to take an aerial view of the route the ant took, one 
might not be convinced that the ant was all that efficient. 
Jones’s (1992) explorer is in search for a hidden treasure. Like the ant, the explorer has 
a definite goal and knows what it is; but the way to find the treasure is not yet known. 
In retrospect after completing the task, it is possible that the explorer may realize there 
may have been a more direct route to finding the treasure. 
Cross observes that while these are somewhat useful metaphors, their use is limited, in 
that in both metaphors the goal is already known. In designing the goal is not known. 
The designer is not searching for something that is lost but rather seeking to discover 
something that does not yet exist. So while a design methodology may describe how 
a designer goes about the search, and may even suggest a procedure to help along the 
way, the designer is searching for something of which he knows not, but which he will 
recognize when he "sees it."
It is this aspect of design methodology that is the subject of this research. Not the 
promise that if one follows a procedure step-by-step (the so called “cookbook” 
approach) one will produce an acceptable solution: This research is interested in 
design methodology’s descriptive value, especially as it is framed in terms of embodied 
cognition and is related to tacit knowledge – how designers immerse themselves 
in this intense, focused and disciplined process that requires a broad domain of 
186 To make judgments about the quality of an experience as a human might, one needs to have a human body or a 
close facsimile of one. How we make sense of and experience the world is dependent on embodied cognition. For 
example, how a dog experiences the world, with its body covered with hair, walking on four feet, having greater range 
of hearing and smell; is different that how a human wearing cloths, walking on two feet, and with a lesser range of 
hearing and smell, experiences the world. And, as a result, a dog makes sense of the world, using a different set of 
parameters than a human, simply because of how its relationship with the world is facilitated by its body.
187 I would prefer to say that the ant was “planning” rather than “designing” a way to meet al the kinds of challenges 
along the way. For Simon, design results in a plan. I hold that designing results in an artifact for human use.  
Simon was not a designer.
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interdisciplinary knowledge, generating a solution for a problem whose definition is only 
fully understood when he designs something that has never existed before. And finally 
understanding how it is that expert designers feelingly know that they have found the 
right solution when they see it.188 Methodologies provide a framework that offer insight 
into the design process in general, and more specifically in terms of the acquisition of 
expertise, offer cognitive scaffolding189 that beginner designers can use to build upon.
§  4.6 Designing as Methodology
... there is no escape for the designer from the task of getting his own creative ideas. After 
all, if the solution to a problem arises automatically and inevitably from the interaction of 
the data, then the problem is not, by definition, a design problem... An abundance of artists 
starving in garrets is the surest guarantee of an artistic breakthrough. 
(Archer, 1981, p. 58)
Archer’s point is an important one to keep in mind as we go deeper into trying to 
understand the structure of designing. The purpose of this effort is not to codify 
designing, to fit it into neat categories, or force it into a prescribed process. The purpose 
is to understand how the expert designer arrives at a design solution that exceeds 
performance expectations, and to attempt to describe how a designer does it, as a tool 
for acquiring design expertise. 
Referring to the basic process described above, the act of designing can be described 
as being composed of three phases: problem,	design	process,	solution. Simply stated: 
a problem is posed, the designer works on it, a solution is had. In this way, the designer 
– either an individual, a group/collaborative effort, a machine or a combination of the 
three – acts as the transformative agent on the problem situation to produce a solution. It 
is a simple model, similar to the black box, and compatible with Polya’s problem-solving 
methodology. However it is not as simple as it seems. Systems, processes, methodologies, 
and heuristics all occur at different scales and/or hierarchies. 
188 Later I will call attention the importance of this feelingly way of knowing when explain what I mean by 
aesthetic resonance.
189 Cognitive scaffolding, a concept attributed to Lev Vygotsky (1896–1934), functions to provide a framework 
that facilitates the acquisition of complex abilities within the students zone of proximal development. 
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Systems do not exist in isolation. Systems seek wholeness. Systems are 
interdependent. Systems exist within systems. The same is true for processes, 
methodologies and heuristics. As a complex system, the overall design process can be 
understood as a meta-heuristic, where a system of sub-heuristics (methods) interact 
and are regulated as subsystems. 
The problem, as will be seen below, occurs when the design process is no longer 
understood as only what happens in the black box, represented by: problem b [design 
process] b solution. Where the design process is understood primarily as what happens 
between the brackets experienced as a dialectic between the possible interpretations 
of the problem and the possible solutions (Snodgrass & Coyne, 1997).   In this model, 
design is understood as a cognitive process that receives a specific input and results 
in a predictable output. As has been demonstrated above, this model of designing/
problem-solving is inadequate, primarily because design problems are by definition 
open-ended and ill-defined. A closed-system problem-solving process is ill-equipped 
to solve these kinds of problems. These models presume that the phases mostly occur 
sequentially, but research has shown that this is not the case (at least for architects).190 
On the other hand, if the design process is described in an all-inclusive manner, that 
includes problem, problem-framing/solution-seeking, solution, then rather than 
defining the design process in terms of three phases, it should be defined as three 
states, where the problem state is where a problem is identified, the problem space 
is defined (to include determining criteria, constraints and qualities), and a way of 
framing the problem space is decided upon. The problem-framing/solution-seeking 
state is understood as a space where the active search for a solution, exploration of 
alternatives and testing of possibilities occurs. This state is best described as what 
happens between the brackets as described above. There is general agreement that this 
state includes three components: analysis, synthesis and evaluation. 191 
190 See Cross & Roozenburg (1992).
191 Jones (1992) writes, “One of the simplest and most common observations about designing and one upon 
which many writers agree, is that [the design process] includes three essential stages: analysis, synthesis and 
evaluation” (p. 63). Coyne (1990), Asimow (1962) and Bahrami & Dagli (1993) hold this position as well. 
However, they do not all use the same terms to describe these “three essential phases.” In fact just a few 
sentences after Jones writes the above, he goes on to rename the three phases as divergence, transformation, 
convergence. (p. 64)
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The solution state is where the solution is externalized as a functional approximation, 
of a building/built environment to be built, and assessed against criteria, constraints 
and qualities.192 The state model presumes that all three states are simultaneously 
active and interdependent (including feedback loops, framing and reframing, defining 
and redefining the problem space), to varying degrees over time.193 This state model 
can be represented as: problem b [analysis/synthesis/evaluation] b solution.
There are numerous design process/methodology models out there.194 Most design 
processes are phase model processes. Phase model processes describe procedural 
approaches to a design problem. Polya’s methodology is a good example of a phase 
model. Another example of a phase model is Asimow (1962). Intended for engineering 
students, his model includes six phases: (1.)Analysis,  (2.) Synthesis, (3.) Evaluation 
and decision, (4.) Optimization, (5.) Revision, (6.) Implementation. 
State models of designing, rely on concepts derived from systems theory. These tend 
to be systematic approaches to designing, or methodologies. These approaches are not 
strictly procedural. Jones (1992) writes “Methodology should not be a fixed track to a 
fixed destination but a conversation about everything that could be made to happen.” 
Two examples of the state model are Cross and Lawson. In Cross’s (2001) model, 
he describes these three components as: problem formulation; process strategy; 
solution generation.  Lawson (2005) describes these three components as “discreet 
properties,” (not phases) with the following characteristics: Design problems cannot 
be comprehensively stated, they require subjective interpretation, and tend to be 
organized hierarchically. Design processes are endless, none are infallible. 
192 Depending on one's model of designer as, the design process ends with the production of the functional 
approximation. However, as I have argued that the proper end to architectural design is the building/built 
environment, I hold that the design process is only consummated when the building/built environment 
is complete. 
193 Design states are not distinct. For example the problem state typically involves some level of solution seeking. 
Just as the solution state involves some level of problem setting. While ever design process is instantiated by the 
recognition of a problem and ends with a some approximation of a solution, it would be a mistake to describe 
these states as sequential. Identifying exactly when the designer moves from one state to another poses the 
same kind of problem posed by Occam’s razor. Just as human perception systems make use of multiple parallel 
cognitive systems in disparate regions of the brain to make-sense of make sense of the various inputs, so it is 
with the designing. 
194 See Broadbent (1973), Jones (1992), Lawson and Dorst (2009), Adams (2015), Delft Design Guide (van Boeijen, 
Daalhuizen, Zijlstra, & van der Schoor, 2013), Design Thinking Methods (Curedale, 2016). See also, Braha 
& Maimon (1997), for  a comprehensive examination of engineering design methodology including a good 
overview of many of the theories, models and methodologies that are included in this research. 
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They involve finding problems as well as solving them, inevitably leading to subjective 
value judgments. The process looks to the future,195 and occurs in a “need for action” 
context. Design solutions are inexhaustible in their possibilities, they are optimal 
and holistic, they make a contribution to knowledge, and exist as part of other design 
problems.
Recall there is no one (correct) prescriptive design process that guarantees a successful 
solution. And, there is no one (correct) descriptive design process that describes how 
all designers work. However, though expert designers do tend to develop their own 
approach to design problems (methodologies) and preferred strategies (methods), 
they also follow a predictable pattern. Methodologies are systems-based models that 
describe	various	ways	of	approaching	the	design	process,	an	ongoing	process	with	
the	application	of	various	strategies	along	the	way	(methods)	intended	to	result	in	a	
solution	to	a	design	problem	that	falls	within	an	acceptable	range.
Returning to the above basic components of the designing, (problem, problem-
framing/solution-seeking, solution), the next three sections will take each component 
one at a time, in an effort to gain a deeper appreciation for how each contributes to the 
design process. As designing is generally understood to be what happens between the 
problem state and the solution state, I will start with the problem. And follow with the 
solution, and finally describe some representative processes/methodologies.
195 Here, I am using “looks to the future” rather than “prescriptive” to avoid confusion. Lawson uses prescriptive to 
contrast design with what scientists do: “While scientists may help us to understand the present and predict the 
future, designers may be seen to prescribe and to create the future” (2005, p.125).
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5 Problem
Learning what the problem is IS the problem. 
(Rittel H. , 1988, p. 2)
If learning what the problem is is the problem, how do we know when we know what 
the problem is, and how do we go about learning what it is? 
The problem state is initiated when someone has “the realization that it could be 
otherwise.” The problem can come from anywhere and take many forms. A design 
problem can be a what-if scenario. It can be a list of criteria and constraints. It can be 
list of requirements and preferences. It can be a narrative. Whatever form a design 
problem takes, the it needs to be interpreted. Designing begins with the recognition of 
a situation that should/could be changed. 
Design problems have two components: content and structure. Designers work with 
others to: (1.) Define the content, which includes, criteria, constraints and intended 
qualities of a design problem (some call this defining or setting the problem space); and 
(2.) Structure the design problem so that it can be solved with the resources available 
(some call this framing the problem). Together these define the problem.
§  5.1 Who	Defines	the	Problem?
In standard architectural professional practice, it is typically assumed that it is the owner’s 
responsibility to define the problem, also known as the “project brief.” It is the architect’s 
responsibility to design a building that satisfies those criteria (as well as others related to 
responsible professional practice, building codes, and building standards).196 
196 The normal scope of services as outlined by AIA Contract B141, “Standard Form of Agreement Between Owner 
and Architect with Standard Form of Architect’s Services,” lists design, contract, and project administration under 
the standard form of architect’s services that are normally considered to be the responsibility of the architect. (AIA 
Document B141-1997, 1997) Article 2.1 describes project administration services, design, and (construction) 
contract administration. Article 1.2.2.1 reads, “Unless otherwise provided under this Agreement, the Owner shall 
provide full information in a timely manner regarding requirements for and limitations on the Project.” Providing the 
“requirements for and limitations” to “program criteria” is normally considered to be the responsibility of the “owner.”
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In this way, it is understood that the problem of designing is to solve for the 
requirements and criteria as defined by the client. And it is upon this understanding 
that the scope of services, schedule and fees are based. This approach has many 
characteristics of a closed system approach.
 The American Institute of Architects (AIA) list of standard design services, follows almost 
identically, phase by phase, the problem-solving methodology that Polya identified in 
How to Solve It (1945): problem [evaluate and planning b schematic design b design 
development b construction documents] b solution. And like the Polya methodology, 
there are associated methods that are useful to achieve the goals of each phase in 
question. The AIA phase model may be useful for identifying services, determining a 
schedule and setting a fee structure. But when tested against the research presented 
above, it does not reflect the way designers actually work. It is more like older prescriptive 
models of design that were based on some ideal about how it should be.
In real life, who defines the design problem is not so clear. As described in the section, 
“Designer as Transformative Agent,” Dong (2009) claims that who gets to define the 
design problem is directly connected to what model (or epistemology) of designer as 
is operative.197 If one understands the designer as a cognitive process, information-
processor or the person who receives inputs and generates an output, then the problem 
is something that is fed into the designer system, and formulated outside it. However, 
as I have previously suggested, if the model of designer as is more inclusive, designer 
as transformative agent that includes the owner/client, end user, fabricator, etc., as 
well as design professional, not as stakeholders but as integral participants within the 
design process, the designer then is the group of people involved in identifying the 
problem (problem-setting), problem-framing/solution-seeking, and solution setting. 
Dong, asking what “is the extent to which we can ascribe design to the 
perspectival account (testimony) of the designer,”writes, “increasingly, design 
is held in the multitudes rather than in a designer or designers…” (p. 5). From 
this point of view of the design process, identifying the problem is just as 
important as solving it, perhaps more so, because until someone recognizes that 
it can be otherwise, there is no opportunity for innovation, novelty or creativity. 
197 Mitchell discusses this (epistemological) phenomenon by introducing the concept of inferences, that is how one 
derives conclusions (predicates) from premises. Before a designer can understand a design problem he needs to 
interpret the presuppositions of the problem statement, its premises: what are the assumptions, the knowledge 
base, expectations, etc. He also needs to assess, or at least understand, on what basis a conclusion was inferred 
from the premises. He defines a design problem as one that “is represented by predicates stated in a critical 
language, a design world which depicts some construction world, a knowledge base about that construction 
world, and procedures for deriving inferences” (1990, p.79).
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Designing begins not when the design brief is given to the designer, but rather, 
when someone sitting in a café looks out the window at a vacant parking lot and 
wonders if it would be possible to build a farmers market there.
§  5.2 Defining	the	Problem
Embedded in a design problem are criteria and constraints – some explicit and 
some implicit and some yet to be discovered – of varying degrees of importance. Rittel 
(1988) writes that “[design] constraints are decided, selected, and self-imposed, 
and not implied, derived or logical necessities” (p. 5). Rittel is writing against 
those who believe that somehow – if for example they approach the problem in 
terms of functional efficiency and cost effectiveness and follow a purely logical 
problem-solving process – the process will inevitably result in the best solution. 
In designing there is no inevitability or logical necessity or even best solution.
All design problems need to be interpreted.  Alexander, (1964) in the 
Synthesis of Form, calls this the problem of fit.198 For example, an owner 
tells her architect that she wants to build a new house on a fairly large site 
on a lake. She wants the house to have a kitchen, dining room, living room, 
family room, study, 4 bedrooms, adequate storage area, and 4.5 bathrooms. She 
is on a limited budget, but wants good quality. There is no rush in getting it built. 
198 The concept of fit is central to Alexander’s theory presented in Notes on the Synthesis of Form,”(1964) For 
Alexander “the ultimate object of design is form” (p. 15). By form, Alexander is not referring to abstract 
Platonic form, but rather the physical form (shape) of an artifact. The functional origin of the form comes from 
programmatic clarity. That is the “earliest functional origins” and the patterns that the design fond in them. 
It is from this point that the designer begins the effort to “achieve fitness between the two entities: the form 
in question and its context. In other words, when we speak of design , the real object of discussion is not the 
form alone, but the ensemble compromising the form and its context. Goof fit is a desired property of this 
ensemble which relates to some particular division of ensemble into form and context” (p. 16). There are two 
(extreme) ways of approaching this fitness between two entities. One can make an effort to devise an object 
that is well-suited (“good designers”) to the environment. Or one can adapt the environment (“the impractical 
idealism of designers”) to fit the form of the object. The good designer, “if he knows what he is doing, is able to 
deal with “several layers of form-context boundaries in concert” and he seeks to achieve “internal coherence of 
an ensemble.” “In a perfectly coherent ensemble we should expect the two halves of every possible division of 
the ensemble to fit one another” (p. 18). However, one must always keep in mind that the “highly inter-laced 
and complex phenomenon” we call the division between the form and its environment should be considered 
“arbitrary” at any one time, and that it is only the form, over which we really have any control. For Alexander, 
the process of achieving good fit (design) is “a negative process of neutralizing the incongruities, or irritants, or 
forces, which cause misfit” (p. 24).
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The designer is already applying the cost = area/time/quality heuristic.199 At first 
glance it seems like a simple design problem. But upon second glance the problem is 
filled with premises, assumptions, presuppositions, and cultural preferences. When 
interpreting the problem, Alexander writes, “It is not possible to set up premises, trace 
through a series of deductions, and arrive at a form which is logically determined by 
premises… There is no legitimate sense in which deductive logic can prescribe physical 
form for us” (p. 8). 
Dorst (2004) observes that most design problems appear to have a “three-fold 
nature”: they are partly determined; they are partly under-determined, and they are 
partly undetermined. Determined problems are those that the AIA B141 contract 
presupposes that the owner will provide for the architect. These problems allow the 
designers to quickly unearth “’hard facts,’ by information gathering and analysis, and 
live with these specifications” (Dorst, 2004). Determined problems are well suited to 
Newell and Simon’s rational problem solving paradigm as described above. Under-
determined problems, are those where critical elements of the problem can only 
be discovered and clarified in the process of trying to solve it. These are the kinds of 
problems where one might say, “I’m not really sure what I mean, but I will know it when 
I see it.” Undetermined problems are those "where the designer is to a large extent 
free to design according to his own taste, style and abilities" (Dorst, 2004), where the 
owner/client defers to the judgment of the designer. Dorst observes that all design 
problems possess, to some degree, characteristics of all these types of design problems.
 Take for example, the four bedrooms from the above example. The designer quickly 
discovers that the owner is married with 3 children (though it is not clear it she is 
married to a man or a woman, or if the children are biological or adopted). Two of the 
children are off in college (their sex/gender identity is not known). The presupposition 
in the West may be that the bedroom should be big enough to accommodate standard 
bedroom furniture: a bed, small desk, book selves, chair, closet, chest of drawers, night 
stands, maybe a TV as well (there is no indication of the ethnic/cultural identity of the 
spouse or the children). The designer may refer to any number of design standards, 
such as Architectural Graphic Standards (American Institute of Architects, 2016); 
Neufert (Baiche & Williman, 2000); Time-Saver Standards (Watson & Crosbie, 2005). 
But this assumes the standard for a bedroom is both what the owner has in mind, and 
that these standards are suitable for this particular design situation.200  
199 Assuming time and area are constraints, the higher the quality the higher the cost. Assuming time and quality 
are constants, the bigger the bigger the area, the higher the cost, etc.
200 Referring to design standards or to previously successful solutions to save time, is a kind of heuristic for 
problem definition.
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The designer may need to ask the owner, exactly what these rooms are for: sleeping, 
getting dressed, studying, privacy, etc.? For example, if the bedrooms are thought to 
be primarily for sleeping, and two of the children are off at college, and the other one 
prefers to study in the living space, basing the size and shape on a standard bedroom 
may prove to be a less than effective allocation of resources. Perhaps the there 
is an alternative.
If there is no clear understanding of what the bedroom is for, there is little likelihood 
that the designer will be able to achieve good fit. Alexander (1964) writes: 
There is a tendency of designers, when faced with difficulty, to change the definition 
of the problem: 1.) There are the 'impractical idealists' who loosen the difficulty of 
constraints by stretching the form-context boundary; and 2.) The 'good designer' who 
'keeps an eye on the possible changes at every point of the ensemble. He is sensitive 
to fit at several boundaries at once. His sense of organization leads to the 'internal 
coherence' of the ensemble. (p. 17)
The challenge for the good designer is not to change (interpret) the problem in a 
manner that fits his presuppositions or convenience, but to engage the situation, 
challenge his presuppositions and biases, and strive for the best fit possible considering 
the situation. 
With all these variables, spoken and unspoken, explicit and implied, preferred and 
required criteria and constraints, it can be challenging to gain enough clarity about 
what the design problem is, before one feels confident enough to start designing, 
though in reality, once the designer begins considering the problem he has already 
begun designing.  One method that designers use to clarify the design problem so 
that they can get "started designing," is to make use of a heuristic called conjectured 
solutions. Cross (1990) describes how this heuristic works by quoting Marples:
The nature of the problem can only be found by examining it through proposed 
solutions, and it seems likely that its examination through one, and only one, proposal 
gives a very biased view. It seems probable that at least two radically different solutions 
need to be attempted in order to get, through comparisons or sub-problems, a clear 
picture of the ‘real nature’ of the problem. (Marples, 1960)
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This quote illustrates the distinctive reciprocal/dialectical relationship that design 
problems have with their solutions, which distinguishes them from other kinds of 
problems. See also Akin, 1979 and Darke, 1979. 
§  5.3 Design Problems Have a Structure
What becomes clearer and clearer is just how problematic design problems can be. 
However, it should be noted that design problems are not problematic in themselves, 
they are what they are. They are considered problematic because they do not fit easily 
into the abstract framework of problem-solving theory. As discussed above, the 
problem with design problems, is that while typical (well-structured) problems – those 
that can be solved using the so called “scientific method” – are clearly defined and 
closed; design problems are described as open, ill-structured (Simon , 1973), wicked  
(Rittel & Webber, 1973) or ill-defined (Rowe, 1987). Schön (1985) just calls them real 
world problems (p. 15).
For Simon, the structuring of a problem is fundamental to solving it.201 
That is, solving a problem is essentially a matter of adequately representing 
it,“so as to make the solution transparent” (1996, p. 153).202  
201 Dorst (2004) writes that “a fundamental distinction between different kinds of design problems can… be 
constructed on the basis of the paradigms of [the] design methodology…” being used. These paradigms provide 
a “basis for further exploration of the structures of design problems.” As an example, Dorst describes the 
rational problem solving paradigm, described above, as a positivistic epistemology; while Schön’s reflection 
in action paradigm is a phenomenological epistemology. He writes: "Positivism claims that a person lives in 
an objective world which can be known through his senses; the sensory data is then structured by an internal 
processing system. This structuring system interprets the data by using basic a priori categories. To know the 
objective world, a person should study it carefully and dispassionately, preferably with scientific methods. While 
from the epistemological perspective of phenomenology the person is not static, but a dynamic, emotive social 
being with a history and an environment which heavily influences the person’s construction of reality. And 
the subject is influenced (and in the end ‘formed’) by what he/she perceives. Therefore, person and object are 
inextricably connected.” His point is that how one thinks about designing/problem-solving will influence how 
the problem is structured.
202 Suggesting the kind of “inevitableness” that Rittel (1988) denies above, “Nothing has to be or remain as it is 
or as it appears to be… which would dictate to take a particular course of action and no other” (p. 5). While I 
appreciate Rittel’s exuberance, as he was not a designer (though he was a planner) and embodied cognition was 
in its infancy while he was writing. However, while there may indeed be no “limits to the conceivable,” there are 
limits to the possible. Having an appreciation for these limits, and knowing how to work with them, is part of the 
difference between an expert designer and a naive dreamer. Which is not to say that the world does not need 
naive dreamers. But they are not properly understood as designers, prophets perhaps, but not designers.
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Or, structuring the problem so that it fits well into a scientific problem-solving 
framework. Well-structured problems can be represented (stated) and processed in 
one or more problem spaces in accordance with identifiable performance criteria, and 
knowledge and states of the problem can be represented in a complete, accurate and 
manageable way. In well-structured problems the problem is clearly stated, and can 
be processed using a specific method producing a repeatable result. This approach is 
“scientific.” Ill-structured problems are characterized by reference to residuals, or what 
is lacking as compared to well-structured problems. As such, these kinds of problems 
resist being well-structured in the manner described above (Murty, 2006). 
Rittel (1988), describing design problems in terms of their initial state, operations 
and goal state, refers to these as "wicked problems." Rittel who writes that "from the 
beginning the designer has an idea of the whole resolution"  (1988, p. 2), like Polanyi 
accepts that the designer pre-structures the design problem.
From the beginning the designer has an idea of the ‘whole’ resolution of his problem 
which changes with increasing understanding of the problem, and the image of its 
resolution develops from blurry to shard and back again, frequently being revised, 
altered, detailed and modified. His focus alternates continually from small component 
parts, back to the whole problem, and back to other details. (1988, pp. 2-3) 
Wicked problems as described by Rittel and Webber (1973) are not so much understood 
as single problems, but problem complexes with multiple interdependencies. In their 
initial state every problem is a symptom of another problem and is essentially unique, 
with no definite formulation and may pose multiple reasonable interpretations. 
Every formulation or interpretation of the problem corresponds to a statement 
of a solution and determines the resolution. In terms of operations, as a result 
of their initial state, one	cannot	understand	the	problem	without	solving	it. Each 
initiative is an irreversible one-shot operation “with an indeterminate range of 
potential solutions, strategies or moves, with no scope for trial and error and with the 
problem solver being responsible for the consequences”203 (Murty, 2006, p. 21). 
203 This speaks to the opportunistic nature of designing. As there is an indeterminate range of potential solutions, the 
designer needs to vigilant to identify and limit the more likely solutions, to reduce his search area, and make better 
use of his cognitive resources and time. Newell and Simon (1958) explain that limiting the potential solutions is 
achieved by the application of heuristics, that eliminate certain variables, or impose additional criteria upon the 
search space to limit the number of potential solutions. Even so, say that the application of these heuristics reduces 
the possible solution paths from 6000 to six. There are still six perfectly reasonable paths to a solution to pursue. How 
does a designer know what path to choose, recognizing that as quoted above, “there are no logical or epistemological 
constraints or rules which would prescribe which of the various meaningful steps to take next” (Rittel 1988). (Though, 
Lawson (2005) does acknowledge “external criteria” as a type that does function as a constraint.) What then is the 
basis of a designer’s preference for one path over the other? Is it “beyond reason,” as Rittel suggests above?
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In the goal state there is no definite completion of the problem, or “ultimate test, or 
criterion to judge a solution to be true or false. Outcomes are merely good or bad, or 
better or worse and any additional effort may be beneficial” (p. 21). The solution is 
never the best, it is only one of many possible solutions, that satisfies the criteria and 
constraints within an acceptable range, based on the interpretation of the problem and 
available resources.
Ill-defined problems as defined by Peter Rowe (1987) are problems where “both the 
ends and the means are unknown at the outset of the problem-solving exercise” (p. 
40). As a result, a large part of the problem-solving activity (designing) consists of 
defining the problem and redefining it as new knowledge and insight is gained.
§  5.4 Lawson's	Comprehensive	Model
Lawson (2005) provides a comprehensive model that identifies three characteristics 
of design problems: (1.) They cannot be comprehensively stated; (2.) They require 
subjective interpretation; and (3.) They tend to be organized hierarchically.204 His first 
point speaks to the way that design problems are formulated. With many uncertainties, 
multiple stakeholders, and competing priorities, specific criteria and limitations of 
the design problem typically emerge during the design process. Similar to Simon, 
Rittel, and Rowe, Lawson holds that is not really until an acceptable solution is had 
that a design problem is fully defined. Even if it were possible to give a designer a 
comprehensive list of criteria and limitations, these criteria and limitations would still 
need to be understood, prioritized and interpreted. Finally, it must be understood that 
the	solution	to	a	design	problem	is	not	always	embedded	in	the	design	problem. Design 
problems always exist in a larger context. Often times the perceived (given) design 
problem (as defined by the design brief) is a symptom of an underlying unarticulated 
cause that must be discovered. 
204 Some of Lawson’s model will repeat points made above. But, as it is a comprehensive model, it is worth 
presenting it in its entirety.
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Lawson's model describes the components of a design problem and how they interact. 
His model includes three categories: generators of design problems; the domain of 
constraints; the function of design constraints.205  The generators of a design problem 
include the designer, client, user and legislator. The four groups are then organized 
by the type of constraint they propose – flexible optional (designer/client); and rigid 
mandatory (user/legislator). Designer/client generated constraints are comparatively 
flexible, while user/legislator generated constraints tend to be fixed and absolute. 
Further, Lawson identifies levels of flexibility that constraints possess by categorizing 
them terms of their domain: internal or external. Internal constraints are those that are 
normally included in the design brief, such as a program of spaces, intended use, user 
load, etc. External constraints are those that are outside the designer’s control. These 
might include site conditions, climate, availability of materials, building codes, etc. The 
significance of these constraints is found in having an awareness of what can (easily) 
be changed and what cannot. Finally, based on models proposed by Hillier and Leaman 
(1972), Markus (1969), Rand (1970), Portillo and Dohr (1994) Lawson categorizes 
constraints by their function: radical, practical, formal, and symbolic. Radical 
constraints deal with fundamental requirements based on the primary purpose of the 
object being designed. Practical constraints are those that are related to the fabrication, 
construction or technical requirements of the design solution. Formal constraints have 
to do with the organizational and compositional aspects of the design solution. And 
symbolic constraints have to do with the expressive qualities of the design and aspects 
that are implemented in order to create a specific quality of experience.
205 Lawson, for the clarity of argument, does not make the distinction between design criteria and constraints, 
preferring the term constraint. However, he does make reference to Portillo & Dohr (1994) who do make 
this distinction. For Portillo & Dohr constraints “organize internal relationships of objectives within a 
design problem and equally establish relationships between the design problems and its larger setting” 
(p. 408) “usually characterized as restrictive and more closely aligned with specific solution requirements” 
(p. 409). While “criteria appear to offer a larger context for problem solving and evaluations solutions than 
do constraints. Criteria consistently reference design functions and evaluative processes based on purpose” 
(p. 409). Heath (2010), answering the question of where constraints come from, writes that constraints 
can come from: authority, needs, facts and values. The distinction between “criteria/constraints” is used 
throughout this research.
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§  5.5 Not all Design Problems are Solvable
Finally, it must be noted, not all design problems are solvable. This can be due to 
limited resources, because the solution relies on technology that is not yet (or will 
never be) available, or because of how the problem was defined (structured) in terms 
of problem space and/or how the problem was framed. Sometimes a key element 
was over-looked or not considered important to include in the problem space. Or, 
sometimes the way the problem was framed (interpreted) was not leading anywhere. 
Or sometimes, how the problem space was defined and how the problem was 
framed was leading to solution possibilities that were not satisfactory, in terms of 
demonstrable criteria, experiential qualities or personal preference. Adjusting these 
variables may lead to a new way of thinking about the problem which may lead to, 
suggest new possible solution paths. Another reason a design problem may not be 
solvable, is due, simply, to the lack of ability/expertise of the designer. 
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6 Solution
Every block of stone has a statue inside it and it is the task of the sculptor to discover it. 
(Michelangelo)
The solution to a design problem is an artifact, and in the case of architectural 
design is a building/built environment. The solution is not an idea or a plan or a 
concept. This does not mean that all design problems that are solved by architect's 
must be, or even should be buildings/built environments. Often times the best 
solution to an architectural problem is not a building at all. The point here is 
that, normatively speaking, the solution to an architectural design problem is a 
building/built environment.206 
The Michelangelo quote above speaks to two problems faced by all designers. How does 
a designer know, out of all the possible solutions one encounters along the solution 
path, that the solution he is pursuing is the right one? And how can the designer know 
that he has arrived at a solution, when the solution is something has never existed 
before? Recall the working definition of design presented in Chapter Two which claims 
the proper end of design is a coherent, and satisficing solution that solves for given and 
anticipated design criteria and constraints that is technically competent, buildable and 
induces an intended aesthetic experience. This description identifies four performance 
expectations which identify demonstrable criteria and experiential qualities. The quality 
(level of expertise) of the solution is determined by the extent to which the solution 
satisfies demonstrable criteria and induces desired experiential qualities. Ultimately 
this will be determined by assessing the building itself (the proper end of designing). 
206 This is the basic presupposition of this research. As this research proceeds, the reader can see that the 
presupposition that a design solution (where the solution is understood as the proper end to the act of 
designing) is, by definition, an artifact (object, thing), has consequences. The most significant consequence 
is that, if the product of design is an artifact that possess certain qualities, one needs to have a body to assess 
those qualities. If the product of the action is a policy, or a plan, a disembodied solution, one can assess how well 
that product solves for abstract criteria and theoretical constraints. One can even assess the level of coherence 
of the solution. However, one cannot assess the physical properties of the object, because it doesn’t have any. It 
is disembodied. But, if the product is intended to be embodied, physical solution, then, it is necessary to possess 
a way of assessing the physical (not only structural, thermal, mechanical, but also experiential) qualities of the 
product, not when it is completed (by then it might be too late), but while it is still experienced as an evolving 
idea or approximation in the mind of the designer. 
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However, and this gets to a central problem of this research, the	designer	needs,	
somehow,	to	determine	that	the	building	he	has	in	mind,	has	externalized	as	a	
functional	approximation,	with	the	expectation	that	it	will	result	in	a	building/
built	environment,	will	both	satisfy	demonstrable	criteria	and	induce	the	desired	
experiential qualities. The trial-and-error method, while effective, is simply not 
practical for the design of objects as large and complex (and expensive) as buildings. 
And the method of incremental improvement, such as multiple releases of software 
(verson.1.0, 1.2, - 1. 7 - 2.0, etc. – my computer is using OSX version 10.12.03 – is 
not practical, as buildings are typically “one-off.”	How	can	a	designer	determine	
the likelihood that the functional approximation (the proximate end of design),	he	
produces	will	result	in	a	building	solution	(proper end of design)	with	the	intended	
characteristics? This is the question that this section will explore.
§  6.1 Who	Determines	the	Quality	of	a	Solution?
 The artist embodies in himself the attitude of the perceiver while he works. 
(Dewey, 1934/2005, p. 50)
Dewey’s quote above describes the posture of the designer as he is designing, as 
embodied in the attitude of the perceiver. The designer does this because he is intent 
of inducing a particular quality of experience in the user. An effective means for 
achieving this is to enter into the experience of the user, to walk in his shoes. From this 
perspective one may ask, who determines the quality of the design solution?  Finally 
it	is	the	user	as	the	perceiver.	In	the	end	it	is	the	one	who	encounters/experiences	the	
building/built	environment	who	determines	the	quality	of	the	design	solution. As an 
occupation, the designer’s work is assessed by the extrinsic performance expectations 
established and maintained by the professional associations, historical precedent, 
and civic expectations. It is the designer, however who defines, who sets the intrinsic 
expectations for his performance. The designer, embodied in the attitude of the 
perceiver, is aware that finally he is not designing for himself. The designer is aware that 
he is not designing for professional, government or civic organizations. The designer 
knows that he is designing a building/built environment for those who will perceive it 
and those who will use it, whomever they might be. 
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Cuff (1992) writes that there are three “principle evaluators of any building’s quality, 
and these are the consumers or public at large, the participants in the design process, 
and the architectural profession. …[A]n excellent building is one perceived to be 
excellent by all three of these groups” (p. 196). These groups participate in generating 
the criteria and constraints of the design problem that define and frame the problem. 
Each of these parties have their own interests and agendas. It is the goal of designing to 
produce a solution that satisfies these within an acceptable range agreed upon by the 
participants, and which conforms to the performance expectations of the profession. 
Recall the working definition of designing described in Chapter Two. It identifies two 
categories of performance expectations: (1.) Demonstrable criteria and constraints, 
and (2.) Experiential qualities. Demonstrable criteria have to do with the functional 
and technical aspects of the building, in terms of plan/section, tectonics, and 
performance criteria.207  Experiential qualities have to do with the quality of the design 
solution in terms of coherence and aesthetic experience. These identify the reasonable 
expectations that anyone might expect from a competent design solution. 
Referring back to Ryles and his description of how an expert pre-structures a problem in 
Chapter Three, Archer’s argument (above) recommending the postulating of informed 
conjectures as a means of understanding the problem, and Rittel's observation that "from 
the beginning the designer has an idea of the ‘whole’ resolution of his problem," a strong 
case for claiming that the	way	one	pre-structures	the	problem	has	a	direct	relationship	
with	the	anticipated	outcome. By pre-structuring one establishes expectations and 
biases the possible solution paths. The designer (group or individual) comes with, if not 
a preconceived solution, at least a sense for how she/he wants to approach the problem 
(informed conjectures). Pre-structuring a problem can be an effective designing/
problem-solving heuristic. The client may have his vision of a building he has be 
dreaming about for years. The end user, say the tenant, once a pre-agreement has been 
made about the required area, has already been planning how they are going to use the 
space. Building officials have their own ideas about the proper way to provide means of 
egress and other building code requirements. And, then there are the builders, who have 
their own ideas, friends and family. The	problem	is	not	that	designers,	owners	and	users	
pre-structure	the	problem;	the	problem	is	that	they	are	often	not	even	aware	that	they	are	
doing it. And as a result they may unwittingly eliminate or overlook possibilities that may 
have led to a more acceptable design solution.
207 See Studies in Tectonic Culture; (1995); Materials, Form and Architecture (2003); Architect’s Handbook of 
Professional Practice (2005); Architecture: Form, Space and Order (2007); Neufert Architect’s Data (2000); 
Architectural; Graphic Standards (2016) for performance expectations and theory regarding demonstrable criteria.
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Imagine that as a group, in a fictional, ideal situation, after some discussion (and 
a miracle), designers, owners, and users all come to share the same interpretation 
(definition and structure) of the problem. Now that the problem has been clarified 
and there is some consensus as to what it means, the designer(s) enters the problem-
framing/solution-seeking phase, with the understanding that as the design process 
proceeds and solutions are considered, the problem itself will evolve. Multiple solution 
paths are identified. Some are taken, some are not. After time a solution begins to 
emerge and a way of thinking about the problem has solidified. Will the generator 
group be able to come to an agreement, as to whether or not the solution is satisficing? 
This will depend on many variables, both implicit and explicit, including how well 
the building satisfies the pre-conceived ideas everyone started with. As well as the 
willingness of the generator group to challenge their presuppositions and biases for the 
sake of a more acceptable solution. But in order for this to occur the generator group 
needs to be cognizant that they in fact do pre-structure the problem.
Once the building is built, the designer, client, user and legislator can walk around 
the building, determine if it functions as planned, if it satisfies legal requirements, 
if it earns desired energy/ecological sustainability performance expectations, the 
quality of construction, building environment systems, lighting, etc. As they walk 
around and walk through the building they are making assessments, about both the 
demonstrable criteria and constraints, as well as the experiential qualities. Assessing if 
the demonstrable criteria and constraints have been satisfied is relatively easy. One can 
easily check the width of a hallway, examine the quality of finishes, check to see if the 
furniture fits, confirm that the means of egress is unobstructed, etc. 
The designer/client/owner/user and legislator can also walk around and through the 
building, to determine if it induces intended experiential qualities. There is admittedly 
a certain level of subjective relativism involved in assessing the experiential qualities, 
but as everyone is walking through the same building at the same time, there is a 
reasonable expectation that they can come to some level of inter-subjective agreement.208 
The question is not if one "likes" the quality of atmosphere that the building/built 
environment induces. This has to do with personal taste. The question is if the building/
built environment induces the intended quality of experience. Much like if we all take a 
bite out of the same apple we can come to a consensus about the quality of its crunch, 
texture, sweetness, tartness. A discussion about the quality of the shared experience is 
possible. Once the building is built, assessing its demonstrable criteria and experiential 
quality is more-or-less straight forward. There is an actual building to assess.
208 Both the concept of subjective relativity and inter-subjective agreement will be discussed in the chapter on 
aesthetic experience
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In this fictional example, the four participants (generator group) have the advantage 
of being able to assess an actual building. One may argue whether or not there should 
be a toilet in the lobby (in terms of functional efficiency, building codes or cultural 
preference), if the color of the entrance is appropriate (in terms of reflective quality of 
light, symbolic meaning, personal preference), if the materials will resist local weather 
conditions (in terms of porosity, strength of materials, availability) if the details 
communicate the desired level of quality (in terms of anticipated building movement, 
daily use, level of available craftsmanship), if the furniture fits properly in the rooms 
(in terms of ergonomics, anticipated and unanticipated use). One may even agree/
disagree on how coherent the overall design feels (how easy is it to figure out how to 
get around), and if the quality aesthetic experience is satisfactory (does it look/feel like 
it was supposed to). Whether one is satisfied with the demonstrable criteria and the 
experiential qualities is another question. The group can participate in this common 
assessment because they are faced with a situation at hand (experience of an actual 
building) where there is a reasonable expectation that everyone in the group (more-
or-less) shared the same experience. This is what is meant by inter-subjectivity. The 
problem arises when there is no physical building at hand, but only an emerging idea in 
the mind of the designer.
Throughout the design process, the designer assesses the quality of the  emerging 
design solution by inhabiting the design world (a mental/internal approximation 
of the design solution) feelingly. He inhabits the design world qua the designer. He 
inhabits the design world qua the client/owner/developer. And he inhabits the design 
world qua the user. And he inhabits the design world qua the designer, client/owner/
developer and the user. In each instance, he is anticipating how the designer, client/
owner/developer and the user will experience the building/built environment by 
applying his senses to the mental approximation of the building he holds in his mind. 
In the end the distal assessment of the design qua building is by the client/owner/
developer and the user. But the proximate assessment of the design solution qua 
internal approximation is (necessarily) by the designer, as up to now there is no way to 
see what another sees/experiences in his mind's eye.
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§  6.2 Making Representations
Both composers and performers are said to hear with the “inner ear,” but that 
immaterial metaphor is misleading – famously for composers like Arnold Schoenberg, 
shocked by the actual sounds of what they’ve written on the page, equally the performer 
whose study of the scores in necessary but not sufficient preparation for putting bow to 
string, or lip to reed. The sound itself is the moment of truth. 
(Sennett, 2009, p. 159)
While the proper end of architectural design is a building, the proximate end 
(product), that is what designers normally produce are externalized approximations 
(representations) of a thing to be built.209 
These external representations provide the basis for assessing the likelihood that the 
design will satisfy demonstrable criteria and experiential qualities. Designers envision 
a possible future and then produce (externalize) a functional representation that 
results in a building that has never existed before. But, predicting the future is a risky 
endeavor. There are so many variables to plan for and anticipate. One soon realizes, 
and perhaps begrudgingly accepts, that just because one can imagine a possible  future 
building, doesn’t mean that it is possible to build it. 
The world of thought and cognition is a world where one can (if one chooses) 
overlook inconvenient complexities (like gravity) if they challenge one's big idea.210 
209 This issue of internal/external representations can be, and often is connected to theories of perception and 
knowing. As a point of clarification this research takes a decidedly embodied approach to representation 
and how it functions in human cognition. It is outside the scope of this research to engage in and in-depth 
discussion on this complex topic. However, a few comments and references may help the reader. While an 
embodied approach to representation and perception has psychological roots in Gestalt psychology (Weber, 
1995), the ecological model of Gibson (1986), as well as philosophical roots in Husserl (1970) and especially 
Merleau-Ponty (1962), this research relies heavily on theories of embodiment as found in Lakoff and Johnson 
(1999), Damasio (1994) and Ramachandran (2011). For a phenomenological approach to inner-state/
external-state, and cognitive functions of representations see Merleau-Ponty (1962), and for a somewhat more 
technical treatise see Peirce, On Representations (1873); and Pape’s (1990) critique of Peire’s theory.
210 Pylyshyn (2004), regarding the phenomenal properties of internal images that are products of imagination, 
writes, “They are our images and we can make them have very nearly any property we wish– and we generally 
make them have the properties we believe would actually obtain if we were to see the real situation” (p. 2). But, 
as qualitative properties associated with mental imagery result from linking these attributes through experience, 
unless one has experienced the properties and characteristics of real materials (tacit knowledge), it is difficult 
to experience a mental representation feelingly, in a manner that induces an experience that correlates with 
the real world. 
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As the Gestalt psychologist have demonstrated, the mind has a tendency to fill in the 
missing parts suggesting the appearance/illusion of a whole. What seemed like a 
good idea at the time, often enough, disappoints in the end. Like Sennett observes in 
the above quote, even though a composition may have sounded good to the “inner 
ear,” it is very difficult to anticipate how it is going to sound before it is performed: 
that is the moment of truth. The same is true for building design, or for that matter, 
any action that involves imagining a possible future. Even though an emerging design 
solution looked good to the “inner-eye,” or felt good to the “inner-body,” it is the 
externalization of the internal representation that is the moment of truth.  Anyone can 
come up with a novel idea for a building and a possible future. Coming up with a novel 
idea or imagining a possible future is the easy and fun part. The real work of designing 
is looking at the novel idea and possible future, listening to it, feeling it, testing it, 
developing it, figuring out how it can be built; externalizing the internal representation 
and communicating it as a functional approximation, with as fine a grain and fidelity 
as necessary, so that someone else can use it to make it an actual building. This then 
is the moment of truth for the designer, when the building is built and is experienced 
by the intended user. Depending on his level of skill, and a bit of luck, there should 
reasonably good correspondence between the designer’s “inner-eye” (mental 
representation) and what we see/experience in the world (the building at hand). 
How is this possible?
§  6.3 Metal Representations
Mental representations that are produced during the design process as a means of 
visualizing the emerging design solution, though having much in common, are not 
the same as the internal representations originated from our eyes. That is to say, there 
are “very significant differences between retinal/cortical images and mental images” 
(Pylyshyn, Z., 2003, p. 115). They are not representations in the visual sense (though 
they may be experienced as such).
To appreciate the significance of these differences it is first important to understand 
that we don’t actually see with our eyes. Or as Ramachandran (2011) puts it, “vision 
does not occur in the eye. It occurs in the brain” (p. 41). Pinker (2009) provides an 
excellent explanation of how visual stimulus from the eyes are filtered, processed, 
interpreted, assembled in the visual cortex, resulting in the images of the world we 
perceive. He notes that seeing involves solving problems that are literally unsolvable 
(not unlike design problems). In an effort to provide reliable, actionable and accurate 
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information and considering limited cognitive processing and memory capacity or 
"bounded-ness," the visual system needs to deduce – making efficient use of available 
resources – “an object’s shape and substance from its projection, making use of inverse 
optics.” The problem is that, like design problems, the projections that are perceived 
by the eye are “ill-posed” problems, that is, “a problem that, as stated, has no unique 
solution” (p. 212). There	are	multiple	reasonable	ways	to	visually	interpret	a	situation	
in a manner that makes sense. The way the visual system makes sense out of these 
ill-posed problems of perception, is by making some assumptions (heuristics) about 
the world. For example, similar to the theory the Gestalt psychologists developed 
over 125 years ago, Pinker writes, “the human visual system ‘assumes’ that matter is 
cohesive, surfaces are uniformly colored, and objects don’t go out of their way to line 
up in confusing arrangements” (p. 212). These assumptions are normally learned 
by experiencing the world.  All sense systems work in a more-or-less similar way. 
Limbeck-Lilienau (2016) writes, “The sensory receptor [be it eyes, nose, ears, skin, etc.] 
‘transduces’ the stimulus into an electrical impulse of the nerves. Different stages of 
cognitive processing in the sensory areas of the brain lead finally to a perceptual state, 
which is generally described as a conscious perceptual experience” (p. 1). What we 
perceive as the real world, with all its attributes, qualities, and meaning, is a cognitive 
construction. Visual images, colors, smells, taste, are all experiential qualities that are 
the product of cognition.211  Cognition is how we know the world.
Mental representations have similar characteristics as visual representations, except 
that they do not originate as electrical impulses caused by sense percepts being 
transduced to initiate cognitive processing. Mental representations are constructs 
of the mind/imagination. Limbeck-Lilenau (2016) explain that a distinction can 
be made regarding perception between the “phenomenal experience and the larger 
perceptual processing in our sensory systems which describe how that experience is 
caused and how it is used in further cognitive processing.” Most perceptual processing 
is not conscious, we are aware of only certain aspects of it, these are what are referred 
to as (conscious) phenomenal experiences. “Phenomenal experience is defined by the 
qualitative character of our conscious state” (p. 2). A phenomenal experience (state) is 
best described by qualia, or “what it feels like to…” 
211 Backhaus & Menzel (1992) write, “[W]e know from psychophysical and neurophysiological investigations that 
color is created somewhere in the brain, although the exact location of this process is still unknown, and we even 
have no idea what entities the sensations called color are . . . In short, colors appear only at a first naive glance to 
be located in objects” (p. 28). 
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A	distinction	is	made	between	the	phenomenal	content	of	the	perception	and	the	
representational content of perception. While it is possible to separate the phenomenal 
content of the perception from the representational, for example one can see a red 
light and recognize it as such without feeling an impulse to stop, or feel anxiety as one 
speeds through it. Another distinction is that perceptual states can be distinguished 
from perceptual judgments and beliefs (p. 5). This distinction is somewhat related to 
Gombrich's concept (1960/2000, p. 14) of the innocent eye. Or, in moral philosophy 
it is similar to the pre-ontic, that is the experience of a phenomenon that has no 
intention (good or otherwise) associated with it.212 
There is a debate regarding the quality of mental representations that is relevant to 
this research: do mental representations possess the same phenomenal qualities 
as sensory representations? There are two side to the debate. Kosslyn et al. claim, 
that mental representations function as depictions of an idea, like the cathode 
ray tube used in television sets back in the 70’s that produce “images [that] are 
temporary spatial displays in active memory” resulting in a quasi-pictoral (analog) 
representation (p. 536). Pylyshyn (2004) critiques this idea arguing that it confuses 
images of the imagination with representations of ideas. He writes, “imagery and 
vision are dissociable, that images are not visually reinterpreted, and that the pattern 
of cortical activity does not spatially (homeomorphically) map properties such as 
the size of imagined objects” (p. 111). Pylyshyn explains that people when asked 
to imagine something “ask themselves what it would be like to see it, and the then 
simulate as many aspects of this staged event as they can as seem relevant”(p. 113). 
He refers to this as the “null hypothesis,” or an “appeal to format,” because it only 
appeals to “the tacit knowledge that people have about how things tend to happen 
in the world, together with certain psychological skills” (p. 113). Pylyshyn, argues 
that the defense for the theory of images being projected in the visual cortex is based 
on misunderstanding recent discoveries in neuroscience. He sites two findings:  
(1.) When a visual pattern is presented to the eye, a homeomorphic (continuously 
deformed) mapping of retinal activity occurs in the visual cortex. (2) Although it 
remains controversial, it has also been reported that there is increased activity in 
retinotopically-organized areas of visual cortex during mental imagery.213 
212 For example the difference between killing and murder. Killing is simply the termination of a life. While murder 
is the termination of a life with intent to kill.
213 See, Tootell, (1982); Roland (1995); Roland & Gulyas (1994).
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From these findings it appears that “cortical images occur in both vision and imagery, 
the difference being that the former is caused by light on the retina while the latter is 
caused by top-down projections from higher cognitive systems” (p. 115). But Pylyshyn 
goes on to argue that these findings do not prove anything about the form of the 
representation. His point is that “imagery and vision might involve the very same form 
of	representation	without	being	pictoral	in	either	case” (p. 115). 
There are two ramifications of this way of thinking about mental representations 
that are critical to this research. (1.) The argument is that the electrical impulses that 
stimulate the images generated in the visual cortex, can either come from retinal 
activity or from within the mind itself (imagination). These images that are generated 
in the visual cortex have similar characteristics, whether they are stimulated by visual 
percepts or percepts of the imagination. (2.) The images generated in the visual 
cortex that are stimulated by retinal activity are perceived as possessing associated 
phenomenal qualities: color, weight, distance, texture (what Böhme (1993) calls 
atmosphere), “where perception is understood as the experience of the presence of 
persons, objects and environments” (p. 116). 
This means that the images generated by the imagination can also be experienced as 
possessing associated qualities and atmosphere.214 That is, it is possible to imagine 
a thing and experience its qualia in a similar way as one experiences a thing in 
the real world.
214 In his doctoral thesis, Ostman (2013) presents a case for the phenomenal qualities of mental images and how they 
are related to qualia and phenomenal character supported by recent research in brain theory. His argument is that 
phenomenal qualities are instantiated by the brain. To defend this position he points to hallucinations, arguing 
that the phenomenal qualities experienced when a person is experiencing a hallucination (as real as it feels) are 
instantiated by internal cognitive functions. He uses this evidence to argue for the verifiability of veridical perception, 
that is the direct perception of stimuli as they exist. He calls this his instantiation thesis (p. 4).
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§  6.4 Representations in Architectural Design
Representations in architectural design are of two kinds: inner-state representations 
(cognitive approximations generated by imagination), or outer-state representations 
(externalizations of the cognitive approximation). Most working design representations 
occur somewhere between the two states. Representations also serve two primary 
purposes: as a way of thinking about something, and as a means to communicate an 
emerging design solution to another agent. Like states, the purpose (intended use) of 
the representation is also fluid.215
As discussed above in the section on problem solving, Newel and Simon (1958) wrote 
that: to think about something, that something must have an internal representation 
of some kind… As the problem-solver traverses the solution maze, a significant amount 
of data is collected that when seen together produces “patterns of elementary symbols” 
or a “state description.” This pattern of elementary symbols or state description 
is what is meant by a representation. The thinking organism, in order to deal with 
complex problems… must have some processes that are capable of manipulating 
the representation… which is generated from data (proposition-like mental entities) 
not only of itself (body schema and body image), but also of its (given) physical 
environment (situation). The representation is evaluated insofar as the patterns within 
the representation “mirror or fail to mirror the patterns without that they represent.216
Throughout the design process, there are typically multiple instances, at various states, 
where the designer/client/user/legislator, need to assess/re-assess the likelihood that 
the building being designed will satisfy the criteria and induce the experiential quality 
as intended before it is built. 
215 There is also some confusion in the literature regarding the terms representation, image, and approximation. 
None of these terms should be thought of as pictures or projections in the mind. These are not visual 
phenomenon. For clarity’s sake, assume an image is a kind of representation and a representation is a kind of 
approximation, and an approximation is an attempt to make sense of or delimit a situation. Limbeck-Lilenau 
(2016, p. 12) describes three different uses of the term representation: (1) a mental representation is a mental 
state which indicates or informs about properties of the external distal stimulus. (2) Representation as an inner 
mental model or picture, (3) representation as information storage in the mind or more specifically in memory. 
The first description is closest to how representation is being used in this research. The inner mental model, 
picture, and image, can be problematic, as they suggest that there is a little guy inside the mind who is looking at 
the internal representation (similar to Kosslyn above); and as such he looks at the representation in a similar way 
that we look at the chair or the painting over the couch in the living room. Internal representations are obviously 
not physical things, but rather the result of neuro-chemical, physiological cognitive processes.
216 For the purpose of simplicity, and brevity I composed this paragraph using quotes from several sources in the 
study. All sentences and fragments are referenced elsewhere.
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Assessing a representation of a building is far more complicated than assessing an 
actual building. The representational data transfer can be achieved by any medium, 
be it spoken or written language, diagrams, renderings, plans, models, digital 
representations.217 The designer is expected to make representations that effectively 
transfer (so that others can understand) data that describes the current state of the 
evolving design solution, for the purpose of getting input (such as approvals) from 
others (the owner for example). The purpose of this type of representation is primarily 
to communicate/externalize so that another agent can understand the idea, and 
imagine the experience with some degree of inter-subjectivity. For many this is the 
primary reason for making drawings, models, renderings, and digital representations. 
There is however another way that both internal and external representations 
of the emerging design solution, in its many states, functions; that is to inform, 
provide feedback for the designer, and to motivate the design process as one seeks a 
particular quality of aesthetic experience within the design world. These externalized 
representations take on a much more personal, sometime expressive, spontaneous 
character. These externalizations provide the basis for the conversation with the design 
situation that is the designing/problem-solving/creative process.
217 Typically, except for the making of scale models and on-site assembly “mock-ups,” most externalized 
representations in architecture are visual, and in two dimensions. This applies just as well to so-called 3-d 
computer models. The 3-d models, insofar as the a visualized on a flat computer screen, are not actually 3-d, 
but only 2-d images that trick the mind into considering it as a 3-d model. This is true of video as well. This 
poses a cognitive challenge for both the designer who is seeking a solution and the owner/user who needs 
to evaluate the design proposal prior to it being built. This difficulty is discussed in detail by Mitrovic (2013), 
Visuality for Architects. Mitrovic argues that considering the significant advances made in the cognitive sciences, 
the “lack of awareness of these changes is a remarkable aspect of contemporary thinking about architecture” 
especially the continued insistence on “the primacy of language in human thinking” (p. 3). Through an excellent 
review of contemporary theories of perception and human cognition, as well as concrete observations from his 
experience teaching design, he provides an articulate and convincing critique of the underlying theory beneath 
how architectural design is taught. He writes, “The expectation that one must justify architectural designs by 
referring to something outside architecture, that formal and visual qualities are of secondary importance in 
architecture, has not just accidentally happened to dominate contemporary thinking about architecture. It has 
its own history and originates in a number of philosophical and psychological positions that became influential 
in the 1960’s. While these positions have in the meantime ceased to be credible in philosophy and psychology, 
they have remained enshrined as dogmas in the writing of architects, architectural historians, and historians… 
moat of contemporary architectural thinking is based on assumptions that have lost their credibility in the 
disciples from which they were originally imported into architectural theory” (p. xiii).
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For a designer, the representation takes the form of (visualized as) the thing 
being designed. It is an internal means of visualizing, that makes use of the same 
neurocircuitry and regions of the brain that are used when seeing/experiencing 
the outside world (Ramachandran, 2011). As an inner-representation evolves in 
complexity it is experienced by the designer as what Schön (1992) calls a design world. 
To use Polanyi’s (1974) idea, the designer inhabits this design world feelingly.218 That 
is, using the same sense systems he uses to navigate a busy street, and that induces 
a sense of awe at the magnificence of the Grand Canyon, to assess the experiential 
quality of the emerging design solution, except in this case the origin of the image is 
not cortical, but imaginary. In this design world the designer can view the emerging 
design solution, walk around it, and test it. While most people possess the basic ability 
to apply the senses to an internal representation, like other “natural” abilities, this 
ability also requires training to develop.219 Through a related ability called Einfühlung 
(translated as empathy)220 and mirror-neurons221 the designer can imbue the emerging 
design solution with experiential qualities. This ability to enter into the design world 
feelingly is made possible because of the embodied nature of human cognition. 
218 Pallasmaa (2009) writes, “While drawing, a mature designer and architect is not focused on the lines of the 
drawing, as he is envisioning the object itself, and in his mind holding the object in his hand or occupying the 
space being designed. During the design process, the architect occupies the very structure that the lines of the 
drawing represent” (p. 59).
219 This ability to visual, manipulate, rotate and inhabit internal mental representations is a fundamental skill for 
acquiring architectural design expertise. While, it is an ability that most people have to some degree, expert 
designer’s skills are more advanced than most. An often referenced experiment by Shepard and Metzler 
(1988) factors that influence estimated rates of mental rotation, including previous exposure, the existence 
of a physical model, memory, eye-movement, 2-d vs. 3-d dimensionality, and a comparative study of previous 
research. Another noted experiment is in Hollard & Delius (1982) where a comparative study between pigeons 
and humans test the cognitive ability to manipulate, rotate and recognize images.
220 The concept of Einfühlung a “process by which we endow the object of our vision – whether human or non- 
human – with life, or with a soul” (Bridge, 2010, p. 3), emerged as a key concept among early 20th century 
German aesthetic philosophers, including F. and R. Vischer, Lipps, Wölfflin, Worringer. Introduced into the 
English language by Titchener as “empathy” term Einfühlung described the projection of a sense of the inward 
feeling of our bodily state onto inanimate objects. See Pionotti (2010) for a general overview; Bridge (2011) for a 
description of Wölfflin; and (Jahoda, 2005) for a description of Lipps.
221 Mirror-neurons were discovered by Rizzolatti in the ventral pre-motor area of monkeys, in the early 1990’s at 
the University of Parma (Rizzolatti & Craighero, 2004). Mirror-neurons, found in both primates and humans, 
fire when one acts and when one observes another performing the same action. Anytime one observes another 
doing something, the corresponding mirror neuron might fire in the observers mind allowing him/her to 
empathize with the other’s feelings by mirroring his actions and thereby constructing an implicit model through 
which the other can anticipate the other’s intentions (Ramachandran, 2011).
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§  6.5 Extended Cognition
The capacity of human (embodied) cognition has its limits (recall Simon’s concept of 
bounded rationality), in terms of processing capacity as well as short term (working) 
memory. There is a limited amount of data (according to Miller [1956] the limit is 
+/- seven bits), that the mind can actively work with simultaneously. The mind does, 
however, have some tricks that allow cognitive processes to deal with increasingly 
complex ideas in working memory. These include: clumping, schema, and scaffolding. 
An immense amount of processing capacity and data (cognitive load) 222 is required to 
maintain, assess, rotate and inhabit an internal representation in working memory of 
something as complex as a building design. The cognitive load involved in processing 
a complex internal representation often exceeds the mind’s processing capacity, even 
after applying all the tricks and load-reducing heuristics available to it. However, the 
mind has one more trick: extended cognition.  Extended cognition is the ability humans 
possess to make use of the external world as a means for increasing cognitive capacity.
As discussed above, human cognition is not limited to what goes on in the brain or as 
Clark and Chalmers (1998) refer to it, the “skin/skull boundary.” Cognition engages 
the whole body, both as a way to interact with the world, as well as a way to extend 
cognitive capacities.223 Some simple examples of how this happens are: writing 
something down so as not to forget it; counting fingers (and toes) as a way to simplify a 
math problem; making and use of tools is another example.224 Above, Polanyi explained 
extended cognition by describing how a blind man explores the world, not with his 
hand, but with the tip of his cane. The cane becomes an extension of his body. Clark 
and Chalmers (1998) describe these extended cognitive abilities as 
the basic package of cognitive resources I bring to bear on the everyday world… The 
biological brain has in fact evolved and matured in ways which factor in the reliable 
presence of a manipulatable external environment… that has favored on-board 
capacities which are especially geared to parasitizing the local environment so as to 
reduce [cognitive] load. (p. 645)
222  For a description of clumping, schema, and scaffolding and See Paas, Renkl & Sweller (2004).
223 Damasio & Damasio (2006) write, “…the body and the brain are engaged in a continuous interaction that 
unfolds in time, within different regions of the body and within mental spaces as well. Metal states cause brain 
states; body states are then mapped to the brain and incorporated into the ongoing mental states” (p. 19).
224 Wilson (1999) provides an excellent description of the inter-dependency between the evolution of the 
mind and the hand.
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The function that allows the mind to extend itself into the external environment is 
called coupling. This is what allows the blind man to know the world through the tip of 
his cane. Polanyi (1974) call it “focal awareness.”225 It is a way we have of knowing and 
increasing cognitive capacity by extending ourselves into the world.
Designers have a favorite way of extending the capabilities of their cognitive ability 
into the world – that is through sketching. When the designer sketches, he is thinking 
with pencil and paper, not unlike an accountant trying making sense of complex 
financial transaction by working with spreadsheets. It is impossible to keep track of all 
the figures and interaction is his mind. When the designer sketches he is externalizing 
thought, exploring opportunities, testing possibilities. 
Sketching assists in examining the internal emerging representation, and to provide 
feedback. Goldschmidt (2003) refers to the feedback gained from self-generated 
sketches as backtalk.226 Goldschmidt writes that sketching facilitates some basic 
functions involved in solving novel problems and creative problem-solving, such 
as restructuring of the problem and productive thinking, and “that it is the sketch’s 
backtalk, and the plausible interpretations of it, that make this possible” (p. 84). 
The purpose of the sketch, is not only as a means to test an idea by externalizing 
the representation and seeing how well it approximates (correlates with) the 
internal representation,227 but also as a means for discovering new ways of thinking 
about the problem. Goldschmidt continues, “The self-generated sketch talks 
back, and its backtalk reflects some of the sketcher’s innermost, tacit, otherwise 
untapped knowledge, biases, and preferences” (p. 87). Arnheim (1993) writes, 
“By making a sketch, the designer supplies the mental image with the assistance 
of an optical image, which has all the properties of such visual percepts” (p. 17). 
225 Polanyi (1974) writes, “When we use a hammer to drive in a nail, we attend to both nail and hammer, but in 
a different way. We watch the effect of our strokes on the nail and try to wield the hammer so as to hit the nail 
most effectively. When we bring down the hammer we do not feel that its handle has struck our palm but that its 
head has struck the nail. Yet in a sense we are certainly alert to the feelings in our palm and the fingers that hold 
the hammer. They guide us in handling it effectively, and the degree of attention that we give to the nail is given 
to the same extent but in a different way to those feelings. The difference may be stated by saying that the latter 
are not, like the nail, objects of our attention, but instruments of it. They are not watched in themselves; we 
watch something else while keeping intensely aware of them. I have a subsidiary awareness of the feeling in the 
palm of my hand which is merged into a focal awareness of my driving the nail” (p. 55).
226 See also Arnheim (1993) written in response to Goldschmidt (1991).
227 The mind, often “fills in the blanks” as a means to reduce cognitive load, and increase speed, causing us to 
sometimes discover that what worked in the fuzzy logic of the mind does not work when put on paper. 
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Sketching forces the designer to apply the constraints of the visual (external) world, 
to the approximate representations of the (inner) mind. It is a dialogical process, 
or as Goldschmidt (1991) calls it a dialectic, that allows the designer to enter into a 
conversation, explore, test and discover ways of seeing the emerging solution.
§  6.6 Criteria and Constraints
The two great rules for design are these: 1st, that there should be no features about a 
building which are not necessary for convenience, construction, or propriety; 2nd, that 
all ornament should consist of enrichment of the essential construction of the building. 
The neglect of these two rules is the cause of all the bad architecture of the present time. 
(Pugin, 2006, p. 385)
The normative expectation that a design solution should solve for demonstrable design 
criteria and constraints is self-evident and does not need much explanation. This is the 
most basic expectation/requirement of a design solution, sometimes encapsulated 
by an erroneous reference to the dictum, "form follows function." A building design 
is expected to serve its intended purpose (function) in a sufficient and satisfactory 
manner. For those with a functional bias, this is the primary expected outcome of the 
design process. This bias has its roots in theories associated with modernism (Banham, 
1980), and some of the same theories that influenced the first generation of design 
research and methodology (Broadbent, 1973). The emphasis on “functionalism,” the 
devaluation of decoration, the fascination with advanced technology, radical changes 
in building technology, the commodification of housing, the financial structure of 
real estate development, etc.,228 all led to a radical shift in the expectations for what a 
building should do, and how the (architecture) profession functions within the building 
development process. 
The desire for/belief in the possibility of objective criteria for the assessment/
judgment of a design solution has also given weight to this normative expectation. 
228 See Perez-Gomez (1992, 2016) for an insightful assessment theory and an overview of how social/
cultural/civic expectations of architecture and architects has evolved and changed since and after the 
“crisis of modern science.”
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As discussed above, early problem solving theory models, such as that proposed by 
Simon, requires that a (design) problem be well-behaved: a clearly defined problem 
that can be solved with an observable, repeatable process, that leads to an optimized/
sufficient/satisfactory solution. And if it was not “well-behaved,” the design problem/
process could be broken down into its constituent parts so that it “operates within a 
closed abstract system, that is controlled and manipulated by a professional problem-
solver and free from human judgment and experience” (Huppatz, 2015).
There is no doubt that a design solution must solve for (and anticipate) design criteria and 
constraints. There is no question that a building design should result in a building/built 
environment that serves the “function” for which it is intended in an efficient and effective 
manner. However, this is not the only normative performance expectation, nor is it the 
most important, rather it is one of several incommensurable performance expectations.
§  6.7 Technical Competency
In addition to the tool and the hand that guides it, there is the material to be treated, 
the formless mass to be transposed into form. Every work of art should reflect in its 
appearance the material as physical matter… In this way, we may speak of a wood style, 
a brick style, and ashlar style, and so forth. 
(Semper, 1989, p. 269)
The expectation that the design solution must be able to be built seems to be a self-
evident. A built building/built environment is the proper end of architectural design. 
If a building design (approximation) cannot be built (implemented), it fails. This is the 
meaning of the term functional approximation; that the design documents provide a 
representation of a building such that it can be built. The above quote from Semper calls 
to mind that buildings are made by hands and tools in the hands of craftsman, who form 
the materials, that result in the building. Buildings are made of the stuff of the earth. 
And the stuff of the earth has physical properties that must be taken account of. 
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It has been observed229 (and is confirmed by my experience) that it is less and less 
the normative expectation that a designer actually knows how a building is made, is 
familiar with materials, or that the (normative) outcome of the design process should 
be a functional approximation, that is that a design solution should be able to be 
built.230 More and more, it seems that design students (and professionals) only need 
to provide a representative approximation of how the building should (could) look. 
Figuring out how and if it can be built is someone else’s problem. Designers are only 
expected to generate an approximate representation of a novel form (not unlike a 
stylist), others are expected to find a way to fabricate/build it. The problem with not 
thinking about buildings in terms of their materials and how to build them is well said 
by Pallasmaa (2009), who writes “Fully computer-generated designs may well project a 
seductive surface appeal, but in fact they take place in a world in which the observer has 
no skin, hands or body” (p. 99). 
One possible explanation (referring back to the section on making representations), 
for this disconnect between the design solution as plan/form/section, and the 
material/structural aspects of the design solution may be attributed to a general 
lack of direct experience (and internalized knowledge) of the characteristics and 
properties of materials. So that when novice designers are generating internal/external 
representations they are unable to couple the phenomenal qualities of the materials 
with the representational images that induces the experience of inhabiting the design 
world feelingly.
Another explanation is that architectural designers no longer consider the building 
as the proper end to design, but rather consider the representation of an idea for a 
building to be the proper end of design.
229 See Mallgrave, who writes, “When one devotes an inordinate amount of one’s attention to compositional or 
novel form, for example, one tends to ignore materiality and detailing” (Mallgrave H. F., loc. 261-262).
230 See Mitrovic (2013), Zumthor (2006),Pallasmaa (2005), Frampton (1995), Pye, (1978) for the importance 
of thinking about a building in terms of built object that possesses material, environmental and structural 
properties. This trend of focusing on the conceptual aspects of architectural design does seem however to be 
shifting, as can be witnessed by the renewed interest in design-building projects and the proliferation of fab-
labs in architecture schools around the world. See Carpenter (1997), ACSA Design Build Award honors program 
(www.acsa-arch.org); as well as TU Delft Bucky Lab (http://buckylab.blogspot.nl). Spiller & Clear (2014) 
collected 40 essays from educators and practitioners around the world that together offers a good, current 
overview of the state of architectural design education.
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§  6.8 Coherence
Pattern pleases us, rewards a mind seduced and yet exhausted by complexity. We 
crave pattern, and find it all around us, in pedals, sand dunes, pine cones, contrails. 
Our buildings, our symphonies, our clothing, our societies – all declare patterns. Even 
our actions: habits, rules, codes of honor, sports, traditions – we have many names for 
patterns of conduct. They reassure us that life is orderly. 
(Ackerman, 2004)
There is a normative expectation that a design solution both possess and communicate 
a sense of coherence. However, what is meant by a sense of coherence as a 
performance expectation is not as self-evident as the previous two. To begin with, 
coherence here is being used as a quality of an experience. That is, it is a feeling that is 
induced in the beholder by the object. It is a mental construction.
Just as one can think of designing buildings as problem-solving/satisfying 
demonstrable criteria and constraints, and technical requirements; it is also possible 
to think of the design of a building, as the imposition of order, composition, intentional 
arrangement on the materials of the earth. The painting by William Blake (1757-1827) 
of God as the architect wielding a compass circumscribing the surface of the earth, 
inspired by Milton’s Paradise Lost (Milton, 1667/2016) comes to mind:
Then stay’d the fervid wheels and in his hand 
He took the golden compasses, prepared 
In God’s eternal store, to circumscribe 
This Universe, and all created things. 
One foot he centred, and the other turned 
Round through the vast profundity obscure, 
And said, “Thus far extend, thus far thy bounds; 
This be thy just circumference, O World!” 
Thus God the Heaven created, thus the Earth, 
Matter unform’d and void.
In circumscribing the “vast profundity obscure” (chaos) God is said to have imposed 
order (cosmos) on the stuff of the earth, the place we inhabit, and from which we 
all evolved, with all its complexity and vast inter-connected ecosystems. An open,  
self-correcting, opportunistic, adaptive world comes into being. This is designing. 
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From the Judeo-Christian tradition being a designer involves participating in creation 
as co-creator, actively participating in this process of bringing something that never 
existed into being. To have the power to impose order, and the ability to perceive 
order.231 Coherence is a quality that is perceived through order-making and sense-
making. It is a quality of perception (not unlike aesthetic quality). The perception of 
coherence suggests deliberate actions and the involvement of a rational being.
The question of coherence, sense-making, 232 meaning, the perception of patterns and 
order in designing can be approached from theology, philosophy, psychology, cognitive 
science, and/or evolutionary biology. The approach in this section with be primarily 
from cognitive neuroscience science and evolutionary biology. The aspect of coherence 
that is most relevant to this study has to do with the quality of the experience induced 
by the design solution in the beholder and the quality of experience induced the 
designer as he immerses (looses) himself in the design process,233 where seeking 
coherence is a function of the design process. 
All design solutions, even if they fail to satisfy demonstrable criteria and constraints 
must minimally appear to be coherent, make sense, have some kind of perceivable 
order or organizational system. As Ackerman points out in the above quote, “we crave 
patterns.” The perception of patterns suggests predictable order, predictable order 
allows us to anticipate impending doom, surviving impending doom allows us to 
anticipate the future, being able to anticipate the future gives us a feeling of coherence. 
A feeling of coherence is reassuring, puts us at ease, allowing us to consider more than 
the immediate concerns of basic survival and reproduction.
231 Not unlike the Gestalt concept of pragnänz: “pregnant with meaning” A basic principle in Gestalt Psychology: the 
brain imposes a “psychological organization” on the phenomena of experience (not entirely dissimilar to Kant’s 
“forms of sensibility”), one that “will always be as ‘good’ as the prevailing conditions will allow” (Kurt Koffka, 
Principles of Gestalt Psychology, 1935).
232 Klein, Moon & Hoffman (2006) describing sense-making write “By sense-making, modern researchers seem 
to mean something different from creativity, comprehension, curiosity, mental modeling, explanation, or 
situational awareness, although all these factors or phenomena can be involved in or related to sense-making. 
Sense-making is a motivated, continuous effort to understand connections (which can be among people, places, 
and events) in order to anticipate their trajectories and act effectively" (p. 71).
233 The experience of loosing oneself in a creative act is called Flow. A term coined by Csikszentmihalyi (1996), 
Flow is described as an optimal experience that involves a kind of loss of self and focused immersion into the 
creative act. It is an autotelic experience where a kind of exhilaration comes from the pursuit of beauty.  It is a 
fragile experience, easily interrupted by distractions. It’s a state of being that requires great discipline to achieve 
(pp. 110-111).
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Humans need to make sense of their environment. On a primitive level, making sense 
of one’s environment is involuntary (though focused attention may reveal additional 
information missed by non-conscious cognitive operations). Just as one does not 
choose to feel cold, choose to feel hungry, choose to know which way is up and which 
side is back (if not there is a feeling of disorientation and confusion), assessing a 
situation and making-sense of it is an ability that has its roots in evolutionary biology 
that allows us to effectively interact with the environment. It is an involuntary, 
physiological impulse. Dervin (1997) writes, the term sense-making “is a label for a 
coherent set of concepts and methods used … to study how people construct sense 
of their worlds and, in particular, how they construct information needs and uses for 
information in the process of sense-making” (p. 2). In an article entitled “Human 
Perception: Making Sense of the World”, Lipari writes:
During the second half of the twentieth century, neuroscientists and cognitive 
scientists began to identify the actual physical processes that transform sensations 
into perceptions. According to this new scientific paradigm, everything we perceive, 
including “external reality,” “is a construction of the brain. Our senses are confronted 
by a chaotic, constantly changing world that has no labels, and the brain must make 
sense of that chaos. It is the brain’s correlations of sensory information that create the 
knowledge we have about our surroundings… (2015, ¶4)
Coherence, order, meaning do not exist in the world, these are constructions of human 
cognition. Lipari’s correlations of sensory information that create knowledge, is what 
Godfrey-Smith (2001) calls cognition, what he defines as “a collection of capabilities 
which, in combination, allow organisms to achieve certain kinds of coordination 
between their actions and the world… a biological tool-kit used to direct behavior” (p. 
5). In describing Environmental Complexity Thesis (ECT), Godfrey-Smith (2001) poses 
as a first principle that, the functional capacity of human cognitive abilities evolved to 
enable the agent to deal with environmental complexity (heterogeneity). That is to say, 
the only reason we have cognitive abilities at all is to allow us to function in-the-world. 
It is a claim similar to those made above by promoters of embodied cognition, such as 
Lakoff & Johnson (1999), Searle (1994), Damasio (1994).
Perceptual mechanisms “all respond, with some degree of sensitivity or discrimination, to 
some physical or chemical variables that impinge causally on the organism, in such a way 
as to enable the organism to make sense of the information about the world that is carried 
by these variables” (Godfrey-Smith, 2001, p. 4). The world is complex. Environmental 
complexity both poses problems and opportunities – for example reproductive advantage, 
as well as adapting to and adapting the agent’s environment for survival advantages. 
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These cognitive abilities do not evolve independent of other bodily functions and 
environmental factors, but rather, like systems theory described above, they evolve 
as inter-dependent systems and sub-systems, adapting to and adapting the world in 
which they inhabit to maximize the likelihood of survival.234 
The ability to make use of multiple sense-systems together, is what allows us to create a 
conception of the world as a dynamic whole that makes sense.235 This is no small ability. 
Ogilvie (1999) writes that “in spite of the multiplicity of sensory inputs” and the lack 
of a ‘master’ area where all signals converge: we usually perceive the world as a unified 
whole” (p. 171). To support this claim they describe an experiment (Rodriguez, 1999) 
that suggests that the perception of the world as a unified whole is due to the “transient 
synchronization of neural discharges act[ing] as an integrative mechanism to bind widely 
distributed neurons into a coherent ensemble underlying a given percept or cognitive 
task” (Ogilvie, p. 171). Gamma band synchronization is found to be consistently present 
in “the visual cortex and the region of the somatosensory cortex in subjects who had 
learned an association between a visual stimulus and a tactile stimulus” (p. 171). The 
theory that coherence has to do with the synchronization of brain waves is not a new idea, 
but experiments like these are offering empirical evidence that this may in fact be how it 
works. Like all systems, this sense-making/coherence-seeking system involves a complex, 
multi-modal dialectic, between the agent’s metal map (Tolman, 1948), the world as it is 
(as perceived by the senses), the world as it is expected to be (based on beliefs), and the 
world as the agent wants it to be (projection). 
Thagard (2002) calls this seeking coherence: when we attempt to make sense of a 
situation, text, picture, built environment, we “construct an interpretation that fits 
with the available information, better than alternative interpretations” (p. 16). That 
construct is a kind of knowledge about the world that produces maximal satisfaction of 
multiple constraints. The presupposition of Thagard’s theory, supported by research in 
evolutionary biology and neuroscience, is that there exists in all humans a basic need 
to make sense of the world. Coherence can be understood as a kind of fit: a fit between 
the experience at hand, and a perceivable system of relations and inter-relations that 
induces a sense of well-being or pleasure (satisfaction). He writes, “various perceptual 
processes such as stereoscopic vision and interpreting ambiguous figures are naturally 
interpreted in terms of coherence and constraints… computing coherence is a matter of 
constraint satisfaction” (p. 40).
234 Wilson (1999) provides an excellent example of the inter-dependent evolution between the unique structure 
of the hand and its intimate communication with the brain through the impact this has had on areas such as 
neurology, psychology and human creativity.
235 Recall Bertalanffy (1968, p.37) from above holds that all systems are oriented toward wholeness.
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Knowing, Thagard (2002) writes "involves at least five different kinds of coherence – 
explanatory, analogical, deductive, perceptual, and conceptual” (p. 41). Perceptual 
knowledge includes visual, auditory, olfactory, and tactile representations of what 
we see, hear, smell, and feel. The world is not experienced directly through these 
sense experiences, but through inference and constraint satisfaction. As discussed 
elsewhere, perception of the world is not assembled one sense at a time, but via the 
parallel processing of multiple sense systems that our cognitive systems use to make 
sense of the world. Thagard explains, relying heavily on Gestalt theory, that the brain 
constructs a coherent, nonverbal representation of the world via interpretations which 
follow certain principles: symmetry, interpretation, sensory priority, incompatibility, 
and acceptance. Symmetry, does not mean the mirror image of a thing divided 
in half along at least one axis. Instead what is meant by symmetry as it relates to 
perception is balance: all the parts appear to fit well together as a composition.236 
Interpretation has to do with how well sensory input fits are governed by “innate 
perceptual principles.” Thagard refers to Gestalt principles of proximity and similarity 
as examples of such an innate principle. Sensory priority and incompatibility have 
to do with the cognitive processes that filter information (sense data) in an effort 
to make sense of the situation. Some sense information jumps to the foreground 
as deemed essential to sense-making, while other information is passed over, as it 
does not seem relevant to the perception of a whole.237 Finally, acceptance has to do 
with the acceptability of an interpretation “depending on its coherence with sensory 
inputs, other… interpretations, and background knowledge” (p. 58). It is this state of 
acceptance that is both sought by the designer as a function and motivating factor 
of the design process; and the state that the designer anticipates that the building/
built	environment	will	induce	in	the	user. Sense-making and seeking coherence 
mostly concern inference making. And the only rule of inference is that we “accept 
a conclusion if it maximizes coherence” (p. 66). Fundamentally coherence is the 
cognitive need that humans display for “constraint-satisfaction.” Or satisfying, 
“mentally balancing many complementary and conflicting pieces of information 
until they all fit in a satisfying way” (Thagard, p. 3).
Given this description of seeking coherence in terms of inference making, one 
could easily replace sense-making and seeking coherence with designing, where 
inference and constraint satisfaction are understood to be biases or heuristics. 
236 Vitruvius (1998, p. 27) defines symmetry as “the appropriate harmony arising out of the details of the work 
itself; the correspondence of each given detail among the separate details in the form of the design as a whole. 
As in the human body, from cubit, foot, palm, inch and other small parts comes the symmetric quality of 
eurhythmy” (Book 1, c. II. 4).
237 This functions in a similar fashion as the two of the three factors observed by Newell (1980) that make Polya’s 
heuristic better suited for a human problem-solver.
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It is this cognitive need that drives (motivates) us to seek order, or impose it when 
necessary, as a way of balancing complementary and conflicting pieces of information 
until they all fit in a satisfying way, such that when a way is found that maximizes 
coherence we accept it as a conclusion. Coherence is the quality of feeling experienced 
when order is perceived and the situation makes sense.
Designing is a process of constraint satisfaction; where the constraints are understood 
to be demonstrable criteria and constraints of the design problem; and where a 
solution is achieved when they all fit in a satisfying way.238 The expectation that a 
design solution should (1.) function as intended, (2.) be technically feasible and 
(3.) make sense, describes the qualities that most design methodologies identify as 
essential. Indeed both Alexander (1964) and Papanek (1984) above both describe 
designing in terms of imposing order. The only performance expectation that is missing 
is inducing an intended quality of aesthetic experience. 
As I reflect on the work of students, participating on design juries, and discussions with 
colleagues, it does seem that after a design solution is shown to solve the problem in 
a somewhat novel way, it appears to function well, and it seems reasonable to assume 
that it could be built; the only experiential quality of the design that is explicitly 
discussed is whether the solution seems coherent or not, does it make sense, is 
there order, proper hierarchy of form, scale, meaning. The quality of the experience 
induced by the design solution as building/built environment is rarely discussed. And 
when it is, the discussion is typically ended with an assent to subjective relativism: 
de gustibus non est disputandum.239
238 Thagard (1998) describes the seeking of coherence as constraint satisfaction (sense seeking function/making 
sense of) that operates over the set representational elements which can be made to fit together (cohere/
feeling of satisfaction) or resist fitting together (incohere/feeling of dis-satisfaction). Recently Thagard has 
further developed this idea proposing a theory of emotional cognition, a theory that describes the how emotions 
function both in the cognitive process and as a means for seeking emotional coherence. There is a psychological 
reward for seeking coherence, a sense of satisfaction or well-being. That emotions (feelings) play a significant 
role in cognition is not a new idea in psychology. Gottfried (2011, p. 62) writes, “In psychology, a reward is 
defined operationally as anything that increases the behavior that leads to obtaining it. When reward acts in this 
way, psychologists call it a positive reinforce because it reinforces or strengthens the underlying associations 
in the brain that are said to ‘control’ the reward-seeking behavior. The concept of reward can be divided into 
primary and secondary rewards, with primary rewards being those that directly meet biological needs (e.g., food, 
water, salt, sex) and secondary rewards [also known as condition reinforces] being stimuli that have acquired 
rewarding properties through their association with primary rewards.”
239 “There is no accounting for taste.”
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Even when working on professional projects, the question of experiential quality is 
normally relegated to being a question of style, personal preference, taste. It is considered 
to be one of many design criteria; alongside environmental sustainability, code 
compliance, life-cycle costs, parking capacity. Experiential quality is negotiated, and is 
often the subject of so called value-engineering. It is as if the building functions well, is 
technically feasible, and seems coherent, then it will result in building/built environment 
that induces intended experiential qualities, somehow… And this may be true for a 
disembodied, rational mind. But then one wonders why would a disembodied rational 
mind would need a building anyway. We need buildings, because we have bodies. It is 
through our bodies that we assess the quality of the experience of a built environment. 
The quality of the experience induced by a building/built environment is more than 
the satisfaction gained by making-sense or imposing order to satisfy the need for 
coherence, it possesses has hedonic (body sense experience) qualities as well. An 
embodied understanding of both the proper end and the proximate end of designing 
takes into account the embodied (hedonic) quality of the architectural experience 
(atmosphere)	induced	in	the	intended	user	as	an	incommensurable,	determinative	
quality. This quality is best described as aesthetic.240 It is my claim that expert 
designers are those who not only know how to make a functional approximation 
that will result in a building that satisfies demonstrable criteria and constraints, is 
technically feasible, and coherent, but are those whom possess the knowledge, skill 
and ability to make use of plan, shape, form, materials, structure, systems, in a manner 
that induces an intended (not accidental) quality of aesthetic experience that engages 
the body and inspires the mind.
240 Hekkert (2006) points out that the aesthetic experience of an object is only one part of the whole experience of 
the designed object. He limits aesthetic experience to the “(dis)pleasure that results from sensory perception” 
(p. 157). (This limitation of aesthetic experience to sensory perception is challenged by Chatterjee [2014] 
below.) Hekkert’s argument, relying heavily on evolutionary psychology, is that we have evolved to aesthetically 
prefer “environmental feature that are beneficial for the development of the senses’ functioning and our survival 
in general” (p. 157). He identifies four general principles for his aesthetics: maximum effect for minimum 
means, unity in variety, most advanced, yet acceptable, and optimal match. To make his argument Hekkert 
refers to evolutionary psychologists (and others who incorporate aspects of evolutionary psychology into their 
work) such as Hildebrand (1999), Orians & Heerwagen (1992), Pinker (2002), Ramachandran & Hirstein 
(1999), as well as Dissanayake (1999) and Tooby & Cosmides (2001). Hekkert observes that the one thing 
these authors have in common is “the notion of adaptation.” This is true, but many of them also build on the 
concept of exaptation. Gould & Vrba (1982) signifying the importance of this phenomenon for the emergence 
of many of the traits, characteristics and preferences that make up what we think of as human prefer the term 
exaptation, that “arose as by-products of other evolutionary processes, or were originally selected for some 
function unrelated to their apparent use” (Larson & Tehrani, 2013, p. 497). See also Ramachandran (2011) 
p. 166, and Pinker (2009) pp. 36-37. This concept of exaptation is fundamental for understanding how 
experiential qualities (such as aesthetic experience) evolved to function within the design process.
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7 Aesthetic
Physical forms possess a character only because we ourselves possess a body. 
If we were purely visual beings, we would always be denied an aesthetic judgment 
of the physical world. 
(Wölfflin [1886] in Vischer, 1994, p. 151) 
Finally, there is a normative expectation that a building should possess intended 
aesthetic qualities. Aesthetic quality is understood as, the quality of the hedonic 
experience induced by a building/built environment. This normative expectation 
is typically more implicit than explicit, related to tacit knowledge. However, it is 
often also the elephant in the room, that everyone sees, but no one wants to admit 
seeing or talking about. This chapter will consider the aesthetic quality of the design 
solution as an intention of the designer, as well as aesthesis as it functions throughout 
the design process; how what is meant by aesthetic has evolved over history, and 
their implications for how we understand aesthetic today; as well as how one's 
understanding of the aesthetic influences how one designs.
Aesthetic experience as it is being used here is not synonymous with “Beauty” (the 
Beautiful, as in a Platonic universal ideal state), or beauty (as in a quality possessed by 
an object).241 Rather, what is meant here is a kind (type) of hedonic experience that is 
evoked	in	a	beholder	by	making	use	of	various	architectural	elements,	materials	and	
techniques. Chatterjee (2014) describes aesthetic as a quality of experience that is, 
241 There has been a long-time association between aesthetic theory and art, as art is often made with the specific 
intention of inducing a reaction in the beholder it is thought to be the proper subject of aesthetic theory. 
However, there is not a necessary connection between aesthetics and art. An aesthetic experience can be 
had anywhere, though this research is only concerned with the quality of an intended (fabricated) aesthetic 
experience). We are constantly experiencing multiple sensory experiences that are constantly being processed 
by our cognitive systems. Therefore it is reasonable to consider that an aesthetic experience does not need to 
be limited to museums, concert halls, and theaters, though it may be more likely that an aesthetic experience 
will be induced in those places. Neuroaesthetics is interested in understanding how an aesthetic experience 
is induced and what an aesthetic experience is from the perspective of neuroscience. See Best (2005) who 
makes a sharp distinction between artistic and aesthetic, writing “[t]here are, then, two, quite distinct, although 
sometimes related, concepts. To put it as starkly as possible, a central feature of an object of artistic as opposed 
to aesthetic interest is, to put it roughly at this stage, that it can have subject matter” (p. 68). While, “[a]esthetic 
quality is an intrinsic aspect of the appreciation and evaluation of the movements involved in sporting activities 
such as gymnastics, diving, skating, and many others” (p. 67). See also Danto (2002),”The Abuse of Beauty” for 
a discussion on how beauty and art came to no longer be necessarily associated with art in the West.
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rooted in but not restricted to basic appetites. The pleasure of gazing at a beautiful 
person or an enthralling painting is not the same as the pleasure of sugar on our 
tongues. Aesthetic pleasures stretch beyond appetitive pleasures in at least three ways. 
First, they extend past desires by tapping into neural systems that are biased toward 
liking without necessarily wanting. Second, aesthetic pleasures are nuanced and 
encompass admixtures of emotions more complex than simple liking. Third, aesthetic 
pleasures are influenced profoundly by our cognitive systems. They are colored by the 
experiences and knowledge we bring to the aesthetic encounters. (pp. 111-112)  
The aesthetic is an embodied way of experiencing/knowing the world through the body. 
The ability that allows us to experience/know the world through our bodies is aesthesis.
Due to the subjective nature of experiential knowledge, there may be an objection 
to claiming aesthetic experience as a normative expectation of practice. There is no 
doubt that any problem situation that does not have an objectively necessary solution 
(such as a well-structured problem); one that relies on bias heuristics to reduce the 
possible solution paths; and that relies on the interpretation and re-interpretation of the 
problem in search of a sufficient, satisfying, somewhat novel solution; is going to involve 
multiple	reasonable	ways	of	seeing	the	problem	and	seeking	a	solution. As noted earlier, 
Pinker observes that even the act of seeing poses a complex problem state "that has no 
unique solution" (p. 212). Due to the limited cognitive processing capacity and memory, 
we only take in information necessary to provide a comprehensive and coherent picture 
of a situation. That is to say that there are multiple legitimate ways of seeing the same 
thing, it all depends on what one is looking for.
The challenge is determining which reasonable way of thinking about a problem is 
preferred. And which way of thinking about a problem has the greatest likelihood of 
resulting in a solution that is acceptable to the designer, client, owner, user group. As 
discussed above, this is complicated, due to the many people with different agendas 
who participate in defining and framing the design problem. It is ultimately a question 
of preference. This of course also applies to a sense of coherence as well. What seems 
to be coherent to one person make not appear coherent to another. The term for this 
problem is subjective-relativism. But relativism is not limited to individual preference, 
it can be extended to cultural relativism, gender relativism, regional relativism, age 
relativism, etc. However, subjective relativism is not always the un-crossable chasm it 
appears to be. Moreover, the fact that different people have divergent opinions about 
the desired quality of a space (atmosphere), and perhaps even about how to achieve 
it, does not mean that it is a topic that should be avoided, or about which one should 
pretend does not matter. 
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Describing intended quality of aesthetic experience as a normative performance 
expectation of a design solution should not be confused with the imposition of a 
normative standard for aesthetic experience. This normative expectation simply claims 
that it is reasonable to expect that a designer should possess the skills necessary to 
produce a design solution that possesses intended aesthetic experience. The question 
is not whether or not aesthetic experience is an essential aspect of architectural design; 
that is a given. The question in this section is to understand what is meant by aesthetic 
experience, and how it functions in the design process.
Böhme (1993) uses the term atmosphere as a way of talking about the aesthetic 
experience of a built environment. The concept of atmosphere describes a “quality of 
feeling [that] can be produced through the choice of objects, colours, sounds, etc.” (p. 
123). Böhme understands “the production of atmospheres” (p. 116) and the quality of 
experience (feeling) that they induce as the work of architectural aesthetics. Atmosphere, 
refers to the quality of the experience between subject and object. One may use 
expressions such as, “this is a peaceful place,” or “there’s a lot of tension in that room,” 
or “I felt overwhelmed when we went there,” or “there is something familiar about this 
place.” Böhme, argues that the quality of feeling that is experienced by a person when he 
encounters a place or a thing is what is meant by aesthetic. The qualities of a thing or a 
place (color, volume, materials, temperature, smell, light, etc.), are the determinations 
that taken together induce a quality of experience. These qualities of the object determine 
the perceivability of the thing. To be effective the qualities of an object must be such that 
they can be perceived by the perceiver, that is within his range or ability (or boundedness). 
For example, the range of hearing and smell of a dog is different than that of a human. 
As such, there are certain sounds or scenes that when perceived by a dog (not to mention 
the difference in the range of cognitive abilities between dogs and humans) will result 
in a quality of experience (atmosphere) quite different from that which a human would 
perceived in the same situation. It is the role of the designer to both anticipate the quality 
of the intended experience (atmosphere), and to have the skill to know which materials 
to use, how to arrange architectural elements, etc. that will likely induce the desired 
atmosphere, or as McCormick (1997) puts it, of “how-to-decide-what-to-do-and-
when knowledge" (p. 145).
A helpful example, used with my students, that describes what is involved in/what it means 
to design an environment that induces an intended quality of atmosphere, is the romantic 
meal. From a functional point of view one may argue that the basic purpose the romantic 
meal is to facilitate eating. The romantic aspect of the meal is extra (an un-essential 
experiential quality), nice, but unnecessary. Though, it is true that eating is a desired 
outcome (proximate), it is not the primary (distal) function. The primary function of the 
romantic meal is to create an environment that is likely to induce a feeling of intimacy. 
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One may even argue that if the design of the meal is really good, it will induce such an 
experience of intimacy and pleasure that the couple will perhaps even forget to eat. 
In this case the designer is faced with many choices that will result in a scene that will 
evoke an atmosphere, that feels romantic. Start with a table: round or square, and what 
size? Consider its size. It should be big enough to comfortably fit plates, eating utensils, 
a bottle of wine, flowers, etc. But not so big that one cannot easily reach across. How 
about the shape? The corners of the square establish boundaries, while the round 
table makes the boundaries ambiguous. Perhaps a square table on the first date. What 
about the lighting: bright, dim; fluorescent, incandescent; general ambient lighting, 
focused task lighting, candle light? So many choices. The design bias or heuristic used 
to limit the solution path (designing possibilities) is: make design choices that facilitate 
the eating of a meal such that the elements induce a romantic atmosphere. (What I 
like about this thought exercise, is that I can see the students’ eyes going back and 
forth as they imagine the space, as they enter the design world feelingly.) Florescent 
light is on the cold side of the spectrum, having a tendency to make everyone look 
gray. Ambient light lights the entire room: Too many distractions. Candle light, has 
several advantages: Its light is on the warm side of the spectrum, so it makes everyone 
look better. Its range of luminosity (foot-candles) is quite limited, forcing one to lean 
forward slightly to see with whom one is dining. Plus, there is the added advantage of 
the smell of a candle burning, and the culturally significant symbolic value of a round 
table, with a white table cloth, set for two, with wine glasses, a flower in the middle 
and candle light that triggers a memory and an associated emotion. All these choices 
are made with the intention to induce a particular quality of experience. Making use 
of Chatterjjee's core triad that are involved in an aesthetic experience: sensations, 
emotions and meaning.242
The designer of the romantic meal starts off with a feeling – or using the vocabulary 
of Hillier discussed in the section on design cognition – he pre-structures the design 
problem as: a meal that involves a particular quality of atmosphere. Assuming that the 
designer is working in a familiar culture, there is no need to engage in extensive research 
to gain a deep understanding of the psychology of intimacy, or the courting rituals of 
peoples of Western-European descent. The designer when faced with the problem, 
immediately knows how the solution should feel. Still, how does the designer know 
which elements to use and how to arrange them? Perhaps, he considers precedent. What 
worked and what did not work in the past? What was the criteria for evaluation of those 
past experiences? The quality of the food? The type of music? The color of the table cloth? 
242 These refer to the qualities of an aesthetic experience described in the quote by Chatterjee (2014) above. The 
elements of the core triad will be described in detail below, in the section on neuroaesthetics.
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Yes, but no, not really… The resultant experience was not the sum of individual 
elements. To use a foundational concept from Gestalt psychology, (Koffka, 1935) 
all those elements, including many more, add up to an experience that is other than 
the sum of the parts.243 The designer, pre-structures the problem situation not only 
by identifying key elements, but by self-inducing a feeling of what he intends the 
experience to feel like and measures the success of the design by testing the quality of 
the experience he intends to feel if it resonates (is congruent) with the experience he 
has self-induced.
Like coherence, aesthetic quality both functions as motivation (feeling that is being 
sought internally) within the design process, and as an intended quality induced by 
the solution in the user. Entering into the design world feelingly involves being able 
to assess the quality of the feeling (phenomenal experience) of both internal and 
external representations during the various states of the design process: this is the 
function of aesthesis. Like learning to see, aesthesis is a learned ability.244 And, also 
like coherence, there is a need to produce external representations of the emerging 
solution for both the purpose of gaining input from others, and as a means to extend 
the designer’s cognitive capacity, enabling the dialectic that seeks congruence of the 
intended aesthetic experience between internal and external representations, through 
the application of the senses. 
How does the designer know which solution path to take, and when the solution 
is finished? He knows which one to take when it feels right, when there is 
(emerging) congruence between what he intended and the situation at hand. 
This kind of knowing (aesthesis) through the application of the senses – like 
declarative and propositional knowledge – is an acquired and highly developed 
of  kind of embodied knowledge, something like what might be called a "sense of 
design."  Certainly the designer needs to satisfy criteria and constraints, and he 
must possess the technical competence to design a building that can be built. 
243 Koffka is often misquoted as writing "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts" when what he actually wrote 
is  “the whole is other than the sum of its parts.” Koffka took issue with that translation. He firmly corrected 
students who substituted “greater” for “other” (cited by Heider, 1977, p. 383). "'This is not a principle of 
addition,' he said. The statement as originally worded was intended to mean that the whole had an independent 
existence in the perceptual system." Dewey (2007) explains, “When the perceptual system forms a percept or 
gestalt, the whole thing has a reality of its own, independent of the parts."
244 Das (2014) in his research on how infants acquire the ability to "see" explains “that neural responses at even the 
earliest stage of visual cortex get reshaped in a way that faithfully reflects ongoing learning” (p. 129). It seems 
that even seeing is an acquired ability. 
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But, once all the site analysis, space relationship diagrams, use programing, size of spaces, 
means of egress, schematic plan, overall form, location on the site, structural, mechanical, 
electrical, plumbing, communications, and fire suppression systems have been worked 
out; the designer is still faced with how to assemble all of these elements into a cohesive 
whole (something that is perceived as other than the sum of its parts); and find a way to 
induce the intended quality of aesthetic experience (that possesses atmosphere). It is the 
seeking of these experiential qualities that motivates the process and leads to a solution 
that engages the whole person. The	internal	self-induced	quality	of	aesthetic	experience,	
functions to pre-structure the problem space and  as a heuristic device that seeks 
congruence	between	internal/external	representations	of	the	emerging	design	solution	
influencing	the	direction	of	the	solution	path	with	the	expectation	that	a	similar	quality	of	
experience	will	be	induced	by	the	building/built	environment	in	the	user. 
§  7.1 Approaches to Aesthetics
There are many ways of approaching aesthetics – from philosophy, psychology, evolutionary 
biology, neurosciences, and from the inter-disciplinary perspective of cognitive science. 
The way of approaching aesthetic experience here relies heavily on cognitive science. 
Even so, it is necessary to acknowledge that many contemporary ideas about aesthetic 
experience have their roots in how aesthetic experience was understood in Classical Greek 
philosophy. It was not until after Hume and Kant that Baumgarten, Lipps, Fetchner, 
Wölfflin and the Gestalt psychologists would begin developing an empirical aesthetics that 
was more heavily influenced by observable phenomenon, rather than seeking universal 
truths. As aesthetic experience came to be understood as a kind of knowledge of the 
world by perception induced by feeling, Clay, Dutton, and Miller and Dissanayake identify 
the evolutionary advantages that our delight with this quality of experience might have. 
More recently, there is growing interest in understanding aesthetic experience from 
neuroscience, that includes Mallgrave, Damasio, Ramachandran and Chatterjee.
To this day we are burdened with reconciling early definitions of what Plato, Aristotle, 
Augustine, Aquinas, and others meant by beauty, and how their ideas influence how we 
understand aesthetic experience in the 21st century. Plato writes, “How, if you please, 
do you know, Socrates, what sort of things are beautiful and ugly …Could you tell me 
what the beautiful is?”245 The question is not what is beauty, but what is “the Beautiful.” 
245 See Plato (2014), Philebus.
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The Beautiful in Plato is akin to the Truth and/or the Good: the three transcendentals 
that point to the One. 246 In ancient Western philosophy, aesthetics was the study 
of Beauty. Beauty, or the aesthetic, was not understood to describe the quality of an 
experience as it is being used here. Rather it was understood to be an intrinsic good, or 
transcendent characteristic: a form. 
In ancient Greek philosophy there are, generally speaking, two conceptions of beauty: 
the idealist (Platonic) and the classical (Aristotelean). The idealist conception of 
beauty and the classical conception of beauty have several things in common: they 
both conceive of beauty as an objective reality (not localized in the beholder); the 
beholder, insofar as he has access to the concept of the Beautiful, experiences the 
Beautiful in the object, and thus is lead to a deeper knowledge of the One; Beauty is a 
kind of knowledge in which one takes delight in as one takes delight in the Truth. The 
ancient philosophers held that there is one Beauty whose existence is inevitably tied to 
the Good, Truth, and ultimately God (the One). Beauty in creation, and the pursuit of 
Beauty in the arts, as well as the profound effect that being in the presence of a thing of 
beauty has on the beholder, are all understood as evidence of God’s presence.
§  7.2 Plato
For Plato (427-447 BCE), Beauty is a transcendental (ideal) form, along with Justice 
and Truth. It has an existence independent of the object. His argument is that if 
different things can possess the quality of beauty to various degrees of perfection, then 
it follows that there must be the possibility of the perfection of beauty, or complete 
Beauty: the Beautiful. Plato writes “Now if a man believes in the existence of beautiful 
things, but not of Beauty itself, and cannot follow a guide who would lead him to a 
knowledge of it, is he not living in a dream?” (Republic, 1956, p. 276).
246 In the Symposium (2014), Diotima instructs Socrates, “But what if man had eyes to see the true beauty — the 
divine beauty, I mean, pure and clear and unalloyed, not clogged with the pollutions of mortality and all the 
colours and vanities of human life — hither looking, and holding converse with the true beauty simple and 
divine? Remember how in that communion only, beholding beauty with the eye of the mind, he will be enabled 
to bring forth, not images of beauty, but realities (for he has hold not of an image but of a reality), and bringing 
forth and nourishing true virtue to become the friend of God and be immortal, if mortal man may. Would that be 
an ignoble life?” 
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That things are in the world, and that things are perceived, and that some things appear 
to have different qualities (qualia) than others and that some things give pleasure 
and some do not is a given. The question is why and how? This why and how does not 
only extend to the phenomenology of perception, but also includes metaphysical and 
epistemological considerations. A concept (thing, quality, experience) as important 
as beauty is not taken lightly. So when Plato discusses the perception (knowledge) 
of things and their proper place in the order of the cosmos he approaches it with 
great care. The things that are seen (perceived), mimic the form. The perfection of 
a thing or its ideal (or universal) state exists in the world of the forms.247 The (ideal) 
form is manifest in matter, which gives it physical properties. But this manifestation 
of the form in matter is a mere shadow of the form, that is less than perfect (an 
approximation). As such it follows, that if the (physical) manifestation in matter 
of the ideal form is a mere shadow of the ideal form, then an image of the physical 
manifestation (representation) of the ideal form is even less perfect, similar to a second 
generation photo copy: two steps away from the ideal. For Plato the really real is the 
ideal (disembodied/abstract) world of the forms, which is eternal, where things are 
perfect, where one does not worry about corruptibility or materiality.248 So, it is not hard 
to understand why, for Plato, artists are considered “unworthy rivals of philosophers" 
– who deal exclusively in the world of ideas – because they try to reveal truth but only 
manage to create poor imitations (mimêsis) of reality (Shimamura, 2012, p. 5).
To further explain how art functions as an imperfect embodiment, or revelation of the 
form of Beauty, Plato introduces terms such as: imitation and inspiration (mimêsis) 
and (most importantly) he defines beauty as a transcendent characteristic (form). 
Within the world of forms, there are also ideas, (transcendent) universal truths that 
hold the most distinguished place in human civilization, that describe the ultimate 
Good. 249 As such the theory of forms guarantees stable referents for evaluative terms. 
In this way Beauty comes to have its own existence as a universal value that points to 
the Good. The Beautiful is an intrinsic good. And the artist, who has knowledge, insofar 
as he has access to beauty, is an “imitator of the Beautiful.”
247 While architects use the term form to refer to the shape and volume of a thing in design, architects are familiar 
(analogously) with the idea behind platonic form in terms of the generative idea: the idea (concept) that 
generates the building. This is what Plato means when he talks about forms.
248 This is an idea that leads to the mind/body dualism found in Descartes discussed above.
249 The Good in Plato is the Absolute (One), Eternal, Truth (God).
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The artist, through special knowledge and technical skill, makes use of certain 
characteristics of the object, that include the qualities of measure (metron) and proportion 
(symmetron) which invariably …constitute beauty and excellence.250 The artist may also 
make use of pure tone or hue, a straight line or regular polyhedron which also possess the 
characteristics of absolute and eternal beauty. It is not the individual characteristics that 
point toward the Beautiful but rather their unity, regularity and simplicity that gives them 
their ideal character and allies them with the One, the True and the Eternal, supporting 
and sustaining their beauty” (Beardsley, 1966, p. 43).
For Plato, the Beautiful has its own existence. It is not a quality of an object, but rather 
a universal, transcendent, eternal, inherent good, that an object points to, depending 
on its level of perfection. The artist, insofar as he has knowledge of the Beautiful, can 
make things that point toward the Good.
§  7.3 Aristotle
For Aristotle (384-322 BCE), the Beautiful is much the same as the Good, as they possess 
the same metaphysical root, “the good and the beautiful are the beginning both of 
knowledge and the movement of things” (Marshall, 1953, p. 229). The Beautiful is the 
“appropriate” (in right proportion) whose chief forms are order, symmetry, and definiteness. 
Beauty, in its highest form is a fixed and eternal concept, that is recognized in objects, and 
can be applied to God (the Good). Aristotle’s aesthetic theory – insofar as he had one – in 
many ways is a response to Plato. However, for Aristotle, Beauty, as found in the arts, exists 
in the present. It is a kind of knowledge that we desire and satisfy through the arts.
Art belongs to a particular type of knowledge. As discussed above in the section on 
cognition, Aristotle identifies three types: knowing (theoria), doing (praxis), and 
making (poiesis).251 Art is a kind of making. Making, as an imitative art has two further 
distinctions: imitating through visual appearances (painting, sculpture) and imitating 
human actions (theater, poetry).252 
250 Socrates says to Philebus, “And now we are at the vestibule of the good, in which there are three chief elements 
— truth, symmetry, and beauty” (Plato, 2008).
251 See Aristotle (2014), Metaphysics.
252 See Aristotle (2015) Poetics.
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Making has four causes: (1.) The material cause (the medium, such as marble, wood 
or bronze for the statue); (2.) The formal cause (the essence or concept for the object); 
(3.) The efficient cause (the craftsman or sculptor and their activity); and (4.) The final 
cause (the “end” or the sake for which a thing is made).253 Imitation finds its perfection 
insofar as it fully actualizes its potential. Potentiality is the intent behind an action, and 
actuality is the action, or the manifestation of the intent.254 
The formal cause is defined by an object’s essence (“the what it is to be” such as 
“chair-ness” or the disembodied idea of a thing); and its accidence (“the what it 
is,” or the actual chair or the embodied existence of a thing). The essence of a thing 
is that which makes a particular thing what it is. In terms of accidence, Aristotle 
identifies nine types: quality, quantity, relation, habitus, time, location, situation 
(or position), action, and passion (being acted upon). Art in Aristotle is a form of 
mimesis (imitation) that provides a natural kind of pleasure or delight. Art is a 
good (a value) that requires extensive knowledge and technical skill (techne). Its value, 
or the pleasure/delight that it offers, is found in the way that it makes use of extensive 
knowledge and technical skill to imitate reality. 
Beauty in Aristotle is a quality of objects: “to be beautiful, a living creature, and every 
whole made up of parts, must … present a certain order in its arrangement of parts” 
(Poetics, 2009). Beauty resides in the thing. Aristotle (2015) in the Metaphysics 
writes: “The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry and definiteness, which 
the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree.” Beauty has to do with 
right relationship; relationship that is in proper proportion. Right relationship can be 
described by a mathematical formula (such as the golden section), or exemplified in 
the Parthenon or the Canon of the sculptor Polykleitos.255 Beauty in Aristotle is a quality 
of an object that can be described and exists independent of the object. 256
253 See Aristotle, (2015) Physics: Translated by R.P. Hardie & R.K. Gaye.
254 In Aristotle, a thing can exist in a state of potential (without being actualized).
255 The Canon of Polykleitos is a lost work that is believed to have provided the basis for the unit and proper 
proportions for Greek sculpture, similar to Le Corbusier's Le Modular. See Tobin (1975) for an extensive 
discussion on the unit, measure and proportion system of the Canon of Polykleitos.
256 Aristotle (2014) writes, in Book III of the Metaphysics,“Now since the good and the beautiful are different (for the 
former always implies conduct as its subject, while the beautiful is found also in motionless things), those who assert 
that the mathematical sciences say nothing of the beautiful or the good are in error. For these sciences say and prove 
a great deal about them; if they do not expressly mention them, but prove attributes which are their results or their 
definitions, it is not true to say that they tell us nothing about them. The chief forms of beauty are order and symmetry 
and definiteness, which the mathematical sciences demonstrate in a special degree. And since these (e.g. order and 
definiteness) are obviously causes of many things, evidently these sciences must treat this sort of causative principle 
also (i.e. the beautiful) as in some sense a cause. But we shall speak more plainly elsewhere about these matters.” 
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§  7.4 Vitruvius
For much of ancient history, and even to some extent up to the present, the 
presupposition that beauty was to be found in the object remained a given. Vitruvius 
(80-15 BCE),257 provides a good characterization of the classical conception of beauty 
with his description the three components of architecture as consisting in order (taxis), 
arrangement (diathesis), and proportion (oeconomia):
 – Order is the balanced adjustment of the details of the work separately and as to the 
whole; the arrangement of the composition with a view to a symmetrical result.
 – Proportion implies a graceful semblance; the suitable display of details in their context. 
This is attained when the details of the work are of a height suitable to their breadth, 
of a breadth suitable to their length; in a word, when everything has a symmetrical 
correspondence.
 – Symmetry is the appropriate harmony arising out of the details of the work itself; the 
correspondence of each given detail to the form of the design as a whole. As in the 
human body, from cubit, foot, palm, inch and other small parts come the symmetric 
quality of eurhythmy.
§  7.5 Hume,	Locke,	Kant
However, by the 18th century beauty had begun to migrate from an objective reality 
outside the beholder (a property of the object) to become a type/quality of pleasure 
experienced by the beholder (Sartwell & Crispin, 2014).  For those who hold this 
position, such as Hume, Locke and Kant, the issue in not so much the object itself, as 
it is the quality of the effect the object/experience elicits (induces) in the beholder. 
The arguments here emphasize perception, physiology, psychology and epistemology. 
257 Vitruvius (1998) Bk. I, Ch. 2.1.
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Hume writes:
Beauty is no quality in things themselves: It exists merely in the mind which 
contemplates them; and each mind perceives a different beauty. One person may even 
perceive deformity, where another is sensible of beauty; and every individual ought 
to acquiesce in his own sentiment, without pretending to regulate those of others. 
(Korsmeyer, 1998, p 139)
In considering beauty as the quality of a personal experience, Hume seems to be 
suggesting an extreme degree of subjective relativism. But then, as if to contradict 
himself Hume writes:
But though this axiom, by passing into proverb, seems to have attained the sanction of 
common sense; there is certainly a species of common sense, which opposes it, at least 
serves to modify and refrain it. (Korsmeyer, 1998, p 139)
Acknowledging that though it is possible for two people to have such extreme opposite 
of perception of the same thing, there are "species of common sense" that make 
this unlikely. To illustrate this observation Hume offers the example of someone 
who might suggest that the (17th Century) authors Ogilby and Milton, or Bunyan and 
Addison, should be considered of equal genius. "Such a person who might hold such 
a ludicrous position may as well maintain 'a mole-hill to be as high as Teneriffe, or a 
pond as extensive as the ocean.' Such a conclusion should be considered 'absurd and 
ridiculous.' No one pays attention to such a taste” (Korsmeyer, 1998, p 139).
Hume then goes on to describe the importance of refined taste.258
In a word, the same address and dexterity, which practice gives to the execution of any 
work, is also acquired by the same means, in the judging of it. The principle of natural 
equality of tastes is then totally forgot, and while we admit it on some occasions, 
where the objects seem near an equality, it appears an extravagant paradox, or rather 
a palpable absurdity, where objects so disproportioned are compared together. 
(Korsmeyer 1998, p. 139)
258 Similar to Ericsson (see acquisition of expert performance), Hume recognizes that refined taste is not simply 
natural, but that it is an acquired skill that requires deliberate practice.
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Hume denies that beauty exists in the object to be beheld, rather, beauty is a quality 
that is perceived by the beholder. However, he does hold that certain compositions, 
materials and effects, when assembled properly, “by the structure of the mind, be 
naturally calculated to give pleasure,” do elicit a pleasant effect. This pleasant effect 
can be enhanced by developing its delicacy. "Where the organs are so fine, as to allow 
nothing to escape them; and at the same time so exact, as to perceive every ingredient 
in the composition: This we call delicacy of taste…" (Korsmeyer, 1998, p. 143). 
Locke makes a distinction between secondary and primary qualities of the aesthetic 
experience: qualities that are dependent on a subjective response, located in the 
mind of the perceiver, (such as color);259 and qualities that are independent (such 
as shape and volume). Dependent qualities (like phenomenal qualities) are by nature 
subjective, as they exist only in the mind of the beholder and have no independent 
existence outside the beholder’s experience of the object. While independent qualities 
are by nature objective. These are qualities that are observable and have an existence 
independent of being perceived. See Jackson, 1929.
In the Critique of Judgment, Kant holds on the one hand, not unlike Hume, that beauty 
is not a real quality of objects – aesthetic judgments are not matters of cognition.  
Kant writes:
[The aesthetic judgment], ...refers the representation, by which an object is given, solely 
to the subject, and brings to our notice no quality of the object, but only the final form 
in the determination of the powers of representation engaged upon it. The judgment 
is called aesthetic for the very reason that its determining ground cannot be a concept, 
but is rather the feeling (of the internal sense) of the concert in the play of the mental 
powers as a thing only capable of being felt. (Hofstadter & Kuhns, 1964, p. 300)
This is because the judgment of beauty is based on a feeling of pleasure induced by the 
object, not on reasoning, or on a perception where the object is experienced as having 
some cognizable feature.
In The Critique of Judgment, Bk. 1.1 “The Judgment of Taste in Aesthetic”, Kant 
(1790) concedes that every aesthetic judgment is, to some extent, based on personal 
experience, that varies from person to person. 
259 Color is a particular problem, in that while it appears to be so, it is not a physiological quality of an object, 
but rather, is totally dependent on the context in which it is observed. See Pinker (2009) Chapter 4, 
“The Mind’s Eye.”
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The judgment of taste is therefore not a judgment of cognition, and is consequently not 
logical but aesthetical, by which we understand that whose determining ground can be 
no other than subjective. Every reference of representations, even that of sensations, 
may be objective (and then it signifies the real in an empirical representation); save 
only the reference to the feeling of pleasure and pain, by which nothing in the Object 
is signified, but through which there is a feeling in the subject, as it is affected by the 
representation. (Hofstadter & Kuhns, 1964, p. 300)
But it is not only subjective. For Kant, it is necessary to distinguish between the 
pleasure an object provides in terms of its usefulness (or one's interest in the 
object) and the pleasure gained by the mere presentation of the object to my senses 
(disinterested-ness). This is a very important point in Kant’s argument. Kant writes 
… if the question is whether something is beautiful, what we want to know is not 
whether we or anyone cares, or so much as might care, in any way about the thing’s 
existence, but rather how we judge it in our mere contemplation of it (intuition or 
reflection). (Gage, 2011, p. 83) 
Kant argues that the aesthetic qualities of an object have nothing to do with the 
practical usefulness or value of the object, or even enjoyment. These all imply interest. 
A pure judgment of taste must be completely distinguished from an assessment of the 
utility or other perceived value of the object, having only to do with the quality of the 
presentation of the object one feels within one's self. That is to say,
We can easily see that, in order for me to say that an object is beautiful, and to prove 
that I have taste, what matters is what I do with this presentation within myself, and 
not the [respect] in which I depend on the object’s existence. (Hofstadter & Kuhns, 
1964, p. 281)
To further develop this idea, Kant makes some distinctions regarding what is meant 
by agreeable sensations versus feelings. For Kant agreeable sensations are objective 
experiences of sense that refer solely to the subject and entail no cognition. Whereas 
feeling refers to the subjective experience of the object. For example, the green color of 
the meadow belongs to the objective sensation, while the delight that the color green 
induces belongs to the subjective sensation. 
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Even though Kant argues that a judgment of taste is necessarily subjective, both 
Hume and Kant, and to some extent Locke, also propose means for inter-subjective 
agreement or as Kant puts it: sensus communis. The presupposition is that the object 
presenting itself has an objective reality that is perceived by the beholder – similar to 
Locke’s primary qualities. That is, each beholder sees the same object. Secondly, each 
beholder shares the same basic human nature, and as such perceives the object in a 
similar manner via the same sense, perception and cognitive systems. 
With these fundamental concepts in hand it is now possible to discuss how aesthetic 
experience is induce in the beholder and (building on Kant's sensus communis) 
what characteristics of human perception facilitate the possibility of intersubjective 
agreement. It is here that aesthetic theory takes a decisive turn toward more empirical 
approaches such as psychology and cognitive sciences. 
§  7.6 Connoisseurship
Contrary to popular belief, aesthetic judgment can be learned. 
(Osborne 1979)
Connoisseurship has to do with the refinement of the ability to distinguish the quality 
of an experience, skill or ability. In aesthetics, connoisseurship is often referred to as 
taste. Generally speaking, taste has to do with a person’s personal or cultural patterns 
of choice that allow him to make distinctions between the qualities of things according 
to his own preference or by the performance expectations of a particular domain. That 
is: the acquired ability to make evaluative distinctions between the quality of sense/
perception experiences within a discipline.260 
We learn to love beauty, so to speak, in diluted form to start with – the physical beauty 
of man or woman – but having acquired the taste, or developed the perceptual skill to 
discern it clearly, we can go to higher and better beauties – with the promise, or at least 
the hope, that we may again behold Beauty in itself. (Beardsley, 1966, p. 41)
260 Such as architectural design
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It is a form of intentional belief acquisition or adaptive preference formation, as 
opposed to ordinary or discovered taste, or what Burke (1756) called “natural relish” 
(p. 14). See Melchionne (2007).  Natural relish requires no discipline. There is a naive 
simplicity to it. It is not acquired, its discovered. It’s a kind of a “I know what I like” 
personal preference where there is no expectation that another would or should enjoy 
it.261 The acquisition of taste within a particular domain however, requires a deliberate 
effort to appreciate subtle variations, references and precedents within a particular 
domain and the ability to recognize performance expectations of excellence. 
The cultivation of taste, or the refinement of aesthetic judgment is a decidedly 
deliberate action. One decides to cultivate taste for/or refine aesthetic judgment of an 
object or experience because one desires to reach out for new experiences, deliberately 
desire to appreciate something one does not understand, or because one desires to 
immerse oneself into a particular discipline (Nimkulrat, Niedderer, & Evans, 2015).
According to Melchionne (2007) – whose argument while insightful is also arguably 
novel – the cultivation of taste normally starts by pretending that one already has the 
desired taste. One puts aside or detaches from one’s ordinary preferences in order 
to enter into the experience seeking to discover something new. This pretending is a 
pretending with intent (deliberate); the intent to acquire an appreciation for a thing 
or an experience.262 It is not the same as pretending to like something for the sake of 
someone’s feelings or to conform to an external belief system for the sake of fitting 
in. In the case of adaptive belief acquisition the change of belief is real, and made 
for a purpose. An acquired taste must be deliberately chosen or desired in order 
to be authentic.263
Related to the refinement of taste, and familiarity with the performance 
expectations within a domain, aesthetic qualities are attributed (in part) in 
accordance with the category of that specific work of art (Walton, 1970; Mitrovic, 
2013, p. 83).  For example, if one assesses the taste of an apple with the 
categories of normative expectations of an orange, the apple will always be wanting. 
261 Later “natural relish” will be referred to as "personal taste."
262 “But though there be naturally a wide difference in point of delicacy between one person and another, nothing 
tends further to increase and improve this talent, than practice in a particular art, and the frequent survey or 
contemplation of a particular species of beauty” (Hume, 1757/2015, Of the Standard of Taste).
263 There is a connection between the deliberate refinement of taste within a domain and the immersion of the 
novice seeking expertise into the culture of the domain.
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If one is not familiar with the standards for judging a refined art work within its domain, 
then it will be difficult to assess its aesthetic value, except in terms of personal preference, 
and perhaps as a sympathetic outsider. This question of attributed qualities is also related 
to the idea that concepts or prior knowledge are necessary in order to experience the 
aesthetic qualities of a work of art. Zangwill (2014) refutes this position by arguing that 
“some aesthetic properties depend exclusively on formal properties of objects, while 
others depend on non-formal properties as well” (Mitrovic, 2013, p. 83).
Berlyne (1970), argues that one's aesthetic experience is driven by novelty, surprise, 
and incongruity, all of which increases arousal. His argument relies on the properties 
of the Wundt Curve, which was originally used to describe how increases in stimulus 
intensity, such as sweetness, is pleasurable up to a point but as intensity moves beyond 
that point our enjoyment drops and can even become negative.264 Berlyne argues 
that we find pleasure (i.e., positive hedonic value) when an artwork (an object whose 
proper end is to induce aesthetic experience) arouses our sense of novelty, surprise, or 
incongruity, but as the Wundt curve describes, when arousal moves past an optimal 
point it leads to a negative response. Importantly, the flip side of novelty is familiarity, 
and thus what appears new or surprising is a moving window, as the more you know, 
the more things become familiar and the greater chance a new work will lie within your 
“sweet spot” of optimal hedonic value. Producing a design solution that lies within the 
sweet spot of the intended users is fundamental to a successful design.
Hume (some two centuries earlier) seems to agree with Berlyne. He writes,
It appears then, that amidst all the variety and caprice of taste, there are certain general 
principles of approbation or blame, whose influence a careful eye may trace in all 
operations of the mind. Some particular forms or qualities, from the original structure 
of the internal fabric, are calculated to please, and others to displease; and if they fail of 
their effect in any particular instance, it is from some apparent defect or imperfection 
in the organ. (Korsmeyer, 1998, p. 141)
It is the objective of good design to be able to manipulate the general principles, forms 
and qualities to elicit an optimal experience calculated to please, assuming that there is 
no defect or imperfection in the beholder. But, if the beholder's performance expectations 
are incongruent with the domain in question, uninformed, and poorly developed it 
becomes exceedingly difficult for the designer to induce an optimal aesthetic experience. 
264 See York (2013) for an explanation of how the Wundt curve works in aesthetics and the development of taste.
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If someone is expecting an apple and is given an orange, there is little likelihood, 
no matter how one well one explains the quality of the orange are tries to apply the 
performance expectations of the orange to the apple, that he is going to be satisfied.
§  7.7 Alexander Baumgarten
It is Baumgarten (1750) who introduces the term aesthetics, to designate what up to 
now had been the study of beauty, in his book Aethetica. This book is said to mark the 
beginning of modern aesthetics. 265 
While Baumgarten was principally known as a rationalist philosopher, it is in his 
psychology, where he discusses the nature of sensible experience. Psychology, for 
Baumgarten, is the study of the “soul,” that which is conscious. The objects of 
consciousness are representations of the world as they present themselves to the soul. 
These representations fall under two categories: the superior faculty and the inferior 
faculty. The superior faculty perceives/knows a thing distinctly, that is intellectually. 
The inferior faculty perceives/knows a thing indistinctly, as a sensitive representation. 
The study of aesthetics has to do with the inferior faculty (sense knowledge): “The end 
of aesthetics is the perfection of sensitive cognition as such” (Wessell, 1972, p. 337). 
That is, it is the study of things perceived (the science of perception), as opposed to 
the study of things known (logic). “’Things known' (i.e., conceptually intuited) are 
the proper objects of logic and ‘things perceived’ (i.e., sensitively experienced) are 
objects for the science of perception which is called ‘aesthetic’” (Wessell, 1972, p. 
338). Baumgarten is interested in knowledge about the form266 that determines the 
order of perceptual or sensate experience (or as he called it, confused experience). The 
appreciation of beauty is produce by “sensitive cognition” (Chatterjee, 2014, p. 117). 
Aesthetics for Baumgarten is the science of perception.267
265 Unfortunately there is no complete translation of Aethetica, in English. All quotes and citations come from 
other’s work.
266 By form Baumgarten is referring to order or the way a thing presents itself.
267 “The Greek philosophers and the Church fathers have always carefully distinguished between the aistheta 
and the noeta,” that is, between objects of sense and objects of thought, and while the latter, that is, “what 
can be cognized through the higher faculty” of the mind, are “the object of logic, the aistheta are the subject 
of episteme aisthetika or AESTHETICS,” the science of perception (Meditationes, CXVI, p. 86). As quoted by 
Guyer (2013).
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Baumgarten writes: “The science of sensitively knowing and proposing is aesthetics, the 
logic of the inferior faculty of knowing, the philosophy of the graces and the muses, the 
inferior knowledge, the art of thinking beautifully, the art of analogy and reason” (Wessell, 
1972, p. 338). As a type of knowing, aesthetics follows an ordering process (discourse) 
not unlike logical ordering. As a type of discourse, aesthetics involves “a series of different 
representations apprehended by the mind in some sort of unity” (Wessell, 1972, p. 339). 
This involves identifying the elements (sensations) that are perceived, and how they 
are ordered together to form the (aesthetic) discourse/experience. Further, as not 
all (sense) experiences are of equal value, the type of sensation proper to aesthetic 
experience must be further understood. The aesthetic experience arises when several 
representations are ordered that form a sensate discourse. It is from the unity that is 
perceived in the sensate discourse that the aesthetic experience evolves.268 
§  7.8 Empathy
Baumgarten writes that aesthetics is sensitively knowing. Above Polanyi describes 
tacit knowing as inhabiting the problem space feelingly. As it became generally 
accepted that the aesthetic experience is induced and experienced as a sensation of 
the body, how this actually happens became a topic of research. It is in this context 
that the concept of Einfühlung – feeling into – emerged as a key concept among early 
20th century German aesthetic philosophers, including, Vischer, Lipps, Wölfflin, and 
Worringer. Introduced into the English language by Edward Titchener as “empathy”the  
term Einfühlung describes the projection of a sense of the inward feeling of our bodily 
state onto inanimate objects (Jahoda, 2005).
For Lipps, Einfühlung is not only important for understanding aesthetic experience, but 
as the primary basis for recognizing each other as minded creatures (Stueber, 2017).  
Bridge (2011), referring to the aesthetic theory of Lipps, writes that for him “empathy does 
not primarily concern our ability to feel sympathy or compassion for other human beings, 
but refers, more generally, to a process by which we endow the object of our vision – 
whether human or non- human – with life, or with a soul” (p. 3). For Vischer (1873/1994) 
Einfühlung is the ability to project a bodily form and personality into inanimate objects. 
268 For a related understanding of aesthetic experience see Thagard’s discussion the emotional dynamics of 
the human pursuit of a sense of coherence in, Coherence in Thought and Action ( 2002); and Hot Thought: 
mechanisms and applications of emotional cognition (2006).
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It is a kind of merging that he ascribes to “the pantheistic urge for union with the 
world” (p. 109). Taking another perspective, Wölfflin (1884/1994) in his dissertation, 
is concerned with “how it is possible that architectural forms are able to express 
emotion and mood?” 
Wölfflin (1884/1994) also refers to Goethe’s idea that one should be able to feel 
the effect of a beautiful space even when blind folded, because the architectural 
impression is not about seeing, but rather “essentially based on a direct body feeling” 
(pp. 149-162). It	is	our	body	which	makes	it	possible	for	us	to	have	an	aesthetic	
experience of architecture forms.269
The concept of Einfühlung in its fundamental sense has a remarkable resemblance 
to the function of mirror-neurons discovered by Giacomo Rizzolatti in the ventral 
pre-motor area of monkeys, in the early 1990’s at the University of Parma (Cinzia 
& Vittorio, 2009). Mirror-neurons, found in both primates and humans, fire when 
one acts and when one observes another performing the same action. Anytime one 
observes another doing something, the corresponding mirror neuron might fire in the 
observers mind allowing him/her to empathize with the other’s feelings by mirroring 
higher actions and thereby constructing an implicit model through which the other 
can anticipate the other’s intentions. Ramachandran (2011) and Damasio (1994), 
referring to Freeberg & Gallese (2007), suggests that mirror-neurons induce a kind 
of embodied simulation which may be the basis for empathic “responses to images 
in general and to works of art in particular” (p. 197). Embodied simulation not only 
induces a response to figurative works of art, but surprisingly with non-figurative 
abstract art and architecture as well. Freeberg & Gallese (2007) write that there is a 
growing body of “neuroscientific evidence clarifying the nature of empathy and the 
role of sensorimotor activity in empathy and emotion” establishing a definable and 
measurable basis for aesthetic judgment in the brain.270 
269 Unfortunately Wölfflin never developed this idea of how the body facilitates aesthetic experience. See Bridge 
(2011) pp. 10-12. However many of his intuitions as well as those of Lipps and Vischer have been validated by 
research in neuroaesthetics (Gallese & Gattara, 2015).
270 See also Eberhard (2007) for a review of how neuroscience is influencing architecture practice in particular. 
Nicholson (1998) wrote an interesting article for Harvard Business Review that provides a good introduction to 
how evolutionary psychology can offer useful insights for understanding human behavior.
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§  7.9 Evolutionary Aesthetics
Two disciplines that have had a profound influence in the area of empirical aesthetics 
are evolutionary psychology and neuroaesthetics. Evolutionary psychology considers 
how humans evolved to experience aesthetic pleasure; neuroaesthetics considers 
it from the inner workings of the brain and body. These empirical approaches avoid 
some of the traditional problems of (philosophical) aesthetic theory, most notably the 
problem of subjectivism, and in terms of a transcendental (disembodied) universal 
truth. This approach to aesthetic experience is less concerned with defining what is 
considered beautiful, or even judging the quality of aesthetic experience. Rather the 
empirical approach starts off with observable evidence that humans have evolved in 
such a manner that physical environments induce feelings, that these feelings have 
qualities, with subtle variations, that result in knowledge, that with practice one can 
become more attuned to. Further as humans evolved there were some environmental 
experiences that began to be sought primarily for the pleasure they provided – as 
opposed for the survival or reproductive advantages they afforded – and that humans 
learned to intentionally manipulate the environment with the specific intention to 
induce those feelings.
Ramachandran (2011) writes, 
 Just as we consume gourmet food to generate complex, multidimensional taste and 
texture experiences that titillate our palate, we appreciate art as gourmet for the 
visual centers in the brain (as opposed to junk food which is analogous to kitsch). Even 
though the rules that artists exploit originally evolved because of their survival value, 
the production of art itself does not have survival value. We do it because it’s fun and 
that’s	all	the	justification	it	needs. (p. 241)
Rusch and Voland (2013) write, “Humans are an aesthetic species. We react with 
aesthetic pleasure to a diverse array of phenomena” (p. 1). Why did humans evolve 
certain types of aesthetical preferences? Evolutionary aesthetics seeks to understand 
how human aesthetic preferences evolved and what their usefulness may have been in 
the evolution of the species.271 See also Consoli (2014).
271 The argument goes, if we accept that the discovery (not invention) of fire affected human biological evolution: 
teeth, digestion, etc.; why couldn’t the (cultural) invention (not discovery) of some art forms (i.e. music, poetry, 
painting, sculpture) also have affected human biology: co-evolution. 
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Within the discipline of evolutionary psychology, aesthetic pleasure is understood as 
an adaptive trait, that is, “a cognitive system that produces aesthetical preferences” 
(Rusch & Voland, 2013, p. 1). Tinbergen (2005) proposes that this system comprises 
four main parts: (1.) An understanding of the ontogenetic development, i.e., the 
changes the trait undergoes and the regulations of these changes from conception 
through the various stages of life until the death of an individual. (2.) The phylogenetic 
development of the trait, i.e. its evolutionary history. (3.) Its proximate mechanisms, 
e.g. the neural circuitry and emotions controlling mental representations and behavior. 
(4.) Its ultimate function, i.e. the reason why the trait was promoted or at least 
conserved by natural selection (as quoted in Rusch & Voland, 2013, p. 113).
It is this last trait that is most often the topic for discussion in aesthetic theory. As 
discussed above in the section on Kant, aesthetic qualities and the pleasure that they 
induce were thought to require a posture of disinterestedness – that is, aesthetic 
qualities (properly understood) were thought to be devoid of function. By explicitly 
investigating the function of aesthetic pleasure in the evolutionary development of 
humans, evolutionary aesthetics seemed to be undermining this principle. However, 
this apparent discrepancy has been avoided by recognizing that the traditional 
(Kantian) view of the disinterested (immediate) quality of aesthetic pleasure is 
intended to describe the proximate phenomenology of aesthetics, while evolutionary 
aesthetics deals with the ultimate function of human aesthetic experience as a 
biological trait and its role in the evolution of cognitive systems. That is, how “the 
basic aesthetic preferences of homo sapiens272 are argued to have evolved in order to 
enhance survival and reproductive success” (Dutton, 2003).273 
272 Human beings, however, are not the only species that has acquired aesthetic preferences in order to enhance 
survival and reproductive success. Other species also engage in deliberate behaviors that involve arranging 
objects, choosing colors and/or making patterns with the specific intent of eliciting an emotional response. 
The most famous of these is the male bower bird from Australia and New Guinea who build these elaborately 
decorated, individual and unique “bachelor pads” to attract mates. The bower bird collects clusters of flowers, 
berries, bits of bone, eggshell and pieces of plastic, foil and shards of glass, which he dutifully arranges in specific 
patterns to create a composition to his liking. It is not unusual for competing males to come by to rearrange his 
composition or steal individual objects to use in his composition. Interestingly enough, when the bower bird 
returns and sees that his composition has been tampered with, he immediately replaces misplaced objects and 
tidies up the arrangement. Individual females come to check out the males’ compositions, and choose their 
mates accordingly. (See http://www.pbs.org/wnet/nature/bower-bird-blues-introduction/2109/)
273 Clay (1908), writing on the origin of aesthetic emotion, writes, “The usual view indeed is to regard [aesthetic 
experience] as an adjunct to the serious business of survival, and yet its deep emotional influence, its soul affecting 
power seem to force upon us the conclusion that it too, as in love, hate, or fear, must draw its strength from some old 
instinct deeply planted and firmly fixed, as only the long fight for life has power to do; this it must be possible to trace 
back the aesthetic emotion to some instinctive necessary function or activity, that subsequently, when refined and 
raised into the ideal regions by the intellect, becomes artistic spirit (p. 282-283).
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Dutton posits a universalist conception of human nature which regards the making of 
art as a natural human activity and experience. When considering aesthetic theories as 
diverse as Tolstoy, Schiller and Bell, Dutton identifies an element held in common – “they 
presuppose or posit the existence of a fundamental human nature, a set of characteristics, 
including interests and desires, and uniformity cross-culturally present in the constitution 
of human persons” (p. 267). As further evidence for a natural inclination to seek aesthetic 
pleasure he refers to Aristotle’s mimetic naturalism – the pleasure people get from 
imitation.274 Kant and Hume, he argues, also rely on this universality of aesthetic pleasure 
– Kant by his assent to sensus communitas; and Hume by claiming that “the general 
principles of taste are uniform in human nature.” Further he argues, based on research 
by Martindale (1990)275 that the (universal human) craving for novelty or the principle 
of habituation, is the “single force that has pushed art always in a consistent direction 
ever since the first work of art was made” (p. 11). This pleasure and instinctive delight 
in imitation and fascination with novelty that all humans seem to enjoy points to the 
likelihood that aesthetic pleasure is natural to (all) humans. This universalist conception, 
holds that there exists a human nature, which is stable, and posits that (1.) art is a 
predictable component of society and that (2.) art will have predictable content – insofar 
as the quality of an aesthetic experience can be predicted based on the likelihood that this 
or that stimulus will evoke similar feelings in one person to the next.276 
The universal preference for certain kinds of aesthetic experiences has been 
documented through numerous experiments. One such notable experiment involved 
showing a series of photographs to children and adults of different landscapes. 
Children showed a demonstrable preference for open savannas, even when they had 
never seen such landscapes before (Orians & Heerwagen, 1992). A similar study 
was done where a systematic poll of the art preferences of people from 10 different 
countries in Europe, Asia, and the Americas recorded a uniform interests in the 
pictorial content of art worldwide (Komar & Melamid, 1997). Other cross-cultural 
studies have been done in literature and performance.
274 “For it is an instinct of human beings from childhood to engage in imitation (indeed, this distinguishes them 
from other animals: man is the most imitative of all and it is through imitation that he develops his earliest 
understanding); and it is equally natural that everyone enjoys imitative objects. A common occurrence indicates 
this: we enjoy contemplating the most precise images of things whose actual sight is painful to us, such as forms 
of the vilest animals and corpses” (Aristotle, Poetics).
275 Martindale (1990) argues that there is a primordial content in art that seeks to make use of emotion, greater 
complexity, and ornamentation, to increase the arousal potential of a style or genre until its potential for 
aesthetic arousal has been exhausted. This cycle repeats itself as new styles are explored though incremental 
development until audiences become satiated and new styles emerge.
276 For example see Jacobsen, Schubotz, Höfel, & Cramon (2006) see also Di Dio, Macaluso, Rizzolatti (2007) 
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From these kinds of studies Dutton (2003) proposes that there are certain signal 
characteristics of art that can be considered universal and cross-cultural. These include 
expertise or virtuosity, non-utilitarian pleasure, style, criticism, imitation, special focus, 
and imaginative experience. It is Dutton’s conviction that the (cultural) relativism 
that has become “dominant orthodoxy” in recent years has resulted in a “dismissive 
attitude toward universal values in art,” and has resulted in a “general denial of the 
possibility of universal aesthetic values” (p. 275).277
Dissanayake (1999) looks to our propensity for “making special” as an indicator of 
evolutionary genesis of aesthetic emotion. 
Artists in all media deliberately perform operations described by ethologists[278] as 
they occur instinctively during ritualized behavior: they simplify or formalize, repeat 
(sometimes with variation), exaggerate, and elaborate ordinary materials, bodies, 
surroundings, times, beats, body movements, semantics and syntax, motifs, ideas – 
thereby making these things more than ordinary. (p. 148)
Dissanayake calls this “making things more than ordinary” artification. Artification is 
“the deliberate use of the proto-aesthetic operations that evolved… as mechanisms used 
unconsciously by ancestral human mothers in the highly adaptive context of reinforcing 
emotional bonds with ever more helpless infants” (p. 156). She argues, children, due 
to various evolutionary and physiological adaptations, are born in a highly vulnerable 
state.279 As such they require a great deal of care and nurturing before they can survive 
on their own. To facilitate this, certain behaviors evolved both from the infant’s side 
(such as a sustained gaze, smiles, cooing, etc.) and from the mother’s or care-giver’s 
side (such as baby talk, bouncing, facial expressions) that provided emotional pleasure 
and deepened the bond. The reward that reinforced these behaviors was (emotional) 
pleasure, not unlike other critical survival behaviors such as sex, eating, and sleep. 
277 See Gombrich (1987) and Crowley (1958) for an overview of aesthetic judgment and cultural relativism. 
278 The naturalistic study of behavior from an evolutionary perspective. (Burghart, 2005)
279 It has been observed that the human preference for upright walking required multiple adaptations to the 
physiology of humans, including a shortened and narrower birth canal than early primates. Meanwhile the 
human brain was growing in size. In order to make it possible for the infant to pass through the birth canal, it 
was necessary to give birth to an infant with a skull that was somewhat flexible and a brain that was not yet fully 
developed. As a result human infants are helpless after birth, requiring considerable brain development outside 
the womb and significant care and vigilance (Gould, 1977).
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These behavioral adaptations, or adapted innate affinitive expressions, assured that 
mothers would be “emotionally bounded to their immature offspring and thus willing 
to provide the necessary extended care over months and years” (p. 154).280 
The hunger for this kind of pleasure (emotional state), that provided a sense of comfort 
and well-being, became ritualized as the human brain increasingly became a sense 
making organ, resulting in the practice of deliberate artification which contributed to 
socialization and cooperation among ancestral humans. As humans evolved we learned 
that certain ritualized behavior (rhythms, colors, special arrangements, patterns, 
textures, etc.) in the right combination, had the ability to induce a desired/desirable 
emotional state. For Dissanayake, its is not so much the making of art as it is an 
evolutionary adaptation, that fed the hunger for the emotional benefits that “making 
special” (artification) and led to the evolutionary adaptation.
Gould and Vrba (1982) introduced the concept of exaptation. This concept has 
made a particularly significant contribution understanding how	we	evolved	to	seek	
out	aesthetic	experience,	no	longer	for	evolutionary	advantage,	but	for	the	sake	of	
the pleasure itself. As discussed above, adaptations are characteristics “currently 
enhancing fitness and that were constructed by natural selection to function in that 
particular role; thus, their selection context has not varied historically” (Lieberman 
& Vrba, 2005, p. 119). However, there are some characteristics that we now have 
that were not initially determined by natural selection or evolved for a different role. 
These are exaptations. Chatterjee (2014) describes exaptations as “evolutionary by-
products that become useful as the environment changes” (p. 162). Ramachandran 
(2011) describes them as “a mechanism that originally evolved for one function and 
then provided the opportunity for something very different to evolve. i.e. language" 
(p. 166). There is some evidence that exaptation may help to explain how it happened 
that we came to simply enjoy some more refined experiences for the sake of the subtle 
experience that they provide.281
280 Adaptation, in evolutionary theory, is understood as an anatomical structure, physiological process, or behavior 
pattern that adds to ancestral individual’s ability to survive and reproduce in competition with other members of 
their species (Crawford, 1998).
281 Consoli (2015) writes, “[the] neuropsychological approach is increasingly framing aesthetic experience as 
a complex and multifaceted experience of knowledge—more precisely, as a specific implementation of the 
epistemic goal of knowing that becomes active when people experience objects (and not only artworks) adopting 
an aesthetic viewing orientation.”
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§  7.10 Neuroaesthetics
Rather, there are indeed universal patterns of appreciation of beauty – aesthetic 
preferences valid for humans in every culture.  All humans evaluate objects that 
correspond to these patterns as beautiful… Analogously, recent brain research also 
teaches that the experience of the beautiful is determined by the internal architecture 
of the brain, that our subjective neural disposition is decisive for beauty – that beauty is 
indeed brain happiness.
(Wolfgang Welsch, 2008, p. 7 & 29) 
Neuroaesthetics seeks to understand aesthetic experience from the point of view of 
neuroscience, cognitive science and evolutionary psychology. Neuroaesthetics starts 
with two presuppositions: (1.) All human behavior has a neural counterpart, that is 
to say that there is “no thought, no desire, no emotion, no dream, no flight of fancy 
that is not tethered to the activity of our nervous system.” (2.) Evolution has played a 
significant role in shaping the human brain and behaviors (Chatterjee, 2014, p. xi).
Neuroaesthetics is a branch of empirical aesthetics, “a branch of psychology dedicated 
to studying the nature of beauty, aesthetics, art, artistic production, aesthetic 
experience, and audience responses to artworks in a broad range of media” (Seeley, 
2014). Empirical Aesthetics has its roots in the work of Fechner. In Vorschule der 
Äesthetik, Fechner (1876) makes a distinction between speculative aesthetics (from 
above) and empirical aesthetics (from below). His was not so much an aesthetics per se 
as it was a methodology (from below), that relied on (objective) research methods that 
sought to understand people’s preferences. As such, the goal of empirical aesthetics is 
not	to	define	what	is	beautiful,	but	rather	to	identify	empirical	evidence	that	helps	us	
to understand the nature of aesthetic experience – why and how certain arrangements 
of objects, colors, proportional relationships, produce/induce certain qualities of 
experience. The fundamental presupposition of empirical aesthetics is that as people 
all experience the same world as embodied beings with fundamentally the same 
bodies, there is a likelihood that what induces an aesthetic experience in one person, 
will induce a similar experience in another. 
Chatterjee (2014), referring to Shimamura (2012), writes, “aesthetic experiences have 
the	core	triad	of	sensations,	meaning,	and	emotion” (p. 138). Each component of the core 
triad has different neural underpinnings that vary depending on which sensory system is 
being stimulated, as each has a different entrance point to the brain. By sensations they 
mean "the multi-sensory experience of vivid colors, bold lines, meter and melody." By 
emotions they mean pleasure evoked by art, disgust and other more subtle emotions. 
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Meaning could include political, intellectual, religious, or subversive. Aesthetic pleasure 
extends beyond “basic appetitive pleasures in three ways.”(p. 111) (1.) They tap into 
neural systems that are biased toward liking but not wanting. (2.) They are nuance, 
with admixtures of complex emotions. (3.) They are influenced by experience, memory, 
knowledge. Aesthetic	pleasure	is	kind	of	optimum	combination	of	sensations,	meaning	
and emotion. Its hard to say exactly what the mixture is, but you know it when you are 
experiencing it.
Initially, neuroresearchers relied heavily on single cases of patients suffering from 
brain damage, lesions or neurodegenerative diseases (Chatterjee, 2014). These cases 
allowed neuroscientists to identify areas of the brain that served specific functions, 
and how damage to these parts effect or do not effect the cognitive capabilities of the 
patient. More recently a good deal of the research in neuroaesthetics relies on neuro-
imaging studies, such as DOI, MRI, fMRI, PET and others. These studies provide the 
data necessary to construct a “basic picture of the neural correlates of visual aesthetic 
appreciation” (Cela-Conde, Agnati, Huston, Mora, & Nadal, 2011). The introduction 
of non-invasive means for studying the brain has had a significant impact on the 
discipline.  
In their article “Toward A Brain-Based Theory of Beauty,” Ishizu & Zeki (2011) 
introduce neuroaesthetics with a quote from Burke (1756): “Beauty is, for the 
greater part, some quality in bodies acting mechanically upon the human mind by 
the intervention of the senses” (p. 1). The quote suggests that there is some neuro-
mechanism that perceives "qualities acting upon the human mind" involved in 
experiencing beauty. The objective of Ishizu & Zeki’s research is to find out if in fact 
such a [neuro]mechanism exists – one that correlates information from various sense 
systems. And if so, how does such a mechanism correlate information from different 
sense systems to simulate a sense of beauty. There were two principle results of their 
study: (1.) Through the use of brain imaging studies activity was identified in a single 
region of the brain that correlated with both visual and musical beauty, (2.) thus 
establishing that there is a linear relationship between a particular neural signal and 
the intensity of the experience declared by the subject. In very simple terms, these 
results provided them with a basis for a brain-based definition of beauty, where beauty 
is understood as a particular quality of aesthetic experience. 
Neuroaesthetics “engages in scientific investigation of the brain-body physiological 
correlates of the aesthetic experience of particular human symbolic expressions, such 
as works of art and architecture” (Gallese & Gattara, 2015, p. 162). Gallese & Gattara 
propose that there are four reasons why neuroscience matters to architecture: 
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 –  Relationship between perception and empathy: As the of concepts of empathy, as 
described above, have been validated new insight has been gained into the cognitive 
function of art and how we experience architectural space (p. 162).
 – Embodied simulation: That the neuromechanisms we use when encountering the world, 
are similar to those that we use when exploring a fictional (imagined) world (p. 164).
 – Embodied simulation allows us to enter into the design word feelingly, to be aware of 
the qualia of a mental image (p. 164).282
 –  Intercorporeality: Research into the function of mirror-neurons has demonstrated 
that the cortical motor system functions not only as a movement machine, but it is an 
integral part of our cognitive system, allowing “direct apprehension of the relational 
quality linking space, objects, and others’ actions to our body.” Mirror neurons also 
facilitate intercorporeality – “the mutual resonance of intentionally meaningful 
sensorimotor behaviors” (p. 166).
Just as designers are expected to know how to make an efficient and effective use of 
space; a stable but soaring structure, and a building facade where everything looks just 
right, so they are expected to design a built environment that induces the (right mix of) 
optimal hedonic value that results in an intended quality of aesthetic experience. 
The above overview of aesthetic theory provides a context in which to appreciate the 
complexities surrounding the discussion of aesthetic qualities. The empirical theories 
provide a somewhat more objective way of understanding aesthetic experience 
than the more philosophical approach. The above gives substantial evidence that 
all humans experience aesthetic qualities in their environment. In addition, the 
above also identifies several ways of understanding the cognitive mechanisms 
that make these aesthetic experiences possible. Also evidence has been cited that 
supports the claim that the same cognitive mechanisms that are stimulated by our 
environments and trigger the feelings that together result in an aesthetic experience, 
are the very same that we make use of when inhabiting an imaginary space. 
282 See also Xenakis, Argyris, & Darzentas ( 2012), “The Functional Role of Emotions in Aesthetic Judgment”; and 
Wilson and Foglia (2011), who observe, “Electrophysiological results have shown that observing the action 
executed by another individual blocks the mu rhythm (as opposed to the alpha rhythm) of the observer, thus 
providing evidence for a resonance system, which links the observed action to the action of the subject’s own 
motor repertoire “ (sec. 5.4).
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Thus supporting the idea mentioned earlier, based on Polanyi and Schön, that when 
designing, the designer possesses the possibility to inhabit the design world feelingly, 
and thereby assess the aesthetic quality of the emerging design solution both as an 
external representation. Aesthetic experience is kind of embodied knowing. Embodied 
knowing is aesthesis.
The following are a representative sampling of some standard design methodologies. 
None of them is of a particularly fine grain. They are intended to describe, in broad 
strokes, how some designers think that designing occurs. This will be followed by 
a synthesis of the methodologies discussed and a proposal for a methodology that 
includes how experiential performance expectations, especially aesthetic experience, 
influences and drives the design process. 
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8 Methodologies
The act of producing that is directed by intent to produce something that is enjoyed 
in the immediate experience of perceiving has qualities that a spontaneous or 
uncontrolled activity does not have.
 (Dewey, 1934/2005, p.50)
The design process, is what happens between (and including) defining the problem and 
generating the solution. There are numerous ways of describing the design process, 
as well as numerous design processes. 283 Design processes are descriptions of how 
designers design. Methodologies are ways designers go about or strategies they use 
to generate design solutions. Methodologies are a kind of meta-heuristic (not an 
algorithm), or purpose-driven system of methods, that describes a way of approaching 
a design problem that has a likelihood of leading to an acceptable (satisficing) solution. 
Methodologies can be general purpose or situational. The distinction between design 
processes (descriptive) and methodologies (strategic) is subtle. In many cases there 
may be no practical difference between a process and a methodology. Nonetheless it 
is important to keep in mind that the design process or the design methodology is not 
designing; both are artificial constructs intended to offer insight into how this human 
cognitive ability called designing occurs.284 
283 For an overview of multiple design theories from an engineering perspective see Tomiyama et al. (2009) who 
present a vigorous evaluation and means of categorization. They explain that the ultimate goal of design 
research is to identify general and abstract (that is universal) laws. Design research theories, take many forms, 
including the observation of phenomena, attempts at universal laws and mathematical formulas. Tomiyama 
et al.categorize these theories into four general categories along two axes: one is “concrete vs. abstract and 
the other is “individual vs. general.” This results in a matrix that categorizes design theories as: concrete and 
individual; concrete and general; abstract and individual; and abstract and general. See also Jormakka (2008) 
who describes methods that include: nature and geometry as authorities, music and mathematics as models, 
accident and the unconscious as sources, rationalist approaches, precedent, responses to site, generative 
processes. Pressman (2012), from years of teaching design proposes processes that to “help students and young 
professionals in creating excellent designs, even magical buildings…” (p. 8). All of the methods follow the same 
basic structure described above.  
284 Coyne et al. (1990) write, “In modeling design we do not attempt to say what design or how human designers do 
what they do, but rather provide models by which we can explain and perhaps replicate certain aspects of design 
behavior” (p. 11).
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Cross and Roozenburg (1992, p. 33) write:
There is no well-formulated consensus model of the design process in architecture (nor 
any longer in industrial design) but we may conclude that there has emerged a ‘type 
model’ with the following features: It has essentially a spiral structure; It recognizes 
the importance of pre-structures, presuppositions or protomodels as the origins of 
solution concepts; It emphasizes a conjecture-analysis cycle in which the designer and 
the other participants refine their understanding of both the solution and the problem 
in parallel; It assumes design problems, by definition, to be ill-defined problems. 
In retrospect, we might say that in architecture and industrial design the attention 
of the design researchers and theorists shifted from the vertical (linear, procedural) 
dimension of the design process to the horizontal (iterative, problem-solving) 
dimension. (p. 331)
Describing how designers work based on evidence from design protocols, 
Cross (2004) observes, 
designers start by exploring the [problem space], and find, discover, or recognize 
a partial structure. That partial structure is then used to provide them also with a 
partial structuring of the [solution space]. They consider the implications of the partial 
structure within the [solution space], use it to generate some initial ideas for the form 
of a design concept, and so extend and develop the partial structuring. . . They transfer 
the developed partial structure back into the [problem space], and again consider 
implications and extend the structuring of the [problem space]. Their goal . . . is to 
create a matching problem-solution pair. (p. 434)
Cross identifies the tendency of (expert) designers to first look for coherence (partial 
structure). This sense of coherence provides them with an inclination – a bias heuristic 
– to pursue one solution path over another as he defines the problem space. As the 
partial structure initially discovered/recognized and used to structure the problem 
space begins to structure the solution space, this sense of coherence (feeling) 
motivates/drives the design process, resulting is congruence between the problem-
solution pair.
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§  8.1 There is no All-encompassing Model of Designing
Lawson & Dorst (2009), in an effort to describe how designers work, describe designing 
– not unlike Dong, 2009 – from several points of view in terms of design as: designing 
as a mixture of creativity and analysis; designing as problem solving; designing as 
learning; designing as evolution; designing as the creation of solutions to problems; 
designing as integrating into a coherent whole; designing as a fundamental human 
activity. Their point is that even after picking a design solution up, rotating it around, 
and looking at it from several different perspectives they “still cannot find a single all-
encompassing model of designing” (p. 46). The insight gained from this exercise is that 
the design methodology that best describes how anyone designs is first determined by 
how he thinks of design as. However, how one thinks of design as, is not static. One’s 
understanding, experience, and ability, all influence how one thinks of design as.285 What 
a beginner thinks of design as and what an expert thinks of design as, are not the same. 
As such the methodologies appropriate for a beginner vs. an expert are not the same. 
There are methodologies that are developmentally more appropriate for beginners and 
methodologies that are developmentally better suited for experts (Curry, 2014).
§  8.2 Teaching Devices
The usefulness of design methodologies is not limited to describing how designers 
work, or as a means of analysis to improve the quality of the design product, but 
they can also be helpful as teaching devices. This was the intended purpose of the 
methodology developed by Thornley. Thornley returning to teaching from professional 
practice was appalled at the state of architecture education. To him the student designs 
looked like modern architecture 
but there was little functional analysis, and appearance (both of the building itself and, 
most particularly, of the drawing) accounted for nearly all. All the tutor could do was 
to compare his prejudices with the students; there was no rational basis for criticism. 
(Broadbent, 1973, p. 264) 
285 In a previously published article (Curry, 2014) I made use of these categories as a means for describing design 
acquisition as a developmental process.
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Thornley developed a process that was both a systematic basis for teaching and for 
his own theory of architecture, as a reflection on “what an architect actually does 
when he is designing something” (p. 265). The process he proposes is organized 
into four stages, each with their related heuristics: accumulation of data b isolation 
of a general concept or form b development of the form into the final scheme b 
presentation of the final scheme. This process, with its associated heuristics, like 
Polanyi’s methodology, assisted the design tutor as he taught the student how to 
design providing cognitive scaffolding (as defined earlier).
§  8.3 Classification	Schemes
Wynn and Clarkson (2005) propose three classification schemes for models 
of designing based on practical relevance: “stage vs. activity-based models; 
problem vs. solution-oriented literature; and abstract vs. analytical vs. procedural 
approaches” (p. 35).  Stage vs. activity-based models, follow the distinction made 
above between phase-based and state-based processes where stage-based models 
are primarily linear, and activity-based models are more spiral. 
Their problem vs. solution classification builds on the observation that design 
strategies can be either problem or solution driven, depending on the level of 
expertise or the discipline of the designer. This classification describes a meta-
approach to design problems observed by Jones (1992), Cross (1992), Lawson 
(2005), Dorst (2010), Badke-Schaub et al. (2011), and others, that distinguishes 
the difference between how an expert and a beginner approaches a design 
problem. As the may be recalled from above, Hillier et al. (1972) argue, against the 
rationalist position that holds a problem-solver must approach a problem from a 
posture of disinterested-ness, that designers “must, and do, pre-structure their 
problems in order to solve them.” The argument is that expert designers, relying on 
tacit (embodied) knowledge and with years of experience, pre-structure a design 
problem in a manner that anticipates how he will solve it (solution-oriented). 
While beginners, with little experience and limit knowledge of the domain, tend to 
rely on research, analysis and procedure to solve the problem (problem-oriented). 
The problem-oriented approach is rooted in an approach to problem solving 
similar to Polya’ methodology, and calls to mind Rittel with his claim that defining 
the problem IS the problem. The implication being that once a designer truly 
understands the problem, the solution will be self-evident. Wynn and Clarkson 
describe Darke (1979) and Jones (1992) as examples of solution-oriented models. 
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Their final classification is abstract vs. analytical vs. procedural classification is 
more a typology of the types of literature related to design methodology. Analytical 
approaches are used to evaluate the process for the purpose of improving designing 
in a particular instance. Procedural approaches are generally distinguished as being 
descriptive or prescriptive. A further distinction Wynn and Clarkson (2005) make is in 
the scope of the procedural approaches, described as: models and methods. Models 
“refer to a description or prescription of the morphological form of scope in procedural 
approaches" (p. 40). This is similar with the meaning of methodology used in this 
research. Methods prescribe systematic procedures to support stages within a model. 
Further both models (methodologies) and methods often “fall between two extremes." 
These are either designing focused, which are intended as (prescriptive) means for 
generating better products; or these are project focused which are intended as means 
to improve the management of a design project.
As the primary focus of this research architectural design expertise, the Wynn and 
Clarkson classification that best describes the model of interest here is the stage-based, 
solution-oriented, descriptive, procedural model with its associated methods. There are 
many other classifications schemes. The usefulness of these schemes is that they provide 
a framework within which to compare and contrast multiple design methodologies.
§  8.4 Ways of Thinking about Designing
Broadbent proposed a normative model (methodology) of how architects work that 
follows the pattern described above: problem b [analysis/synthesis/evaluation] b 
solution. His is a more-or-less information driven, rationalist approach. Perhaps more 
insightful than his methodology, Broadbent (1973), coming to designing as a sociologist, 
brings two important perspectives to this overview of methodology, these are (1.) four 
ways of thinking about designing (pragmatic, iconic, analogical, and canonic); and 
(2.) an assessment of the changing situation of, and the identification of performance 
expectations for architectural design. His ways of thinking about designing, have to 
do with what the expected outcome of designing is to be. Lawson (2005, pp. 203-
205) summarizes these four ways succinctly: (1.) Pragmatic designing is essentially a 
traditional and conservative making use of available materials methods of construction, 
generally without innovation. (2.) Iconic designing – perhaps even more conservative 
– is where a designer might make use of existing design solutions (styles) and modify 
them to meet new conditions. (3.) Canonic designing looks to the use of rules such as 
planning grids, proportioning systems, classic orders, Corbu’s modular and the like. 
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(4.) Analogical designing looks to other fields and disciplines to find new ways of 
structuring the problem. This this last way is currently very popular in design schools. 
No one of these ways of design is really sufficient. One would think that an expert 
designer, while perhaps emphasizing one way over another, would make use of all the 
ways. Certainly a concern for how a building is built, a willingness to make use of existing 
successful solutions, an appreciation for proportion, and the pursuit of new ways of 
thinking about a design problem are all of value. What is revealing, and relevant to this 
research, is Lawson’s clear preference for the analogical way evidenced by his enthusiastic 
description, writing “Broadbent himself seems to suggest that the ‘analogical’ methods 
are the most promising of these four for form generation” (p. 205). He considers the use of 
human form, organic form, metaphor and narrative all as outgrowths of this idea. But, like 
Broadbent said, it all depends of what you expect of designing.
In terms of expectations for the product of designing, Broadbent (1973) observes that 
“the new maths, with a certain amount of statistics, has been almost as influential in 
the development of new design methods as all the other sources and disciplines put 
together… raising design to the highest level of abstraction” (p. 272). This desire for 
“the abstract purity of a concept” did not stop at designing, but led to a “tendency to 
think of people as abstractions… rather than as persons, and the same unwillingness 
to think of a building (or anything else in design) as a concrete physical thing” (p. 272). 
Still, Broadbent writes, there are those (empiricists) who find these views unacceptable, 
who insist on seeing “the building as a real, tangible thing which modifies the physical 
environment, and in doing so impinges on the user’s senses” (p. 272). Their ideal 
would be, if it were possible “to work again pragmatically – manipulating real materials 
to full size on the actual site" (p. 272).
His design thinking will tend to be analogic or repetitive, and his approach to design will 
depend as far as possible on comparing his experience of things which he has observed 
in the real world. His own sketches, drawings and models fall into this category; these 
will be comparable, in perceptual transaction, with his ever-changing visual aura, 
thermal and other sensory experience of real buildings. Some of the finest designers in 
history have worked in these ways… (Broadbent, 1973, p. 272)
 Still, there is a rationalist, “parallel tradition, in which the abstract geometry of the 
designing analogue seemed even more important to the architect than the sensory 
stimulus which the building would afford its users” (Broadbent, 1973, p. 273). It is 
this empiricist vs. rationalist dichotomy, that this research is challenging, in light of 
new research in the area of embodied cognition and the embedded ways that design 
expertise is thought to be acquired.
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§  8.5 Divergence,	Transformation,	Convergence
On one level the normative model of designing (problem b [analysis/synthesis/
evaluation] b solution) described by Broadbent is sufficient. Jones (1992) taking a 
systems approach to the design process “disintegrates” the design process to “make 
public the thinking that a designer traditionally keeps to himself" (p. 69). 
While disintegrating the “design act” Jones focuses on the dynamics of the design 
process, recognizing that “the way in which this mixing of judgment and calculation… 
is not settled” (p. 63). His process, like Broadbent’s is based on what he calls the 
“simplest and most common” three essential stages: [analysis b synthesis b 
evaluation], except that in the process of disintegrating designing he redefines 
the stages from analysis to divergence; from to transformation; from evaluation to 
convergence. Jones also makes note of the on-going interrelationship and feedback 
between the three stages, making it a less linear model of designing. His model is 
summarized as: problem b [divergence/transformation/convergence] b solution, 
where the problem and solution are both outside the brackets.
 – Divergence involves expanding the problem space (boundary of the situation) large 
enough to seek a fruitful solution 
 – Transformation involves pattern-making, seeking cohesion, fun, flash of insight, how to 
think about the problem 
 – Convergence involves reducing variables and options until a final solution begins 
to emerge 
While these terms are analogous with the procedures traditionally used to describe the 
design process, they are meant to describe means that facilitate the discovery of new 
methods that are needed to face new kinds of problems. Jones then uses these terms to 
both describe existing methodologies and to explore new ones. While Jones does refer 
to divergence/transformation/convergence as stages in the design process, he does 
not hold that these stages occur sequentially. 
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§  8.6 Pre-structuring the Design Problem
The description of the design process proposed by Hillier et al. (1972) is a more 
integrated, than a procedural, process or linear model. Theirs is a break with the 
rationalist, analysis-synthesis “notion of design” that was popular with design 
theorists at the time. One of their main critiques of the trend at the time to adopt a 
rationalist approach to designing was the claim that a designer approach a problem 
with no presuppositions (an innocent eye).286 They argue that this rationalist claim 
of “disinterestedness,”  is a myth and that its time to simply accept that expert 
designers do approach design problems with presuppositions, that is that they pre-
structure design problems. Being able to pre-structure a problem in light of previous 
experience, mastery of the domain, and vast situated strategic knowledge, is in fact 
what distinguishes an expert from a novice.  From Hillier's perspective, the rationalist 
approach is an illusion that has failed. They argue that if this rationalistic approach 
is so good then why is it that “designers do not produce better buildings out of the 
information [design] research provides, and why, with expanding technological means 
and user requirements the theoretical open ended-ness of architectural problems lead 
to so little fundamental variety in solutions proposed.” Hillier (1972) asks, why not just 
embrace the reality, along with Ryle (1949)  and Polanyi (2009), that “the cognitive 
schemes	by	which	we	interpret	the	world	and	pre-structure	our	observations”	are	a	
precondition to doing science and design (p. 3).287
Free of the prohibition to pre-structure a design problem, they propose an alternative 
theory. To explain how their theory works, and the consequences of accepting that 
designers really do pre-structure their design problems, they offer a simple scenario:
286 This argument is reminiscent of Gombrich’s critique of the myth of the “innocent eye,” a term to which Ruskin 
gave currency, and the importance of schemata in perception. Gombrich (1960/2000) writes, “it is so hard for 
us all to disentangle what we really see from what we merely know and thus to recover the innocent eye” (p. 
223). It speaks to the cognitive ability to shift focus from what one thinks one sees (informed by pre-existing 
schemata) and what one actually sees (trying to just see what is there), to be aware that one is doing it and the 
difference between the two.
287 Polanyi (1966) calls this tacit inference, writing that “no rules can account for the way a good idea is found for 
starting an inquiry; and there are no firm rules either for the verification or the refutation of the proposed solution 
of a problem” (p. 1). His argument is that scientists because of their training and years of practice, have acquired a 
“way” of seeing things (making sense of the world), that their perception (way of scientific knowing) has developed 
the capacity to perceive in nature certain patterns and systems that non-scientists (typically) do not: “Scientific 
knowing consists in discerning gestalten that indicate a true coherence in nature” (p. 1). Gestalten here is used in 
the sense of perceived order (the tacit apprehension of coherence), when we apprehend something as a whole, we 
“see its parts differently from the way we see them in isolation” (p. 3) as differentiated from a simple aggregation of 
parts. For a concise description of how gestalten works in perception see Arnheim (1987).
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We can imagine a man and an object he will create as though separated by a space 
which is filled, on the one hand, with tools and raw materials which we can call his 
‘instrumental set’ (or perhaps technological means) and on the other a productive 
sequence or process by which an object can be realized. If time is excluded from the 
space, we can conceive of the ‘instrumental set’ as though laid out on a table, and 
constituting a field of latencies and pre-constraints. If time is in the space, then the 
instrumental set is, as it were, arranged in a procedure or process. (Hillier, Musgrove, & 
O’Sullivan, 1972, p. 6)
The instrumental set (technological means) is the “stuff” of architectural design, 
including design criteria/ constraints, codes/zoning ordinance, site considerations, 
functional requirements, structure systems, mechanical/electrical/HVAC systems, 
materials and methods of construction, social/cultural/economic/environmental 
consideration, etc. These are all laid out on a table. All of this stuff possesses latencies 
– characteristics and properties (potentialities) or affordances (Gibson, 1986) – that 
offer designing opportunities.288 Rather than thinking of materials, codes, functional 
requirements and structure as “constraints” that limit the “creativity” of the designer, 
these are thought of as designing opportunities. These opportunities that emerge 
from discovering latencies (gleaned from the properties and characteristics of the 
instrumental set) then need to be integrated somehow into a cohesive whole.
On the other table, “our man” is faced with multiple productive sequences 
(methodologies, strategies, procedures) – ways of thinking about (processing) 
the instrumental set that will lead to any number of solutions of which he needs 
to pursue one that will work within an acceptable range. All productive sequences 
(strategies) are of three types. This fictitious man then is faced with choosing 
between one of the three. He can follow some predetermined process (for example, 
a step-by-step linear design methodology) which will lead to a definite design/plan 
of a preconceived object (building type/form/personal obsession) or one based on 
pure imagination (impose a form with little consideration of the instrumental set). 
288 Not unlike the possibilities offered by asking a brick what it wants to be.
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Or he can “interrogate his instrumental set, by an understanding of its latencies in 
relation to general object [building] types” (p. 7) to generate a form from which a 
design solution may be developed. For example, ask the brick what it wants to be and 
see where that goes.289
In other words, the instrumental set is understood as the problem space which is 
framed290 by the designer’s (intrinsic/extrinsic) pre-structuring of the problem (setting 
expectations/conjecture) be they be based on a knowledge of the solution types or by 
knowledge of the latencies of the instrumental set. The designer then (having already 
pre-structured or framed the problem) considers the instrumental set (engages in a 
dialectic between what is on the table and the objects that are possible to produce 
from them (in light of an expected outcome). Then by engaging in a tacit productive 
sequence he explores multiple possible solutions (solution paths). The designer needs 
to engage in some process of variety reduction (bias heuristic) so that the possible 
solutions can be reduced to one that will result in “not the building, but at one remove, 
sets of instructions for building.” For Hillier et al. (1972) the product of designing 
(proximate goal) is not a building, but rather “a set of descriptive documents of 
increasing refinement and specificity," not unlike Habraken’s functional approximation 
(p. 10). These are “sets of instruction for building,” not a set of documents that 
describe/represent a possible building.
This concept of variety reduction is essential. Up until now, most of the methodologies, 
described the various phases, stages or states of a design process. But, there has been 
little mention regarding how the designer proceeds through the process. Newell and 
Simon’s process was motivated by searching for the optimal combination of variables 
that would result in a satisfying solution. Polanyi’s methods provided a meta-heuristic 
that promised to increase the likelihood that the problem-solver would find the 
optimal solution. The decision-making criteria for these processes is dependent on 
verifiable deductive logic. 
289 This second approach described by Hillier is not unlike the great architect and educator Luis Kahn’s suggestion 
to his students, when they lacked inspiration, and when analysis and functionalism failed them, to ask the 
materials what they want to be: “You say to a brick, ‘What do you want, brick?’ And brick says to you, ‘I like an 
arch.’ And you say to brick, ‘Look, I want one, too, but arches are expensive and I can use a concrete lintel.’ And 
then you say: ‘What do you think of that, brick?’ Brick says: ‘I like an arch.’” https://www.theguardian.com/
artanddesign/2013/feb/26/louis-kahn-brick-whisperer-architect
290 A frame is “an active perspective that both describes and perceptually changes a given situation” (Kolko, 2011, p.13).
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Heuristics that are effective in reducing the search area, and eliminating solution paths 
have already been discussed that are effective when faced with well-defined problems. 
But there are aspects of the design process that have already been observed that make 
the need for variation reduction more complicated.
§  8.7 Design Abduction
As discussed above, cognition (thinking) is often described three ways: deductive, 
inductive and abductive. Kees Dorst (2010) writing about the nature of design thinking 
(Rowe, 1987), offers an accessible way of describing the differences between these 
three ways of thinking. 
Dorst (2010) recommends a return to the basics, back to “the formal logic behind 
design reasoning.”  Dorst’s model, similar to the basic components given above 
(problem b [problem-framing/solution-seeking] b solution), involves three 
components that make up the basic equation: what is the problem, how to solve it 
(where methodology is understood as problem-framing/solution-seeking), to achieve 
the desired outcome (solution). In deductive thinking “we know ‘what’ the players in 
a situation will need to attend to, and we know ‘how’ they will operate together,” thus 
allowing us to “safely predict the results” (p. 132). In inductive thinking “we know 
the ‘what’ in the situation, and we can observe the results. But we do not know the 
‘how’” (p. 132). Both deductive and inductive thinking help to predict “phenomena 
that already exist in the world,” the outcome is a result. Abductive thinking helps to 
create new things, where the outcome is a value. Dorst makes a distinction between 
normal abduction and design abduction. Normal abduction, is typically associated with 
problem-solving, where we know what the methodology (working principle) is and we 
know the desired outcome (value), what we don’t know is what (thing) will produce this 
value. For design abduction we know what the desired outcome (value) is, but we don’t 
know what the problem (thing) is and we don’t know how we will solve it. For Dorst, the 
problem of designing is the problem of how to solve it.
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§  8.8 Reflective	Conversation	with	the	Situation	
Schön proposes a comprehensive theory of how designer’s work that is fundamentally 
a critique, of the (positivist) understanding of professional education founded on 
technical rationalism.291 His is a theory of “reflection-on-action, reflection-in-action, 
responding to problematic situations, problem-framing, problem-solving, and the 
priority of practical knowledge over abstract theory” that finds its roots in the writings 
of Dewey (Shapiro H. , 2010, p. 311).292 Schön is not writing about architecture per 
se, but rather proposing an epistemological alternative (similar to the critique of 
prescriptive methodologies above), where the actual practices of professionals rather 
than science or theory (only) constitute the core of professional knowledge. 
Schön was neither an architect, nor involved directly in any design profession. He was 
a philosopher (a pragmatist in the line of Dewey), a policy maker, scholar and teacher. 
Schön turned to university-based architectural studio design education as an alternative 
model for professional education. In so doing, Schön – making use of design protocols 
and direct observation – studied the studio as a model teaching method for professional 
education. His studies, critiques and insights have resulted in not only a theory of how 
the studio works as a teaching tool, but also how designers design.
Schön, like Ryle and Polanyi, recognizes the limitations of a positivistic philosophy 
of science293 and technical rationality as a basis for real life problem-solving. 
291 “A view of professional knowledge [where] professional activity consists in instrumental problem solving made 
rigorous by the application of scientific theory and technique” (Schön, 2009, p.21).
292 Dewey, along with the technical rationalists, accepted science as a valid method of reflection. However he takes 
issue with science as the primary (only valid) method of reflection (real knowledge) because science does not 
require verification and often is disconnected with the actual experiences of practitioners and clients, claiming 
that “scientific inquiry is merely an intermediate stage, a kind of ‘time out’ in a process which begins when 
practice becomes unsettled or problematic” (Waks, 2001, p.40). The result is that problems encountered in 
practice are studied outside of their context, where inquiry guided by scientific method result in theories that are 
to be applied in practice before they can be verified or proved to be relevant. The process ends there. However, 
for Dewey, the process only really ends when the results of the scientific inquiry are carried back into practice and 
conformed in the experience of practitioners.
293 Schön (1985 p.19) refers to a quote by Bernstein, “There is not a single major thesis advanced by nineteenth 
century Positivists or the Vienna Circle that has not been devastatingly criticized when measured by the 
Positivist’s own standards for philosophical argument. The original formulation of the analytic-synthetic 
dichotomy and the verifiability criterion on meaning have been abandoned. It has been effectively shown 
that the Positivist’s understanding of the natural sciences and the formal discipline is grossly oversimplified. 
Whatever one’s final judgment about the current disputes in the post-empiricist philosophy and history of 
science… there is rational agreement about the inadequacy of the original Positivist understanding on science, 
knowledge, and meaning” (1976, p. 207).
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Referencing Glazer (1974), Schön (1985) identifies three characteristics of a problem 
that is well-suited to be solved by traditionally trained “technical experts”: the problem 
is clearly defined, goals are relatively fixed, and phenomena lend themselves to the 
categories of available theory and technique (p. 17). Unlike Simon, Rittel, Rowe and 
Lawson, Schön does not define a new category for design problems (i.e.: ill-structured, 
wicked, ill-defined, etc.) as a special kind of problem. Rather, Schön (1985) observes 
that the structure of real world problems makes them difficult to solve for “technical 
experts” who due to their professional education, rely too heavily on the methods 
and theories of technical rationality, leading to what he calls the “dilemma of rigor or 
relevance” (p. 15). Expectations of practice came to hold that professional rigor was 
only to be found in “well-formed problems of instrumental choice whose solution [relies 
on] research-based theory and technique” (p. 15). As such, the professional who limits 
his practice to the application of rigorous research-based technique soon finds himself 
with only three options: choose the high ground by narrowly limiting his practice to 
purely technical problems; be selectively inattentive to data that does not fit within their 
theories; or use junk categories, to explain away variables that do not fit within their 
theories (1991, pp. 240-241).294 The other option is to “choose the swampy lowland;” 
jump into the messy, murky sometimes confusing reality of the situation. The “swampy 
lowland” is what Schön means by the “intermediate zones of practice – the situations 
of complexity and uncertainty, the unique cases that require artistry, the elusive task 
of problem setting, the multiplicity of professional identities…” (1985, p. 12) – where	
the	rigorous	methods	of	the	technical	expert	fail,	the	embodied,	tacit	knowledge	of	the	
expert practitioner takes over. But this choice of relevance over rigor, soft science over 
hard science, tends to leave the practitioner with “a nagging sense of inferiority.” To 
validate his position as an expert, he needs a science that validates his ability.295   
Schön, like Hillier, accepts that the (expert) practitioner/designer approaches the 
problem with a bias that comes from years of practice and situational knowledge.296 
294 These options are ways of dealing with real world (ill-defined, wicked) problems typical of novice designers who 
tend to be problem-oriented and have limited mastery of the domain’s declarative/conceptual and procedural/
heuristic knowledge. See below.
295 For example, “engineering is an application of engineering science; rigorous management depends of the use of 
management science; and policy-making can become rigorous when based on policy-science” (1985, p. 14).
296 Novices also approach problems with a bias, or a preconceived idea as to what the solution will be. However, the 
pre-structuring of the problem that typical of experts should not to be confused with the naive and uninformed 
pre-suppositions of the novice. The novice needs to learn how to put his initial (uninformed) bias aside, and 
learn to test it against newly acquired domain specific knowledge/concepts and normative procedural heuristics 
and apply these to various situation as he engages in the deliberate practice the essential for the acquisition of 
expertise. See section on expertise below.
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There is no innocent eye or purely deductive reasoning. He writes, “when the 
practitioner sets the problem, he chooses what he will treat as the “things” of the 
situation… what he will attend to and what he will ignore.” In The Design Studio (1985) 
Schön provides a description of the process or “schema” that he is proposing:297
To begin with, the starting condition of reflection-in-action is the repertoire of 
routinized responses that skillful practitioners bring to their practice.298 This is 
what I call the practitioner’s knowing-in-action. It can be seen as consisting of 
strategies of action, understanding of phenomena, ways of framing the problematic 
situations encountered in day-to-day experience. It is usually tacit, and it is delivered 
spontaneously, without conscious deliberation. It works, in the sense of yielding 
intended consequences, so long as practice situations fall within the boundaries of 
the normal and routine. It is a dynamic knowing process,299 rather than a static body of 
knowledge, in the sense that it takes the form of continuing detection and correction 
of error,300 on-line fine-tuning, all within the framework of a relatively unchanging 
system of understanding.301 A process of continual adjustment in the service of 
maintaining a sense of constancy302… Sometimes, however, there are surprises. These 
take the form of unanticipated events which do not fit303 existing understandings, 
fall outside the categories of knowing-in-action. They are anomalous, and if they are 
noticed, they yield uncertainty – meaning not merely that one cannot predict for sure 
what will happen but that, at least for a time, one cannot make sense of the situation. 
Often, such surprises appear as unique events – things one has never seen before and 
may never see again. Often, they are associated with conflicting values, conflicting 
ways of framing the problematic situation, even conflicting paradigms of practice. 
297 It is a lengthy quote, but it is the most concise account I can find that describes what he means by “reflection-in-
action” that I can find, and fundamental to this research.
298 In other places this “repertoire of routinized responses that skillful practitioners bring to their practice” is what 
is meant by procedural/heuristic knowledge.
299 Similar to dialectic used above.
300 Similar to feed-back used above.
301 Similar to a way of thinking about the problem used above.
302 Similar to the experience of coherence used above.
303 A reference to Alexander’s concept of fit used above.
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These are tensions or contradictions in what Geoffrey Vickers304 called the appreciative 
system of the practitioner. Together, uncertainty, uniqueness, value-conflict, make up 
what I call the indeterminate zones of practice. In these zones, competence takes on a new 
meaning. There is a demand for reflection, through turning to the surprising phenomena 
and, at the same time, back on itself to the spontaneous knowing-in-action that triggered 
surprise. It is as though the practitioner asked himself, “What is this?” and at the same 
time, “How have I been thinking about this.” Such reflection must at least be in some 
degree conscious. It converts tacit knowing-in-action to explicit knowledge for action. 
It must take place in the action present – the period of time in which thinking can still 
make a difference to the outcomes of the action. It has a critical function, questioning 
and challenging the assumptional basis of action, and a restructuring function, reshaping 
strategies, understanding phenomena, and ways of framing the problems. Thinking gives 
rise to experimenting – but to a particular kind of experimenting, unique to practice, like 
and unlike the experimenting of laboratory science. It occurs on-the-spot, in the practice 
situation. It consists in actions that function in three ways to test new understandings 
(“what is going on here?”), to explore new phenomena (“What else looks odd here?”), and 
to affirm or negate the moves by which the practitioner tries to change things for the better 
(“How can we get this under control?”) On-the-spot experiment may “work”, in the sense 
that you get what you intend and/or like what you get. Or it may yield further surprises, 
pleasant or unpleasant. In these instances, we can think of the inquirer moving in the 
situation and the situation “talking back” to the inquirer, triggering a reframing of the 
problem, a re-understanding of what is going on. The entire process then has the quality 
of a reflective conversation with the situation. (pp. 24-26)  
304 Vickers (1983), coming out of systems theory, and influenced by writers such as Wiener, von Bertalanffy, and 
Ross (as mentioned above), argued that the making of judgments is a necessary element of all human action. 
Vickers was highly critical of Simon, referring to his “unbounded” enthusiasm for computerized models of 
decision-making, and his principles of management as “proverbs masquerading as science” (p. xvi). Vickers' 
theory of appreciative judgment has three components: reality judgments – what is and is not the case; value 
judgments – what ought and ought not be; instrumental judgments – concerning the best means available to 
reduce the mismatch between what is and what ought (p. xix). Human action inextricably includes all three 
forms of judgment. Three other components of the appreciative systems include: the ability to find pattern in 
complexity, and the ability to shift focus and find other patterns; artful selectivity in deciding what features of 
a situation are most important, in keeping with shifting interests, values and concerns; the ability to read the 
situation, including how to simplify the complexity of an environment.  John Forrester comments on the back 
cover, “Sir Geoffrey Vickers taught us that a value-free judgment would be literally worthless. Human systems 
become recognizable as more than machines only as they honor (or betray) valued norms like impartiality or 
responsiveness, respect or productivity, or combinations of these. So all management and administration, all 
planning political action, depend not just on mechanical rule-following, but on practical goal-setting too: on 
appreciative judgments constructed in the face of ambiguity and uncertainty about what a rule, obligation, or 
goal really means” (Vickers, 1995).
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In general terms, Schön observes that professional designers: recognize a problem 
b [define the problem space/frame the problem] b[(move/see/move) b reframe  
b(move/see/move)] b produce a solution. It is a complex process that functions like 
a system with multiple feedback loops, involving defining/redefining the problem 
space, framing/reframing the problem, challenging assumptional biases, a willingness 
(courage to) confront the indeterminate zones of practice as the designer both builds 
and inhabits (feelingly) a design world that is directed toward a goal. 
As the designer engages in the frame/re-frame b move/see/move b refine (iterative) 
process, a design world begins to emerge in which he inhabits.305 This world has – 
normative, external and self-imposed – rules and variables.306 The more the designer 
works in this world the more detailed and complex it becomes.307 The designer inhabits 
this	design	world	feelingly,	making	use	of	embodied	cognitive	abilities,	experiencing	
its	spatial	qualities,	looking	around,	feeling,	moving	around,	testing	it	against	design	
criteria,	and	looking	for	opportunities.
The problem space is derived from the problematic situation. It is the space where all 
the design, performance, economic, environmental, technical, legal, etc., criteria/
constraints as understood by the client, users, stakeholders, architects, engineers, etc. 
are identified. Analysis/structuring of the problem space allows the designer to gain an 
understanding of the design problem.308
In the process of defining and understanding the problem space the designer begins to 
frame the problem. Criteria are prioritized. Particular interests are discovered. Client, 
user-group, stakeholder priorities are taken into consideration. Vague patterns and 
relationships are suggested. Personal preferences and interests are considered (explicitly 
and/or implicitly). There is an attempt to make sense (seek coherence) of the problem 
space. In doing so, a way of thinking about the problem emerges, that includes a sense of 
coherence and a feeling for the quality of aesthetic experience that is desired (intended).
305 It is important to keep in mind that Schön is trying to describe how architect’s design from what he has observed 
watching designers (professionals/studio masters/students) design.
306 These rules and variables are similar to Lawson’s criteria.
307 There comes a point where the design world has become so complex and detailed that it exceeds the memory/
processing capacity of the human mind, at which point it needs to be externalized or represented in a manner 
that will retain necessary information and allow for further manipulation and development of the data set. This 
is related to Simon’s concept of “bounded rationality.”
308 Unlike Hillier’s instrumental set, Schön’s problem space does not explicitly include building materials, components 
and systems. The problem space can be understood as consisting of a pre-ontic consideration of all the criteria and 
constraints related to the project. Building materials, components and systems emerge as part of the design world.
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Once the designer has framed the problem (discovered a way of thinking about the 
problem) he “jumps in” and begins, with pencil in hand (computer, models, etc.), 
to explore possibilities. To do so, the designer engages in an exploratory/iterative 
process of discovery that involves assessing the situation (seeing), trying out ways of 
responding to the situation (move), and then evaluating whether the response had 
the desired effect (see). Schön call this iterative, problem framing/solution seeking 
process see-move-see.309
Move: A move is a conjecture: “Given this situation, and these objectives, let’s try this 
and see what happens.” It is similar with what Akin calls inference-making, where “the 
designer takes a piece of information, adds to it what he knows, and arrives at new or 
modified information” (Akin, 1986, p. 49). 
See: Schön refers to the evaluation of moves as seeing. Seeing involves generating/
assessing internal/external representations. After the designer makes a move he steps 
back and sees, that is evaluates his move: “OK, I tried this, it seems to have solved this 
problem, but in doing so I caused another problem over there. Maybe that’s not such 
a big problem, or maybe it can be solved easily if I try something else. Still I do like how 
that last move solve this.”  Schön (1985) writes, “the designer evaluates his moves in a 
three-fold way: in terms of the desirability drawn from the normative design domains, 
in terms of their conformity to or violation of implications set up by earlier moves, and 
in terms of his appreciation of the new problems or potentials the have created” (p. 
49). The evaluative meta-heuristics being applied in seeing involve the application of 
demonstrative criteria and testing for experiential qualities: a feeling of coherence and 
resonance with the intended quality of aesthetic experience.
Building on insights from Simon and Rittel, as well as Ryle and Polanyi, Schön, 
recognizes, and observes, that in the dialectic process of problem-setting/solution-
seeking, the designer gains a deeper understanding of what the actual problem 
is. As such, Schön describes move-see-move not as a linear step-by-step process. 
Rather he observes that at times the designer is faced with an irreconcilable situation 
where the way the problem is framed, how he is thinking about the problem, the 
way the problem space is defined, and the direction that the design solution is 
going cannot be resolved in a satisfactory manner: something needs to change. 
309 Move-see-move as described by Schön is a kind of verification process where the designer tests his ideas 
through some kind of externalization. The idea being that complex spatial ideas that are held in the mind are 
ambiguous and need to be tested. The brain (neural systems) compensate for complexity beyond its capacity 
for the necessary level of detail, by glossing over the details (not unlike fuzzy logic). When a designer forces his 
self to externalize (draw or make a model) he is forced to figure out the details that his mental image may have 
glossed over, to see if it actually works. Additionally, by externalizing the move, the designer may discover new, 
previously not considered, moves (options) that may prove to be excellent design opportunities. 
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Schön refers to this as the “intermediate zone.” In this zone the designer assesses the 
situation and adjusts either the problem space (adding or subtracting some variable), 
how the problem is framed (changing priorities, discovering a new/better way of 
thinking about the problem), or makes a radical change in how he is approaching 
the design solution. The (creative) ability to reframe a problem space (situation) 
that leads to new insight, acting as a key or re-ordering principle, is analogous to a 
paradigm shift (Kuhn, 1962). It is precisely in this zone that creative and novel insight 
often takes place.
The indeterminate zone is analogous to the “Rashomon effect,”310 a realization that the 
way the problematic situation was/or is being framed (one of any number of legitimate 
ways of framing the problematic situation) has led to a problem-solving situation that 
is resulting in conflicting values or paradigms of practice. Multiple solution paths can 
be followed with no active heuristic bias. The designer does not know (explicitly or 
implicitly) what to do next. A sense of coherence is lost. “It is not turning out the way I 
thought/wanted.” It is at this point that the designer needs to reassess, take account 
of where he is in the process; to stop as ask his self “what do I know, and how I have 
been thinking about this?” This	is	the	point	when	the	designer	realizes	(or	not)	that	
the	way	he	has	been	thinking	about	the	problem	(how	the	problematic	situation	has	
been	framed	or	what	kind	of	solution	was	hoped	for),	the	assumptional	bias	and/or	the	
appreciative	system,	is	not	working;	insofar	as	it	is	not	producing	kind	of	solution	that	
resonates	with	the	designer’s	expectations.	It	is	in	this	intermediate	zone	that	design	
innovation/creativity is most likely to occur.
310 Anderson (2016) observes the dual phenomenon associated with the Rashomon effect. The first is the 
disorienting effect the observer feels that comes from the experience of never really knowing what happened, 
as is Kurosawa’s 1950 film, Rashomon. The second refers to “the naming of an epistemological framework – or 
ways of thinking, knowing and remembering – required for understanding complex and ambiguous situation.” 
It is a way of making sense and imposing structure in an ambiguous situation.
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§  8.9 The Design Problem and the Problem of Designing
Designing is an interaction of making and seeing, doing and discovering.
 (Schön & Wiggins, 1992, p. 135)
Kolko (2011) writes about designing as a synthesis that “involves the combination 
of two complicated entities: the designer and the design problem” (p. 3). Schön calls 
it a reflective conversation with the situation. From the above it can be seen that this 
conversation involves more than the designer (as an individual person). Following 
Wong and Lawson, the designer includes those who identify and structure the problem, 
as well as those who participate in the iterative process of externalizing the emerging 
representation of the solution. As discussed above, all of the persons who make up who 
we call the designer each come to the problem situation with their own presuppositions 
and expectations, and biases, and experiences, and expertise. This conversation with 
the problem situation is very complex indeed.
Though the focus of this research is about design expertise, and explicitly not about 
how to design a building, the two are nonetheless incommensurably inter-connected. 
Designing, as an object of study, is difficult to understand separate from the domain 
within which it functions. This research starts with the presupposition that the proper 
end of designing is an artifact, and so it follows that the proper end of architectural 
design is buildings/built environments. The end of designing in not an idea or a 
concept. Though the generative idea (Darke, 1979) can be a powerful tool for framing 
the problem, achieving coherence and identifying the intended aesthetic experience, 
and even variation reduction. The generative idea is not the design solution, it’s a 
heuristic, a design strategy. Neither is a narrative, an algorithm or whatever other 
conceptual device the designer uses as a heuristic to frame the problem and/or 
generate conceptual form.311 As critical a function that it might play for generating 
form,	making	sense	of	the	problem,	or	even	as	a	motivational	factor,	in	the	end,	
concept,	the	narrative,	the	generative	idea	does	not	matter. The owner, client, user, 
government official, do not care how or why you designed what you did. The only thing 
that matters is if whatever and however you designed it, it resulted in a building/built 
environment that satisfies demonstrable criteria and the induces the intended quality 
of experience. It is critical for the reader to appreciate this.
311 See Jormakka (2012) for an overview of alternative methods for generating architectural form.
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 Related to this presupposition is the distinction between the proper end and the 
proximate end of designing. This distinction is necessary in order to preserve the 
understanding that designing results in artifacts not an idea for or representation of 
an artifact. The act of designing is only consummated in the making of the artifact. 
As such, the proximate end of designing is a functional approximation, whose raison 
d’etre is to result in a building. 
While it may be argued, that what the designer produces is nothing more than an 
external representation of the building concept (be it drawings, models, animations, 
written documents), the argument presented here is that this distinction is not a 
simple question of semantics. The argument is that if the designer understands 
the proper end of designing as an external representation whose raison d’etre is to 
effectively communicate the idea  or concept for a building design, then the way he 
engages the design problem is (can be) more abstract, and disembodied. But, if the 
designer thinks of the proper end of designing to be a building that will be built, he 
always has a physical object before him. It is the difference between appreciating a 
piece of furniture in a catalogue and trying to figure out how it was possible to make 
such an exquisite object. Both appreciate the form, how well it functions, the materials, 
and perhaps the craftsmanship. But after that, the appreciation of the furniture 
takes a decidedly theoretical turn, while trying to figure out how it was made takes a 
decidedly tectonic turn. 
When the designer thinks of designing as making an artifact, he must find a way to 
engage the object throughout the design process, from structuring, defining and 
setting the problem space, to framing the problem; through move/see/move; through 
efforts at variety reduction, assessing and reassessing  assumptional biases based on 
the quality of the design world as he inhabits it feelingly; through determining the 
most effective way to externalize the approximate representation; through on-site 
modifications; through experiencing the building/built environment and assessing 
how well it correlates with how he anticipated it would feel.
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§  8.10 Designing as Making a Functional Approximation of a Thing to be Built
Our job is to give the client, on time and on cost, not what he wants, but what he never 
dreamed he wanted, and when he gets it, he recognizes it as something that he wanted 
all the time.
(Denys Ladson in Cross, 2011)
I propose a description of the design process that is a synthesis of the above. My 
primary references are Schön, Hillier and Dorst. The overall design process is one that 
involves setting the problem space, framing the problem (way of thinking about the 
problem), engaging in the dialectic of see/move/see (testing/discovering), refining the 
problem space, reframing the problem, further engaging in the dialectic of see/move/
see until a solution beings to emerge that begins to satisfy the design criteria and 
constraints, and induces a sense of coherence and intended aesthetic experience.
The expert designer comes to the problem with years of situated knowledge, an 
understanding of materials/structure/systems, various techniques for achieving 
architectural experience, mean and methods for achieving coherence, analytic abilities 
to understand the problem and the expectation of the client, etc. with which he 
engages the problem situation. He enters the world of the problem space, with the 
expectations of the intended-user in mind, seeking a way to “think about the problem” 
that suggests possible solution paths with associated internal representations. The 
designer makes a preliminary assessment the possible solution paths, identifying a 
preference for a solution path that seems likely to satisfy demonstrable criteria and 
induce intended experiential qualities. A “design world” begins to emerge. This design 
world begins not unlike a vague memory or a sense of déja-vu. He inhabits the world. 
Sees it. Moves things around. Sees it again. Externalizes (sketch, makes a quick model) 
Looks at the externalization. Inhabits it. Considers the possibilities, as well as the 
intended and unintended consequences. Its beginning to work, but something isn’t 
quite right. He feels lost. He has entered into and intermediate zone. Reassess. Look for 
opportunities (opportunism) outside the problem space or heretofore unrecognized 
relationships. Test it. Feel it again. Does it feel right? Is it working yet? Move things 
around again. See/move/see. Externalize (a more detailed drawing, perhaps a 
computer model). Things are beginning to fall into place. He likes it. It feels like it is 
working. He is immersed in the design world (flow). There are too many variables. Its 
hard to keep the entire design world in active memory. Externalize again. Take some 
parts to a higher level of detail. Look. Does it look (feel) the way it looked (felt) in my 
mind (congruence)? What’s working? What’s not? Ask someone else to look. Does 
what he says make sense? Does it feel right? Does he “get it?” Revisit the problem. 
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What do I know. Is the way I am thinking about the problem (framing) working? See/
move/see. Externalize. Get more input from others (they can see what I cannot, 
because I see what I want to see, not necessarily what is there). See/move/see…
The above should sound familiar to a designer, at least in a meta-fashion. The basic 
structure of the above narrative is consistent with problem b [problem-framing/
solution-seeking] b solution. The primary differences with this model of the design 
process is that coherence and aesthetic experience have been moved from being one of 
several prioritized design criteria to functioning as meta-heuristics – motivating factors 
and points of reference, and means of assessing the emerging internal/external design 
representation throughout the design process. In addition to critical thinking, and 
technical knowledge, the designer is described as inhabiting (bodily) the design world, 
and using his body and associated sense systems as a means for limiting possible 
solution paths, reassessing assumptional biases and/or the appreciative systems. The 
designer inhabits the design world not only in the first person as I/we, he also inhabits 
the design world in the second person as “you,” also in the third person as “him/them,” 
attempting to anticipate how the building/built environment will be experienced by 
the user. The model presupposes that there is no “innocent eye,” an expert designer 
comes to the problem with certain (refined and developed) biases, presuppositions, 
and previous experience, these are what makes him an expert. 
 You must have a starting point, a standard of comparison, to begin that process of 
making and matching and remaking which finally becomes embodied in the finished 
image. The artist cannot start from scratch, but he can criticize his forerunners. 
(Gombrich, 1972, pp.271-272)
This description also presumes that the designer is human (bounded) with full use of 
the embodied/extended cognitive abilities and capacities that evolved and developed 
over so many centuries to allow us to engage with the world and each other.  
The following chapters will explain how these happen.
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9 Expertise
Generally, in acquiring a skill – in learning to drive, dance, or pronounce a foreign 
language, for example – at first we must slowly, awkwardly, and consciously follow 
the rules. But then there comes a moment when we finally can perform automatically. 
At this point we do not seem to be simply dropping these same rigid rules into 
unconsciousness; rather we seem to have picked up the muscular gestalt which 
gives our behavior a new flexibility and smoothness. The same hold for acquiring 
the skill of perception.
(Dreyfus H. L., 1992, p. 249)
This chapter is concerned with factors (cognitive and psychological) related to the 
acquisition of design expertise.312  It is not about the process of becoming a practicing 
architect, though many of the principles do apply.313 
The previous chapter described ways to understand and think about design expertise 
as processes and methodologies. It provided a simple framework of design as a series 
of states that include: [problem-setting b (problem-framing/solution-seeking) b 
solution-making]. After describing what these three states mean, some theories and 
ways of thinking about designing were presented. Special attention was given to Hillier, 
Dorst and Schön. The chapter was concluded with a synthesis of design expertise that 
included the function of experiential qualities in the design process, the multiple 
ways that the designer inhabits the design world, and emphasis on designing as an 
embodied/extended cognitive ability.
Above, design as practiced within the context of an occupation that exceeds 
performance expectations, was describe as what is meant by designing expertise. 
Obviously no one is born an expert. Though there is the belief that some are 
born with natural talent, and without natural talent one can never be an expert. 
312 See Badke-Schaub, Roozenburg, and Cardoso (2010) for a critique on the negative effects an overestimation of a 
designer’s expertise may have.
313 For an excellent study of the process of “becoming-an-architect” see Cuff (1992) where she describes 
“the more tacit, more intricate evolution of an individual through a sequence of distinct periods: as an 
architectural student, an entry-level architect, a project architect or associate, and finally as principal” 
(p. 116). Cuff describes the evolution of a professional architect in 5 phases which are analogous to AIA 
definitions: Entry (Technical III), Late Entry/Early Middle [Technical II], Middle and Late Middle [Technical I], 
Late Middle [Supervisory], Full-Fledged [Principal] (p. 139).
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When considered together, no one is born an expert abut natural talent in necessary to 
be an expert, it seems reasonable to ask how then does one become an expert designer? 
In the broadest strokes this question seems to simply comes down to nature vs. nurture. 
However, recent research into the acquisition of expert ability, theories of technical 
knowledge, and cognitive theory, provide another way of discussing this question that 
goes beyond the nature vs. nurture conundrum. There are few observations this research 
offers to start with. First, talent is over-rated. While being able to excel in any activity 
that has established expectations of excellent performance requires some natural 
pre-disposition, there is no such thing as a natural talent. Some studies suggest that 
certain personality types are pre-disposed toward designing while other types are not. 
Other studies suggest otherwise. Efforts at testing for design aptitude have not produced 
consistent results. There is however strong evidence that expertise (in any area) requires 
thousands of hours of deliberate practice. However, there is no evidence that thousands 
of hours of deliberate practice guarantees the acquisition of expert performance. 
Designing, like other occupations where the proper end of the action is making 
something, is considered a technical ability. Technical ability involves the mastery 
of three different types of knowledge: declarative/conceptual, procedural/heuristic, 
strategic/situational (McCormick 2004). Mastering these does not happen all at once. 
Rather, the acquisition of expert ability follows a sequential, developmental process, 
where beginners spend much of their energy mastering declarative/conceptual 
thinking, advanced beginners develop procedural/heuristic knowledge, while experts 
rely on embodied/tacit knowledge to assess a situation (Dreyfus 2002). Feelings and 
a lack of self-consciousness play an important role in expert performance, developing 
a sense of what to do. Not everyone who tries will achieve a level of expertise. Some will 
become satisfied once they reach a level of functional competence. Others will find that 
they do not have the aptitude, pre-disposition, personal motivation (grit) or ability to 
achieve expertise. And others will simply loose interest. Not everyone who wants to be 
an expert can be an expert. 
What the following will demonstrate is that while,	natural	predispositions,	physical	
ability,	better	than	average	intelligence,	and	the	grit to spend thousands of hours 
of	deliberate	practice	are	certainly	important,	in	the	end,	it	is	the	development	of	
the ability to inhabit the design world feelingly, so fundamental to tacit (embodied 
cognition),	that	determines	who	will	become	an	expert	designer	and	who	will	not.	The	
ability	to	inhabit	the	design	world	feelingly	is	what	is	meant	by	a	sense of design.
The chapter begins with the question: Who can be an architect? This will be followed by 
a review of recent research from the relatively new disciple of expertise theory. Having 
established that expertise is acquired, I will review cognitive theory related to technical 
expertise and a developmental model for the acquisition of expert performance.
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§  9.1 Who	can	be	a	designer?
Wherefore a man who is to follow the architecture profession manifestly needs to… 
have both a natural gift and also a readiness to learn. (For neither talent without 
instruction nor instructions without talent can produce the perfect craftsman.) 
He should be a man of letters, a skillful draughtsman, a mathematician, familiar 
with scientific inquiries, a diligent student of philosophy, acquainted with music; 
not ignorant of medicine, learned in the responses of jurisconsults, familiar with 
astronomy and astronomical calculations. 
(Vitruvius)
If the prerequisites that Vitruvius lists above were included in qualifying exams 
for professional practice (such at the ARE in the USA), it seems likely that there 
would be far fewer men and women licensed to practice architecture. Perhaps 
this paragraph – which is more a description of an impossible ideal than a 
useful list of characteristics, abilities and aptitudes – was Leonardo da Vinci’s 
inspiration for his iconic “Vitruvian man” who is the measure of all things. 
314 The answer to who can be a designer depends on how designing and what 
designers do is described,315 and if one who wants to be a designer possesses 
the characteristics, abilities and aptitudes necessary to acquire some level of 
competence if not expertise at designing. 
314 It is doubtful that Vitruvius even considered the possibility that women could be architects, which is 
interesting when one considered that 40% of architecture students in the USA are woman today (ACSA 2015, 
http://www.acsa-arch.org/images/default-source/data/acsa-atlas-2015-03.jpg?sfvrsn=0).
315 See Box (2007), Krupinska (2014), Spiller and Clear (2014) for recent descriptions of who can be an 
architect. The internet is full of sites on who can/can’t be an architect. Shelley Little (2015) writes that 
there are “10 signs that you should be an architect:” You are smart, you are willing to work hard, you are 
a problem solver, you have killer negotiation skills, learning is fun for you, you are a creative thinker, you 
have a scientific mind, you still like to play with blocks, you are a fount of knowledge, you have a love of 
nature. Michael Riscica’s (2017) published two complimentary articles “10 Reasons why you should not 
become and architect,” and “10 reasons why you should become an architect. A brief overview of these 
sites suggests that what Vitruvius thought important may still ring true for many architects. 
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The above, theories of what designing is includes from “everyone designs”316 (Papanek, 
1984) to Dong’s (2009) theory that “design is an enactment of a set of operating 
principles wherein the actors emphasize different aspects of these principles,” with 
others in between. There are those who believe, such as Vitruvius above, that like 
other areas of expertise, design requires some kind of natural (perhaps genetic) 
talent;317while others are convinced that it is an acquired ability. So, for some, who 
can become a designer is a matter of determining if he possesses natural talent. For 
others, becoming a designer is mostly about the acquisition of a complex skill set, 
competencies and abilities. 
For some design expertise is akin to engineering; for others, it is a form of artistic self-
expression. For some design expertise is primarily about growing a successful professional 
practice; while others consider design expertise as a way to engage in community service. 
With all these different ways of thinking about design, are there identifiable markers, 
traits, aptitudes or characteristics that suggest who is well-suited to be a designer? 
316 The claim that “everyone designs” is a sentiment that reminds me of the rat in the Pixar animation, 
“Ratatouille” (2007) who is inspired by a famous (fictitious) French chef’s proclamation that “everyone can 
cook,” The rat (building on his highly developed, innate sense of taste/smell, and constant experimentation 
and practice) acquires such great skill at cooking that even the famous French food critic (not knowing that 
the food was cooked by a rat) writes a review of the food prepared by the rat declaring it the “best in Paris,” It’s 
a fun movie. I recommend it. Though light-hearted, there is a kind of truth in the movie – just like the famous 
chef claims “everyone can cook”, it could be argued that “everyone can design”; but everyone cannot be a 
great cook, nor can everyone be a great designer. To be great requires something else. Insofar as designing is a 
fundamentally human behavior, akin to problem solving and decision-making, everyone can and probably does 
design. But this is not the sense of designing that I am concerned about. I want to know what is that “something 
else” that distinguishes the expert designer from the novice, and how does one acquire that “something 
else”? How one is able to, learn to, acquire the skills and competencies necessary to significantly exceed the 
performance expectations. How does one acquire design expertise?
317 The cult of the gifted genius and natural talent has many believers and apocryphal stories to support their 
beliefs. There’s the story, reported by his sister, of Mozart writing his first symphony when he was five years old 
that can be found in Deutsch (1965, p. 455). The awe at the natural ability of athletes Tiger Woods. And then 
there is the favorite of architects, who love to tell the story of how Wright “designed” Falling Water (arguable 
one of the most significant building of the 20th century) in two hours. The story goes, as can be found in Edgar 
(1979), that Mr. Kaufmann Sr. was in Milwaukee nine months after his initial meeting with Wright. He called 
Wright at home at breakfast time to surprise him with his plan to take the train that same day to come check 
on the progress he has made on his house. Though Wright had only been to the site to visit and had a survey, 
he had told Kaufman that he had been working on the design since they first met nine months earlier. In fact, 
to date, he had not drawn anything on paper. So, it is said, in preparation for Kaufman’s surprise visit, Wright 
walks calmly into the studio, surrounded by interns (witnesses), lays out a piece of paper, picks up his pencil, and 
proceeds to draw the plans for Falling Water in the two hours it took Kaufman to take the train from Milwaukee. 
Done! Good story. But completely unbelievable. For an excellent study on the topic on the myth of creative 
genius see Gardner (1993) Creating Minds: An Anatomy of Creativity Seen Through the Lives of Freud, Einstein, 
Picasso, Stravinsky, Eliot, Graham, and Ghandi; and Colvin (2008) Talent is Over-rated: What Really Separates 
World-class Performers from Everybody Else. 
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This section asks this question in terms of personality, characteristics, aptitude, and 
intelligence, in an effort to identify at least some characteristics and aptitudes that 
describe the kind of person who may be well-suited to be a designer.  
There is some evidence that designers have similar personality attributes. Broadbent 
(1973) describes several studies that sought to describe the psychological/personality 
traits of successful creative architects.  For example, the seven items in a collated list 
from a study referred to as Block’s 100-item Q-sort (1961) included:
 – Enjoys aesthetic impressions; is aesthetically reactive
 – Has high aspiration level for self
 – Values own independence and autonomy
 – Is productive; gets things done
 – Appears to have a high degree of intellectual capacity
 – Genuinely values intellectual and cognitive matters
 – Concerned with own adequacy as a person, either at conscious or unconscious level
Broadbent notes that many of these early personality profiles, including those of 
Allport (1954) and MacKinnon (1962) describe the architect as “a thoroughly pleasant 
individual and able, above all, to see the other’s point of view.” But referring to a study by 
Blake where he describes F. L. Wright as “arrogant, strident, full of conceit;” Le Corbusier 
as “cold, suspicious, pugnacious, sarcastic (but quite humorous about himself), and 
arrogant;” and Mies van der Rohe as “massive, granite faced, elegantly dressed, gentle, 
fantastically self-disciplined, taciturn and shy to the extent that he found speech-
making painful” (1973, p. 9). Broadbent suspects that these descriptions may not be 
reliable. Broadbent makes reference to another study by Smith (1964) who claims that 
good architects are likely to be “unsociable, humorless, severe, aloof, suspicious, cool, 
reticent, misanthropic, calm, cold, calculating, self-centered, shut-in, and fanatical” (p. 
9). Smith claims that this is characteristic of people who possess high special ability, 
which is typical of people with schizothymic personality, that is, people with schizoid 
tendencies. So, at least up to the time when Broadbent was writing, it seems that the 
personality of the creative architect covers the whole spectrum.
Owen (2006), in “Design Thinking: Notes on Its Nature and Use,” recognizes that 
even with “considerable speculation over many years, the nature of creativity, what 
makes one person creative and another not, and the creative process itself, remains 
elusive” (p. 26). While the creative process is not the same as the design process, and 
while creativity is not the same as designing, they do have enough similarities that 
an overview of what is thought to be the characteristics of creative thinking will be 
helpful. Owen offers three lists from educators, practitioners and theorists: Fabun, 
Arieti, Csikszentmihalyi, plus his own list of characteristics for design thinking. 
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Fabun lists: Sensitivity; Questioning attitude; Broad education; Asymmetrical thinking; 
Personal courage; Sustained curiosity; Time control; Dedication; Willingness to 
work (p. 22). Arieti added to Fabun’s list: Fluency in thinking; Flexibility, Originality; 
Redefinition; Elaboration; Tolerance for ambiguity (p. 23). Csikszentmihalyi sees 
creative people in terms of “pairs of apparently antithetical traits that are often both 
present in such individuals and integrated with each other in a dialectical tension.” 
They include: Generalized libidinal energy and restraint; Convergent and divergent 
thinking; Playfulness and discipline – or irresponsibility and responsibility; Fantasy and 
reality; Extroversion and introversion; Humility and pride; Masculinity and femininity; 
Traditional conservatism and rebellious iconoclasm; Passion and objectivity; 
Suffering and enjoyment (p. 23). Finally Owen’s characteristics of design thinking are: 
Conditioned inventiveness; Human-centered focus; Environment-centered concern; 
Ability to visualize; Tempered optimism; Bias for adaptively; Predisposition toward 
multi-functionality; Systemic vision; View of the generalist; Ability to use language as a 
tool; Affinity for teamwork; Facility for avoiding the necessity of choice; Self-governing 
practicality; Ability to work systematically with qualitative information (pp. 24-25).  As 
can be seen from Owen’s lists of characteristics, it is hard to say who can be a designer.
An alternative to personality studies of successful architects, and lists of characteristics 
produced by practitioners, educators and theorists, is to look to the criteria design schools 
use as a basis for admittance to their programs. The presupposition being that the purpose 
of the criteria is to identify students who are likely to successfully complete the program. 
In their study “Who Should be a Designer?” (2002), Goldschmidt, Sebba, Oren, and Cohen 
discuss criteria for admission into schools of architecture as well as  a historical review of 
the admissions practices of various schools. They observe that the history of university-
level professional education is relatively recent, with most pre-WWI schools of architecture 
being modeled after Ėcole Nationale et Spéciale des Beaux Arts. In the 1920’s an alternative 
model was founded in Europe. The most famous are the Bauhaus (in Germany) and 
Vkhutemas (in Russia).  The second half of the 20th century saw a surge in the number of 
university based schools of architecture. Despite their number, geographical distribution 
and cultural contexts, “almost all of them share similar goals and the programs they offer 
are based on training principles that were, to a significant extent, inherited from the Beaux 
Arts and the Bauhaus-Vkhutemas traditions” (Goldschmidt, et al., 2002). Central to all 
these programs is the design studio, the teaching method that so fascinated Schön (1985).
Admission to Ėcole des Beaux Arts involved joining an Atelier headed by a Patron – 
usually an accomplished architect – where students were prepared to participate in 
the entrance competition. The competition had three parts: two sketch problems, the 
first being a simple structure making use of classical motifs, while the second problem 
involved producing a full-scale drawing of an architectural detail. The third part of the 
test was a comprehensive exam focusing primarily on scientific knowledge. 
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The Bauhaus had a different philosophy. Gropius’s admissions policy was, “Any person 
of good repute, without regard to age or sex, whose previous education is deemed 
adequate by the Council of Masters, will be admitted, as far as space permits” (Wingler 
1969, p.33). In addition to previous education that was deemed adequate, novice 
applicants were expected to provide a portfolio. More advanced applicants were 
expected to provide “certificates of previously completed training in the crafts” (p. 44). 
All successful applicants were then required to take the primary course. Successful 
completion of this course gained them admission into the workshop of their choice.
Goldschmidt et al. (2002) surveyed 69 schools of architecture from 21 countries, 
“requesting information about practices, policies and procedures pertaining to 
admission of students” (p. 69). Eight different forms of criteria were identified, with all 
schools making use of more than two forms on average. These criteria are: high school 
records, psychometric/general scholastic aptitude tests, special architecture aptitude 
test, interview, portfolio, essay, written statement, letters of recommendation. Most 
schools require high school records. About half required psychometric/scholastic 
aptitude tests and/or portfolios. Though there is belief in their predictive power, there 
seems to be little correlation between previous school performance and later success. 
The value of aptitude tests is highly contested, as it is argued that they generally 
test non-curriculum based knowledge, and it is thought that students from private 
preparatory schools have an unfair advantage. 
Special aptitude-for-architecture tests look for evidence of non-verbal or visio/spatial 
intelligence. In Denmark this test has been considered effective in predicting student 
future success. Schools in other parts of the world have not found it effective. The 
portfolio functions in a similar manner as the architecture aptitude test, with several 
schools finding it effective. Other schools, find that, like the general aptitude tests, 
the quality of the high school program gives some students an unfair advantage. It is 
interesting to note that the same schools that prefer the general aptitude test, tend 
not to require portfolios, using concern for the quality of the high school program for 
each. The study concludes that not much is known about the success of prevalent 
admissions criteria and even less is known of the impact such criteria have on the built 
environment. More study is needed.
Most of these admissions criteria are intended to test interest, aptitude and ability. 
Interest has to do with motivation, or as will be discussed below grit. Aptitude is 
defined as an innate, learned or acquired ability of an individual to perform certain 
tasks. Aptitude tests inculcate many factors such as numerical reasoning, verbal 
reasoning, abstract reasoning, speed, accuracy, and other such abilities. Cross (1990) 
claims that “design ability is, in fact, one of several forms of fundamental aspects of 
human intelligence” (p. 128). Further, Cross (2011; 2007), recognizing how multiple 
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aspects of practical problem-solving ability are spread out among the multiple 
intelligence theory of Gardner (1983), proposes that in addition to Gardner’s six forms 
of intelligence (linguistic, logical mathematical, spatial, musical, bodily-kinesthetic, 
personal) “it seems reasonable, therefore, to try to separate out design ability as a form 
of intelligence in its own right” (2011, p. 136). Cross goes on to identify some of the 
aspects of "design intelligence." He writes, “good designers have a way of thinking that 
involves operating seamlessly across different levels of detail, from high level systemic 
goals to low-level physical principles;" designers have “cognitive skills of problem 
framing, of gathering and structuring problem data and creating coherent patterns 
from the data that indicate ways of resolving the issues and suggest possible solution 
concepts”; designers can engage a problem with intensity and “reflective interaction 
with representations of problems and solutions, and an ability to shift easily and rapidly 
between concrete representations and abstract thought." Finally, good designers 
“apply constructive thinking not only in their individual work but also in collaboration 
in teamwork" (p. 136).
From the research that Broadbent presented, there does not seem to be one particular 
personality type that is predictive of the likelihood of succeeding at designing. The lists 
of characteristics of designers, while being illustrative, is not of particular use. From the 
research that Goldschmidt et al. presented we know that there have not yet been any 
exams or aptitude tests that reliably predict the likelihood of succeeding at designing. 
There is some anecdotal evidence that ability to draw and above average intelligence 
do seem to indicate the likelihood of succeeding at designing. But there is one aptitude 
that does seem to be commonly held and is supported by research; that an aptitude 
for spatial thinking and problem solving. See Nazidizaji, Tome, and Regateiro (2015), 
Sutton and Williams (2010), Kvan & Jia (2005). 
From the above review, who can be a designer seems to be inconclusive. Certainly the 
Vitruvian man would likely be successful as a designer, but only if he was motivated 
to learn to design. The one thing that does continue to be generally accepted is that 
success in design is made more likely if one possesses non-verbal or visio/spatial 
intelligence, which is more an aptitude than a natural talent.
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§  9.2 Expertise Theory
If people knew how hard I worked to get my mastery, it wouldn’t seem so 
wonderful at all.
 (Michelangelo)
To acquire the complex cognitive abilities involved in designing as described above, one 
needs more than predispositions, aptitudes, and formative childhood experiences. One 
needs years of deliberate practice, (intrinsic) motivation to avoid being satisfied with 
mere competence and resist complacency, and the mastery domain related declarative, 
procedural and strategic knowledge. In addition one needs the resources, opportunities 
and support required to immerse ones self in the pursuit of mastery of designing as an 
occupation. 
Expertise theory, having roots that date back to the learning theories of Pavlov, Watson, 
Thorndike, Tolman, Hull, and Skinner, has evolved in to a cognitive science that, studies 
the acquisition of skills through learning and practice. According to expertise theory,the 
expert	is	the	one	who	consistently	exceeds	the	performance	expectations	of	a	particular	
occupation at a level that is considered exceptional. Recall, expertise is domain specific, 
an expert in one field, even a closely related field, is not necessarily an expert in another 
field. Each domain of practice, has its own, skills and related fields of knowledge, as well 
as performance expectations. 
Traditional theories of skill acquisition identify three phases of development (Ericsson, 
2003): (1.) The “cognitive” phase, when the underlying structure and special aspects 
of the activity need to be attended to are learned; (2.) The “associative” phase, when 
a level of functional performance is attained; (3.) The “autonomous” phase, when 
performance of the activity is possible without thinking about it (p. 989). An acceptable 
standard of performance for everyday and recreational activities can be achieved in less 
than 50 hours, already possessing many characteristics of automated performance. 
Once this level of automation is achieved and a functional (cognitive) representation 
of the activity has emerge, everyday and recreational activities require a minimum 
of effort to perform and enjoy. However, this level of skill acquisition (autonomous), 
should not be confused with expertise. Once the skills necessary to perform a task or 
activity at an acceptable level are acquired, further development is not necessary. Its 
deemed good enough. Further development is arrested. 
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Skills development can be arrested at any level. However, for some, skills acquisition 
at an acceptable (functional) level is not enough. They, for whatever reason, desire to 
exceed the minimum level of skills acquisition necessary to perform at an acceptable 
level. To do so they choose to resist the complacency “associated with generalized 
automaticity of skill by deliberately acquiring and refining cognitive mechanisms to 
support continued learning and improvement” (Davidson & Sternberg, 2003, p. 63). 
Based on years of research and observation into the acquisition of superior expert 
performance among athletes, musicians, chess players, scientists and artists, Ericsson 
(2016 & 2008) challenges the  general belief that the underlying reason why some 
people are able to perform at such high levels, are considered prodigies, or seem to 
have super-human abilities, is fundamentally based on “natural talent,” or having the 
“right genes” to start off with (genetic predestination), and no amount of practice, 
discipline or motivation would made a difference.  Expertise theory posits that “no 
matter	what	innate	genetic	endowment	may	play	in	the	achievement	of	‘gifted’	people,	
the	main	gift	that	these	people	have	is	the	same	one	that	we	all	have	–	the	adaptability	
of	the	human	brain	and	body,	which	they	have	taken	advantage	of	more	than	the	rest	of	
us” (Ericsson & Pool, 2016, p. xvii). 
The argument is that even if you accept that certain people are genetically pre-disposed 
to certain abilities, what really matters is the potential to exploit the incredible 
cognitive/physical adaptability possessed by every human being to achieve new heights 
in expert performance. With this in mind, expertise theory claims that the acquisition 
of superior expert performance is not so much about the actualization of potential 
(abilities),	but	rather	creating	“abilities	that	may	not	have	existed	before” (Ericsson 
& Pool, 2016, p. xxi). This research is somewhat counter intuitive, when considering 
the almost cult-like prevalence of the idea of “talent” and “gifted-ness” that is so 
deeply ingrained in common culture. However, current research into the structure and 
plasticity of the brain, experiments and case studies  have begun to demystify what 
is meant by talent and debunk the whole notion of “natural gifted-ness,” or genetic 
predestination (Hill & Schneider, 2006). 
There are several factors that influence the level of expert performance one can achieve. 
Most importantly, and perhaps least surprisingly, extensive experience within a 
particular domain is required to reach expert levels of performance.318 
318 While many would like to believe that expertise is possible in multiple domains, the research has not supported 
this. In fact it seems that choosing a particular domain or discovering a kind of activity that gives one pleasure is 
a prerequisite for the acquisition of expert performance.
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However it should be noted that extensive experience in a particular domain does 
not necessarily lead to expert levels of achievement.319 Normally, after someone is 
first introduced to a profession and after completing basic training and related formal 
education, he works under the direct supervision of an accomplished professional. 
After a period of time actively engaged in related activities and accepting some level 
of responsibility, he achieves an acceptable level of proficiency in his field. With more 
extensive experience leading to an acceptable level of mastery within his field he is 
able to work as an independent professional. This is a critical moment in determining 
the level of achievement he will finally attain. Most professionals reach a level of 
performance that is acceptable and satisfactory, and maintain this level of acceptable 
performance for the rest of their careers.320 They have reached a level of professional 
performance that is good enough. However, some professionals are motivated to 
continue to improve, reaching the highest levels of professional performance. Why?
In the mid-19th century Galton (1869), 321 provided a description of the generally 
accepted view of why this happens. According to Galton, every healthy person improves 
through experience at first. But these improvements gradually decrease due to “innate 
factors that cannot be changed through training; hence attainable performance 
is constrained by one’s basic endowments, such as abilities, mental capacities, 
and innate talents” (as quoted by Ericsson, 2004, p. 685). His point is that while 
most healthy people can acquire the basics in an area of expertise, only those with 
“innate talent” will succeed in becoming experts. This view also explains declines in 
professional achievement as one gets older and “the inevitable degradation of general 
capacities and processes with age” (Krampe & Charness, 2006).
319 Gladwell (2008), in his book Outliers: The Story of Success, implies that 10,000 hours of deliberate practice is all 
that is needed to acquire expert ability. There is no evidence that this is true. Gladwell, makes this claim based 
on broad generalizations of Ericsson (1993). See also Daniels (2015).
320 “Research has shown that generally speaking, once a person reaches [a] level of ‘acceptable’ performance and 
automaticity… additional years of ‘practice’ does not lead to improvement” (Ericsson, 2016, p.12).
321 Galton (1869) proposed one of the earliest theories exploring why some people succeed and why others fail.  
A half cousin of Charles Darwin, his theory presupposed what we might call genetic determinism (eugenics) 
based on observable inherited physical characteristics and abilities (Galton, 1883, pp. 24–25), and is credited 
with first posing the question, nurture vs. nature (Galton, 1874). Based analysis of a list of notable figures 
in the sciences, arts and athletics Galton concluded that there are three ways in which these (presumably) 
men were remarkable: “they demonstrated ‘ability’ [natural talent] in combination with exceptional ‘zeal’ 
and ‘the capacity for hard labor’” (1869, p. 38). “Exceptional zeal and the capacity for hard labor” is what 
is meant by “grit.”
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Ericsson (2004), challenging this view, found that in fact there are many types of 
experience related to both the acquisition and maintenance of expert performance, 
and “that these different types have qualitatively and quantitatively different effects on 
the continued acquisition and maintenance of an individual’s performance” (p. 685). 
The framework he proposes claims that “some types of experience, such as merely 
executing proficiently during routine work, may not lead to further improvement, and 
that further improvements depend on deliberate efforts to change particular aspects 
of performance” (p. 683). What makes the difference between people who achieve 
mediocre, or minimal levels of competence, and those who achieve high levels of expert 
performance in their chosen domain, is their ability to harness the innate cognitive/
physical adaptability to refine their skill.
Ericsson and Pool (2016) argue that the most efficient and effective way to benefit – 
achieve expert level of performance – from the cognitive and physical adaptability of 
the human mind/body is through deliberate practice. Ericsson makes a distinction 
between naive, purposeful and deliberate practice. Naive practice is essentially just 
“doing something repeatedly, and expecting that the repetition alone will improve 
one’s performance.” While, he adds, purposeful practice “has well defined, specific 
goals.” It is focused, involves meaningful feedback, and requires one to get out of 
one’s “comfort zone.” Maintaining the focus and motivation necessary for purposeful 
practice “is hard work, and generally not fun.”322 Generally speaking, the motivation for 
persisting in purposeful practice comes from “the ‘feel good’ experience of being able 
to do something you here-to-fore could not” (pp. 14-22).
322 This often misunderstood point made by Ericsson observed that a distinctive characteristic of deliberate practice 
is that “it is not fun.” Duckworth in her recent book, Grit (2016) contrasts this idea of deliberate practice 
(which is not fun) with Csikszentmihaly's (2008) concept of flow, which top performers all agree that they 
seek “primarily because it’s fun." She suggests that these two concepts are in conflict with each other. This is a 
misunderstanding. Ericsson’s point is that actively seeking the acquisition of expertise (training) requires more 
than the simple repetition of an enjoyable activity such as one might engage in on a Saturday afternoon with 
one’s friends in a friendly game of basketball. Without the requisite intensity, repetition and focus on particular 
skills (deliberate practice), and meaningful feedback (coaching), one is not likely to improve. Systematic 
repetition, hours of intense practice, being constantly pushed outside one’s comfort zone, is not usually fun. 
Csikszentmihaly's concept of flow, on the other hand, describes a state “focused immersion” in the creative/
discovery process that “feels” like it is leading to a solution. This intense experience of losing oneself in the 
creative process is associated with pleasure, or what Csikszentmihaly calls optimal experience. Flow is normally 
only experienced once one has achieved a certain level of expertise.
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Deliberate practice, while similar to purposeful practice, is specifically intended to 
harness the brain/body’s adaptability. Previously it was believed that once a person 
reached adulthood, the wiring of his brain was pretty much fixed, that individual 
differences in abilities were mainly due to fixed genetically determined differences in 
the brain’s wiring and abilities, and as mentioned above learning was little more than 
a way of fulfilling/actualizing one’s potential. 323 However, research has shown that the 
plasticity of the brain, that is the brain’s capacity to reroute neurons to compensate 
and achieve homeostasis exceeds levels previously imagined (Ericsson & Pool, 2016, 
pp. 31-38). Deliberate practice is different from other kinds of purposeful practice in 
that it requires  (1.) a domain of expertise that is relatively well-defined, where training 
methods and of practice are well-established; and (2.) an accomplished experienced 
teacher who can suggest specific practice activities designed to help a student to 
(incrementally) improve his performance. These practice activities (drills) are focused 
on helping a student to improve specific skills, often requiring hours of repetition and 
regular feedback leading to subtle adjustments with incremental goals.
One study suggested that for some domains (specifically learning to play the violin) 
this can take up to 10,000 hours (Ericsson, Krampe, & Tesch-Romer, 1993). 324 Their 
intention is not to say that 10,000 hours of deliberate practice is all that is necessary 
to become a virtuoso. What Ericsson and others are arguing is that the highest level of 
expert performance is accessible to anyone with a basic predisposition,325 motivation 
and years of intense and deliberate practice. The the body and mind can be reshape, it 
doesn't come easily. It is Ericcson's argument that this is what it takes to harness and 
reshape the amazing plasticity of the body and mind so that one can perform at an 
exceptional level.
323 Seung (2012), proposes a theory of how the wiring of the brain influences who we are called the connectome. 
His theory is that there are three things that influence the development of the brain: genetics, environment, 
and how the brain develops throughout one’s life. He argues that there is good evidence that, “reweighting, 
reconnection, rewiring, and regeneration” (p. XV) of neurons, influenced by genes and environment is what 
makes us unique individuals.
324 This nice round number was picked up by Gladwell (2008) who proposed the “10,000 hour rule,” in his book 
Outliers, suggesting that with 10,000 hours of deliberate practice anyone can master anything. Ericsson has 
challenged this misinterpretation of his research (Ericsson & Pool, 2016). Previously Simon and Chase (1973) 
suggested the so called “10 year rule.” Which held that the minimum necessary to acquire expertise (in chess) 
was a period of 10 years.
325 This idea of a “basic predisposition” is not well developed in Ericsson and Pool (2016). It can refer to physical 
characteristics, childhood fascination, innate sense of curiosity, or certain genetic traits that increase the 
likelihood of succeeding in a particular area of expertise. What is clear in Ericsson is that “basic predisposition” 
is not the same as natural talent.
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An additional characteristic that is typical of experts is the qualitative difference in the 
organization of their (domain related) knowledge and representations thereof. This 
has to do with how experts’ knowledge is encoded (scaffolding) around foundational 
domain-related concepts (conceptual/declarative knowledge) and solution procedures 
(procedural/heuristic knowledge) that allows for the rapid and reliable retrieval of 
stored information whenever it is relevant.326 The process of encoding and mastering 
conceptual and procedural knowledge leads to the acquisition of domain-specific 
memory and skills allowing experts "to rapidly access relevant information in an 
extended working memory that relies on storage in long-term memory” (Ericsson 
et al., 1993, p. 397). This is the value of reflective practice and the identification 
of methodologies.
The superior quality of expert’s mental representations327 is what allows them to adapt 
rapidly to changing circumstances and anticipate future events in advance (Ericsson K. 
A., 1995). Mental representations are similar to the patterns of play that de Groot’s grand 
master chess players made use of (discussed in the section on problem-solving), that 
allowed them to quickly assess the situation and choose the next move and to be able to 
remember the arrangement and strategic relationship of pieces from multiple games (de 
Groot, 1978). These mental representations appear to be essential for experts’ ability in 
providing a self-monitoring feedback loop of their own performance (Ericsson K. A., 1996; 
Glaser R. , 1996) that facilitates ongoing improvement by designing their own training and 
assimilating new knowledge.328 What Schön calls reflective practice.
This question of what motivates some people to exceed performance expectations 
and push themselves beyond their limits has also been considered by 
Csikszentmihalyi (2008) and Duckworth, Peterson, Matthews and Kelly (2007). 
Csikszentmihalyi argues that the (intrinsic) motivation for exceeding normative 
performance is the pursuit of a kind of pleasure he calls optimal experience. The 
key element of an optimal experience, Csikszentmihalyi writes, is “that it is an end 
in itself” (2008, p. 67). He calls this an autotelic experience.329 That is, it is a self-
contained activity that is done with without expectation of reward. These experiences 
are contrasted with exotelic experience -- activities done for external reasons. 
326 What is meant by and the function of declarative/conceptual knowledge, procedural/heuristic knowledge, 
mental scaffolding is discussed in the next section.
327 What is meant by mental representations is discussed at length in the section “Making Representations” above. 
As used here it is similar to Schön’s design world.
328 Schön refers to this as reflective practice.
329 Csikszentmihalyi (2008) derived the autotelic from the Greek auto (meaning self), and telos (meaning goal).
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This distinction between types of activities hinges on what in ethics is called intrinsic 
motivation (where the motivation comes from inside the agent, such a personal and 
religious belief) and extrinsic motivation (such as for reward, to avoid punishment, 
to gain advantage). Most activities are not one or the other. For example, there are 
somethings we do because we have to, but then in the midst of doing whatever it is, 
something about it becomes intrinsically rewarding. As an activity becomes intrinsically 
rewarding (autotelic), it takes on a life of its own. One loses oneself in the activity. The 
autotelic experience (or flow) lifts the experience to a different level. “Alienation gives 
way to involvement, enjoyment replaces boredom, helplessness turns into a feeling of 
control, and psychic energy works to reinforce the sense of self, instead of being lost 
in the service of external goals." Flow is “an almost automatic, effortless, yet highly 
focused state of consciousness” (Csikszentmihalyi, 1996, p. 110). 
Csikszentmihalyi discovered that the flow experience, whether it was experienced by 
athletes, artists, religious mystics, scientists, or ordinary working people, was described 
in almost identical terms. Nine elements of the flow experience were identified: (1.) 
There are clear goals every step of the way; (2.) There is immediate feedback to one’s 
actions; (3.) There is balance between challenges and skills; (4.) Action and awareness 
merge; (5.) Distractions are excluded from consciousness; (6.) There is no worry of 
failure; (7.) Self-consciousness disappears; (8.) The sense of time becomes distorted; 
(9.) The activity becomes autotelic. Csikszentmihalyi writes that those who he has 
interviewed often talk about the “autotelic aspects of their work as the exhilaration 
that comes with the pursuit of truth and beauty” (p. 122). It is the way that focused, 
intense, engaging work induces this state of flow that motivates people to exceed the 
norm. It seems once you have experienced it, you cannot get enough of it.
Duckworth, et al. (2007) take a different approach to the question of motivation. They 
observe that while “we know a great deal about intelligence, or mental ability… we know 
comparatively little about why… most individuals make use of only a small part of their 
resources, whereas a few exceptional individuals push themselves to their limits” (p. 
1087). They observe, “In addition to cognitive ability, a list of attributes of high-achieving 
individuals would likely include creativity, vigor, emotional intelligence, charisma, self-
confidence, emotional stability, physical attractiveness, and other positive qualities.” But, 
there is one personal quality that they have found was shared by “the most prominent 
leaders in every field: grit" (p. 1087). They define grit as perseverance and passion for 
long-term goals, “the ability to work strenuously toward challenges, maintaining effort 
and interest over years despite failure, adversity, and plateaus in progress” (p. 1088). They 
contend that “grit, more than self-control or consciousness, may set apart the exceptional 
individuals [who] make maximum use of their abilities.” Bloom (1985) writes, in his 
qualitative study of world class musicians, athletes, scientists and artists, that “only a few of 
[the 120 in the sample] were regarded as prodigies by teachers, parents or experts” (p. 533). 
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Instead, what he learned was that most high achieving individuals worked every day for 
a minimum of 10 – 15 years to attain their level of expertise. Duckworth et al. attribute 
this capacity to invest oneself so heavily, and commit so much time and energy, to 
make maximized use of their resources in pursuit of excellence, to grit.
The point is that “natural ability” and desire are not enough. Though the likelihood 
of	acquiring	design	expertise	may	be	enhanced	by	the	possession	of	certain	physical,	
psychological	and	intellectual	predispositions,	design	expertise	is	not	an	innate	skill,	a	gift,	
or	a	God-given	talent. Design expertise is acquired, and possesses characteristics that are 
similar to other areas of expertise. Due to the complex nature of problem solving and the 
demands it makes on memory and cognitive functioning, mastery is greatly facilitated by 
making use of cognitive scaffolding. Making use of various models of design methodology 
aid in providing cognitive scaffolding during the process of acquiring design expertise.
§  9.3 The Acquisition of Expert Performance330
Tell me and I will forget. Show me and I may remember. Involve me and I will 
understand.331 
(Confucius)
Above, Ericsson (2003) described the traditional three phases to achieve a competent 
level of new skill automation; the “cognitive” phase, the “associative” phase, and the 
“autonomous” phase. But, as Ericsson observes, this level of automated performance 
–  while sufficient for everyday ability and enjoyment of a task – should not be confused 
with expertise. Expertise is highly dependent on and the expectations of practice 
as determined by an occupation. These establish the base-line acceptable level of 
performance. To achieve even this level of performance in a complex occupation such 
as architectural design involves different kinds knowledge and ways of structuring the 
knowledge that develops over time. 
330 § 9.3 -"The Acquisition of Expert Performance," and § 9.4 - "Dreyfus Model" rely heavily on previously published 
research (with permission), Curry (2014).
331 不闻不若闻之，闻之不若见之，见之不若知之，知之不若行之，学至于行之而止矣
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To review, there are three types of knowledge involved in the acquisition of technical 
ability, the ability to do/make something: conceptual/declarative, procedural/
heuristic, strategic knowledge. These three types of knowledge can be understood 
as “know what,” “know how,” and “know when.” This was discussed above at length. 
McCormick (1997) observes that these distinctions are “remarkably close to the idea of 
‘know how’ as procedural knowledge and the ‘know that’ as conceptual knowledge.332 
The third kind of knowledge is “know when.” Know when is a kind of strategic 
knowledge that “in effect controls the procedural and declarative knowledge as a ‘how-
to-decide-what-to-do-and when’ knowledge” (p. 145). 
But even mastery of these three types of knowledge is not enough in themselves. 
Mastery needs to be acquired in a situated learning environment – one needs not only 
to learn the what and the how of the domain of the occupation, one needs to learn 
while doing in a suitable environment. 
This section will describe the types of knowledge related to the acquisition of 
technical expertise, how they are acquired, and how they function. To do so I will 
refer to McCormick's theory of learning and knowledge in technology education 
(1997, 2004, 2006),  Sweller’s theory, the theory of cognitive load (2016), Pass 
et al. theory of scaffolding (2004, 1998), and Dreyfus’ developmental stages of 
expert performance (2004). 
Conceptual/declarative knowledge is traditionally thought to be the foundation upon 
which expert performance in built. In the popular imagination one assumes that 
before someone can do something, he should know as much as possible about what 
is involved. The is the kind of technical rationalism that was critique by Schön above. 
The thought is the more one knows, the more likely one is to succeed. And in a certain 
theoretical way, this makes sense. Even so, however logical this theory is, we know that 
this is not really how it works. (Recall the section on tacit knowledge.) Learning how to 
do something does not occur the same way as learning abstract ideas. One needs to 
be clear about what the learning objectives are. Is the objective to master conceptual/
declarative knowledge about how something is done? Or is the objective to become 
an expert performer? Because, if the objective is to become an expert performer, it is 
necessary to get the body involved right from the beginning.
332 There is some debate as to whether or not the distinction between conceptual and procedural knowledge is genuine 
or an artificial construct. There are several alternative theories offered, including Dillon, Scribner, Lave, Vygotsky (see 
McCormick, 1997). The value of the distinction is found in trying to understand how the two kinds of knowledge 
work together. In this way the distinction is useful. I will continue to use this distinction as a part of this working 
model.
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Declarative/conceptual knowledge is the explicit knowledge of facts and concepts 
and the relationships among items of knowledge related to the domain of expertise 
that leads to understanding. Understanding is the forming of links between discreet 
ideas, concepts and facts. There are two theories for how this kind of knowledge occurs: 
constructivism and schemata. Constructivism relies on the building up of (mental) 
representations (conceptual models) that one tests against one’s reality or experience. 
When a new concept is introduced or discovered, there is an attempt to fit that concept 
within the structure of one’s mental representation.333 Learning only takes place if/
when the new idea or concept is integrated into the pre-existing representation. 
Or occasionally the pre-existing representation needs to be adjusted to allow for 
the new concept or idea. Pre-existing conceptual models are difficult to change/
challenge as they are built upon prior knowledge. Concepts from other disciplines, 
misunderstanding, cultural issues, and alternative meanings can make integrating new 
knowledge (constructing) into a coherent model challenging.
Conceptual knowledge frameworks – including knowledge structures that exist in 
memory – are known as schemata. Schemata are ways that complex concepts are 
held in memory.334 Such as knowledge about the look, feel, smell, characteristics and 
properties of materials. Or the proper way to assemble and name the components 
of a Doric column. Schemata are also known as device knowledge. It is knowledge of 
how all the parts work together to produce a particular outcome. Easy access to these 
schemata is how experts in a domain are able to solve problems quickly. 
 In this case the domain of expertise is architectural design. The conceptual/declarative 
knowledge that a designer needs to master includes: history and theory, materials 
and methods of construction, statics and principles of structure, mechanical systems, 
codes and zoning, etc. Students come to architectural design with pre-existing mental 
representations (models) that include concepts and ideas related to the domain of 
architecture – that may or may not be correct or useful. This is similar to how a designer 
pre-structures a problem discussed above. 
333 The structure of the representation into which new knowledge needs to be incorporated to become learning, is 
similar to the concept of scaffolding below.
334 Human memory is limited. To compensate for the limitations of memory 2 types of memory have evolved: long-
term and short-term or working memory. The smallest unit of memory is a bit. It is said (Miller, 1956) that the 
human mind can process a maximum of 7 bits of memory (+/- 7) at a time. This limitation can be surpassed by 
clumping several bits of information into a group (clump). Clumps are multiple bits of related information help 
together in memory. So now it is possible to hold 7 clumps of information in working memory. This limitation 
can also be exceeded by connecting multiple clumps of information with a concept or idea. These groups of 
related clumps are called schemata. Further, schemata are organized in memory through a complex system of 
relationships that is called a mental representation, mode or a  framework.
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Many of these concepts and ideas may need to be changed or at least challenged. 
Others do not. An early challenge for many students is to adapt or re-structure their 
mental representations – related preconceptions about what architectural design 
entails – in a manner that can support the new concepts and ideas, that will sustain 
and allow for new links, and that can provide an adequate framework to support the 
diverse, inter-disciplinary concepts and ideas that make up the domain of architecture.
Procedural/heuristic knowledge, described above in detail, is most closely associated 
with tacit knowledge, or how to do something. This kind of knowledge involves making 
use of the conceptual/declarative knowledge to solve problems. Sometimes referred to 
as metacognition or self-regulation, it includes rules-of-thumb, and situation specific 
methods of solving design problems and details. Procedural/heuristic knowledge has 
an obvious connection with design methods and methodology. 
Strategic knowledge is situated knowledge. It is knowledge that a designer uses to 
know when, how and what to. This kind of knowledge, allows a designer to draw upon 
the vast amount of conceptual/declarative knowledge and procedural/heuristic 
knowledge at his or her disposal, to assess the situation, and then decide how best to 
use his resources to solve the problem (McCormick, 1997). Strategic knowledge is most 
closely associated with expertise. At it highest level, strategic knowledge functions as 
embodied knowledge – implicit knowledge that relies on feeling and intuition. How this 
works is described by Dreyfus’s (2004) developmental model below.
McCormick (2004) considers technical learning as situated learning. Similar to Dewey 
(1938/2015) and Glaser (1992), McCormick (2009) identifies three aspects to 
situated learning: (1.)“Not only do cognitive processes differ according to the domain 
of thinking, but also to the specifics of the task. Knowledge in this sense is embedded in 
the context and not in abstractions” (pp. 22-23). Knowing and doing have a reciprocal 
relationship. (2.) Research provides evidence that “action affects thinking and thinking 
affects action" (pp. 22-23). This is crucial to understand. A foundational skill that 
students learning to design need to develop is “to think through their doing, and for the 
feedback from this doing to affect their thinking” (pp. 22-23). Schön (1992) calls this 
“the reflective conversation with the materials of a design situation” (p. 131). 
Situated learning also includes enculturation and participation in the domain. That 
is to say “When we learn, we learn to become something (McCormick, 2004, p. 
23). Learning how to design is not just a matter of mastering a body of knowledge, 
procedures and strategies, it also includes learning how designers work. The final 
aspect of situated learning (3.) learning experiences need to be authentic. That is 
the problems that the student is working on needs to be meaningful, and related 
to the domain. As discussed above, deliberate practice requires a level of intensity. 
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If the project a student is working on seems irrelevant personally and professionally, 
it will be difficult for her or him to motivate himself (intrinsically) – be emotionally 
engaged –  thus relying on external motivation to complete the task at hand. Being 
able to immerse oneself into the task at hand is critical to situated learning, and a 
prerequisite to experiencing flow.
McCormick (2006) points out that “concepts in technology may differ from those in 
science” (p. 24). This is related to Schön’s (1991) critique of professional education 
that emphasizes technical rationality and concepts of how it should be, rather 
than what actual expert designers know. Scientific concepts “deal with generalities 
(abstractions), whereas technology [deals] with how these concepts are manifest in 
particular contexts” (p. 24). This observation raises two points. (1.) The frustration 
that recent graduates face when they in good faith attempt to apply the conceptual 
knowledge they learned in school to a real problem, and find out that those theories 
and case studies did not take into account the realities of actual practice. For example 
the challenge of finding a way to communicate one’s internal representation of an 
emerging idea to a client who is not trained in design. One quickly learns that designers 
do not see the world the same way as non-designers. (2.) When students learn design 
problem-solving as a series of steps (cookbook method), without engaging in a real-life 
problem situation, it quickly becomes a blind ritual where the student does what he 
thinks is expected, because that what they thought they were supposed to. Or, they 
do in fact solve the problem, finding their own methods. But then make-up a story the 
follows the narrative that they thinks the teacher wants to hear.335
335 Mitrovic (2013) provides and excellent anecdote that describes this situation. “A short silence follows her 
presentation. The guest critic, who feels obliged to say something, comes up with a question: “Well, what is 
your theoretical position? I mean architectural question?” – one of those formulations that guest critics use 
when they feel obliged to help the student. Yet, for the student, the question is unexpected: it does not pertain 
to visual issues, the kind of problem that motivated her work. A theoretical position ultimately consists of 
statements one believe to be true or false – it does not pertain to what the building looks like. Although well 
intended, the critic’s question redirects discussion away from her spatial and visual interests. Noticing the 
student’s perplexity (she’s got excellent grades in her theory courses, but how can reading Derrida help you 
decide about the color of the facade, or the shape of the window), another crit tries to save the situation by 
providing guidance: “What is the meaning of your building?” (p. 9-10). And so it goes. Rather than talking about 
what she did, the visiting crits wanted her to make up a story, a narrative, or refer to theory.
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§  9.4 Cognitive	Load	Theory:	Cognitive	Scaffolding
As mentioned above, novice designers are often overwhelmed by the amount of 
declarative/conceptual knowledge and heuristics they need to master before they are 
able to produce (successful) design solutions. Cognitive load theory, which grew out of 
research related to the acquisition of expert performance, provides a framework and 
some strategies for understanding and responding to this situation.  
Mastering architectural design, requires what is generally referred to in education 
circles as competency-based learning, that is: “the ability to operate in ill-defined 
and ever-changing environments, to deal with non-routine and abstract work 
processes, to handle decisions and responsibilities, to work in groups, to understand 
dynamic systems, and to operate within expanding geographical and time horizons” 
(Keen, 1992; cited in Kirschner, 2002, p. 2). The acquisition of complex skills occurs 
within a specific domain of expertise and presumes the mastery of the foundational 
declarative/conceptual knowledge related to the field. Architectural design as a specific 
domain of expertise assumes familiarity with a sometimes overwhelming amount 
of cross-disciplinary information (declarative knowledge). The mind has a way of 
dealing with this.
Developed by Sweller (1988), Cognitive Load Theory, begins with Simon’s concept 
of bounded rationality as a starting point. Humans have limited cognitive ability 
and capacity. The theory proposes strategies for working with the bounded-ness of 
human cognition. As mentioned above, it is generally accepted that human cognition 
involves three types of memory: working memory, which is limited; and long term 
memory which is practically limitless; and general-purpose working memory which 
has a limited capacity of about seven chunks of information (Miller, 1956) when 
just holding information, and not more than two or three chunks when processing 
information. (This does not include the numerous other way access to information is 
increased via extended cognition, i.e.: writing, books, internet, photos, etc.) The way 
long-term memory achieves its virtually unlimited capacity, is by storing information 
as schemata. Schemata can also reduce working memory load, because once they have 
been acquired and automated, they can be handled in working memory with very little 
conscious effort making use minimal cognitive resources. In addition, no matter how 
extensive a schema is, it will be treated as one chunk of information, thereby increasing 
the amount of information that can be held and processed in working memory without 
requiring more conscious effort. This ensures that there is enough cognitive capacity 
available to solve very complex problems.
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However, when schemata have not yet been acquired, all information elements 
(bits and/or chunks) of the problem have to be kept in working memory as separate 
items, which can lead to excessive demand on working memory capacity, resulting in 
a feeling of being overwhelmed. Consequently, there is not enough capacity left for 
the formation of  problem schema, and learning is hampered (Gog, T., Ericsson, K. A., 
Rikers, R.; Paas, F., 2005).  The demand made on cognitive processing and memory 
resources is called cognitive load. Paas, Renkl and Sweller (2004) explain that cognitive 
load (i.e.: for novices) can be greatly reduced with the introduction of procedural 
frameworks that offer a more effective way of structuring complex cognitive tasks than 
conventional problem solving. Procedural models of designing (methodology) function 
as such frameworks during the early stages of learning to design; providing scaffolding 
to facilitate the development of schemata, reducing cognitive load on the student who 
is seeking to master the complex cognitive task that designing is.336 The frameworks 
function as a kind of training wheels for a beginner designer recommending a 
systematic way to approach a design problem. The point is that the our cognitive 
architecture – with all its amazing abilities and limited capacities – has a significant 
influence not only on what we can learn but on how we are able to acquire complex 
skills. Making use of design methodologies or referring to descriptive processes during 
the early stages of learning design builds upon this cognitive architecture, taking into 
account its strengths and limitations, reducing the stress associated with cognitive 
load, and greatly facilitating the acquisition of design ability.
336 A common mistake, made by well-intentioned design instructors, is to overload the students’ working memory 
before they have had a chance to develop chunks that lead to the emergence of schemata essential for complex 
problem solving, thus limiting their ability to discover generative concepts upon which to develop a design 
solution.  This overload impedes learning. This is not intentional. The design competency of design instructors 
is typically quite high. They are usually actively engaged in professional practice performing at the level of 
expertise, and highly motivated teachers. However, most design instructors are not consciously aware of how 
they arrived at such a high level of competency and what factors where critical in their development. Once one 
embodies the knowledge necessary to be an expert, the designer loses awareness of what he had to do to acquire 
it. He relies on tacit knowledge.
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§  9.5 A	Designer's	Brain
Research related to expert performance has shown that acquisition of expert ability 
occurs developmentally, not all at once. In explaining how this occurs, Ericsson et. al. 
(2007), refer to the seminal theory of expertise posed by Simon and Chase (1973), that 
observed “extended experience led experts to acquire a gradually increasing number 
of more complex patterns” (p. 59). By extended experience Simon and Chase meant 
more than longevity. They meant deliberate, focused experience that was immersed in 
the domain, similar to Ericsson’s deliberate practice described above. The difference 
between the ability of a novice and an expert is not simply that the expert has more 
years of extensive practice and accumulated knowledge (Ericsson, 2008). The 
difference is the result a demanding process of moving from data driven, fact based, 
heuristically programmed problem-solving to an intuitive, feeling driven, effortless, 
tacit ability, that informs the designer what to do without explicit recourse to rules.
Expert performance involves the acquisition of knowledge and the appropriation of 
schemata, as well as the internalization and embodiment of knowledge and action 
that allows an expert to have a feel for what to do: a sense of design. Long years of 
study, deliberate practice and on-going experience (training) taking advantage of the 
plasticity and adaptability of the body and brain, results in physiological changes in 
brain structure. 
Research has shown that as one progresses on the long road from beginner to expert 
performer, many fundamental changes in the structure of the mechanisms mediating 
performance as well as the conditions of learning and practice take place, as well as 
biological changes in brain structure (Hill & Schneider, 2006). As discussed above 
in relation to the connectome, the structure of the brain is not fixed as previously 
thought. As it turns out, the repetitive actions associated with deliberate practice 
reinforce synaptic connections across different regions of the brain results in a literal 
restructuring of the brain: One acquires a designer’s brain.337 This restructuring 
occurs incrementally, with much effort, over time and is highly adaptive (see Seung, 
2012). The acquisition of expert design ability is not simply about working in a studio 
environment solving incrementally more complex design problems over a specified 
number of years under the guidance of an expert designer/tutor. It involves an actual 
restructuring of the brain.
337 See Mallgrave (2011) The Architect’s Brain, for a detailed description of what this involves.
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§  9.6 Dreyfus Model
Over the past 25 years Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1980) have developed a developmental 
model of skills acquisition that describes how expert performance is acquired. Their 
model is based on the insight that anyone seeking to acquire a new skill has two 
options: he can try the less efficient (and perhaps more dangerous) method of learning 
on his own by trial-and-error; or the more efficient method of seeking out an instructor 
and/or instruction manual. By observing how experts acquire skill in several disciplines 
Dreyfus and Dreyfus have developed a model that provides a framework for increasing 
the efficiency of the learning process. 
Their developmental model of skills acquisition “consists in analyzing and 
systematizing descriptions of changes in the perception of the task environment in 
the course of acquiring complex skills” (Dreyfus & Dreyfus, 1980, p. 1). They claim 
that rather than simply extended experience (like Simon and Chase, and Ericcson), the 
acquisition of expert performance occurs in stages. And that the nature of the problem 
being considered, how it is framed and reframed, is dependent on the level of expertise 
of the problem solver. “The tradition has given an accurate description of the beginner 
and of the expert facing an unfamiliar situation, but normally an expert does not 
calculate. He or she does not solve problems. He or she does not even think. He or she 
just does what normally works and, of course, it normally works” (2004, p. 180). Over 
the years the number of and the names given to each phase by Dreyfus has changed. 
The phases I will use here are: novice, advanced beginner, competent, proficient, 
and expert. 
Dreyfus (2004, pp. 179-180) describes how one learns to drive a car to illustrate 
his model: A novice student driver learns to recognize and understand domain 
independent variables such as speed, rules for shifting, braking and accelerating, rules 
of the road, safety precautions, etc. He begins by attempting to follow all the rules. 
But this results in poor performance in the real world. As an advanced beginner, the 
student driver gains experience with real situations and begins to make connections, 
master basic tasks, learns to make situational decisions, such as “shift-up when 
the motor sounds like its racing.” At the level of competence, the student benefits 
from more experience, and begins to be aware of the potentially overwhelming 
number of variables. It can be exhausting. To deal with this possible overload, he 
becomes more selective about which variables to attend to. For example, when 
leaving the freeway off ramp he learns to be attentive to the speed of the car and not 
to whether to shift gears. He becomes emotionally involved in choosing what to do 
rather than being driven by rules. At the level of proficiency the student is becoming 
more emotionally involved in the task. He is developing a “feel” for what to do. 
TOC
 235 Expertise
At this level, the student might, approaching a curve on a rainy day, feel that he is 
going too fast and decide to either apply the breaks or to down shift or to ease off the 
accelerator. His experience of different types of situations and the various possible, 
viable responses have increased and he has developed some reliable strategies for how 
to choose the right option in this particular situation. At the expert level, the student is 
completely immersed in the situation. He sees the situation and knows how to respond 
in a seemingly intuitive manner. He no longer needs to consider all the options, he just 
sees the curve, feels the gravitational pull and knows what to do.
Below I propose a version of the Dreyfus model (Dreyfus, 2004) adapted for learning to 
design, based on and in consideration of the principles and insights described above:
STAGE	1	 Novice:  
Acquisition of (non-situated) domain specific factual knowledge and heuristics. 
Novices are generally presented with decomposed tasks in context-free environments 
that require minimal skill to complete. Performance tends to be rule-based and data/
research driven with little need to interpret the situation [Problems appropriate for this 
stage include abstract, disembodied form and space exercises: emphasis on plan form 
and functional considerations].
STAGE	2	 Advanced Beginner:  
Appropriation of frameworks for understanding/interpreting the situation
As novices gain experience, acquire increased domain specific conceptual/declarative 
knowledge and begin applying new skills in real situations, they begin to adapt to 
the relevant contexts and recognize aspects of new situations. Maxims or heuristics 
for dealing with varying situational contexts emerge [Problems appropriate for this 
stage include emphasis on plan, section, elevation, form and site: minimal concern 
for technical issues such as structure, materials and systems: relatively simple 
program requirements].
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STAGE	3	 Competence:  
Assimilated ability to “see” (read) the situation
With increasing skill and this new awareness of the increasing number of potentially 
relevant elements and procedures can be overwhelming. To deal with this students 
seek means and methods (heurisitcs) to limit relevant variables for consideration and 
to identify opportunities that speak to his or her interests. Accountability for strategic 
choices and emotional involvement (sense of design) emerge. Here the student is 
beginning to be able to see the problem and test new skills and strategies to solve it. 
Design solutions tend to be “concept” driven. [Problems appropriate for this stage 
include complex program requirements and use types, consideration of structure, 
systems and materials: producing a whole idea for a building].
STAGE	4	 Proficiency:	 
Appropriation of strategies for responding to the situation (scenarios)
This stage is distinguished by emotional involvement with the problem-solving 
activity that reduces the need to apply detached, rule-based strategies. A seemingly 
intuitive, “feeling” driven, tacit sensibility begins to emerge. Successful approaches 
produce positive emotional responses (“It feels right”) and unsuccessful approaches 
produce negative emotional reactions (“Hmm, that doesn’t feel right”), resulting in 
the embodiment and assimilation of successful strategies. “At this stage, the involved, 
experienced performer sees goals and salient aspects but not [necessarily] what to do 
to achieve these goals.” [Problems appropriate for this stage include highly complex 
building types/program requirements, integrating structure, systems, materials, 
environmental, and other issues].
STAGE	5	 Expertise:  
Assimilated ability to respond to the situation
What distinguishes expertise is the ability to, seemingly without effort, see the 
situation and to see (among a large repertoire) a way to solve it that is most likely 
to produce the desired outcome, and then to choose the solution that feels right 
(and usually is). To know more that you can say. The expert relies heavily on a broad 
based, domain specific tacit knowledge, and experience with diverse situations and 
strategies, to solve the design problem. The expert sees “immediately how to achieve 
this goal.” This is when a fully developed sense of design has been acquired. [Problems 
appropriate for this stage include self-directed learning: exploring architectural ideas].
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This chapter after considering what designing is, how designers think, and what 
designers do, examined who can be a designer, how expertise is acquired and 
theoretical considerations related to the cognitive processes involved in acquiring 
design expertise. Several observations have emerged. There does not seem to be any 
particular personality type, or aptitude test that is effective in determining who is 
likely to be a successful designer. However, there is evidence that suggests that there 
are some predispositions, and competencies that increase the likelihood of success 
– especially an aptitude for visio-spatial thinking and problem solving. Ericsson’s 
research provides a convincing argument supporting the counter-intuitive idea that 
the likelihood of achieving exceptional performance in any domain has more to do 
with taking advantage of the adaptability of the human brain and body, and years of 
deliberate practice than natural talent. Duckworth et al., recognizing that very few 
people seem to be motivated to achieve levels of exceptional performance, even if 
they have the intellectual and physical potential, proposes a motivational theory she 
calls grit: “[The] ability to work strenuously toward challenges, maintaining effort 
and interest over years despite failure, adversity, and plateaus in progress” (p. 1087). 
Then, assuming a highly motivated person, with grit, and an aptitude for visio-spatial 
thinking and problem solving, who is willing to invest the time and effort into years of 
deliberate practice; the cognitive processes related to acquiring design expertise were 
considered. These included the three types of domain related knowledge, declarative/
conceptual, procedural/heuristic and strategic, that need to be mastered. It was 
observed that acquiring expert performance ability requires situated learning, that 
facilitates the development of structure or scaffolding that assists learning complex 
skill. Finally, the Dreyfus five stage developmental model was presented as a way to 
make sense of how the novice develops from an (explicit) problem-oriented design 
approach to the expert’s (implicit) solution-oriented, tacit approach to design that is 
driven by a feeling for what to do.
What becomes apparent, when seen as a whole, is that while design expertise is highly 
dependent on explicit, declarative knowledge and conceptual methods for solving 
problems, it relies just as heavily (perhaps more so) on implicit, tacit, embodied 
knowledge that is highly influenced by body knowledge and feeling (aesthesis). It is this 
feeling knowledge that is the foundation for a sense of design.
The next chapter will introduce the concept of aesthetic resonance. Aesthetic 
resonance describes the feeling that expert designers experience (aesthesis), that 
tells designers what to do.
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10 Aesthetic Resonance
The artist embodies in himself the attitude of the perceiver while he works…
 (Dewey, 1934/2005)
§  10.1 The Theoretical Foundation for Aesthetic Resonance
This chapter introduces the concept of aesthetic resonance, which describes the 
function aesthesis plays in design cognition. The above provides a theoretical 
foundation for understanding the way this concept is used in this research.
§  10.1.1 The	Body	Knowing
The above argument is based on the presupposition that while the proximate end 
of design is a functional approximation, the proper end of design is a building/built 
environment. Without this, this thesis cannot be defended. If one supposes that 
the proper end to design is a plan or a design concept or a representation, even a 
representation that describes a building that could be built, then designing can be 
satisfied with abstractions and “pure form” – without a body. But abstract concepts, as 
useful as they are, and pure forms, as interesting as it is to contemplate them, do not 
exist; except as abstract ideas in the realm of a disembodied mind. But, as was argued 
above (and seems self-evident), people are not disembodied minds. Indeed it was 
proposed above that there is no such thing as a mind (vs. body). Rather, mind is a word 
(a convention) used to describe human cognition, which is not independent from the 
body, but quite the opposite; it is absolutely dependent on the body. 
Some scholars, referring to the above, propose that the body did not evolve as a physical 
means of gaining sense information, nourishment, and locomotion in the world; but 
rather, rather, they argue the mind evolved to increase the ability of the body to interact 
with the world. Or as Ryles might quip, to allow the man-in-the-machine to get around. 
This thesis presupposes, and has argued that there is no mind-body dualism. 
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The body came first, and there is no such thing as the Cartesian mind. This is difficult 
for some to accept, as the idea of a mind/body dualism is so deeply ingrained not only 
in popular Western culture but popular Eastern culture as well.338 The point is that if 
the proper end to designing is a design object for the purpose of human use, one then 
needs a body to experience the functional and aesthetic qualities of the object. Our 
bodies are quite good at this. Without a body one cannot open a door, one cannot enjoy 
the cozy feeling of sitting in front of a fireplace (atmosphere), one cannot look out the 
window, one cannot smell fresh bread baking in the kitchen, one cannot complain 
about a draft. Of course one might argue that one does not need a body to imagine 
all those things, but one might need to consider if one doesn’t need a body, then one 
does not actually need all those things either. Above, research has been presented 
that offers a reasonable argument that the human body and cognitive abilities evolved 
simultaneously. That how we experience, perceive and make sense of the world is a 
function of embodied cognition. 
It was also shown that the theory of tacit knowledge, as proposed by Ryles and Polanyi, 
offers a convincing explanation of how experts from scientists to master carpenters 
are able to do what they do – by feelingly inhabiting the situation – establishing the 
importance of body knowledge over Newell and Simon’s disembodied general problem 
solving theory. Ryles, describes two types of knowledge: knowing that and knowing 
how. Knowing how, or how-to, is normally associated with procedural, heuristic, tacit, 
implicit knowledge. Polanyi (1974) describes tacit knowledge as a kind of knowing 
that is made up of a range of conceptual and sensory information, images and ideas 
that can be brought to bear (made use of) when making an attempt to make sense of 
(understand, frame, find order) or perform some task that is typically associated with 
expert (design) performance. 
The concept of Einfühlung (empathy), proposed by German empirical psychologists 
of the 19th century was introduced as well. Einfühlung is the embodied experience 
of feeling into that induces an aesthetic experience. More recently, the discovery 
by Rizzolatti of mirror-neurons gives evidence that the cognitive functions (sense 
perception) that we use to interact with the world, are the same as that which allow us 
to experience a full range of sense experiences in our imagination. From the discipline 
of neuroaesthetics the concept of embodied simulation was described by Gallese 
& Gattara, as how one can experience an internal representation using the same 
sense systems that one uses to know the world. Chatterjee proposed the core triad – 
sensations, meaning, and emotion – that are the components of aesthetic experience. 
338 As mind and soul are often used interchangeably, this resistance may be ascribed to fear of losing the existence of the 
soul. But, however interesting is would be to muse on this, questions of the soul are outside the scope of this research.
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These provide a way to talk about the quality of the aesthetic experience, and 
what mix of stimuli and cognitive functions may be at work that produce the 
various and subtle variations of quality in such experiences. The implications for 
design, or at least for providing empirical evidence that describes what designers 
do is exciting. These theories not only provide empirical evidence that inter-
subjective experience is probable, but they pose a challenge to designers, that 
cannot not be ignored: feelings	matter.
Ericsson’s theory of expertise can be described as the process of acquiring tacit 
knowledge. His theory holds that it is the ability to take advantage of the body’s 
and mind’s amazing plasticity and adaptability, and years of deliberate practice, 
more than “natural talent,” that leads to expert performance. He too pointed to 
the primacy of the ability to feel the situation and respond in a seemingly effortless 
manner as the hallmark of exceptional performance. Finally there is the Dreyfus 
developmental model that gives structure to Ericsson’s theory, and describes how 
mastery of multiple types of knowledge in the domain, evolve into a situated, highly 
automated ability to perform complex tasks and the ability to assess a situation 
with one’s feelings rather than relying upon the rule-based procedural heuristics 
associated with beginners. The acquired ability to rely on one’s feelings seems to 
be the hallmark of expert performance. This ability to rely on one's feelings, as the 
hallmark of expertise suggests that it is also what is meant by a sense of design.
§  10.1.2 Resonance
Another theme that was explored above had to do with the cognitive mechanisms 
(perception/representation) that facilitate the way we interact, experience, 
and learn about the world. Above, Anderson (2003) is cited in the section on 
embodied cognition, holding that it is probable that complex data sets are 
experienced as internal (mental) representations that can be externalized either 
to test for correlation or to transfer (communicate) with another. Lipari (2015) 
was also cited in the section on coherence, writing about correlation in reference 
to sense-making, It is the brain’s correlations of sensory information that create 
the knowledge we have about our surroundings. Regarding representations 
Newell et al. (1958) write about the correspondence between the internal and 
external representation in human problem solving as a way to test the veracity 
of the solution. These terms, correlation and correspondence, both describe a 
situation where two phenomena are being internally compared – not to see if they 
are identical -- but to test if certain properties work as intended or needed. 
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The terms suggest that one is looking not for fit as Alexander uses it, but rather 
for congruence, right relationship – harmonious relationship as Aristotle uses it: 
appropriate (in right proportion) whose chief forms are order, symmetry, and definiteness. 
Schön (1992) describes this activity within the design process as appreciation, “by 
which is meant both their active, sensory apprehension of the stuff in question, and 
their construction on an order in that stuff that includes the naming and framing of 
things, qualities and relationships" (p. 9). The word that comes to mind is resonance.
Resonance in physics means, “the reinforcement or prolongation of sound by reflection 
from a surface or by the synchronous vibration of a neighboring object” (Oxford 
Dictionary of English, 2016). Resonance is a synchronous vibration. When one says that 
an idea resonates, it implies not only that one understands the meaning, but that there 
is kind of knowing that is hard to explain; it is as if one feels the meaning. Resonance 
refers to knowing something feelingly. It is more than making sense of a situation – a 
sense of coherence; it is feeling the mood, the vibe, the atmosphere of a situation 
(aesthesis). Synchronous means “existing or occurring at the same time” (Oxford 
Dictionary of English, 2016). To resonate is to vibrate at the same time. 
§  10.2 Inhabiting the Design World Feelingly
The hybrid idea of inhabiting the design world feelingly, adapted from Polanyi (1966) 
and Schön (1992), is proposed to describe this feeling/experience of resonance in 
the design process. But, instead of describing the resonance one might experience 
between two abstract ideas when they feel like they are working together as hoped for, 
resonance is being used here to describe the experience of the designer actively seeking 
a particular quality of atmosphere that requires a level of connoisseurship of spatial 
experience. A feeling the designer knows, cannot really describe, but only recognizes 
when he experiences it. Combined, aesthetic resonance refers to the application of 
aesthesis to assess the quality of the atmosphere of the design solution as it emerges 
as both internal and external representations against the anticipated feeling the 
designer is seeking. When using the phrase aesthetic resonance the implication is that 
the	feeling	the	designer	intended	to	induce,	vibrates	synchronously	with	the	experience	
that	is	induced	when	he	inhabits	the	design	world. The designer pre-structures the 
problem space by identifying a quality of atmosphere he desires to induce in the user. 
This is a sense of design. When the designer inhabits the design world, he is applying 
his senses to the situation, seeking body knowledge, that will inform his design 
decisions. It is a visceral, hedonic experience that is developed over years of practice.
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The concept of the application of the senses to enter feelingly into an imagined world is 
not a new concept. For example, though he did not have the neuroscience to back him 
up, the 16th century mystic, Ignatius of Loyola (1968), writing between 1522–1524, 
recommended the application of the senses as a method for entering more deeply 
into a contemplative state. His suggestion was to enter into an imaged state feelingly 
as a means to garnish another level of meaning from the (imagined) situation. There 
is a visceral quality to the experience he recommended his students to seek during 
contemplation. He recommended engaging the imagined situation by locating oneself 
in a particular place in the scene. Taking account of the atmosphere: the weather, the 
smells, the feeling of the ground under one’s feet, the weight of the cloths on one’s 
back, the sounds, and to even to try to feel how the others in the scene are feeling. 
Loyola was recommending the use of what we now call empathy, that is facilitated 
through mirror-neurons not only allowing us to feel the feelings of another, but to also 
activate the same mechanisms in our brains that are activated when we experience the 
world. One could say that Loyola was teaching his students how to apply and develop a 
sense of aesthesis, to inhabit an imagined place feelingly.339
There is growing interest in and familiarity with embodied cognition amongst designers 
and theorists. Some have been referred to in this research: Eberhard, 2007; Mallgrave, 
2013, 2011; Pallasmaa, 2015, 2009, 2005; Perez-Gomez, 2016, 2015. Perez-Gomez 
(2015) writes regarding architecture education:
The new central concern [in design education] should be to prepare the future architect 
to use her imagination to make poetic artifacts and spaces with character, resonant 
with the human situations they house, engaging dimensions of consciousness that 
are in fact usually stifled by conventional educational paradigms, rather than simply 
planning efficient buildings.” (pp. 229-230)
339 As a one hour exercise for second year design students, I invite them to close their eyes and try to stand in front 
of the building (usually a house) they are designing. Then after a minute or so, keeping their eyes shut, I suggest 
that they approach the building, being attentive to the feeling of the ground under their feel, the sound of the 
crushed gravel, the shade of the trees, the time of day. Then I suggest that they open the door. But stop for a 
moment and feel the quality of the material of the door knob, then look at it, what does it look like. Is it metal? 
Now, I suggest, step into the house. What is the first thing you feel. Close the door, now take off your shoes (if it 
is in China), is there any place to put them? What about your jacket? While you are sitting down, or leaning on 
the wall, taking off your shoes, what do you see. And so it goes for about an hour. The point of the exercise is to 
invite the students to learn to use and develop their aesthesis ability to assess the quality of the atmosphere 
they are creating. A related exercise is to tell them that they are invisible, and to watch how the children use the 
space. Then to watch the grand parents. Then the parents. And so on. These are exercises that accomplished 
designers do intuitively. But I don’t think it hurts to introduce students to this amazing cognitive power while 
they are still in school.
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 It seems that body-knowledge is being re-introduced back into the design process.
Aesthetic resonance describes how aesthesis functions within the design process. 
Aesthesis is at work when the designer assesses the aesthetic quality of interior and 
exterior representations of the emerging design solution and finally the competed 
building/built environment. The designer, making use of the same cognitive systems 
that allow him to assess the quality of the room he is sitting in, wander around his 
mental representation, looking, touching, tasting, smelling, feeling his way through, 
seeking congruence, correlation, resonance between what he intended and what he is 
experiencing. Aesthesis was defined above as apprehension by all the senses, enabling 
an understanding through non representative concepts of that which is perceived by 
embodied consciousness (Perez-Gomez, 2016, pp. 17-18). This is what the designer 
does. Or as Dewey puts it, it is an attitude of the perceiver, that provides information 
about an atmosphere or object; be it an internal representation of an intended 
atmosphere or object, an external representation of an intended atmosphere or object, 
or an atmosphere that is induced by a building/built environment. Aesthesis is the 
cognitive mechanism that facilitates the assessment of the quality of an atmosphere, 
imagined and real. Aesthesis is the cognitive mechanism that assesses an atmosphere 
and allows us to make a judgment about its experiential quality.
§  10.3 A Design Scenario
A design scenario might proceed like this: In the process of defining the problem, the 
designer brings a predetermined sense of coherence and quality of aesthetic experience, 
as well as a way of thinking about the problem to the problem situation. Depending on the 
designer’s experience, he may or not be conscious of this.340 These may be a preference for 
using a grid, modular or proportional system, narrative, generative idea, or any other devise, 
that will facilitate the making of a cohesive plan. The designer may also, based on the 
building type, past experience, personality of the client, the intended users, etc., think/feel 
like this building should possess this or that feeling, or quality of atmosphere. Of course, the 
building does not possess a feeling/or quality of atmosphere, the building induces a quality 
of experience through it architectural characteristics and how the user experiences them. 
340 It would seem to me, that an experienced, mature designer would be self-aware of his preferences, and have the 
discipline to acknowledge them, and then put them aside, so as not to unduly bias how he defines the problem 
space and frames the problem. I have no way of substantiating this, and I have not found any research that 
supports it. It is a question for further research.
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It is a normative expectation that the expert designer is skilled at making use of 
architectural elements to induce an intended quality of architectural experience/
atmosphere. As the designer works on the problem and a design world emerges, he 
inhabits the design world feelingly. The expert designer is not seeing plans and sections 
and elevations in the design world. He uses these conventions (tools) to externalize 
his mental image. The designer is experiencing an emerging world making use of 
all his sense systems. As he inhabits this world, and considers the design criteria 
and constraints, he assembles them, arranges them, moves them around. There are 
an unlimited number of combinations possible. He looks for evidence of emerging 
coherence and engages his desired quality of aesthetic experience to bias or limit 
the possible solution paths. He tests the resonance between his desired aesthetic 
experience against the experience his mental approximation is inducing. Likewise, as 
the design traverses one or another solution path, he arrives at moments when it just 
doesn’t feel right. It is an odd feeling. One wonders how can something that has never 
existed before not feel right? But that is the way it feels. Something is not working. The 
designer frames and reframes the problem. Makes moves, assesses them (sees), and 
makes new moves. Still it just doesn’t feel right. The designer returns to the problem 
space, adjusts the problem definition, includes a new variable into the mix. Things start 
falling place. It is starting to feel right. And so it goes.341  
The predetermined aesthetic experience with which the expert designer pre-structures 
the problem can also be challenged or evolve. Midway through the conceptual design 
phase, the designer may realize the he was thinking about the problem all wrong. He 
expects this. The feeling he desires is a heuristic tool. He has the discipline to let it go if 
its not working (if not with some resistance). A new revised feeling emerges. It is tested. 
It is a better fit with the problem situation. Things start coming together. He inhabits 
the design space. It feels right. It resonates. It is exciting. He enters into the optimal 
experience called flow. He is inhabiting the design world feelingly.
The design world (internal approximation) becomes too complicated to hold in working 
memory. Aware that what seems to work well in his imagination does not always 
match reality, he needs to externalize the internal representation, to test if it really 
works as well as it seems. He needs also to look at the external representation for new 
or missed opportunities. The designer also needs input from the client/owner/user 
to know if the emerging design induces the intended quality of experience in others. 
341 The novice designer with limited experience, minimal mastery of domain-related situated knowledge and being 
problem-focused, cannot rely on feelings to produce a reliable solution. The beginner is more dependent on 
domain-specific declarative/conceptual knowledge, analysis, trying to please the design tutor to make-sense of 
the problem. He has preconceptions with which he – perhaps with a certain degree of naïvete – pre-structures 
the problem, but with limited situational experience, there is a likelihood that these will not work.
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He is also interested in the efficiency of the plan and other demonstrable 
characteristics. But, what he really wants to hear, is that the client/owner/user likes 
the emerging design. That the feeling it induces resonates with the client/owner/
user's expectations. He needs the client/owner/user to be able to inhabit the design 
world as he does. But this is not easy. So he makes external representations intended 
to allow the client/owner/user to inhabit the design world. But, non-designers do not 
have a refined ability to experience a design world feelingly (aesthesis), design sense. 
So he inhabits	the	design	world	in	different	modes: as designer, as owner/client/user; 
as designer observing designer, as designer observing owner/client/user. This is a 
highly developed skill. In each of these modes of inhabitation, he seeks to experience 
the design world from a different perspective. Insofar as he has mastered this ability, 
he increases the likelihood that the client/owner/user will be satisficed with the 
experience of the actual building. Finally the designer inhabits the actual building. 
And tests to feel if there is resonance between how he thought it would feel and how it 
actually does feel. This is the consummation of the act of designing.
§  10.4 Feeling as a Functional Cognitive Bias in the Design Process
Aesthesis and the desire for a sense of cohesion function as cognitive biases in 
the design process. Design moves are deemed successful or promising insofar 
as the feelings evoked by the emerging design proposal are resonant with the 
intended aesthetic experience and produce a sense of cohesion. The intensity of 
the experience of resonance creates a feeling of excitement (as in being hot on the 
trail), which provides emotional motivation (intensity) to continue in pursuit of this 
rather than that direction. Aesthesis functions throughout the design process: from 
the moment of determining the problem space, to framing the problem, through 
the iterative “see-move-see” process of solution-seeking and development, 
through the technical phase of determining structure, systems, materials and 
methods of construction, through site visits and evaluation of the completed 
building built environment. 
Throughout this process aesthesis plays a critical role in the design decision-
making process not unlike a wine tasting experience where one is determining 
which wine will go best with dinner, or which wine to buy for a friend. One starts 
with a pretty specific expectation/anticipation for the taste (and price range) of 
the wine (pre-structuring). It is accepted from the beginning that it is unlikely 
that there will be a perfect match. A match that is both satisfying and sufficient. 
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Its not so much a compromise, but an acknowledgment of the complexity involved in 
balancing multiple criteria that offer the greatest likelihood of resulting in the intended 
(anticipated) experience. 
To continue with the wine analogy, one could rely on reviews from leading experts 
or respected magazines, the recommendations of the wine steward, technical data, 
research and analysis; or one could pick up the bottle, look at its color, feel its weight, 
attend a tasting, discuss the flavor, tannins, the acid, the body, the color, the nose, etc., 
to get some input from someone with a respected – recognizing that the responsibility 
for the choice belongs to the buyer. Only the buyer knows the precise flavor that is 
being looked for. But that’s not the end of it. Up to now, use has been made of all the 
resources available to the buyer (conceptual/practical) to make an deliberate choice. 
How effective his choice was, is finally determined by tasting the wine and then testing 
the anticipated experience against the actual experience.342 In this movement from 
comparison to choice, he is seeking aesthetic resonance. Does it live up to expectations. 
Søren Kierkegaard (1843/1987) writes, “If I had a humble spirit in my service who, when 
I asked for a glass of water, brought me the world’s costliest wines blended in a chalice, I 
should dismiss him, in order to teach him that my pleasure consists, not in what I enjoy, 
but in having my own way.” In the end the question is no if it is good – there is a lot of 
good wine out there – but if it is what I wanted, anticipated, expected.
This experience of resonance relies on an understanding and feel for how architectural 
elements, materials, color, volume, proportion, light, sound, etc., work together 
to evoke an intended aesthetic experience; an ability to think multi-dimensionally 
and externalize design concepts; an ability to apply one’s senses to enter into and 
assess/discern the quality of the aesthetic experience of the (emerging) imagined or 
externalized solution; and the knowledge of how and the skill to (subtly) adjust the 
various architectural elements in a manner that will result in a building that evokes 
the desired quality of aesthetic experience. This requires a highly developed sense of 
design. This is design expertise.
342 Above this ability to discern quality within the parameters of a normative expectations for performance was 
referred to as connoisseurship. Consoli (2014) explains that there are two different theories that are usually 
used to explain aesthetic pleasure and appreciation: The first argues that “liking and esthetic [sic.] pleasure are 
a function of the interpreters’ processing dynamics, in particular the fluency and ease of the processes.” The 
interpreters processing dynamics is what is referred to in this research as aesthesis. The second theory holds that 
“liking or preference for a stimulus is based upon the arousal potential of the stimulus.” Arousal potential was 
discusses above with Berlyne’s use of the Wundt curve.  Based on current research from neurocognitive science 
Consoli argues that: “(1.) Esthetic [sic.]pleasure constitutes a subjective feeling grounded in and caused by the 
interpreter's processing dynamics; (2.) The crucial parameters and variables of the processing dynamics that 
are able to produce appreciation appear to be opposites: high art stimulates disfluency, low art fluency; and (3.) 
Expertise represents the key component to understanding and appreciating disfluency” (p. 95). The ability to 
distinguish the quality of an esthetic experience is acquired.
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§  10.5 Summary
We inhabit, make sense of, and experience the world, our buildings, and built 
environments with our bodies. The first way a user experiences a building is with his 
body, seeing a facade in the distance, touching the door knob, climbing the steps, 
stepping into the lobby, working in an office, looking out a window in a school, sewing 
cloths in a factory, trying to sleep in a prison cell, giving birth in a hospital, seeking solace 
in a church, temple or mosque. Each has an atmosphere, for better or for worse, that was 
intentionally (or unintentionally) made by a designer. The experiential quality of these 
environments are the result of decisions made during the design and building process. 
The cognitive ability we use we assess a built environment/atmosphere is aesthesis. 
Aesthesis functions not only as a mean to assess an external built atmosphere, but 
also functions to assess the quality of an internal imagined atmosphere. The designer 
makes use of aesthesis to determine if the quality of the internal approximation of his 
design proposal correlates with the experience he intended. The designer also makes 
use of aesthesis to assess the experiential quality of externalized approximations of 
his design proposal against that which he intended. This use of aesthesis as a means 
to assess the quality of a design proposal against the that which is intended is called 
aesthetic resonance. Aesthetic resonance functions throughout the design process 
as both a motivating factor that establishes the goal to be achieved, and as a heuristic 
that influences design decisions. Both the deliberate development of a refined sense of 
aesthesis through connoisseur sometimes referred to a sense of design –  and the ability 
to enter feelingly into the design world to assess the experiential quality of the emerging 
design solution against that which is intended – aesthetic resonance – are necessary to 
acquire design expertise.
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11 Conclusion
Based on a review of current research in design theory and cognitive science, critical 
reflection on 25 years of teaching and professional practice, and in dialogue with 
colleagues, the above sought to describe how design expertise is acquired and the 
function and place of aesthesis within the design process. The thesis established that 
the proper end of architectural design is the making of building/built environments. 
That the normative performance expectations for architecture design as an occupation 
establish that it is reasonable to expect that a design professional can provide a 
coherent solution that satisfies design criteria, constraints and technical requirements, 
and that induces intended aesthetic experience. That expert performers rely heavily 
on tacit embodied knowledge. The above challenged Cartesian dualism, arguing 
with cognitive scientists for a change in the way we think about human cognition as 
existing in a disembodied state, to doing away with the concept of the mind as other, 
and embracing an embodied way of thinking about human cognition. The above 
presented multiple ways of describing design, especially as a process. And then went 
on to describe processes, problem-solving, systems theory methods and methodology. 
Some traditional ways of thinking about design were challenged, and some old theories 
reclaimed. Finally, a description of design that is derived from Polanyi, Hillier, and 
Schön, and influenced by theories of embodied cognition was presented. This laid the 
ground work for challenging the idea of natural talent as the determining factor that 
made it more likely that someone would success at designing. And, with the same 
theory, illustrated that through thousands of hours of deliberate practice it is possible 
to restructure one’s brain and train one’s body such that even the most difficult of 
maneuvers appear effortless. And it illustrated the ability to assess a complex situation 
without invoking explicit rules, procedures and heuristics, but rather being able to 
use one’s feelings and usually be right. Finally, it was shown how this embodied way 
of knowing functions in the design process in both seeking a sense of coherence, 
and being drawn to and intended quality of aesthetic experience. The term aesthetic 
resonance was introduced to describe how the embodied knowing of designers 
(aesthesis) both pre-structures the design problem and allows the designer to inhabit 
the design world feelingly. It is argued that this ability to inhabit a design world 
feelingly is what is meant by a sense of design.
By presenting research and posing arguments from design theory, expertise, 
embodiment, aesthetic judgment, and by posing a theory of aesthetic resonance 
I sought to defend four claims: (1.) Design is an acquired skill that follows well-
established models that describe the acquisition of expert performance, (2.) 
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As architectural design is fundamentally about making places (buildings) for human 
use and habitation, which are experienced through embodied cognition, design 
solutions are (properly) experienced not so much as abstract ideas (concepts), but 
rather as tactile, actual objects. (3.) A successful design is not only a coherent solution 
that solves for clearly defined (functional, technical, environmental, economic) criteria 
but also one that possesses aesthetic qualities. (4.) Aesthesis (body knowledge) plays 
a critical role in the design process. The ability to assess the quality of an atmosphere 
(aesthesis) within the design process (as internal and external representations) is 
essential to the acquisition of design expertise. Aesthesis is the way an expert designer 
knows what to do, knows that an approximation of a building that never existed looks 
the way it was supposed to.
In making these claims I argued for the importance of recognizing the developmental 
process that students of (architecture) design must move through to acquire design 
expertise; the need to challenge Cartesian dualism that promotes abstract formalism; 
and to acknowledge the fundamental role that aesthesis plays within the design 
process (aesthetic resonance).
By providing a theoretical basis for understanding how design expertise is acquired 
and by introducing the concept of aesthetic resonance, it is my sincere hope that 
this thesis will provide a useful conceptual framework, that will influence how design 
educators, students and professional think about designing, and be a resource for all 
those seeking to participate in designing a built environment worthy of the dignity 
of all people.
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